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Abstract 
The significance of risk is growing in many Western societies, a phenomenon linked 
to increasing individualism, personal choice, and outcome uncertainty in multiple 
spheres of life.  Despite being healthier and more physically protected from harm than 
any previous society, a serious concern for safety and risk control is emerging as a 
defining characteristic of modern social life.  Within the context of a risk-averse 
society, this thesis investigates the nature and relevance of risk in natural resource 
recreation and tourism settings. 
 
Millions of people every day visit national parks and other protected areas around the 
world in which natural hazards inhere.  Many visitors fail to recognise these hazards, 
creating moral, legal, and ethical issues for natural resource managers.  People travel 
to national parks anticipating a degree of adventure, to escape routines, and to witness 
the grandeur of nature.  Ironically, the very qualities that attract people to natural 
areas may also put them at risk.  Managers of natural resource tourism and recreation 
areas in New Zealand are confronted with a paradox born out of visitor demand for 
nature experiences, a legal obligation to facilitate free access, and a growing social 
emphasis on health and safety. 
 
In particular, this study assesses the risk perceptions of visitors to the Fox and Franz 
Josef glaciers, popular tourist attractions on the West Coast of New Zealand’s South 
Island, and explores the risk perceptions and beliefs of resource management agency 
staff.  The study also investigates the issue of risk communication at these two sites, 
and the degree to which existing hazard messages are successful at encouraging 
appropriate visitor behaviour.  Pictorial hazard warning signs are introduced to the 
sites and their effectiveness evaluated. 
 
The findings show that many visitors (especially international visitors) have relatively 
poor awareness of natural hazards, and behave in ways which potentially compromise 
physical safety.  It is argued that perceptions and behaviour are a consequence of 
diverse individual and situational factors including limited knowledge of the sites, 
beliefs about management, poor comprehension of hazard warning signs, and freedom 
from the normative constraints of everyday life. 
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In contrast to visitors, managers at the glacier sites consider the risks to be significant, 
and, potentially, severe.  It is argued that managers’ perceptions of risk are influenced 
by several important social and site-specific factors, including their own experiences 
of hazards at the glaciers, perceived legal and moral obligations, the organisational 
culture, and impressions of high societal expectation concerning safety.  The situation 
is further complicated by the freedom of access principle in national parks, and 
increasing tourist demand for nature-based experiences.  These factors governed 
beliefs about the subject of risk. 
 
This study identifies several dimensions of risk in nature-based recreation and tourism 
settings.  Visitors are at risk of personal accident or injury at certain tourism 
attractions.  Awareness of hazards is limited, visitor behaviour compromises safety, 
and existing communication strategies are only partially effective.  Risk is also 
apparent in the agency responsible for management of outdoor recreation areas.  Site 
managers perceive a risk in their failure to prevent visitors from harm, whereas senior 
managers identify risk as primarily financial, legal, and political.  Collectively, these 
factors demonstrate that the phenomenon of risk is increasingly important in the 
tourism and recreation context, and has the potential to influence significantly both 
management and experience of protected natural areas in New Zealand. 
 
Key words: Risk, perception, communication, warning signs, management, natural 
hazards, safety, national parks, tourism, recreation, Fox Glacier, Franz 
Josef Glacier. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent changes in the global economy have significantly restructured social relations both 
within and between societies (Castle & Haworth, 1993; Le Heron & Pawson, 1996).  New 
modes of production, the development and expansion of a consumer society, and changes in 
the labour market have altered the way people see themselves in the world, raising both their 
awareness of the world around them, and their lifestyle aspirations.  These changes have 
dramatically affected individuals’ leisure times and experiences, and contributed to the 
creation of a massive, commercial leisure industry. 
 
Economic change, in combination with technological advances, globalisation, and altered 
social and individual expectations, has equipped a growing number of people with the 
motives and means for travel.  Every week, millions of people now travel the world for no 
other reason than for pleasure, making tourism the greatest movement of people in history.  
For tourism destinations (present and future), the social, economic, and biophysical 
implications of this phenomenon should not be underestimated. 
 
New Zealand is a small player on the tourist destination field.  Of the world’s 625 million 
tourists in 1998 (World Tourism Organization [WTO], 1999), New Zealand attracted a 0.25 
per cent share of the market.  Despite this small proportion, international tourism to New 
Zealand is significant in terms of its small resident population (3.8 million inhabitants), and 
the more than four billion dollars in foreign exchange earnings that it generates each year 
(Collier, 1999).  Tourism is currently New Zealand’s largest export earner, generating 16 per 
cent of total exports in 1998 (Collier & Harraway, 2001) and, as such, is acknowledged as a 
very important sector of the New Zealand economy. 
 
Considerable efforts have been made to encourage greater numbers of visitors to New 
Zealand.  Tourism New Zealand (formerly the New Zealand Tourism Board [NZTB]) has the 
primary responsibility of selling New Zealand’s tourism product to overseas markets.  
Advertising campaigns emphasise themes promoting the destination as ‘clean and green’, 
‘100% pure’, and ‘safe and friendly’ (NZTB, 1997; Tourism New Zealand, 2000).  These 
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marketing strategies appear to have been effective.  Tourist numbers to New Zealand have 
increased by nearly 50 per cent since 1991. 
 
The centrality of international tourism in New Zealand makes tourism an important and 
intriguing area of study.  While market segments, tourist spending patterns, and geographic 
distributions and flows are beginning to be understood, little is known about some other 
aspects of the New Zealand tourism phenomenon. No existing research examines visitor 
perceptions of, and attitudes towards risk and safety, or the moral and legal responsibilities of 
New Zealanders as the facilitators of the tourist experience.  In particular, the salience of 
national parks and other protected natural areas (PNAs)2 as tourist attractions warrants further 
investigation. 
 
The present study is about risk in natural resource recreation and tourism settings.  
Throughout the world, millions of people every day visit national parks and other protected 
areas in which natural hazards inhere.  Many visitors are either unaware of, or fail to 
recognise, these natural hazards.  People travel to national parks anticipating a degree of 
adventure, to escape routines, and to witness the grandeur of natural landscapes.  Ironically, 
the very qualities that attract people to natural places may also put them at risk (Bean, 1989; 
Martin, 2000; Greenway, 1996). 
 
In order to understand the nature and significance of risk in the parks, recreation and tourism 
context, it is useful to identify and examine three interrelated dimensions: i) the perceptions of 
individual park visitors; ii) the perceptions and beliefs of those responsible for the park 
settings; and iii) the social context in which individuals and organisations operate.  The three 
dimensions of the research can be identified as separate entities, yet they are also part of a 
single whole.  How visitors perceive risk is likely to be influenced by the ways in which 
managers present it, as well as the social and cultural norms of their societies.  How managers 
perceive risk will, in turn, be affected by their interpretations of social acceptance and 
tolerance of risk, their understanding of legal obligations, and their beliefs about visitor 
hazard awareness and competency. 
                                                 
2 Protected Natural Areas (PNAs) is a generic term used to describe largely unmodified lands which have 
protected status under New Zealand law.  The term PNA encapsulates national and conservation parks, the 
various reserves, and other (mostly) public lands administered by the Department of Conservation (Devlin, 
Dingwall, & Lucas, 1990).  Dingwall (1981, p. 8) describes PNAs as those areas “in which the preservation or 
protection of nature is either the principle or a major objective of management”. 
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The topic of risk in this dissertation is examined in relation to each of the three dimensions, 
drawing primarily from the disciplinary perspectives of social psychology, sociology, and 
tourism studies.  The adoption of a multi-disciplinary approach is appropriate to the topics of 
risk and tourism, given the range of social science contributions to the understanding of these 
concepts.  For instance, Graburn and Jafari (1991, p. 7-8) claimed that “no single discipline 
alone can accommodate, treat, or understand tourism; it can be studied only if disciplinary 
boundaries are crossed and if multidisciplinary perspectives are sought and formed”.  A very 
similar multidisciplinary stance has been articulated by some authors on the subject of risk 
(Holzheu & Wiedemann, 1993; Lupton, 1999). 
 
This chapter describes the nature of the research problem, identifies the key research 
objectives, and outlines the importance of the study.  The research context is explained, and 
relevant terminology is discussed.  In Section 1.4, the glaciers of Westland National Park are 
introduced as the physical locations for this study of risk and tourism.  The chapter is 
concluded following a brief description of the thesis structure. 
 
1.2 Research context 
The context for the current study can be explained in terms of the three dimensions identified 
above. 
 
1.2.1 Society 
In recent decades, social expectations concerning safety standards have increased, while 
tolerance for risk and danger appear to have diminished (Furedi, 1997; Taig, 1996).  In many 
Western societies, this can be observed in a variety of spheres, from maternity care to disease 
prevention, and from cell-phone technology to the provision of walking tracks in national 
parks.  Modern Western societies are predominantly urban, and their citizens are often 
sedentary, highly regulated, and physically protected.  New technologies have improved the 
ability to predict many natural phenomena including droughts, floods, landslides, volcanic 
eruptions, and so on.  Human reliance on technology, and the protections of urban living, 
have insulated many people from direct experience with natural hazard and physical risk.  
Individual ability to detect, or disposition to expect, hazards in the natural environment may 
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have dimmed as a consequence of these changes in lifestyle.  Furthermore, the identification 
and control of hazard and risk appear to have moved away from the responsibility of 
individuals and become the specialist responsibilities of agencies and institutions (Gregory, 
Loveridge, & Gough, 1997; Johnston, 1995).  This shift contradicts the increased 
individualism evident in some other aspects of Western life such as personal responsibility for 
economic welfare, health, education, and financial independence in retirement.  This apparent 
paradox, among others, is a feature of discussion in Chapters 2 and 4. 
 
1.2.2 Management  
The management of visitors to natural attractions is a considerable challenge for public and 
private agencies throughout the world.  Increasingly, people from many parts of the globe 
wish to experience natural and cultural features far beyond their everyday life spheres.  
Developments in mass communication and transportation have enabled access to areas 
previously unknown or sufficiently remote to prevent human contact, excepting occasional 
traders and explorers.  In the mid twentieth century, when travel became more feasible and 
popular, tourists typically remained passive receivers of the experience, rather than active 
participants in it (Urry, 1990).  Tourism in the 1990s, however, appeared to undergo a 
transformation, including a change in tourist expectation.  Many visitors were no longer 
content to ‘gaze’ upon the natural vistas or cultural villages encountered en route, demanding 
instead a more interactive, authentic travel experience (Higham, 1996; Perkins & Thorns, 
2001).  These developments in taste and opportunity can be witnessed in the prolific rise of 
nature tourism as a substantial commercial business (McKercher, 1998), appealing to the 
traveller’s desire to see, smell, taste and touch the ‘real’ rather than the contrived 
(MacCannell, 1976; Urry, 1990). 
 
The increasing numbers of people travelling to PNAs, and the ways in which these visits are 
conducted, have created a new set of challenges for management agencies with 
responsibilities for natural areas visited by the public.  Among these are concerns about the 
social and physical impact of visitors in culturally or environmentally sensitive areas, and, at 
some attractions, concern for visitor health and safety.  The present discussion primarily 
focuses on the latter challenge. 
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As tourism to New Zealand has become less institutionalised, the safety of visitors in a range 
of urban and natural settings is potentially compromised.  The emergence of Free Independent 
Travellers (FIT)3 as the dominant tourist group in New Zealand (NZTB, 1991; Parr, 1989), 
suggests that where visitors go, when they go there, and what they do, is far less constrained 
than for many visitors in the past.  The availability of rental cars and camper vans has 
increased the flexibility and range of travel options for visitors to many countries including 
New Zealand.  Land management agencies, such as New Zealand’s Department of 
Conservation (DOC), charged with the responsibility of minimising harm to natural 
environments and the safety of people who come to visit them, have been forced to develop 
strategies to address a growing number of visitors, and increasing diversity of activities and 
behaviour.  Some of these issues are developed later in the thesis. 
 
1.2.3 Tourists 
Relative control over many aspects of Western life has created the potential for travel and 
exploration.  Financial security, mass communication, and a desire for temporary departure 
from the routine and mundane, also contribute to the tourism motive.  It is reasonable to 
assume that, unlike the travellers of centuries past, tourists today have a solid sense of security 
based on the controlled, predictable, and urban communities in which most people now live, 
and the relative comfort in which they travel.  In contrast, the natural attractions to which 
tourists to New Zealand are invited are often not entirely controlled or predictable - or, at 
least, they have the potential to become inhospitable or dangerous.  This has implications for 
safety, risk, dissatisfaction, and liability in relation to New Zealand’s tourism ‘product’. 
 
Adding to the potential for liability and dissatisfaction, is the possibility that tourists and 
recreationists have high expectations concerning levels of service and accountability, 
including those which relate to safety and risk.  Boerwinkel (1995, p. 241) observed that 
visitors to recreation and tourist destinations may feel “less guests than rightful buyers of a 
recreational product.  The host in such places is now, more than in the past, considered ... as 
just a provider of a recreational product”.  If this is accurate, there are important implications 
for the management of many nature-based recreation and tourism settings, especially if there 
                                                 
3 FITs are those travellers not part of organised ‘package’ tours, who make many of their own arrangements 
concerning accommodation, food, attractions, and so on (Parr, 1989). 
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is unwillingness among visitors to accept personal responsibility for any undesirable 
outcomes of their experiences. 
 
1.2.4 Parameters of the current research: Some definitions 
This study is concerned with recreation and tourism in natural resource settings.  A variety of 
terms have been applied to this phenomenon, including ‘outdoor recreation’ (Devlin, 1995; 
Manning, 1999), ‘resource-based recreation’ (Devlin, 1993), ‘resource-based tourism’ (Ewert 
& Shultis, 1997), and ‘nature-based tourism’ (Valentine, 1992).  Ewert and Shultis (1997, p. 
95), for instance, defined resource-based tourism as “tourism activities and experiences 
dependent on the attributes associated with natural and relatively undeveloped settings”.  
Similarly, Valentine (1992, p. 108) described nature-based tourism as “primarily concerned 
with the direct enjoyment of some relatively undisturbed phenomenon of nature”.  While each 
of the terms may imply subtle differences in context, they have in common a focus on natural 
settings predominantly unmodified by human influence.  People are motivated to visit these 
areas at least partly because they offer an alternative to densely populated or facility-oriented 
urban environments (Pigram, 1993).  Natural resource settings for recreation and tourism 
typically include mountain lands, coasts, lakes, rivers, beaches, and the sea.   
 
The settings of particular interest to the present study include those defined above, yet it is 
important to emphasise that there is a continuum of visitor involvement in nature-based or 
natural resource recreation and tourism.  While the terms can refer to physically challenging 
and adventure tourism activities such as mountaineering, bungy-jumping, and white-water 
rafting, the vast majority of participants in natural resource recreation and tourism are 
satisfied with more passive involvement with nature, such as short walks and sight-seeing in 
front-country4 areas (DOC, 1996b; NZTB & DOC, 1993).  The dominant focus of the present 
research is on this latter group of tourists. 
 
It is also important to clarify use of the terms ‘recreationist’, ‘tourist’, and ‘visitor’ in the 
current study.  As above, each of these terms reflects something of the context for the 
discussion.  Whether an individual is deemed to be a ‘tourist’, a ‘recreationist’, or a ‘visitor’ 
                                                 
4 Front-country recreation areas are “settings within relatively easy reach of vehicle access that are serviced by 
such facilities as car parks, picnic and camping areas, toilets, water supplies, signs, …and easy walking tracks 
(DOC, 1999b, p. 29). 
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rarely affects the individual, yet this topic has been the subject of considerable attention in 
leisure and tourism studies (Moscardo, 1999; Simmons & Leiper, 1993; Smith & Godbey, 
1991; Theobald, 1998), and in more technical contexts (Collier, 1999; Collier & Harraway, 
2001; United Nations [UN] & WTO, 1994).  Naturally, formal definitions exist, especially for 
‘tourist’, as there can be important financial implications associated with its measurement.  
Many definitions of ‘tourist’ depend on the dimensions of time and residence (Collier, 1999; 
UN & WTO, 1994) and, to a lesser extent, distance (Theobald, 1998).  For instance, the UN 
and WTO (1994, p. 20) stated that temporary visitors to regions outside their own (nationally 
or internationally) can be considered tourists, but only where the main purpose of the visit is 
“other than the exercise of an activity remunerated from within the country visited”.  To 
qualify, inter-region visits must also be of at least 24 hours duration and, in the case of 
domestic tourists, not greater than six months. 
 
Intuitively, ‘visitors’ can be considered as a broad class of people who spend time in regions 
beyond their own.  This includes those visiting regions for recreation and tourism.  People 
who visit national parks and other PNAs for the purposes of recreation can be difficult to 
differentiate on the basis of their status as recreationists or tourists, other than the important 
distinction of national origin.  If the technical definitions are adopted, most participants in the 
current study can be considered as visitors and tourists since the majority originate from 
outside the West Coast region, and the glaciers cannot be considered a “usual habitat” 
(Collier, 1999, p. 2) for most of the people who visit. 
 
The focus of this study is on people who visit conservation and recreation areas, at their 
leisure, for the purposes of recreational and tourist activities such as sightseeing, walking, and 
heritage appreciation.  For the purposes of the remaining discussion, the technical definitions 
of the terms are less significant.  To this extent, and unless specified in literature reviewed, the 
terms ‘tourist’ and ‘visitor’ are used interchangeably. 
 
Finally, it is important to emphasise the parameters of the study in relation to risk and leisure, 
recreation, and tourism.  In the literature, the concept of risk is raised in a variety of contexts 
including youth at risk, thrill-seeking and adventure tourism, organisational risk, and the 
negative consequences of risk-taking in outdoor recreation environments (for New Zealand 
examples see Haddock, 1995; Johnston, 1989b, 1992; Morgan, Moore, & Mansell, 1997, 
2000).  For some of these participants, risk is actively sought, forming a critical part of the 
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experience (Apter, 1992; McAvoy & Dustin, 1990; Priest, 1992).  Much of this literature 
provides important context, but is not at the core of the current study, which focuses on those 
risks that are not deliberately sought.  These ideas about risk stem from a wider interest in 
how visitors are managed in the protected natural areas of New Zealand. 
 
1.3 Risk and safety in natural resource settings: An outline of the 
research problem 
The dilemma of risk in recreation and tourism settings has several levels, including visitors’ 
demand for natural experiences, and the risk averse society in which tourism occurs.  This 
section outlines the research problem, the associated research objectives, and the importance 
of the study. 
 
In promotional literature and picture postcards, the central themes or images through which 
New Zealand is sold as a tourism destination are those of landscape and nature, and 
mountains in particular (Cloke & Perkins, 1998; Dilley, 1986).  Shultis (1989, p. 329) 
observed that “for both domestic and international markets, the major raison d’être of New 
Zealand as a tourist destination is its landscape”.  Approximately 60 per cent of all visitors to 
New Zealand enter a forest or national park (NZTB, 1993), and 33 per cent undertake a short 
bush walk5 (NZTB 1996).  At some natural attractions, up to 75 per cent of all visitors are of 
international origin (NZTB & DOC, 1993).  The scenic theme is augmented by an attempt to 
market New Zealand as a clean, friendly and safe destination (Ministry of Commerce, 1996; 
NZTB, 1997; Page, 1997), an image that presents something of a paradox when aligned with 
the risk and adventure activities that are also promoted to tourists in New Zealand. 
 
Although New Zealand’s tourism industry is built upon its natural attractions, little is known 
about the risks perceived by visitors to these areas.  That genuine physical hazards are 
inherent in some environments such as the glaciers of Westland National Park, presents 
managers of these areas with a number of challenges related to the health and safety of 
visitors.  At the glaciers, the issues include visitor safety, the ethics and feasibility of 
restricting access within a national park, and behavioural compliance with warning messages.  
It is from both the general ‘problem’ of tourists and risk, and the more specific issues evident 
at the glaciers, that the research aim and objectives for this study are drawn. 
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1.3.1 Objectives of the current research 
The primary aim of the research is: 
 To examine the nature and significance of risk in the management of parks, recreation, 
and tourism in New Zealand. 
 
More specifically, the research objectives are: 
 To identify and evaluate visitor awareness and perception of natural hazard and risk at 
Fox and Franz Josef glaciers on the South Island’s West Coast. 
 To identify and evaluate visitor attitudes toward individual responsibility for safety at 
the glaciers. 
 To assess the extent of behavioural compliance with hazard warning signs among 
visitors to the glaciers, and to measure the relative effectiveness of introduced pictorial 
warning messages. 
 To determine the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of agency staff with regard to their 
roles as risk managers, both at the glacier sites, and within New Zealand more 
generally. 
 To identify and assess how the Department of Conservation presents and 
communicates risk and safety messages in natural resource recreation settings such as 
the glaciers, and to examine what perceived legal and moral obligations form the basis 
of these strategies. 
 To explore the relevance of the theory of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992) to 
understanding risk perceptions and risk management in the New Zealand tourism and 
recreation context. 
 
These objectives are deliberately broad in scope, indicative of the exploratory nature of the 
topic, and the researcher’s commitment to a multi-disciplinary approach.  The methods used 
to address the objectives include a survey questionnaire and quasi-experimental component, 
observations, short interviews, and in-depth interviews with key informants (refer to Chapter 
5). 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 A short bush walk was defined as less than half a day, but more than half an hour (NZTB, 1996). 
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1.3.2 Importance of the study 
Leisure tourism is a discretionary activity, and most tourists will not spend their 
hard earned money to go to a destination where their safety and well-being may 
be in jeopardy (Pizam & Mansfield, 1996, p. 1). 
 
The management of visitor safety is an issue of paramount importance to outdoor recreation 
and visitor service agencies.  In New Zealand, the topic is especially salient in the wake of the 
most serious outdoor recreation accident in its history: Cave Creek (an accident in which 14 
people fell to their deaths when a platform over-looking a gorge collapsed).  With visitor 
numbers to many protected natural areas increasing each year, and with a significant 
proportion of these visitors originating from countries overseas, the issues of safety, risk 
management, and liability need intensive research. 
 
Further, given the importance of natural attractions in terms of New Zealand’s international 
market niche, it is crucial that aspects of risk, safety, and liability are understood.  Tourists are 
likely to be vulnerable to risk owing to the situational and affective characteristics of this 
leisure context.  If tourists are more vulnerable to risk, this has implications for international 
visitor management and the wider issues of moral obligation and social contract, particularly 
in an increasingly globalised world (McLuhan & Powers, 1989). 
 
Despite the growing number of visitors to nature-based attractions world-wide, and the 
evident management challenges in risk communication, little is known about the effectiveness 
of hazard messages presented to visitors in protected natural areas.  McCool and Braithwaite 
(1992, p. 319), for instance, observed that: 
Message effectiveness with regard to hazards in dispersed and natural recreation 
settings remains a largely ignored area of inquiry…. [The lack of] hazard/risk 
research is unfortunate because the consequences of ineffective messages can 
be significant in terms of injury or death to visitors as well as financial loss to 
recreationists and to managing agencies. 
One could add to this the costs to the industry in general, including the potentially negative 
impacts on promotional efforts. 
 
The present study aims to address this current gap in the literature.  While studies on risk, risk 
perception and, to a lesser extent, risk in recreation and tourism abound, few attempt to 
 11
address the multiple dimensions of risk perception and risk management.  To this extent, the 
current work is unique in combining aspects of the attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of both 
tourists and managers within a wider social and cultural context. 
 
1.4 The physical context for the investigation of risk: The study sites 
This study uses the popular attractions of Fox and Franz Josef glaciers as a setting through 
which to explore the nature and significance of risk in recreation and tourism areas.  This 
section provides important background and other contextual information about the glaciers of 
Westland National Park.  The section also includes a brief introduction to the Department of 
Conservation, the government agency responsible for the management of national parks and 
other protected natural areas in New Zealand.  This agency becomes the focus of discussion in 
Chapter 7. 
 
1.4.1 Westland National Park: Fox and Franz Josef glaciers 
The physical focus of the present study is Westland / Tai Poutini National Park6, an area of 
approximately 120,000 hectares situated in South Westland, New Zealand (Figure 1.1).  The 
Park was formally established in 1960, and is one of 13 national parks administered by the 
Department of Conservation7.  Westland National Park is also included within the 2.6 million 
hectare South West New Zealand World Heritage Area, recognised by the United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) as one of the world’s 
outstanding natural areas (DOC, 1999b; Shackley, 2000). 
 
                                                 
6 The name Tai Poutini derives from the Maori Te Tai o Poutini (the tides of the West Coast) (DOC, 1999). 
7 At the time of writing, a 14th national park, at Stewart Island, was in the final stages of establishment. 
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The physical nature of the Park is characterised by diversity, with 
lowland forest, coastal, and wetland areas in the west, and steep 
alpine zones to the east.  A prevailing westerly air stream 
combines with a sharp change in gradient between the coast and 
the mountains to produce a high level of precipitation (exceeding 
ten metres annually in the mountains), much of it falling as snow 
in the areas of greatest altitude (Coats & Chinn, 1992; McCaskill, 
1966; Potton, 1985; Sara, 1970).  The regular rainfall and 
relatively mild temperatures in lowland areas (11°C yearly 
average (DOC, 1999b)) contribute to the region’s lush, dense 
rainforest, fast-flowing rivers, and deep lakes. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Westland National 
Park, New Zealand 
 
Figure 1.2: Map of Westland National Park (Source: Potton, 1998) 
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Road access is limited to a single highway, which dissects the Park from the northeast to the 
southwest (State Highway 6).  The highway is a critical part of the South Island tourist route, 
linking the West Coast to visitor attractions in Canterbury (via the Lewis Pass to the north), 
and Queenstown and the Lakes (via the Haast Pass to the south).   
 
The service towns of Franz Josef and Fox Glacier are located along the main highway through 
the Park (Figure 1.2), legacies of a gold rush that swept the West Coast during the 1860s and 
1870s.  While the prospect of gold initiated many to the area, it was for farming, timber 
milling, and recreation and tourism that people stayed (Alexander, 1994; DOC, 1999b).  The 
area’s popularity grew throughout the twentieth century, with improvements to road access, 
available accommodation, and new recreation opportunities.  Today, the Park is used by 
increasing numbers of domestic and international visitors, who participate in activities 
ranging from short walks to scenic flights, and from guided glacier hikes to alpine tramping 
and climbing. 
 
The Fox and Franz Josef glaciers are two features of the region that have evidently captivated 
travellers and explorers since the earliest observations were made (Haast, 1879; cited in Sara, 
1970; Morland, 1916).  Today, the glaciers, each situated a few kilometres to the south of the 
respective townships, are the premier tourist attractions on the South Island’s West Coast, and 
play a critical role in tourism to the region generally (DOC, 1999b; Moore, Simmons, & 
Fairweather, 2001; Moran, Sleeman, & Simmons, 2001; Tourism Resource Consultants 
[TRC], 1995).  It has been estimated that 20 per cent of all international tourists to New 
Zealand visit the West Coast, and more than half of these visit the glaciers (Gough & Ball, 
1995; NZTB, 1996).  The Fox and Franz Josef glaciers attract approximately 400,000 visitors 
annually, with the latter receiving about two thirds of this use (DOC, 1999b).  The two sites 
can be regarded as front-country recreation sites at which high numbers of visitors, along with 
some facilities are present.  The glaciers are described in the Westland National Park 
Management Plan as “intense interest sites”, and represent two of three such sites in the Park 
(DOC, 1999b, p. 30). 
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To a significant extent, the 
popularity of the glaciers is 
dependent on the maintenance of 
relatively easy foot access to 
within close proximity of the ice.  
The terminal ice face at both Fox 
and Franz Josef Glacier is 
currently within 30 minutes walk 
of the respective car parks, and 
situated at only a few hundred 
metres above sea level. The 
walkways that lead to the attractions are sufficiently short and level to allow unimpeded 
access for able-bodied visitors, including those with no outdoor recreation experience.  The 
consequence of this accessibility is that visitors can get very close to both glaciers with 
minimal effort, and without exposure to alpine conditions.  Unless visitors elect to climb on 
the glacier8, no specialist equipment is required, and many visitors will alight from vehicles 
and embark upon the walk to the attraction with little or no modification to their clothing or 
footwear. 
 
The Fox and Franz Josef glaciers provide excellent 
study sites to examine the subjects of risk, hazard, and 
safety perception among a range of visitors.  As key 
components of the South Island tourism trail, the 
glaciers attract a broad cross section of the visitor 
market, although the majority of visitors are short 
term, and from regions outside of New Zealand 
(DOC, 1999b).  Further, the Department of 
Conservation has recently expressed concerns about the physical risks to which visitors are 
exposed at the glaciers (DOC, 1997a, 1997b).  Loose rock, falling ice, and fluctuating river 
levels represent natural hazards to tourists and recreationists whose experience in such 
environments is likely to be limited.   
                                                 
8 The Department of Conservation recommends that visitors who wish to climb on the glacier do so only in the 
company of an experienced guide.  Professional glacier guiding companies operate throughout the year at both 
Fox and Franz Josef Glacier. 
 
Plate 1.1: Franz Josef Glacier 
 
Plate 1.2: Fox Glacier 
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While there is a growing body of information about the natural hazards and physical risks to 
which visitors are exposed at the glaciers in South Westland (DOC, 1999b; McSaveney & 
Davies, 1998; TRC, 1995), very little is known about how visitors to these attractions 
perceive risk and safety, or the extent to which visitors accept responsibility for their own 
safety. The present research will help develop an understanding of the significance of risk in 
natural area tourism, and assist the management agency in identifying appropriate levels of 
risk management and hazard communication at the sites.   
 
1.4.2 The Department of Conservation 
The Department of Conservation administers Westland National Park as part of a significant 
PNA system including 12 other national parks throughout New Zealand.  This government 
department manages hundreds of tracks, thousands of structures and millions of national and 
international visitors each year in areas which, collectively, constitute approximately 30 per 
cent of New Zealand’s total land mass.  These areas are public lands, also known as the 
‘conservation estate’. 
 
DOC was established in 1987 with the passing of the Conservation Act (1987), and replaced 
several land management agencies existing at that time.  For the first time, New Zealand’s 
conservation estate was the responsibility of a single government agency.  Under the 
Conservation Act, the Department is obligated to: 
1. manage all land, and other natural and historic resources for which it is 
responsible, for the purposes of conservation (S 6(a)); and 
2. foster the use of natural and historic resources for recreation, and allow 
for their use for tourism, to the extent that this use is not inconsistent with 
conservation (s 6(e)). 
 
DOC aims to achieve its natural and cultural heritage responsibilities through protecting and 
restoring natural areas, reducing threats to native species, controlling pests and weeds, and 
promoting conservation.  Public recreation is fostered through the construction and 
maintenance of facilities (including huts, tracks, and bridges), granting and managing 
concessions, managing visitor centres, and providing information (DOC, 1996b, 2001).  
Owing to its dual (and sometimes conflicting) mandates, its wide range of geographically 
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dispersed responsibilities, and the emotive nature of some of its work, DOC operates within a 
complex and often politically charged environment. 
 
In addition to a central management office in Wellington (‘Head Office’), the Department is 
represented throughout New Zealand by 13 regional conservancies.  Each conservancy 
includes several area offices responsible for the delivery of conservation and recreation 
outputs (DOC, 2001).  Three regional offices (‘Northern’, ‘Central’ and ‘Southern’) were a 
recent addition to the Department’s structure, and have the task of “continuous quality 
improvement” (DOC, 2001, p. 13). The Fox and Franz Josef glaciers are within the West 
Coast Conservancy (South Westland Area Office), and managed on a day-to-day basis 
through individual administrative units (field centres) based in the nearby townships of Fox 
Glacier and Franz Josef.  
 
Further aspects of the Department’s systems, structure, and governing legislation are 
presented in Chapter 7 when the risk perceptions and attitudes of its managers are discussed. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters.  The relevant literature is contained in the next three 
chapters, which collectively inform the three dimensions of the study.  Chapter 2 is a 
discussion of the social context in which risk needs to be considered.  Chapter 3 examines 
individual visitors’ perceptions of risk, including factors that influence these.  Chapter 4 
focuses on the management and legal context of risk in recreation and tourism settings, and 
identifies the significance of risk in this context.   
 
In Chapter 2, the concept of risk and its growing importance in Western post-industrial 
society is examined.  It is argued that, as in no previous society, current attitudes to risk and 
safety in such societies are conservative in the sense of emphasising the avoidance of risk 
where possible.  Chapter 2 reviews definitions and explanations of risk and hazard, and the 
rise, in recent decades, of concerns over risks.  The perspective of the chapter is primarily 
sociological, and this informs the analysis and discussion of ideas presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 3 involves discussion of the individual and how he or she perceives risk.  The 
perspective adopted is principally social-psychological and includes an examination of the 
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subjective experience, the influence of other people (including the media), and the way in 
which each affects risk perception.  A section of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of risk 
communication and, in particular, the effects of warning messages on compliance and risk 
perception.   
 
Chapter 4 reviews the available literature on risk in recreation and tourism, and locates the 
present study within that context.  The nature and scope of risk in natural resource tourism is 
identified, and the legislation relevant to New Zealand discussed.  The possibility that tourists 
are especially vulnerable to hazard and risk is also explored. 
 
In Chapter 5, the methods for this study are described.  These methods include both 
quantitative and qualitative tools in order to address the specific research objectives (Section 
1.3.1 above).  Few integrative studies in natural resource recreation and tourism have been 
undertaken in New Zealand (Simmons & Berno, 1995), yet there is excellent scope for their 
adoption.  Considerable attention is given to the topic of ethics in Chapter 5, as some aspects 
of the methods raise interesting and significant ethical issues.   
 
Chapters 6 and 7 present and discuss the research findings, including visitor perceptions of 
natural hazard and risk, and the factors affecting how risk is managed at the two tourism 
attractions.  While the extent to which visitors perceive risk, and their specific awareness of 
natural hazards is examined in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 focuses on the degree to which risk is 
presented to visitors, the strategies used to communicate risk, and the legislative, moral and 
pragmatic justifications for the management approaches used.  The growth of risk 
management in the New Zealand parks and recreation context is a feature of the discussion in 
Chapter 7.  Discussion covers the various factors affecting managers’ risk perceptions, 
including the effects of key historical events and other social context. 
 
Chapter 8 forms the final synthesis of the research findings, a reappraisal of the research 
objectives, and presentation of implications for the management of visitors in natural resource 
recreation settings.  The aim of this last chapter is to integrate the various dimensions of the 
study, and to articulate the complex relationships between them. 
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1.6 Chapter summary and conclusions 
The study of risk has grown significantly in substance and in scope over three decades.  While 
the focus of this field still lies in the analysis of technological and environmental risk, some 
researchers have looked in detail at the concept of risk in recreation and tourism.  Few, 
however, have examined risk and safety perceptions in the context of nature-based tourism, 
and none within the context of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992).  The present study aims to 
make a contribution to the understanding of risk perception, visitor management, tourism 
studies, and the social psychology of communication in natural environments.  The study also 
complements existing literature on the sociology of risk, and the political significance of risk 
management. 
 
To this extent, the present study adds to the existing work in the fields of ‘risk’ recreation and 
tourism, as well as to the understanding of risk perception and its effects on tourists and the 
tourism industry.  Furthermore, the study expands current knowledge of communication and 
warning compliance in natural resource environments, and establishes important links 
between the social and cultural context and the management of parks, recreation, and tourism 
in New Zealand. 
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Chapter 2 The nature and significance of risk 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The investigation of risks is at once a scientific activity and an expression of 
culture (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 177). 
 
A substantial and growing literature on risk has emerged out of the realisation in advanced 
industrial societies of the need to regulate technology and to protect their citizens from natural 
and technological hazards (Kasperson et al., 1988; Krimsky & Golding, 1992).  One 
significant component of the risk literature represents a reaction to increasing social concerns 
about the potential dangers in both the human-induced and natural environment (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Gough, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Hunnius & Kliemt, 1993; Leiss & Chociolko, 
1994; Sjöberg, 1987).  Subjects of analysis typically include risks associated with health, 
environmental pollution, nuclear power plants, and natural disasters.  Among others, these 
issues have stimulated public discussion on how best to meet the challenges of technological 
progress, and inevitably focus on the concept of ‘risk’ (Hunnius & Kliemt, 1993).  Far less 
debated are the possible risks to which people are exposed in natural environments, not 
normally part of their lifestyles.  In this sense, technology has facilitated access to risks of 
another kind. 
 
This chapter documents a growing emphasis on safety, risk, and hazard in many modern 
societies.  The main discussion is preceded by an initial section devoted to the definition of 
key concepts used in this study.  Several sociological explanations for the contemporary 
prominence of risk are then proposed, and an outline of the development and current 
significance of legislation that both justifies and perpetuates the concern over risk and safety 
is given.  The present chapter acts as a basis for the discussion of risk in recreation and 
tourism presented in Chapter 4. 
 
2.2 Definition of terms 
Risk and risk-taking are inescapable aspects of all human existence, involving choices or 
trade-offs between positive and negative outcomes.  ‘Risk’ is a term used in an increasing 
number of contexts, to the point where it could be considered a dominant social discourse in 
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many societies.  As a concept, however, ‘risk’ is ambiguous in meaning, and is often used 
interchangeably with similar terms such as ‘hazard’ and ‘danger’, and within the context of 
‘safety’ (or the lack thereof).  This section examines the meaning, usage, and scope of the 
term ‘risk’, and thus provides a basis for the later discussion on the significance of risk in 
some Western societies.  A variety of risk definitions are reviewed, and some common 
elements identified.  Related concepts are discussed and differentiated. 
 
2.2.1 Risk 
The term ‘risk’ appears to have originated in the Italian language (risco or risicare), first 
appearing in the 17th century (Bernstein, 1996; Keey, 1998; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986).  
Bernstein (1996) claimed the latter meant ‘to dare’, whereas Keey (1998) gave a less neutral 
interpretation as ‘to run into danger’.  Others have also suggested that the idea of risk took 
hold in the 16th and 17th centuries, first used by Western maritime explorers (Covello & 
Johnson, 1987; Giddens, 1998).  Giddens differed on the term’s derivation, however, citing 
instead a Spanish or Portuguese connection, where it was originally used to refer to sailing 
into uncharted waters.  Hence, the earliest conception of risk included the dimensions of 
uncertainty, danger, and loss, yet it also implied a choice rather than a fate (Bernstein, 1996). 
While there may have been no word for risk, Wiedemann (1993) traced the perception of 
hazards as risks to the development of insurance, the earliest evidence of which he reports as 
1329. 
 
A wide variety of disciplinary interests are represented in the study of risk, including those of 
sociologists, psychologists, economists, geographers, safety engineers, and philosophers, 
prompting Holzheu and Wiedemann (1993, p. 10) to describe the field of risk studies as “vast 
and loosely defined”.  As a consequence, the term ‘risk’ has assumed a range of meanings, the 
most common of which include the technical (including wide application in a variety of 
scientific contexts such as engineering and medicine), and financial (especially insurance and 
investment).  Most authors note that risk means different things to different people, although a 
review of the literature suggests that disagreement about risk is found less in the elements of 
its composition, and more in how it is assessed, what to do about it, and who is responsible 
for it.  The existence of risk, its significance, and its probability is where the genuine 
controversy lies. 
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Risk is present in multiple spheres, and is highly contextual.  In the leisure and tourism 
domain, for instance, a variety of different types of risk have been identified (Brannan, 
Condello, Stuckum, Vissers, & Priest, 1992; Cheron & Ritchie, 1982; Fullagar, 1996; Roehl 
& Fesenmaier, 1992).  Some possible risk contexts are illustrated in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Risk The possibility that the action will: 
Financial not provide value equal to money spent 
Functional  result in mechanical or technical failure 
Physical  lead to bodily harm or illness 
Psychological alter an individual’s perception of self, or fail to meet expectation 
Social / Commercial alter others’ perceptions of the individual or organisation 
Time  be too long, or not worth the time taken 
 Adapted from Cheron & Ritchie (1982)
 
 
The risks identified in Table 2.1 apply in both a personal and public sense, although 
individuals are likely to be more concerned with physical, social, and psychological risks than 
organisations, which are more likely to emphasise financial and functional risks.  The oldest 
acknowledged form of risk is the possibility of physical harm, and perhaps the most recent 
those of time and finance.  Throughout human history, however, perceptions of social and 
psychological risks have helped shape attitudes and behaviour. 
 
The conventional and scientific approach considers risk as an expression of probability.  That 
is, risk is understood as “the likelihood that something unpleasant will happen” (Wagenaar, 
1992, p. 258).  Hence, risk can be calculated and formalised in terms of magnitude and 
statistical probability, and represented by formulae as discussed by Rayner (1993), 
Jungermann and Slovic (1993) and Elms (1998b).  In this technical sense, risk (R) is defined 
as a function of probability (P) and magnitude (M) of an undesired event (Rayner, 1993). 
 
Table 2.1: Multiple risk contexts 
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Elms (1998b) described risk as involving 
three related components (Figure 2.1), two of 
which correspond closely with probability 
and magnitude.  Importantly, Elms also 
emphasised the salience of context to the 
understanding of risk.  Two risk calculations 
(likelihood x consequence) may appear the 
same, but each may relate to completely 
different contexts, and therefore need to be 
considered separately. 
 
Consistent with this technical-scientific approach to risk, Yates and Stone (1992) identified 
three major components in the risk construct including potential loss, the significance of loss, 
and the uncertainty associated with loss.  Similarly, Sitkin and Pablo (1992) offered three 
‘outcome’ dimensions: uncertainty, expectation, and potential.  Reflecting their management 
focus, they defined risk as a characteristic of decisions and “the extent to which there is 
uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions 
will be realized” (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, p. 10).  According to these authors, risk in decision-
making exists along a continuum where outcomes are more or less certain, and the range of 
possible outcomes includes some extreme consequences. 
 
While convenient, and clearly amenable to quantification, the traditional technical approach to 
risk does not allow for a comprehensive understanding of the risk construct, and involves 
several assumptions not always made apparent.  For instance, in technical assessments, risks 
are viewed as unproblematic facts that are possible to measure and objectify.  Also implicit is 
an agreement on the significance of any particular risk.  The values that underpin risk 
identification and assessment are rarely made explicit.  Further, there is often an assumption 
that risk involves undesirable outcomes, with no acknowledgement of potential benefits. 
 
The alternative perspective is to consider risk as a social construction, rather than an objective 
reality yet to be discovered.  Some authors deny the suitability of a technical approach to the 
understanding and assessment of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Fox, 1999; Krimsky & 
Golding, 1992; Lupton, 1999; Rayner, 1993; Rayner & Cantor, 1999).  In their critique of risk 
theories, Douglas and Wildavsky, for instance, claimed that risk acceptability is always a 
ConsequenceLikelihood 
Context 
 
Figure 2.1: Three components of risk 
Source: Elms (1998b, p. 44) 
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political issue, a product of social and cultural processes.  These authors seriously question 
the attempts of risk analysts to make the assignment of probabilities a value-free exercise: 
“judgements of risk and safety must be selected as much on the basis of what is valued as on 
the basis of what is known” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 80).  Fox (1999) went beyond 
the culturalist model and argued that hazards are socially constructed out of judgements about 
the adverse outcomes of choices made by humans.  Objects in the environment that are 
otherwise ‘inert’, are transformed into hazards through our evaluations of risk (Fox, 1999). 
 
An emphasis on negative outcomes of risk is a common feature of risk definitions (Furedi, 
1997; Gough, 1998a; Johnston, 1989a; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Wiedemann, 1993).  For 
instance, in a business context, Williams and Narendran (1999, p. 103) stated that: “most 
theorists agree that a risky decision involves the unspecified possibility of an undesirable 
outcome” (emphasis added).  Similarly, from the perspective of engineering, Elms (1998b, p. 
44) claimed that “risk has to do with something unwanted that could happen in the future” 
(emphasis added). 
 
The focus on the negative outcomes associated with risk may be a recent phenomenon.  
According to some authors (Carpenter, 1995; Furedi, 1997; Leiss & Chociolko, 1994), society 
has moved away from treating risk as either a neutral or a positive feature of life and now has 
a predominantly negative view of its presence.  MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986, p. 9) 
claimed that at other stages in history, risk was represented as an admirable enterprise, citing 
Samuel Johnson’s use of the term in the eighteenth century: ‘To risque the certainty of a little 
for the chance of much’.  Similarly, Wiedemann (1993, p. 54) observed that the public 
increasingly “regard[s] risk from the aspect of a negative utilitarianism [where]... the possible 
loss outweighs the potential gain; the motto is now: ‘better safe than sorry’”.  The possible 
consequences of societal risk aversion are discussed in Section 2.3.4. 
 
While risk is usually used in a negative context, it is simplistic to assume that all risk is now 
avoided.  There are many instances in which successful risk-takers are admired, including 
entrepreneurs in business, mountaineers, and sports people.  It is also evident that the positive 
or negative usage of the concept of ‘risk’ is highly contextual.  In fields of application such as 
engineering or insurance, risk does assume a largely negative connotation (to be avoided).  In 
other contexts, such as investment and some forms of recreation, the risk can have a positive 
meaning.  Whether a risk is viewed as positive or negative will depend on the values 
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associated with the outcome.  The unifying feature of risk, then, is the presence of uncertainty 
from which might emerge outcomes that are interpreted as either positive or negative. 
 
While definitions of risk vary in their emphasis and application, a degree of commonality 
between them is evident.  Differences tend to reflect disciplinary positions and, ultimately, 
ontological perspectives.  Disparities are also more evident in the assessment of risk and its 
application, rather than in terms of the underlying meaning of the concept.  A review of 
definitions presented in the wide literature on risk, reveals common use of terms including 
‘loss’, ‘chance’, ‘probability’, ‘exposure’, ‘uncertainty’, and ‘choice’.  Typical of many 
definitions is ‘the potential to lose something of value’ (Australian / New Zealand Standards 
[ANZS], 1999; Brannan et al., 1992; Elms, 1998b; Haddock, 1993; Hanna, 1991; 
MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). 
 
From the preceding discussion it is evident that risk involves choice and uncertainty.  A 
situation in which the only outcome is loss is not a risky one (Giddens, 1998; Lash, 
Szerszynski & Wynne, 1996; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; Roehl & Fesenmaier, 1992).  
Risk implies that the human agent has a choice, and, therefore, a degree of control over the 
eventual outcome.  The notion of risk is not raised across all aspects of life unless there is the 
opportunity for human agents to influence these.  Where there is no choice, no alternative 
outcome, there is no risk. To this extent, risks are trade-offs: “to take a risk is to incur a 
certain loss in expectation of a larger but less certain offsetting gain” (Leiss & Chociolko, 
1994, p. 256).  As will be discussed in Section 2.3 below, one hallmark of some Western 
societies is a growing individualism, and the freedom to choose in many life spheres.  A 
perception of choice has become widespread in modern Western democracies, thereby 
increasing the perception of risk. 
 
2.2.2 Terms related to risk 
2.2.2.1 Actual and perceived risk 
Many writers seek to differentiate between ‘actual’ risk (also referred to as ‘real’ risk or 
‘objective’ risk), and ‘perceived’ risk (Bamford, 1987; Elms, 1998b; Lee, 1981; Slovic, 
Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1982).  The difference between these assessments is important to 
the later discussion and analysis presented in this study, and hence Chapter 3 addresses the 
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subject of ‘perceived risk’ directly.  At this point, it is sufficient to note that the assessments 
of ‘actual’ risk (probability x magnitude) are technically described as the ‘estimated’ or 
‘observed’ risks (Elms, 1998b).  These terms refer to assessments based on statistical 
probability such as the prediction of future events from statistical data provided by past 
events.  The term ‘actual’ risk is used to convey an objective assessment, to differentiate 
between the technical calculations of experts, and the subjective perceptions of the public, 
which have traditionally been considered irrelevant to social decision-making.  
 
2.2.2.2 Hazard 
The word ‘hazard’ is thought to have its origins in the name given to dice and other games of 
chance, from the Arabic word for dice – al zahr (David, 1962; cited in Bernstein, 1996).  
Today, hazards refer to specific circumstances that promote the possibility of loss occurring, 
or reduce the chances of gains being made.  Hazards can take many forms and typically 
describe dangerous conditions in contexts including the workplace, home, recreation and 
leisure areas, and other places where people or the things they value are present.  In particular, 
most definitions emphasise that hazards include any source of potential injury or harm to a 
person (ANZS, 1999; McCarthy, Ayres, Wood & Robinson, 1995).  In the natural resource 
recreation and tourism context, Christiansen (1987, p. 135) defined an inherent hazard as “a 
natural feature of the environment that is potentially dangerous”.  Examples from these 
settings might include river rapids or deep pools of water in the river, rockfall areas, and steep 
slopes. 
 
Like risk, hazard implies an element of uncertainty and chance.  Unlike risk, the term hazard 
is exclusively used in the context of negative consequences.  Where risk is the potential for 
loss, hazards are specific circumstances which increase the chance of that loss occurring.  In 
this sense, driving a car presents a risk (physical injury, property damage, or legal liability), 
whereas ice on the road represents a hazard.  To drive the car over the icy road would entail a 
risk, reinforcing the notion that risk relates directly to an action performed, and perhaps 
chosen by, an agent.  In the present study, the phrase ‘natural hazards and risk’ is used in 
recognition of the difference between the two phenomena, but also in acknowledgement that 
the two invariably occur together. 
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2.2.2.3 Danger and safety 
It is also useful to differentiate between the terms ‘risk’, ‘danger’, and ‘safety’ – often used 
synonymously in the literature on risk.  Luhmann (1993) provided a helpful discussion of this 
difference.  According to Luhmann, a risk is involved if the uncertainty of future loss can be 
attributed to a decision (thus, the risk is contained in the choice).  In contrast, where the 
possible loss is considered to occur externally, that is, attributed to the environment, we speak 
of danger.  In this sense, older societies were preoccupied with dangers, whereas 
contemporary society concerns itself with risk.  ‘Danger’ also implies limited control over the 
outcome, and is often applied in an experiential sense.  That is, one can be ‘in danger’, 
although the specific dangers closely represent hazards. 
 
The terms ‘risk’ and ‘safety’ are also closely linked.  Safety can be considered as the control 
of conditions that potentially lead to loss (Haddock, 1993), and as such, the antithesis of risk.  
To feel ‘safe’ is to feel free from danger or threats to personal security or well-being.  Yet 
Wildavsky (1988, p. 5) argued that there could be no safety without risk because, “for the 
most part, safety and risk coexist in the same objects and practices”.  This apparent paradox is 
part of an argument that challenges society’s current emphasis on risk aversion, a set of 
claims that will be explored in Section 2.3 below. 
 
2.2.3 Summary 
In a semantic sense, risk is a term used to convey the threat of an undesirable outcome.  Risk 
is present (in a variety of contexts) when outcomes are uncertain, when particular outcomes 
are favoured over others, and a degree of choice is available.  Although risk is variously 
defined, common dimensions are evident in most applications of the concept.  Whether risk is 
present, how it is assessed, what its implications are, and who is responsible for it are 
questions of a political and ethical nature.   
 
As will become clear in following section, the overwhelming emphasis in some Western 
societies is on risk avoidance, as part of a search for safety (Wildavsky, 1988).  Section 2.3 
investigates the significance now associated with this concept.  Risk has become more than a 
word describing potential loss; it has attained a paradigmatic status in many Western 
societies. 
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2.3 A society preoccupied with risk and safety  
The evaluation of everything from the perspective of safety is a defining 
characteristic of contemporary society (Furedi, 1997, p. 4). 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Risk is ubiquitous.  A concept underlying virtually any activity containing an uncertain 
outcome, it arises in nearly all aspects of life.  Asking someone for a date, accepting a 
challenging work assignment, having a baby, writing a thesis, raising a sensitive issue with a 
spouse or a friend, all involve uncertain outcomes, and present some level of risk (Roberts, 
1994). 
 
Although it may have been undefined, risk has always been present in human experience.  
Elms (1998a, p. 2) noted that “for as long as we have been able to look into the future and 
wonder and worry, we have been aware of hazards and of what could go wrong”.  How 
different societies have reacted to this awareness is what has changed over time.  For some, 
the future was determined by the will of the gods, while others attempted to predict what 
could happen and took action accordingly.  “People consulted fortune tellers, oracles, 
prophets or the I Ching, but they would also be prudent and wear amour, build their house 
upon rock, or lay up stores against the future” (Elms, 1998a, p. 2).  This section discusses the 
claim of several sociologists that current Western societies are focused on risk and safety in 
ways never previously experienced.  Evidence for this claim is presented and discussed, as are 
the consequences of a risk-oriented society. 
 
It should be emphasised that the tendency to view technological progress and social outcomes 
from the perspective of risk is not necessarily applicable to all cultures and societies, but is 
confined almost exclusively to the Western democracies.  For instance, Hunnius and Kliemt 
(1993, p. 223) claimed that “scholars [in the former German Democratic Republic] were not 
allowed to gather data on … environmental pollution, public health, or the public’s 
assessment of and attitudes to specific technologies”.  In addition, Goszczynska, Tyszka, and 
Slovic, 1991, p. 81) claimed that, “in communist countries, information on risks and accidents 
has been strictly censored”.  The absence of debate about risk issues, and the apparent lack of 
choice concerning their management, means that the risk society discussion is largely 
confined to the Western democracies, no doubt related to their strong emphasis on 
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individualism, and the relative control those governments have gained over basic lifestyle 
features such as safe drinking water, hygiene standards, and vaccination. 
 
2.3.2 The origins and cultural evolution of risk 
It is instructive in this discussion of risk, to consider first the origins and precursors of the 
concept.  Parallels can be observed in the roles of different social constructs. 
 
Primitive societies used misfortune and the resultant blame for political purposes, to increase 
group solidarity and survival of the community (Douglas, 1992; Luhmann, 1993; Wiedemann, 
1993).  According to Douglas (1992, p. 6): 
The stronger the solidarity of a community, the more readily will natural disasters 
be coded as signs of reprehensible behaviour.... Danger is defined to protect the 
public good and the incidence of blame is a by-product of arrangements for 
persuading fellow members to contribute to it. 
 
Wiedemann (1993) also drew comparisons between different historical epochs and examined 
how each has achieved social control mechanisms.  Wiedemann explored the three concepts 
of ‘taboo’, ‘sin’, and ‘risk’ and argued that each achieved social control through guiding 
human conduct.  In the case of taboo, the hazard is the harmful consequence certain to befall 
the offender who breaks the taboo.  Sins contravene the will of God, or some divine order, 
and will bring punishment upon the sinner. Risk is also concerned with potential harm:  “Like 
taboo and sin, the risk concept motivates the individual to adopt a form of behaviour or action 
to minimize the hazard” (Wiedemann, 1993, p. 44).  While Wiedemann recognised the social 
control function of risk, sin, and taboo as being similar, he also identified differences, the 
most important of which is the relativity of risk.  Sin and taboo systems are far less tolerant of 
deviancy, whereas “what is a great risk to one man may be none at all to another” 
(Wiedemann, 1993, p. 45).  Wiedemann traced the emergence of a risk consciousness to the 
Enlightenment, when many common dangers were systematically overcome by technological 
explanations.  At a similar time, the theory of probability was synthesised, a concept essential 
to the calculation of risk. 
 
In most previous societies, a concept such as risk was unnecessary because risk only has 
meaning in a society that is oriented towards the future, and a future that is open.  The idea of 
risk is linked to the aspiration to control the future and, as such, defines the boundary 
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separating modern times and the past (Bernstein, 1996; Giddens, 1998).  The attempts to 
control risk released Western society from a belief in a predetermined future and that humans 
were passive before nature.  Lee (1981) described this as a profound philosophical change 
during which fatalism was discredited and religion radically altered.  Explanations for 
catastrophes are now linked to antecedent events, rather than fate or the will of God.  
“Responsibility, if not omniscience, has been transferred to the government and to scientists 
or other experts” (Lee, 1981, p.6).  Yet, ironically, it may have been the success of science 
and technology that ultimately contributed to the emergence of a ‘risk society’, characterised 
by doubt and uncertainty.  According to Beck (1992, 1996, 1998) and Giddens (1994, 1998), 
science information is increasingly uncertain, and many new technologies, rather than 
creating a greater sense of security, have had the opposite effect through their contribution to 
a new set of risks. 
 
2.3.3 A new modernity: The emergence of a risk society 
Risks and hazards in the 21st century are very different from the risks and hazards of centuries 
past.  Since the middle of the twentieth century, risk has achieved global proportions, and 
extends well beyond small localities or political borders (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1994).  Social 
class, gender, or residential locality no longer protect people completely from the new set of 
human-induced hazards and risks such as acid rain, global warming, or the possibility of a 
nuclear winter.  Unlike the risks and hazards associated with traditional modernity, the 
hazards of the risk society are far less constrained by geography and time, and may even pose 
significant threats to future generations. 
 
Some authors have observed that we live in more dangerous times than those of earlier 
generations (Rohrmann, 1996; Slovic, et al., 1981), yet others have argued that it is the nature, 
significance, and origin of risks and dangers that have altered (Beck, 1998; Dwyer, 1991; 
Franklin, 1998; Giddens, 1994, 1998; Lash et al., 1996; Lübbe, 1993).  Giddens (1998), for 
instance, suggested that, unlike previous societies, the risks created by humans are equal or 
more threatening than those that come from the outside (natural sources).  Environmental risk, 
a subject not even considered until a few decades ago, now occupies the attention of many 
Western societies and their political leaders.  Environmental risk is a useful example of how 
the scope of risk has changed since the advent of industry.  Although benefits may accrue to a 
 30
risk-imposing group, other groups (perhaps covering a very wide, even global area) suffer 
exposure to impacts (Adams, 1995). 
 
In a very different context, the freedoms associated with living in a post-industrial society also 
represent a number of social risks and hazards not previously present.  These new risks 
include, for example, deciding if, when, and who to marry; whether or not to reveal sexual 
orientation; and which occupation to pursue.  Certainties associated with class, gender, and 
social mobility in general are absent today, a situation which contributes to an emphasis on 
uncertainty and risk.  Beck (1992) has identified these social changes as part of a new phase 
of modernity, an epoch he has termed the ‘risk society’. 
The system of coordinates in which life and thinking are fastened in industrial 
modernity – the axes of gender, family and occupation, the belief in science and 
progress – begins to shake, and a new twilight of opportunities and hazards 
comes into existence – the contours of the risk society (Beck, 1992, p. 15).   
In the risk society, a new generation of risks is born, as humans are confronted with the 
consequences of their actions (Franklin, 1998). 
 
Ulrich Beck’s (1992) theory of the risk society examines the changing relationship between 
social agents and social structure, and suggests that, in a significant way, people today are 
more individualistic than in any previous social arrangement.  The risk society thesis assumes 
that traditional certainties can no longer be taken for granted, creating new risks for 
individuals to negotiate.  Beck (1992, p. 3) contended that society has moved beyond 
modernity to a “reflexive modernity” in which individuals, free from the constraints of social 
structures, “reflexively construct their own biographies”.  For Beck (1996), the new 
modernity is reflexive as it draws on traditional modernity for definition, and is concerned 
with its unintended consequences, such as the hazards now emerging out of science and 
technology. 
 
Lash et al. (1996), following Beck (1992), argued that risk and individualisation have been 
closely linked since the origins of modern society.  For these authors, it is not the emergence 
of new or an increased number of dangers that has led to heightened risk consciousness, rather 
it has resulted from the setting free “of agents from normative institutional constraints” (Lash 
et al., 1996, p. 13).  These authors observed that, in the process of modernisation, “more and 
more areas of life... have been taken from the sphere of the natural and inevitable and made 
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the objects of choice and responsibility” (Lash et al., 1996, p. 12).  In ‘simple’ modernity, few 
areas of life were constructed in terms of choice and, hence, remained unaffected by risk. 
 
Giddens (1994, 1998) also recognised the new significance of risk in the context of a society 
in which traditional norms are being eroded.  For Giddens (1998), the risk society represents a 
diversity of possible futures, less defined by nature or tradition.  To this extent, Giddens 
described risk society as comprising ‘the end of nature’ and ‘the end of tradition’.  While past 
societies worried about what nature could do to them, a transition has occurred where many 
current societies worry about what they have done to nature.  Similarly, Giddens has argued 
that the risk society exists ‘after tradition’.  Where previous communities lived in a world 
dictated by fate and prescription, modern societies operate in an environment of choice, which 
inevitably means that individuals have to confront futures much more open than in the past, 
with all the risks this brings (Giddens, 1998). 
 
Luhmann (1993), too, has illustrated the links between uncertainty and the reduced role of 
nature.  According to Luhmann, the idea that nature can limit the future has all but been 
abandoned, with technology taking its place.  If humans have greater influence over their 
individual futures, ultimately more is at stake in the choices that are made, thereby increasing 
the perception of risk. The basis of this argument is that, because what we do on the planet is 
likely to affect us (and others, including future generations), this attaches greater meaning, 
significance, and risk to decisions.  In previous societies, in which a strong dependence on the 
supernatural prevailed, the future may have been feared or welcomed, but individuals’ 
perceptions of how they might personally affect that future was limited.  Unwelcome events, 
such as floods, lightning, or disease, were interpreted as resulting from the displeasure of God 
or the breaking of some taboo, rather than events that could be predicted, or the effects of 
which could be managed.  MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) have also suggested that 
primitive people had little control over their environments and faced many risks in everyday 
activities such as obtaining food and shelter.  Pre-figuring the arguments of Beck and 
Giddens, MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986, p. 4) claimed that, “while modern man has 
gained some control over his environment and may experience fewer risks in acquiring the 
basic necessities, a more complex environment has brought new risks”.  Global warming and 
an associated rise in sea level is probably the most obvious example of how humans may have 
contributed (albeit in a collective and unconscious fashion) to what may be the greatest risk to 
life on earth. 
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Furedi (1997), following Beck (1992), suggested that modern society has established safety as 
a fundamental value.  According to Furedi, risk is more prevalent in modern society because 
of a heightened sense of insecurity resulting from changes to social cohesion.  Furedi cites the 
breakdown of social collectives, including the family, and economic conditions that create an 
insecure work environment, as features contributing to a ‘culture of fear’, in which people are 
preoccupied with managing and, ultimately, minimising risk.  This preoccupation extends to 
include situations that were previously never considered unsafe.  Referring to a recent 
regulation preventing him from examining a female patient alone, Derbyshire (1997, p. 823) 
concurred with Furedi and lamented the influx of safety rules on the basis that they may 
promote distrust and even undermine desired outcomes.  He illustrated the proposition that his 
own profession had become risk and safety obsessed with the empirical observation that in the 
five years between 1967 and 1972, ‘risk’ was cited approximately 1,000 times in British 
medical journals; in the years between 1992 and 1997 80,000 references to the concept were 
observed (Derbyshire, 1997).  Although this appears to be strong evidence of an emphasis on 
risk in the medical profession, Derbyshire does not specify how this analysis was conducted, 
leaving open the possibility that there has also been a significant increase in the number of, or 
contributions to, medical journals in Britain. 
 
Furedi (1997) observed that the problem of insecurity is exacerbated by the breakdown of 
communities and the solidarity traditionally provided by religion, geographical immobility, 
and small community localities.  He argued that the relative weakness of institutions which 
previously linked individuals, contributes to a heightened sense of isolation and, 
consequently, a feeling of vulnerability.  According to Furedi (1997, p. 67), the current 
Western emphasis on health, safety, and security are the “products” of social isolation.  
Further, like Douglas (1992) and Wiedemann (1993), Furedi argued that the emphasis on 
safety is a mechanism for social control, providing a provisional solution to the problem of 
social cohesion.  According to Furedi, in some respects, the traditional morals of religion may 
have been replaced by the morality of safety.  In this sense, social norms are now transmitted 
through the discourse of risk.  Hence, the “dividing line today is not between practices that are 
normal or abnormal, or moral or immoral, but between [for example] sex that is safe and sex 
that is unsafe” (Furedi, 1997, p. 151).  In such a society, to ignore safety advice is “to 
transgress the new moral consensus” (Furedi, 1997, p. 4).  Luhmann (1993, p. 10) also 
emphasised the current moral power of the risk concept.  Further extending the religious 
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analogy, he described the preoccupation with risk calculation as “the secular counterpart to a 
repentance-minimization program”. 
 
That some Western societies exhibit a new preoccupation with risk was also observed by 
Douglas (1992), who explained the phenomenon in terms of the movement toward a global 
society.  Recent economic imperatives have drawn individuals away from local communities 
into regional, national and international markets.  According to Douglas, liberation from small 
community constraints can result in the loss of traditional protections, making individuals 
vulnerable.  Similarly, Dwyer (1991, p. 27), in his analysis of life and death at work, 
contended that the emergence of industrial society dismantled patterns of protection 
traditionally afforded through “community networks, family, ties to the land, and the guild 
system that were part of agricultural and craft traditions”.  This exposure and vulnerability 
loosely equates to a feeling of uncertainty or the perception of risk as proposed by Beck 
(1992) and Giddens (1994, 1998).  Douglas (1992) and Dwyer (1991) both implied that there 
has been a cultural shift towards concern for fairness and the development of political 
pressure to avoid exposing people to risk.  Such political pressure may then result in the types 
of health, safety and accident legislation to be discussed in Section 2.4.3.1, which then affects 
management perceptions of risk (discussed in Chapter 7). 
 
According to Douglas (1992), the concept of risk is well suited to a culture that supports a 
modern industrial society.  Of the different blaming systems evident in tribal societies, 
Douglas (1992, p. 15-16) argued that “the one we are in now is almost ready to treat every 
death as chargeable to someone’s account, every accident as caused by someone’s criminal 
negligence, every sickness a threatened prosecution”.  In this sense, Douglas has identified 
one of the consequences of a risk-oriented society, in which the identification and punishment 
of transgressors is part of the quest for safety. 
 
The theses of Beck, Giddens, Furedi and others are compelling, yet may be criticised on the 
basis that there is little research evidence to support them.  For the most part, these authors 
operate at the level of grand theory, and few links are made to how risk is experienced by 
individuals or social groups.  Several authors emphasise the breakdown of traditional 
institutions (such as the family, church, and tribe) as critical in exposing the individual to 
uncertainty, risk, and the responsibility for influencing life outcomes.  While there is clear 
evidence for less prescribed social roles and greater opportunities for social mobility, the ‘risk 
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society’ and ‘culture of fear’ theses do not acknowledge the power of modern institutions, 
such as commerce and the media, to shape and direct individual choices.  These institutions, it 
can be argued, also create a degree of social conformity, albeit based on different values and 
principles than those of traditional modernity.  Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the risk 
society thesis may have application to the present work, in understanding risk and risk 
management in natural resource recreation and tourism settings.  Section 2.3.4 explores 
possible evidence for the proposed social preoccupation with risk and safety through looking 
at some of the consequences of a risk-oriented society. 
 
2.3.4 Evidence of a risk-oriented society: The compelling need to warn 
The previous section established a claim that a new world-view of risk consciousness has a 
significant influence on many aspects of social life.  According to some authors, Western 
societies have become so risk averse that opportunities for exploration and discovery (at both 
the level of the individual and the wider community) are passed up in favour of conservative 
and safety conscious alternatives (Carpenter, 1995; Furedi, 1997).  If this observation is 
accurate, there are obvious implications for participation in, and management of, outdoor 
recreation and tourism, a subject of discussion in Chapter 4.  The current section considers 
some of the available evidence for the prominence of a concern for safety. 
 
2.3.4.1 Marketing safety and risk 
Trends in the marketing of products and services may be a useful indicator of the significance 
of risk and safety in some aspects of society.  Those who create advertisements, for instance, 
are usually familiar with what the public wants to see and hear about products.  Equally, the 
manufacturers responsible for the safety of these products recognise the modern consequences 
of poor safety performance. 
 
An appreciation of the current ‘risk culture’ is not restricted to compliance with an increasing 
number of, and scope for, safety regulations, but is also about meeting people’s expectations 
and gaining market advantage (Taig, 1998).  Safety, and the management of risks, has become 
big business, and a dimension of marketing household appliances, cars, and tourism 
destinations.  Taig (1998, p. 9) argued that, while safety and health have always been factors 
present in consumer decision-making, never before have they commanded such priority in 
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consumers’ choices.  The motor vehicle industry provides examples of this in sales 
promotions where features such as ‘ABS brakes’, ‘side intrusion bars’, and ‘driver / passenger 
airbags’ are prominent.  In New Zealand, these features are often more evident in the 
advertising than the individual specifications of the vehicle’s performance, suggesting that 
safety is a discourse that is widely understood and agreed upon.  Ironically, the increased 
emphasis on the safety features of motor vehicles comes at a time when the number of 
fatalities on New Zealand roads has reached a 30 year low (Statistics New Zealand, 2000).  
Notwithstanding the likelihood that a reduction in road deaths is influenced by factors other 
than the safety features of the vehicles (such as driver education, improvements in road 
design, the price of oil influencing the number of vehicles on the road, and the number of trips 
taken), consumers appear to demand higher safety protections than in the past. 
 
The health and insurance sectors are also major proponents of a developing concern for safety 
and risk reduction.  The public appears increasingly interested in both conventional medical 
technology and alternative means to reduce their chances of developing life-threatening 
diseases.  The media regularly report new evidence that certain products and activities either 
increase or decrease the risk of getting cancer, Alzheimer’s, diabetes, heart disease, or other 
ailments.  The evidence is sometimes contradictory, but nonetheless influential, readily 
absorbed by the public, as well as entrepreneurial manufacturers who recognise that consumer 
choices will be affected by the perceived health and safety benefits of their products.  Some 
recent examples of products and activities subject to contrasting expert opinion include the 
consumption of alcohol, red meat, aspirin, and undertaking vigorous exercise.  Giddens 
(1998) argued that these contradictory opinions of science, now in the public domain, 
contribute to uncertainty as individuals are faced with making decisions about what is safe or 
unsafe.  
 
In seeking some empirical evidence of what appears to be a demand for safety, Furedi (1997) 
observed that, in the United Kingdom, citizens’ concerns with the dangers of drinking water 
from the tap have resulted in sales of bottled water doubling between 1990 and 1995.  Further, 
Furedi reported that the average household expenditure on insurance doubled during the 
1990s.  The consumer response to perceived risk in these cases is clear, although the origins 
of the behaviour are less certain.  That is, rather than perceiving a risk, it is possible that 
people assume there must be risk since there is insurance for it, or there is a less risky product 
 36
available.  To this extent, the arguments of Furedi and others do not necessarily imply an 
increase in the social perception of risk, but do suggest a commitment to the value of safety. 
 
2.3.4.2 Proliferation of warnings 
Further evidence of the community’s preoccupation with health, safety and risk is illustrated 
by the proliferation of warnings accompanying products, services, and experiences 
(Edworthy, Stanton, & Hellier, 1995; Friedmann, 1988; King, 1997; Meehan, 1995; 
“Uncommon sense”, 1998).  From the traditional warning ‘slippery when wet’, to more 
specialised and detailed appeals for caution, manufacturers and service providers are 
increasingly aware of the legal and commercial consequences of faulty or dangerous products.  
Observing a “bombardment” of warnings in everyday life, Edworthy et al. (1995, p. 2147) 
anticipated that “over-warning” could soon be a problem, especially “given the product 
manufacturer’s desire to protect him or herself from expensive litigation”. 
 
Risk awareness appears to take on absurd dimensions in the United States where a recent 
article in Time International bemoaned the apparent loss of consumer discernment.  Among 
the warnings observed by the author of the article were a chainsaw instruction manual 
warning: “Do not attempt to stop chain with your hands”, and on a brand of household iron: 
“Do not iron clothes on body” (“Uncommon sense”, 1998, p. 83).  Similarly, another 
columnist records her impressions of the warnings and cautions included in the instructions 
for a toaster purchased in the United States:  “Do not use appliance except as intended”, and 
“Do not place any part of this toaster under water or other liquid” are among those she 
mentions (King, 1997, p. 84).  That it was considered necessary to identify these inappropriate 
uses of a household toaster illustrates the extent to which some manufacturers fear legal or 
commercial repercussions following the misuse of their products.  According to McCarthy et 
al. (1995), the product safety standards used in the United States, and the safety literature in 
general, has taken a ‘warn about every hazard guideline’, rather than leave correct usage in 
the hands of the responsible consumer.  Adopting a slightly different perspective, Wogalter 
and Laughery (1996) partially justified the proliferation of warnings by claiming that in 
today’s high technology society, warnings have become more necessary: “Products, 
equipment, tools, and the environment have become more complex; how they work, their 
composition, and their inherent hazards are frequently not obvious” (1996, p. 33). 
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The willingness of manufacturers and other producers to warn consumers of the possible 
dangers inherent in the use of their products may have little to do with concern for consumer 
welfare.  Jungermann, Schütz and Thüring (1998), for instance, contended that information 
given to consumers of pharmaceutical drugs is less about patient safety than it is about the 
manufacturer’s legal risk.  From their analysis of patient package inserts (PPIs) accompanying 
medicines, the authors concluded that: 
Little effort is spent in industry on optimizing the communication with respect to 
the potential reader’s comprehension and utilization of the information.  The 
reason might be that PPIs are primarily written to protect the producer against 
lawsuits, not to guarantee understanding and proper use by the patient 
(Jungermann et al., 1998, p. 217). 
 
In many parts of the Western world there is strong legislation in place to protect citizens and, 
in some countries, to ensure litigation against those whose products or services are found to 
be unsafe or dangerous through negligence (Glassey, 1998; Hanna, 1991; Taig, 1998; 
Wildavsky, 1988).  This may have contributed to a recent increase in people’s expectation of 
protection, feelings of entitlement, and awareness of their rights (Brown, 1987; Fischhoff, 
1985; Taig, 1998), and an associated rise in the cost of compensation, particularly in highly 
litigious societies (Hanna, 1991).  Slovic et al. (1981) also observed an increasing pressure on 
the designers and regulators of hazardous enterprises to inform people about risks to which 
they may be exposed.  It is possible that one result of a high level of paternalism may 
contribute to a culture of expectation of others taking responsibility for risk and safety, and 
one in which risk tolerance is low. 
 
2.3.5 Interim summary 
At a time when life expectancies and standards of living have never been better, people in 
Western society appear increasingly preoccupied with risk (Dwyer, 1991; Furedi, 1997; 
Hanna, 1991; Lübbe, 1993; Slovic, 1999; Wildavsky, 1988; Wren, 1997).  This apparent 
contradiction has been explained by various sociologists who argue that risk and safety have 
attained status through the breakdown of social institutions and the rise of individualism.  An 
increasingly individualised society means that social members have a much greater role in 
constructing their own life outcomes.  In the new reflexive modernity, the 
opportunities, hazards and ambivalences of biography which once could be 
coped with in the family unit, in the village community, and by recourse to the 
social class or group, increasingly have to be grasped, interpreted and dealt with 
by the individual alone (Beck, 1996, p. 30). 
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If Beck’s analysis is accepted, it is also reasonable to suggest that, in this individuated milieu, 
people will feel more responsible and accountable for their life outcomes, and yet less certain 
about their futures.  A preoccupation with risk and safety may also be related to increased 
expectations of life chances, and demands for individual rights, entitlements, blame, and 
compensation.  If, as several authors suggest, fewer people interpret life’s outcomes 
(especially negative ones) as fate, it seems plausible that they will emphasise things that 
represent obstacles to health, wealth, and safety.  Furthermore, in societies with a strong 
communal ethos, the continued existence of the community might ‘justify’ some individual 
loss.  To take an extreme example, the loss of individuals during a period of famine helps 
sustain the community by reducing the overall demand for resources.  In a society where 
individualism is the norm, however, the unit of survival becomes the individual and, 
therefore, levels of risk that threaten the well-being of the individual are no longer deemed 
‘acceptable’. 
 
The argument for a risk conscious society premised on the notion of growing individual 
responsibility is a compelling one.  Perceptions of responsibility and choice may well lead to 
a sense of uncertainty, but the relationship with individualism is less clear.  Although 
paradoxical, it is also possible to argue that increased risk perceptions among members of 
society will mobilise people into collectivities, such as those groups concerned about the risks 
associated with environmental pollution, genetically modified food, and the effects of 
telecommunication towers in residential areas.  While a risk and safety conscious society is, in 
part, formed by increased individual responsibility, it is also possible that the resultant risk 
perception will create collective outcomes, rather than erode them. That is, if individuals’ 
lives are more focused on risk, one might expect this to strengthen links between individuals.  
To a certain extent, this is not incompatible with what Furedi (1997) referred to as the ‘new 
moral consensus’ of safety, yet he (and others) also argued that such ‘consensus’ is only 
provisional, presumably because the modern institutions upon which it is based are more 
transient and fragile than in the past. 
 
The risk society thesis is also based on the notion that people today must construct their own 
biographies from a plurality of possible futures.  This implies the absence of institutional or 
other influences on life outcomes.  While it is apparent that modern social arrangements allow 
individuals to control aspects of their own futures, biographies cannot be constructed without 
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the support and cooperation of other people and organisations.  Today’s society is one of 
choices, the outcomes of which individuals will bear, but because these outcomes are also 
reliant on other people, some of the control is relinquished.  Hence an implicit social contract 
may operate where individuals relinquish some control of their lives, and in return have high 
expectations of their keepers. 
 
The phenomenon of an increasing individualism coupled with a reduced willingness to accept 
some risks appears paradoxical, yet can be understood in terms of the likely contractual 
expectations held by members of society.  While it can be argued that, in a ‘pure’ 
individualised society, no one member would expect anything from any other, in reality 
individuals are dependent on others for specialised knowledge, including information about 
risk, in order that decisions can be made.  Individualism may be about freedom and choice, 
but choices cannot be made, nor depended upon, if trustworthy information is not available.  
Individualism, therefore, requires a social world in which there is a social contract binding 
members to supply information.  Hence, there is no real paradox between increasing 
individualism and readiness to blame others for misfortune, but members of many Western 
societies do demand access to accurate information relating to decisions they will make 
affecting their safety. 
 
The risk society is characterised by freedom and choice over a number of life spheres, 
previously highly prescribed.  Sociological explanations for the rise of risk focus on the 
fragmentation of collective values, and the subsequent emphasis on individualism.  One 
consequence of this is increased uncertainty, a key determinant of risk.  With individualism 
comes an associated demand for accountability and responsibility as individuals face 
potentially significant losses (social, physical, and financial) as a result of their own decisions 
and those they ‘delegate’ to others.  In response to increasing uncertainty, demand for 
accountability, and reduced risk tolerance, a new science in risk assessment and risk 
management has emerged.  Where prayer, ritual, and superstition once stood, now risk 
management and hazard mitigation strategies prevail. 
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2.4 Controlling risk: Management, legislation, and acceptance 
Whatever we do, there is a chance that something will go wrong.  But whereas at 
one time people regarded the future as purely a matter of chance, known only to 
the gods, now we can work with uncertainty.  We can manage risk, and manage 
it rationally (Elms, 1998a, p. 1). 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Given the apparent importance of risk in some Western societies, it is inevitable that 
considerable effort should go into controlling or limiting exposure to it.  Societies which seek 
to reduce their exposure to negative outcomes will attempt to develop systems and processes 
for achieving this aim.  Now common in the discourse of Western communities, the term ‘risk 
management’ is evident in areas as diverse as outdoor recreation and education, financial 
advising, engineering, and politics.  Risk management uses the tools of technical science, 
involving application of mathematical probability, to maximise gains and reduce exposure to 
loss.  This section begins with an outline of the basic elements of, and justification for, the 
risk management process.  The legislative context for risk management is then described, 
followed by a discussion on risk acceptability. 
 
2.4.2 Risk management 
Risk management is an emerging management science that first attracted the interest of 
academics in the 1970s (Rejda, 1998; Sutton, 1989).  Since that time, the demand for the 
services of safety professionals in countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the 
United States, Great Britain, and France has grown exponentially (Dwyer, 1991).  This 
demand corresponds to increasing public concern for risk and safety in a variety of contexts 
(including personal, industrial, environmental, and financial), and the development of health 
and safety legislation throughout the Western world (refer to Section 2.4.3.1). 
 
The essence of risk management revolves around the principles of identifying, assessing, and 
removing (or reducing) risks to the individual or agency perceived to be under threat 
(AS/NZS, 1999; Bamford, 1987; Batt, 1996; Bernstein, 1996; Direnfeld-Michael, 1989; 
Fullagar, 1996; Gough, 1998a; Hamilton-Smith, 1996; Keey, 1998; Leiss & Chociolko, 1994 
Rejda, 1998).  Such a systematic approach to risk management has only been possible since 
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the development of probability theory (Bernstein, 1996; Elms, 1998a; Wiedemann, 1993).  
For instance, it was necessary to understand several dimensions of probability in order to gain 
predictive power and, thus, reduce uncertainty.  In particular, understanding the structural 
elements of any given situation is critical to the rational management of risk.  That is, the 
built-in properties of any situation, such as the two sides of a coin, must be known before the 
likelihood of separate outcomes can be estimated.  Also critical to reducing uncertainty 
through prediction is knowledge of the frequency of any given event (such as lightning, flood, 
disease, or a coin landing ‘heads up’), which necessitates the ability to count and record.  
Comprehension of these elements allowed the likelihood of various events (and, therefore, the 
risk exposure) to be estimated (Elms, 1998a), and created the potential for a massive 
insurance industry. 
 
Today, the most common form of risk management is insurance (Rejda, 1998), a custom that 
is essentially a risk purchasing or risk leasing arrangement between two parties.  Many 
individuals now pay insurers to accept the financial risks associated with property, death, 
health, and employment.  Until the late 18th century, however, insurance was generally 
considered immoral, and more a gamble than a rational way of dealing with risks 
(Wiedemann, 1993).  Wiedemann implied that the immorality of insurance lay in its similarity 
to gambling, yet it seems just as possible that its basis was in the idea that insurance 
effectively reduced risk and ultimately sheltered people from some of the consequences of 
their actions. 
 
Beyond the insurance industry, the risk management process is applied to a plethora of 
situations in which undesired or unexpected outcomes could be significant.  Formalised risk 
management has emerged as a strategic process undertaken by a range of groups and 
organisations with the intention of protecting against threats that are considered to represent 
unacceptable or unsustainable losses (Elms, 1998a). 
 
2.4.3 The legal context for risk management 
Another important aspect of controlling exposure to risks, and apportioning responsibility for 
risk, is the legislative context.  Societies create laws that bind their citizens to act in ways that 
protect each society’s interests.  As in other spheres of life, laws governing risk have been 
developed in most parts of the world in the form of health and safety legislation.  This section 
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provides a brief overview and discussion of the development of health and safety legislation.  
In Chapter 4, specific consideration is given to the legislation affecting the management of 
natural resource recreation and tourism. 
 
2.4.3.1 Health and safety legislation 
The most obvious example of health and safety legislation is that which protects workers from 
harm while at work.  Dwyer (1991) reviewed much of the history of such legislation in 
Western economies, and concluded that the adoption of laws strongly reflects political and 
economic imperatives, and not simply a direct concern for the well being of employees.  
According to Dwyer (1991, p. 67), legislative changes occur in response to “social 
movements, satisfying political compromises..., suppressing technical accident causes, or 
simply providing a market for new prevention techniques”.  Dwyer (1991, p. 50) identified 
the phrase “safety pays big dividends” as illustrative of the motives of many industrial and 
manufacturing employers who adopt safer practices and techniques for their workers.  
Economic interests can be protected through reducing the costs of disasters such as those that 
were common in factories and mines in the early to mid twentieth century (Dwyer, 1991). 
 
Impetus for safer work practices has also been political.  Social movements in the 1960s and 
1970s forced industrial safety out of a hitherto private and invisible realm into the public 
arena, revealing safety and compensation systems as seriously deficient (Dwyer 1991).  By 
the end of the 1970s, the social demand for improvements to workplace safety (in 
combination with economic and other political motives) had led many Western democracies 
to re-address health and safety at work (Dwyer, 1991; Wren, 1997).  The common outcome 
for many of these societies was to increase the state’s role as a creator and administrator of 
standards. 
 
Like other Western nations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, New Zealand society demanded 
improvements to injury prevention and compensation systems.  Rather than address the 
legislation governing workplace practice, however, a different path was adopted.  In 1972, no-
fault legislation was passed under the Accident Compensation Act, creating a system that 
provided a universal, state-operated scheme to compensate all victims of accidents, both work 
and non-work related.  According to Dwyer (1991) this system represented an 
acknowledgement that accidents and injuries are produced by social processes, rather than 
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directly attributable to individuals who suffer their consequences.  As such, the responsibility 
for the production of accidents becomes that of the society as a whole (Dwyer, 1991). 
 
Developments in health and safety (injury prevention vis a vis compensation) legislation in 
New Zealand took longer to emerge than in other industrially advanced countries.  In part, this 
may have been a consequence of a robust compensation system in place since 1974.  To a 
degree, this system may have hindered injury prevention legislation because of the 
comprehensive compensation available giving employers few economic incentives to be 
proactive about health and safety at work (Wren, 1997).  Wren claimed that when change did 
occur in New Zealand, it was driven by demands from several sectors, including trade unions 
(who sought extensions to workers’ rights), employers (who were frustrated by perceived 
duplication and conflict among existing regulations), and Occupational Safety and Health 
Unit (OSH) officials (who saw merit in updating the legislation in line with overseas 
developments).  While not all interests evident in these demands were satisfied, this pressure 
eventually led to the passing of the Health and Safety in Employment Act (1992). 
 
The development of legislation that addressed the health and safety of workers and the 
general public affected by work, had several important implications for recreation and tourism 
(Davidson, 1996; Heilbronn, 1992; Hughes-Johnson, 1996; Martin, 2000).  These are 
discussed in Chapter 7.  At a broader level, the legislative changes (both in New Zealand and 
elsewhere) reflected a growing public awareness of risks, rights, and responsibilities (Brown, 
1987; Taig, 1998).  A tension is also evident between growing individual responsibility (such 
as economic independence for health, education, and retirement), and increased expectation of 
organisational accountability (Hanna, 1991; Smith, 1998).  The New Zealand health and 
safety legislation allows for these constructs to coexist. 
 
2.4.4 Acceptance of, and responsibility for, risk 
Two final dimensions are important to consider in this introductory chapter on risk.  Given 
that risk is about potential loss, it is necessary to examine the extent to which those exposed 
accept the potential losses, and who might be expected to take responsibility for any negative 
outcomes. 
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Various authors have argued that risks taken voluntarily, or where some outcomes are under 
personal control, are more socially acceptable than those to which people are exposed without 
knowledge (Bean, 1989; Gregory et al., 1997; Horswill & McKenna 1999; Singer & Endreny, 
1993).  Leiss and Chociolko (1994) explained the public’s concern about risks (even when 
experts rate the technical risk as low) in terms of voluntariness and compensation.  According 
to these authors, people fear “falling victim unfairly to uncompensated loss” (Leiss & 
Chociolko, 1994, p. 4).  To accept risk voluntarily implies some control over, and 
responsibility for, the outcome.  Conversely, the involuntary exposure to risk carries with it 
serious repercussions concerning moral and legal responsibilities, and the question of 
compensation for any actual damage, loss, or injury resulting from exposure. 
 
Leiss and Chociolko (1994, pp. 33-34) proposed three conditions for judging risk as 
acceptable: i) the level of risk should be below some threshold; ii) benefits must appear to 
outweigh risks; and iii) there should be no unjust distribution of risks and benefits.  These 
specifications reflect the social values of many Western democracies, yet can be interpreted as 
somewhat idealistic.  For instance, it is unclear how risk thresholds are decided, or whether 
risks avoided are greater than new risks generated through exposure.  Cost – benefit 
calculations are also fraught, especially given that these will often accrue differentially, and 
because a benefit to one party may represent a cost to another.  Further, Leiss and Chociolko 
argued that the ultimate objective is to achieve a ‘reasonable’ societal consensus on how to 
assess and manage risks.  Such a consensus is likely to be problematic given that risk is a 
highly politicised construct.  It may be as fraught as obliterating ‘crime’ (constantly 
redefined), or agreeing once and for all, on the ‘best’ policies of governance.  Where there is 
risk, there are choices; and where there is choice, there is interest.  Interest is the source of all 
politics. 
 
Unlike the calculation of risk itself, risk acceptability is based, not on probability, but on 
moral and political considerations (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  Sjöberg (1987) also argued 
that, while conditions for acceptability can be suggested, there is no such thing as an absolute 
level of acceptability.  This is largely because it is typically impossible to reach agreement on 
what the risk is, the likelihood of its occurrence, and the magnitude of its consequences.  
Furthermore, Gough (1998b) suggested that a risk can only be deemed ‘acceptable’ by the 
risk taker and is, therefore, related to perceived risk.  To this extent, “the concept of 
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acceptable risk requires that people are aware of the risk, that they understand the risk, and 
that its acceptance is consistent with their personal value system” (Gough, 1998b, p. 26). 
 
Another important feature of the nature of any particular risk is the degree to which it is 
perceived to be within the control of the people it affects.  Horswill and McKenna (1999) 
investigated the effect of perceived control on risk acceptance by assigning subjects in an 
experimental setting to the respective roles of vehicle driver and passenger.  These researchers 
found that “those who were told to imagine they were driving chose significantly faster 
speeds than did those who were told to imagine they were passengers” (Horswill & McKenna 
1999, p. 377).  This implies that those who perceive greater control (ie., the drivers) accept a 
higher level of risk than those who perceive less control (ie., the passengers). 
 
In addition to ‘voluntariness’ and ‘controllability’, Jungermann and Slovic (1993) add 
‘accountability’ as an important feature affecting individual risk acceptance.  The nature of 
any given risk has an important effect on how people perceive responsibility for it.  
Jungermann and Slovic (1993, p. 94) claimed that “technologies for which we can find the 
guilty parties… excite our indignation much more than natural risks, which we tend to accept 
as inevitable”.  Similarly, Lee (1981, p. 13) noted that when the cause is human and the 
outcome adverse, “we tend to attribute responsibility, and hence blame, proportionately to the 
various agents”.  Much stronger blame is attributed if the risks have been imposed, rather than 
accepted voluntarily. 
 
Responsibility for risk, or the adverse consequences of risky actions, often falls on 
governments or other institutions, including those in the private sector.  For instance, 
insurance companies accept some responsibility for risks (such as natural and accidental 
death, damage to property, and loss of income) in return for the payment of regular premiums.  
Society also assumes a degree of responsibility for the risks taken by its members in a variety 
of other ways.  A publicly funded health system, for instance, deals with some of the 
consequences of smoking cigarettes, a behaviour known to increase the risk of several cancers 
and heart disease.  The cost of this risk is borne by society as a whole, although some attempt 
at redistribution is effected through the imposition of targeted taxes on cigarettes and tobacco. 
The smokers themselves therefore assume a greater proportion of the financial risk. 
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A common indicator of responsibility is the voluntariness of the risk exposure (Laughery, 
Lovvoll, & Wogalter, 1995; Leiss & Chociolko, 1994; Singer & Endreny, 1993).  Individuals 
may be expected to accept responsibility for risks to which they are voluntarily exposed, 
while others may be held accountable when risk exposure is involuntary.  Using this 
framework, it might, therefore, seem reasonable to hold individuals accountable for the effects 
of smoking cigarettes, driving too fast, or contracting AIDS through unprotected sex.  It is 
less likely that, as a society, we would expect the same risk acceptance for those hotel 
employees exposed to passive smoking, or patients contracting AIDS through blood 
transfusions. 
 
There are, naturally, several factors that confound the voluntary / involuntary dichotomy 
concerning responsibility for risk.  For instance, it can be difficult to determine the extent to 
which individuals are aware of risks associated with actions taken voluntarily.  Prior to the 
1960s, for example, smoking cigarettes was not considered a serious health risk, and was even 
recommended by some doctors as a form of relaxation (Giddens, 1994).  Furthermore, the 
addictive nature of nicotine contained in tobacco smoke raises the question of voluntary 
control, and, therefore, responsibility for one’s actions.  Exposure to risk, and the extent to 
which individuals or groups accept responsibility for risk, is also highly dependent on 
effective communication, a subject of interest in Chapter 3. 
 
2.5 Chapter summary and conclusions 
This chapter has presented a broad discussion on the nature and significance of risk in 
Western democratic societies.  A review of the literature suggests that risk is a relatively 
modern concept, only applicable to societies of the last few centuries.  Risk and its 
management is now prominent in a wide variety of contexts including technical and scientific, 
financial, legal, and personal arenas.  Despite the fact that risks are never taken without the 
possibility of some ‘gain’, most usage of the term ‘risk’ is associated exclusively with ‘loss’, 
and as something to avoid in many areas of contemporary life.  Since about 1970, there has 
been an increasing public awareness of risk, and an associated aversive reaction to its 
presence.  These perceptions (further explored in Chapter 3) are reflected in the various 
legislative arrangements emerging throughout the Western world at around the same time, and 
the increased public expectations concerning the safety of products and services consumed.  
To a certain extent this is linked to a growing individualism in Western societies in which 
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people are exposed to the consequences of their own decisions and choices to a much greater 
degree than in previous societies, in which the lives of citizens were largely prescribed 
through qualities such as class, gender, and race.  
 
A new social contract may also be emerging - that of greater expectation of public and private 
officials to be accountable for the public consequences of their actions (Fischhoff, 1985).  
Members of Western democracies are demanding greater safety, security, and assuredness 
across multiple sectors of society.  The growing significance of risk in Western society has 
important implications for the management of recreation and tourism in natural settings, 
especially those areas in which potentially hazardous conditions inhere.  These implications 
and consequences form a large part of the discussion presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis, and 
re-emerge in later analytical sections.  The following chapter (Chapter 3) builds on the 
discussion presented above, and specifically addresses aspects of risk perception and risk 
communication. 
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Chapter 3 Risk perception and communication 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the scientific assessment of risk was discussed as part of an introduction to the 
concept of risk.  ‘Objective risk’, and ‘real risk’ were described as part of the technical 
vocabulary of experts who make rational risk calculations.  When public perceptions of risks 
are discrepant with these assessments, perceptions have traditionally been dismissed as 
irrational, and of limited value to decision makers (Fischhoff, 1995; Lee, 1981; Rohrmann, 
1996; Slovic, 1999).  Irrespective of the actual presence of risk, however, it is the perception 
of risk that will govern the behaviour of individuals.  Furthermore, if the seriousness of the 
risk or hazard is the subject of discussion (as distinct from its likelihood of occurrence), 
public judgements can be considered essential, since social and moral values are the ultimate 
criteria for determining significance (Lee, 1981). 
 
Having established a recent social tendency towards risk aversion (Chapter 2), it is now useful 
to examine some of the concepts associated with the individual’s perception of risk, and how 
hazards and risks are communicated.  This chapter begins with a general definition and 
discussion of risk perception, including consideration of those risks perceived as most 
significant by the public.  This is followed by a section in which the various dimensions 
influencing perception and risk-taking are identified and discussed.  The rather limited 
literature on risk perception in the context of recreation and tourism is then introduced.  The 
final part of the chapter examines risk communication, including aspects of message 
effectiveness, warning compliance, and factors affecting these.  Available literature specific to 
communication in tourism and recreation is reviewed.  This chapter extends the risk theme 
established in Chapter 2 and prepares a basis for the discussion on risk in the management of 
recreation and tourism presented in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1.1 Perception 
Perception is a branch of cognitive psychology concerned with how the individual comes to 
know his or her environment through the information received via the sense organs.  The term 
‘perception’ is applied to a wide range of phenomena, including the perception of an object as 
present in the environment, recognition of familiar features (such as a face or landscape), and 
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intuitive feelings based on the information available (such as perceived safety, or perceived 
hostility of a place). 
 
Perceptions are important to understand because, as the judgements, attitudes and beliefs held 
about the external environment, perceptions are considered to influence behaviour (Fishbein 
& Manfredo, 1992; McGuire, 1985; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Tobin & Montz, 1997).  Yet, while 
these assessments are individual in construction and expression, perception is more accurately 
understood as subject to both social and cognitive dimensions.  While cognitive psychology 
traditionally emphasised the role of the individual, there is now wide recognition of cognition 
as a social activity, combining information processing strategies and socio-cultural 
dimensions (Forgas, 1981; Langer, 1989; Moscardo, 1996; Philipchalk, 1995).  To this extent, 
it is not possible to understand cognition outside of its social context, nor is the study of 
society complete without acknowledgement of the cognitive efforts of individuals (Forgas, 
1981).  In this chapter, perception is considered to be the product of the combined action of 
individual thought processes and the permeating features of society and culture. 
 
3.2 Risk Perception 
Risk perception is the process through which individuals form impressions about threats to 
the things they value.  These perceptions are influenced by experience, personality traits, and 
social norms and, therefore, also connote subjectivity.  Risk perceptions, then, as experienced 
by individuals, are not technical calculations, a fact that frustrates some experts in terms of the 
usefulness of public risk perception data in informing decision making (Rohrmann, 1996). 
 
It is important to emphasise that the term ‘perception’ has a variety of applications in the 
context of risk and hazard, including assessment, attitude, and awareness.  McCool and 
Braithwaite (1992, p. 304) observed that “the term has come to represent such widely varying 
concepts as cognition, knowledge, decision-making and choice behavior”.  Consistent with its 
multifaceted nature, Rayner (1993, p. 199) argued that risk perception “must be regarded as a 
broad term encompassing a range of social behaviors and preferences, as well as stricter 
issues of the cognition of probability and the magnitude of consequences”. 
 
The study of risk perception covers a wide variety of topics and discipline areas.  Subjects of 
discussion include topics as diverse as the perceived risks among cigarette smokers, 
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adolescents, pregnant women, motor vehicle drivers, recreationists, and employees at nuclear 
power plants.  The following section reviews some of the main research findings in the risk 
perception literature. 
 
3.2.1 Research in risk perception 
The study of risk perception is typically associated with one of two approaches, each of which 
places greater or lesser emphasis on the importance of individual or socio-cultural influences 
in understanding risk perception.  By far the most prolific body of work has been within the 
‘psychometric paradigm’.  This approach is characterised by attempts to make quantitative 
judgements about the perceived risk associated with a diverse range of hazards.  A smaller 
number of academics have proposed a cultural theory for understanding risk perception and 
risk taking behaviour.  Proponents of cultural theory have argued that risk perceptions cannot 
be isolated from the social and cultural contexts (Lupton, 1999).  Douglas (1992), through 
whom this perspective is most widely recognised, has argued that risks, rather than being 
cognitive aids for the individual decision-maker, are more accurately interpreted as shared 
conventions which support particular worldviews (Douglas, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Rayner & Cantor, 1999; Wildavsky & Dake, 1998).  The psychometric and cultural 
theory approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive explanations.  Differences between 
the approaches relate less to the specific risk perceptions identified than to the factors that 
determine these (see Section 3.3). 
 
The risk perception literature is dominated by the psychometric paradigm, and in particular 
the studies of Paul Slovic and associates, whose multiple works on risk perception focus 
primarily on understanding how people characterise risk, the accuracy of public perceptions 
of risk, attitudes toward risk acceptability, and how knowledge about risk perception can 
contribute to effective policy (Barnett & Breakwell, 2001; Kasperson & Dow, 1993; Lupton, 
1999; Marris, Langford, Saunderson, & O’Riodan, 1997; Slovic, 2000) .  The research 
undertaken by Slovic and others has typically adopted a psychometric scaling approach to 
produce quantitative assessments of risk and hazard perception.  The principal focus of the 
research has been to investigate public judgements of hazardous activities, substances, and 
technologies (Jungermann, & Slovic, 1993; Slovic, 1998, 1999, 2000; Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1985, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d).  The results of this work, 
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and others within this paradigm, have allowed several broad conclusions to be drawn about 
the public’s risk perceptions.  These conclusions are outlined below. 
 
One conclusion from the psychometric studies is that risk perception can be represented by 
three primary factors (Goszczynska et al., 1991; Hartenian, Bobko, & Berger, 1993; Mullet, 
Duquesnoy, Raiff, Fahrasmane, & Namur, 1993; Slovic et al., 1980, 2000c).  The first factor 
has been termed ‘dread risk’ (Slovic et al., 1980), and includes characteristics of severity, 
dread, and catastrophic potential of particular hazards.  The second factor is ‘unknown risk’, 
characterised by the degree to which the specific hazard is “unknown to those exposed, 
unknown to science, unfamiliar, and involuntary” (Goszczynska, et al., 1991, p. 182).  A third 
factor, less frequently reported, relates to the ‘number of people thought to be affected’ by the 
hazard (Mullet et al., 1993; Slovic et al., 1981).  The order of these factors differs between 
studies, but dread risk and unknown risk consistently occupy the highest rankings.  What this 
means is that, among members of the public, the highest risk perceptions are held for those 
hazards that involve severe, immediate and dreaded consequences beyond the understanding 
and management of individuals and experts, and to which exposure is involuntary.  Hazards 
affecting large numbers of people also receive high risk estimates from the public.  Consistent 
with these factors, members of the public have typically rated the risks associated with 
nuclear power and pesticides as the greatest (Kasperson & Dow, 1993; Slovic et al., 2000c) 
 
Another common outcome of risk perception research has been the identification of group 
differences in risk perception.  Researchers have found differences in perception between 
variables such as age (Bromiley & Curley, 1992; Deery, 1999), gender (Flynn, Slovic, & 
Mertz, 1994; Gustafson, 1998; Mesch, 2000), culture and nationality (Eiser & Arnold, 1999; 
Goszczynska et al., 1991; Rohrmann, 1996; Sokolowska & Tyszka, 1995), knowledge 
(Johnston, 1995; Wildavsky & Dake, 1998), and others (Barnett & Breakwell, 2001).  While 
not conclusive, many studies have suggested that risk perception increases with age, women 
have higher risk perceptions than men, and those with more self-reported knowledge of the 
specific risk have lower risk perceptions. 
 
A third prominent finding in the risk research has established that the public does not see risk 
in the same way as the experts (Elms, 1998b; Gregory et al., 1997; Kasperson & Dow, 1993; 
Kemp, 1993; Lee, 1981; Leiss & Chociolko, 1994; Paton, Smith, & Johnston, 2000; 
Rohrmann, 1996; Slovic et al., 1981, 2000d).  The public – expert disparity is important to 
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examine because, while the risk assessments of experts help direct policy and risk 
management decisions, the perceptions of the public reflect important social and moral values 
and will direct behaviour.  The literature is also relevant to the current study given its 
attention to both public (park visitor) perceptions of risk, and those of managers and policy 
makers. 
 
The most documented example of the difference in risk assessments of experts and the public 
is the observation that the risks that kill are not necessarily the ones that people fear (K.C. 
Cole, 1998; Furedi 1997; Jungermann & Slovic, 1993; Rohrmann, 1996).  Public – expert 
disparities are typified by the former’s underestimation of many voluntary risks (such as 
driving a car, smoking cigarettes, high cholesterol diets, immoderate alcohol consumption, 
and lack of exercise), and overestimation of involuntary risks (such as air pollution, food 
additives, genetic engineering, and generation of nuclear energy) (Leiss & Chociolko, 1994).  
Furthermore, the public often overestimates the risk of high magnitude, low frequency events 
(such as a nuclear accident or jet airliner crash) and underestimates the less dramatic, slow to 
accumulate risks (such as those associated with smoking and weight gain) (K.C. Cole, 1998; 
Fischhoff, 1985; Lee, 1981; Singer & Endreny, 1993; Slovic, et al., 1981, 1982, 2000b; 
Wildavsky, 1993). 
 
Multiple reasons have been suggested for the differences in public risk and expert risk 
assessments, several of which relate directly to the factors influencing individual risk 
perception discussed in Section 3.3 below, including incomplete and sometimes contradictory 
data, complex theories, and unwillingness of some experts to understand public concerns 
(Elms, 1998a; Leiss & Chociolko, 1994).  Kasperson and Dow (1993) suggested that the 
public has difficulty with technical risk, especially the assessment of infrequent but high 
consequence risks.  This is supported by studies, such as those reported by Slovic et al. 
(2000c), on drivers’ use of seatbelts and the public’s insurance behaviour. 
 
Jungermann and Slovic (1993) explained the difference between lay and expert risk 
perception in terms of the cognitive processes used to assess risk.  While expert assessments 
are made using algorithmic methods, the general public tend to rely on heuristic procedures 
such as the prominence or availability of events.  If an event is easy to imagine or recall, its 
occurrence will be judged more likely.  This inferential strategy is known as the ‘availability 
heuristic’, and helps explain why risk perceptions are often inaccurate (Kasperson & Dow, 
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1993; Slovic, 2000; Slovic, et al., 1980, 2000b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a, 1982b).  Hence 
a recent child abduction reported in the media, is likely to increase the perceived risk of 
another kidnapping to higher levels than occur when there have been no similar recent events. 
 
3.3 Dimensions of risk perception 
The literature on risk perception is broad and dispersed across many disciplinary areas.  
Common fields of interest include management and decision-making, technological and 
environmental risk, engineering, finance and insurance and, in fact, virtually any aspect of 
human endeavour in which decisions must be 
made.  Despite the varied disciplinary contexts 
and applications, risk perceptions can be 
organised along common dimensions.  These 
dimensions are shown in Figure 3.1, using a 
framework adapted from Tobin and Montz 
(1997).  The dimensions of risk perception are 
classified as situational (physical environment 
and social environment) or individual 
(experiential, cognitive, and personality disposition).  This model is appropriate for 
understanding risk perception because it acknowledges the combined influences of individual 
information processing, personality traits, and social conditioning.  While each dimension of 
the model is depicted as discrete, in reality none is entirely independent of the others.  The 
factors overlap and interact to create individual risk perceptions.  The dimensions are 
discussed below. 
 
3.3.1 Situational factors affecting risk perception 
The situational dimension comprises both the physical and social aspects of the individual’s 
environment.  In the context of natural hazards, physical aspects include features such as the 
potential dangers observed, their estimated frequency, severity and controllability.  Social 
factors are varied, and include social demographic characteristics, cultural attitudes to risk, 
hazard and risk communication, the influence of media, and social norms. 
 
 
Adapted from Tobin and Montz, 1997 
SITUATIONAL 
Physical 
Social 
RISK  
PERCEPTION 
  
IINDIVIDUAL 
Experience 
Cognition 
Disposition 
 
Figure 3.1: Dimensions of risk perception 
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3.3.1.1 Physical environment 
The physical environment refers to the characteristics of the specific hazard, such as its 
physical nature, magnitude, frequency and duration.  Individuals’ perceptions of serious 
earthquake risk, for instance, are likely to be influenced by personal knowledge of the 
temporal distribution of major earthquakes (Tobin & Montz, 1997).  Lee (1981) claimed that 
the potential size of a single catastrophe has important influences on the public’s perception 
of its seriousness.  For instance, despite public acceptance that accidents at nuclear power 
plants are unlikely, their perceptions seem heavily influenced by how devastating the accident 
would be if it occurred.  Slovic et al. (1981) reported physical situational factors affecting risk 
perception to include the number of people exposed to the hazard, immediacy of threat, and 
threat to future generations. 
 
3.3.1.2 Social environment 
In their discussion of risk perceptions, Tobin and Montz (1997) identified the socio-economic 
environment as an important influence.  This included individual characteristics such as age, 
gender, and experience with hazard, as well as education, religion, household size, and 
income.  These latter features are used to help explain the hazard perceptions and responses of 
people who reside in high risk areas, such as those areas prone to hurricanes, floods, and 
earthquakes.  While not identified by Tobin and Montz, these factors are also likely to 
contribute to hazard or risk perception through influencing attitudes and beliefs, as well as 
through the different responsibilities and obligations that accompany some social 
characteristics.  For example, the circumstances of each individual’s life (such as 
responsibility for children or other dependants), as well as wider social or cultural safety 
norms, are likely to affect his or her assessment of loss potential and magnitude.  Tobin and 
Montz did not discuss other social situational factors which are also important to consider in 
the formulation of risk perceptions.  The model (Figure 3.1) has been adapted to incorporate 
these. 
 
The adapted model goes beyond socio-economic variables, and incorporates micro- and 
macro- features of the individual’s social world.  For instance, individual risk perceptions are 
likely to be influenced by the actions and responses of other people in the specified risk 
context.  These might include the direct actions of officials or managers, media portrayal of 
events, or the behaviour of fellow residents or visitors.  Furthermore, the broad social context 
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or cultural disposition toward risk must also have a mediating influence on individual risk 
perception.  In Chapter 2, the discussion centred on the proposition that people and 
organisations in some Western societies have become risk averse and focussed on safety.  
This aspect of the social environment is likely to help determine individual risk perceptions in 
a variety of contexts. 
 
The salience of social influences in creating risk perceptions is raised by Sitkin and Pablo 
(1992) in their study of management and decision-making.  The authors emphasised the role 
of information gathered from others as pertinent to the risk perception construct.  In 
particular, they claimed that an organisation’s leaders, and the organisational culture that 
prevails, has a formative influence.  “Organizational members come to view their world 
through the lens of their organization’s culture, which can distort their perceptions of 
situational risks, sometimes by overemphasizing or underemphasizing risk” (Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992, p. 21).  On a wider scale, the ideological stance adopted by governments can influence 
perspectives on and perceptions of risk.  Gregory et al. (1997, p. 51), for instance, claimed 
that recent major restructuring of government institutions in New Zealand, “has involved the 
devolution of responsibility to local government and individuals where possible.  It is possible 
that this has influenced perceptions of responsibilities”, and, in turn, may have heightened 
perceptions of risk among some managers (in relation to legal liability). 
 
Douglas and Wildavsky and associates, have also emphasised the centrality of the socio-
cultural context to understanding risk perceptions.  These authors minimise the role of 
cognition and personality influences on perception and claim that in risk perception “humans 
act less as individuals and more as social beings who have internalised social pressures and 
delegated their decision-making processes to institutions” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 
80).  Similarly, Furedi (1997) has claimed that risk is perceived on the basis of the prevailing 
ideas and values held about society and its future.  As such, what is seen as a risk or hazard at 
one time may not be so at another.   
 
Proponents of the cultural theory thesis have argued that people choose what to fear to support 
their way of life (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner, 1993; Wildavsky, 1993; Wildavsky & 
Dake, 1998).  In this way, certain interest groups within society perceive risks on the basis of 
what threatens their worldview.  Hence, liberal ‘egalitarians’ (Rayner, 1993; Wildavsky & 
Dake, 1998) fear technology on the basis that the risks and benefits are unevenly distributed 
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throughout the population, yet rate social deviance as low risk.  Conversely, conservative 
‘hierarchists’ (Wildavsky 1993; Wildavsky & Dake, 1998) consider technology as benign, but 
that social deviance leads to disaster.  Thus, these authors have concluded that there is no risk 
taking or risk averse personality; rather, these dispositions reflect cultural or political 
perspectives. 
 
Sjöberg (1998), however, has refuted this analysis, and argued that the notion of choice is 
misleading.  According to Sjöberg, people do not freely choose what to fear but, rather, would 
like to be free of fear.  While Sjöberg doubts the explanatory power of cultural theory in 
understanding risk perceptions, a less literal interpretation is more forgiving.  For instance, 
Wildavsky (1993) uses the term ‘choose’ rather loosely.  It is more plausible to suggest that 
individuals’ fears reflect the threats they perceive to the things they value. 
 
Another important situational factor influencing risk perception is the news and advertising 
media (Singer & Endreny, 1993; Wildavsky, 1993).  According to Singer and Endreny (1993, 
p. 4), the media play an especially significant role in the portrayal of high severity – low 
probability risk events, which are “likely to be regarded as ‘newsworthy’ by journalistic 
standards, and therefore reported in the press”.  Reporting, in turn, is likely to make such 
events more readily available to attention and recall.  Bias in media coverage of the 
sensational, dramatic, and altogether less common risks and hazards can influence the 
individual’s risk evaluation of particular objects or events. 
 
Slovic et al. (1981, 1982) have also suggested that biased media coverage and inadequate 
information contribute to the misunderstanding of risk.  Some empirical evidence for this 
claim is provided by Goszczynska et al. (1991) in a cross-national study of risk perception.  
The authors found that overall risk ratings in Hungary were lower than those in the United 
States and Norway, prompting them to suggest that this might be related to the 
disproportionate emphasis the Hungarian media affords to dangerous events beyond that 
country’s borders.  According to Goszczynska et al. (1991, p. 181): “In communist countries, 
information on risks and accidents has been strictly censored [one reason for which is] to 
show that life under the communist system is safer than that under a capitalist system”.  Given 
that people will form perceptions on the basis of what they see, know, and experience, the 
control of media in this case may help explain reduced risk perceptions. 
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Further, Kottak and Costa (1993, p. 338) studied environmental risk perception in Brazil, and 
revealed that awareness of risks was most developed in places and groups directly influenced 
by the media, “rather than among those who are most endangered”.  They argued that the 
globalisation of media has increased risk perceptions as a consequence.  Constant 
rebroadcasting of isolated events, and the internationalisation of news media generally are 
factors which can magnify risk perception, or bring the perception of risk closer to home.  The 
most recent example of this phenomenon was the media attention devoted to the attacks on 
New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.  The extent to which the globalisation of 
media has increased risk perception, however, is not clear-cut.  It can be argued for instance, 
that media attention to events far from home desensitises the ‘viewers’ to the threats, and 
reinforces a belief that disasters and tragedies happen to ‘other’ people.  In this sense, it is 
likely that the type of risk is important.  Where hazards and risks are perceived to be 
contained within the boundaries (or attributes) of ‘other’ localities, the perception of risk may 
not be increased by the media.  Where widely reported threats are seen as applicable to the 
‘home’ environment, perceptions are likely to be greater. 
 
According to Elms (1998b), the risk perceptions of the public are easily influenced, and 
sometimes successfully manipulated through the media by interest groups with strong 
agendas.  Further, he claimed that emotive appeals, information bias, and inability to 
comprehend the statistical nature of risk, are among the reasons for inaccurate perceptions 
held by the public.  Elms (1998b, p. 46) observed a New Zealand public feeling threatened by 
the transportation of reprocessed nuclear waste at the perimeter of its economic zone, despite 
“careful analysis and attention to the facts” revealing the risk of serious incident as “very 
low”.  Similarly, Furedi (1997, p. 16) noted that, although it is “not possible to prove that a 
single American has died from radiation from the civil nuclear industry... surveys of 
Americans continually place nuclear power at the top of the list of risks in life”.  These 
observations can be explained in part by situational factors such as voluntariness and 
controllability (Hartenian et al., 1993; Jungermann & Slovic, 1993; Mullet et al., 1993; 
Slovic, et al., 1980).  In particular, risk perceptions and risk ratings in the above examples are 
likely to be affected by attitudes toward sovereignty or control over personal destiny.  In order 
to exert political influence, it then becomes discursively advantageous to emphasise ‘risk’ or 
the absence thereof. 
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3.3.2 Individual factors affecting risk perception 
In addition to situational factors, risk perceptions are also influenced by individual factors.  
The adapted model (Figure 3.1) considers these in three dimensions: personal experience, 
personality disposition, and cognitive elements.  The latter refers to individual attitudes, 
values, and beliefs about a hazard or risk feature.  The attitudinal dimension is not well 
differentiated in Tobin and Montz’s (1997) discussion, but it is likely that attitudes are both a 
product of some other variables and a significant contributor to response and action.  It seems 
reasonable to suggest that attitudes, as general, personal dispositions held toward an object, 
person, or event (Moore, 1995), will influence hazard perception by affecting the extent to 
which new information is processed and accepted.  The interrelationships between attitude 
and experience, and between attitude and personality are acknowledged, and their individual 
treatments are not intended to imply mutual exclusivity. 
 
3.3.2.1  Experience 
Critical within the individual dimension is the role of both direct and vicarious experience.  
Perceptions are constructed using experiences from everyday life, and the perceived lives of 
others, including the experiences of others portrayed by the media such as television, 
newspapers, magazines, and the internet.  The degree of influence that certain experiences 
have on perception is complicated.  For example, regular exposure to media reports of motor 
vehicle fatalities (approximately 500 fatalities annually in New Zealand) is likely to have less 
effect on people’s negative evaluation of driving, than reported air accidents will have on fear 
of flying, despite the fact that only about 25 people die as a result of aviation accidents in any 
one year (Statistics New Zealand, 2000).  This suggests that people tend to focus on threats 
that are “exotic, personal, erratic, and dramatic” (K.C. Cole, 1998, p. 33).  As a consequence, 
people ignore the more ordinary hazards of everyday life such as burns, falls, drowning and 
choking.  Other risks are not perceived as significant threats simply because they are familiar 
and the effects are slow to accumulate (K.C. Cole, 1998; Singer and Endreny, 1993; 
Wildavsky, 1993).  In this vein, Rück (1993) observed that cigarette smoking kills 100,000 
people in Germany every year, a number equivalent to a jumbo jet with a full complement of 
passengers crashing every day.  Yet the 365 ‘crashes’ cause little reaction at all, compared to 
the occasional actual jumbo crash, which creates official investigations and sends fear 
throughout the air travelling public.  Rück uses the jumbo jet analogy to demonstrate how the 
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concept of risk is all in the mind.  Yet risk is a powerful construction, which shapes attitudes 
and behaviours. 
 
Rück’s analogy is a good example of the rhetoric that surrounds the subject of risk.  Here the 
facts are presented in such a way that casts the general public as irrational, although for any 
individual smoker, the chance of dying from a smoking-related illness today, is probably 
lower than the chances of an air traveller dying in an air accident today.  Hence, to fear flying 
more than smoking can be interpreted as a perfectly rational response. 
 
In support of these observations and analogies, considerable research in the psychology of 
human judgement has shown that most people overestimate the occurrence of rare events and 
underestimate the frequency of common events (Fischhoff, 1985; Lee, 1981; Leiss & 
Chociolko, 1994; Slovic, et al., 1981).  Consistent with the availability heuristic, “people’s 
estimates of causes of death [for instance], are strongly related to the number of people they 
know who have suffered those misfortunes and the amount of media coverage devoted to 
them” (Fischhoff, 1985, p. 87).  This point was also demonstrated by Slovic et al. (1982, 
2000b), who found that when people were asked to estimate the ratio of deaths caused by 
diseases to deaths caused by accident, they typically estimated that as many people die of 
accidental causes, although the actual ratio is approximately 15:1.  Similarly, in research 
reported by Slovic et al. (1981, p. 19), “pregnancies, births and abortions were judged to take 
about as many lives as diabetes, though diabetes actually causes about 80 times more deaths”. 
 
Familiarity with an object or event may also influence risk perceptions.  For instance, Sitkin 
and Pablo (1992) studied a group of managers and found that, as management experience 
increased, decision makers overestimated their ability to cope with problems and 
underestimated risk.    Similarly, other researchers (Oskamp, 1982; Slovic et al., 1981; 
Tversky, & Kahneman, 1982b) have contended that overconfidence in judgements can result 
from increasing levels of experience.  de Turck and Goldhaber (1989), in their review of the 
product safety literature, also found that frequent users of products paid less attention to 
warning labels and signs, perceived fewer risks associated with the product, and were more 
likely to engage in risky behaviour with the product. 
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3.3.2.2 Attitudes and beliefs 
Further cognitive features that appear to influence risk perceptions include belief in personal 
judgements, resistance to change perceptions, and a personal feeling of immunity.  
Judgements made using the availability heuristic are often held with high levels of 
confidence, despite the tenuous basis for this (Lee, 1981; Margolis, 1996; Slovic et al., 1981).  
Furthermore, once perceptions of the risk associated with events or objects (such as 
earthquakes, floods, or smoking) are formed, it is very difficult to change these, even when 
contrary information is overwhelming (Fischhoff, 1985; Greening & Chandler, 1997; 
Margolis, 1996; Slovic et al., 1982).  This may be because people often view themselves as 
personally immune to many hazards, adopting a belief that ‘it won’t happen to me’ (Greening 
& Chandler, 1997; Slovic et al., 1981).  For instance, Middleton, Harris and Surman (1996) 
found that novice bungy jumpers perceived their risk of injury to be less than the risk to the 
‘typical jumper’.  Other research has demonstrated that the majority of people believe 
themselves to be better than average drivers, more likely than average to live past 80 years 
old, and so on (Begg, Langely & Morrison, 2001; Greening & Chandler, 1997; Slovic et al., 
1981, 2000a).  Cognitive mechanisms contribute to these beliefs; many car journeys are made 
without incident, creating a schema (eg., of being a good driver) that is rarely contradicted 
(Greening & Chandler, 1997).  Daily experiences inform us that when accidents do happen, 
they appear to happen to other people, further reinforcing individual belief in one’s own 
ability. 
 
Other beliefs that are likely to influence risk perception include perceived benefits accruing to 
the individual, or society as a whole.  Perceived benefits, for instance, may influence the 
degree to which a risk is accepted.  Risks may be perceived as lower if there are identifiable 
benefits attributable to the outcome (Mullet et al., 1993; Rohrmann, 1996).  In this way, 
attitudes toward, or beliefs about, potential outcomes will affect risk perception.  Mullet et al. 
claimed that dimensions such as economic justification, social well-being, and societal benefit 
are evaluative factors that influence risk perceptions. 
 
3.3.2.3 Personality disposition and risk-taking behaviour 
Many authors have linked risk perception and risk-taking behaviour to personality type or 
disposition, and included biology, psychology and culture among the determinants.  For 
instance, Sitkin and Pablo (1992) argued that individuals each have a risk propensity – a 
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general tendency to take or avoid risks.  According to Sitkin and Pablo (1992, p. 19), a risk 
averse personality characteristic will encourage the individual to disproportionately consider 
negative outcomes, “thus overestimating the probability of loss relative to the probability of 
gain”. The converse is implied for the risk-seeking decision maker with high risk propensity, 
resulting in lower risk perception. 
 
Similarly, Williams and Narendran (1999) examined the managerial risk preferences of 
managers in India and Singapore, and found that gender, culture, and nationality were 
significant predictors of risk preference, with males and those holding ‘modern cultural 
values’ expressing a stronger willingness for risk.  In a completely different context, Harrell 
(1991) determined that older adults and women demonstrated greater awareness of traffic 
hazards and exercised more caution than male pedestrians using an inner city intersection. 
 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) argued that people can be categorised as risk takers or risk 
averters on the basis of their responses to particular situations.  According to these authors, a 
risk taker will accept higher exposure to risk and require less control and information than the 
risk averter.  While risk takers are optimistic, and believe they can control outcomes, risk 
averters focus on worst case scenarios, and devote more effort to reducing risks than their less 
conservative counterparts (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986).   
 
Another important psychological component thought to influence perception and behaviour is 
the locus of control (McCool & Braithwaite, 1992).  Individuals who generally feel as though 
they have some control over what happens in their lives are said to have an internal locus of 
control.  Those who perceive events to be beyond their influence are said to have an external 
locus of control.  As Lee (1981, p. 13), explained, “people differ in the extent to which they 
tend to consistently attribute events to their own behaviour or see them as a function of 
external forces beyond their control”.  This is relevant to the discussion on risk perception 
because those individuals with an external locus of control are likely to have higher levels of 
anxiety and expect hazards more frequently than those with an internal locus (Tobin & Montz, 
1997). 
 
Other authors have implied that a risk-taking personality has an evolutionary basis, aiding the 
survival of the species (the rationale being ‘he who hesitates is lost’, and ‘nothing ventured, 
nothing gained’) (Konner, 1990; Sinn & Weichenrieder, 1993; Trimpop, 1994).  Adopting 
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such a stance, Sinn and Weichenrieder (1993) suggested that success in evolutionary terms 
has little to do with longevity, and that risk-taking may have been an important strategy to 
ensure that genes were passed to the next generation.  Risking life and limb to avoid 
starvation may have been what differentiated survivors from the failures.  Other biological 
perspectives suggest that it is possible to be genetically predisposed to exploratory or risk 
behaviour (a risk gene), and that some individuals become addicted to adrenaline and, 
therefore, seek dangerous, extreme, and challenging situations (Moore & Rosenthal, 1993; 
Roberts, 1994; Toufexis, 1996). 
 
Although this evolutionary explanation for risk taking has some intuitive appeal, it is 
simplistic to suggest that all individuals within a population would gain advantage through a 
risk-taking disposition.  It is equally likely that in any given population, risk-taking 
individuals would be balanced with risk-averse individuals, hence allowing for the selection 
of strategies suitable to a variety of conditions. 
 
Rather than a biological explanation, Sulloway (1996) claimed that risk-taking has social and 
cultural roots, and that family birth order helps determine the risk propensity of individuals.  
Sulloway asserted that ‘later borns’9 were more likely to become risk takers than their elder 
siblings.  His theory is based on an application of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species, and 
treats the family as a niche, aspects of which individual members potentially exploit.  In order 
to survive and maximise their environment, later borns are rewarded when they ‘rebel’ and 
effectively take risks.  This explanation for risk taking borrows from the principles that 
underpin evolution theory, yet it is entirely social rather than biological.  Social conditions 
determine the necessity for certain individuals to engage in risk behaviour.  Sulloway argued 
that conditions within the family create and reinforce personalities to a significant extent. 
 
In contrast to the explanations above, proponents of a cultural theory of risk have rejected the 
notion of risk taking or risk avoidance personalities, and argued that people who undertake 
high risks in one arena, may go to great lengths to avoid risks in another (Wildavsky, 1993).  
According to this perspective, it is the particulars of the situation, which define the extent to 
which a risk will be taken or avoided (Rayner & Cantor, 1999; Wildavsky & Dake, 1998).  
Further, Wildavsky and Dake found no evidence for a personality structure as suggested by 
                                                 
9 Those with one or more elder siblings. 
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Sitkin and Pablo (1993), and claimed instead that risk taking and risk avoidance are dependent 
on how people feel about the object of attention.  Consistent with the view that individuals 
perceive risk in ways that support their ways of life (Douglas, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Fox, 1999), Wildavsky and Dake (1998, p. 104) argued that “those who endorse 
egalitarianism are also more likely to be personally risk taking but societally risk averse, 
while those who favour hierarchy tend to be personally risk averse but societally pro-risk with 
respect to technology and the environment”. 
 
Despite the evident disagreement on why the differences exist (cultural or psychological), the 
research literature has generally suggested that there are important differences between 
individuals with respect to risk perception and risk taking.  Part of these differences can be 
attributed to personality disposition, either to maintain a particular set of values, or to satisfy 
internal drives.  The cultural theory seems plausible in that risk, as a social construction, is 
perceived differently by different people and different societies.  Few people, or societies can 
be described as ‘risk takers’ in all aspects of life.  The idea that particular risk personalities 
exist also has merit (and some empirical support), yet may be most useful in clearly defined 
risk contexts, rather than generalised across all possible risk situations.  The balance of these 
dimensions is dependent on ontological perspective.  In the present study risk perception and 
risk-taking are approached from a multidisciplinary perspective, which recognises both the 
individual and situational influences.  No single dimension is sufficient to describe the 
concept of risk perception or behaviour completely. 
 
3.4 Risk perception in the recreation and tourism context 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Relative to other areas of risk perception research, there have been few studies or discussions 
on the phenomenon of risk perception in recreation and tourism.  Most research to date has 
focused on public perceptions of risks associated with various technologies and consumer 
goods (Slovic and colleagues), and some work on perceptions of natural hazards (Drabek, 
1994, 1996; Gough, 1998b).  No studies were found in which tourists’ perceptions of natural 
hazards were assessed with regard to non thrill-seeking settings. 
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Risk perception in recreation and tourism has typically been discussed in one of two contexts.  
One focus has been the perception of risk associated with adventurous activities, and the 
relationship between perceived risk and competence levels of participants (Carpenter & 
Priest, 1989; Morgan, 1998; Morgan et al., 1997, 2000; Priest & Bunting, 1993; Priest & 
Carpenter, 1993).  These authors have been interested in the pre- and post- activity 
perceptions of risk among participants actively pursuing risk or thrills.  A second area of 
research has investigated the role of risk and safety perceptions in tourists’ destination 
decisions, and to a lesser extent, the risk perceptions of participants in adventure tourism. 
 
3.4.1.1 Risk perception in adventure recreation and tourism 
Following the wider risk perception literature, Priest and Baillie (1987, p. 18) defined 
perceived risk as “an individual’s subjective assessment of the actual amount of danger 
involved in an adventurous setting”.  While it is questionable that settings must be 
‘adventurous’ in order for risks to be perceived, the critical difference between risk perception 
in recreation and tourism settings, and risk perception in other spheres of life, is that 
recreation and tourism participation is largely voluntary.  This does not mean that participants 
necessarily assume responsibility for risk, but exposure to settings in which risks may inhere 
is often within the control of recreationists and tourists, unlike the risk exposure in the wider 
environmental and technological context. 
 
Morgan et al. (1997, 2000) explored the link between risk and competence in the context of 
the adventure tourist’s experience.  The researchers aimed to investigate various dimensions 
of Priest’s (1992) Adventure Experience Paradigm (AEP), and to test its applicability in the 
adventure tourism setting.  The AEP suggests that participants’ experiences can be classified 
in multiple ways depending on the relationship between risk and competence.  According to 
the model, low competence coupled with high risk, has the potential to result in a negative 
experience (such as fear or physical harm).  Similarly, a high level of competence, and low 
perceived risk may also result in a negative experience (such as boredom).  A ‘peak 
adventure’ experience is possible only when the perceived level of competence of the 
participant equals the perceived risk.  Morgan et al. (2000) surveyed participants in two 
separate adventure tourism activities (white-water rafting and sea-kayaking).  The researchers 
found specific combinations of risk and competence were associated with different levels of 
danger, fear, concentration, anxiousness, boredom, and control, implying that the AEP model 
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has some utility for understanding the experiences of adventure tourists.  The researchers also 
reported that perceived risk among respondents was higher before involvement in the activity 
than following it.  
 
In other recreation research exploring risk perception, Levine and Gorman (1994) assessed 
skiers’ perceptions of danger as a function of their knowledge of danger.  The researchers 
found that knowledge of fatalities in skiing was an important factor in increasing skiers’ 
ratings of the dangerousness of the sport.  The authors also noticed a decrease in self-reported 
risky behaviour when knowledge of previous accidents was high.  The results of this study 
add credence to the postulate that individual risk perception is influenced by the availability 
heuristic, in this case by awareness of the history of an activity or the history of a place. 
 
3.4.1.2 Risk perception and tourism destinations 
Within the literature on risk perception and tourism, two themes can be identified.  First, there 
are studies that have examined the general risk perceptions of travellers, including some in 
which visitor perceptions of specific destinations have been explored.  Second, there is 
literature which has examined the impact of particular events on tourist perceptions and travel 
behaviour.  This section is organised around these two themes. 
 
Many authors specifically suggest that the destination decisions of potential tourists will be 
influenced by perceptions of the relative risk or safety of those places (Carter, 1998; Cha, 
1997; Clift & Page, 1996; Mawby, Brunt & Hambly, 2000; Page, 1997; Pizam & Mansfield, 
1996; Pizam, Tarlow, & Bloom, 1997; Ryan, 1993; Sirakaya, Sheppard & McLellan, 1997; 
Sönmez, Apostolopoulos, & Tarlow, 1999; Sönmez & Graefe, 1998a, 1998b; WTO, 1996).  
This is not altogether surprising given that potential tourists are likely to evaluate the relative 
costs and benefits of all destinations.  Sönmez and Graefe (1998a) observed that, in addition 
to the typical vacation costs of transport, accommodation, and entertainment, other costs that 
may enter the decision-making process are the potential physical (health, sickness, or injury), 
psychological (disappointment), and social costs of visiting particular places.  Pizam et al. 
(1997, p. 23) made this point more explicitly, claiming that “most tourists select their 
destinations not only on the basis of price and destination image, but, most importantly, on 
personal safety and security”. 
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Included among studies of prospective travellers’ risk perceptions are fears of equipment 
failure, financial loss, physical injury, and disappointment (Roehl & Fesenmaier, 1992), as 
well as concerns about ill health, political instability, and terrorism (Sönmez & Graefe, 
1998a).  Similarly, Tsaur, Tzeng, and Wang (1997) found that Taiwanese tourists on group 
package tours were most concerned about law and order, followed by transportation, hygiene, 
medical support, accommodation, and the weather. 
 
Additional support for the centrality of risk perception in tourist decision making is provided 
by Sönmez and Graefe (1998a) who conducted a study to assess the risk perceptions of 
potential travellers.  Overall, the results indicated that alongside attitudes and income, 
potential travellers’ risk perception levels were significant predictors of intended travel 
behaviour.  These factors “determine if potential tourists will go abroad or vacation at home, 
how much information they will gather about the destination, and how concerned they will be 
about its safety” (Sönmez & Graefe, 1998a, p. 134). 
 
Other research has also linked risk perception with travel destination choice.  Demos (1992), 
for example, examined the impact of an increasing rate of violent crime with a declining 
tourism industry in Washington DC.  Demos conducted a study of visitor perceptions of 
safety, revealing that about one third of respondents were “skeptical about safety conditions in 
Washington before they [arrived]”, and that “the majority of tourists fear for their safety at 
night” (Demos, 1992, p. 83).  While Demos’ study gives no indication of who the fearful 
visitors were (business travellers or leisure travellers, for instance), the results imply that 
safety is in the minds of tourists to Washington at least.  It is interesting to note that Demos’ 
respondents, although perceiving a high rate of crime, were not dissuaded from visiting 
Washington. 
 
In another investigation of tourists’ beliefs and ideas about risky destinations, Carter (1998, p. 
350) found that travellers’ intentions to visit or avoid particular geographic regions was based, 
in part, “on a mental representation of the difference between ‘home’ and distant areas”.  
Carter’s qualitative study of international business and leisure travellers originating from 
Scotland, showed that locations perceived as ‘risky’ were those most distinct from the 
respondents’ home localities.  Where relative perceived differences between the home and 
visited culture and geography were greatest, so too were perceptions of risk.  Africa, and to a 
lesser extent Asia were reported as risky destinations by respondents, whereas Europe and 
 67
North America were perceived as places with little or no risk.  Where dangers (such as murder 
and HIV infection) in these latter localities were identified by respondents, Carter suggests 
that these fears were ‘neutralised’ by placing them within a cultural landscape that is familiar.  
In destinations where visitors feel alienated, these risk perceptions may be magnified. 
 
Not all tourists, however, will be influenced by risk and safety information to the same extent.  
Evoking Plog’s (1974) tourist typology, Sönmez and Graefe (1998b) suggested that 
psychocentric (risk averse) travellers paid greater attention to safety features of tourism 
destinations than their allocentric (risk seeking) counterparts.  Cha (1997), in a study of 
Korean travellers’ motivations for visits to Australia and New Zealand, also determined that 
some groups of tourists (notably package tourists) placed comparatively greater emphasis on 
safety as a factor influencing destination choice. 
 
The findings of Mawby et al. (2000) also offer some mild contrasts to the suggestion that 
tourists choose destinations on the basis of safety or risk perceptions.   Mawby et al. (2000) 
conducted a survey of British holidaymakers in which respondents were asked to recall and 
evaluate various dimensions of recent holidays abroad.  The authors compared reported 
incidence of crime among their sample with national crime statistics, revealing that tourists do 
suffer significantly higher rates of victimisation.  In terms of risk perception, however, the 
tourists sampled were less concerned than was expected.  While 42 per cent of the sample said 
they had ruled out at least one country because of perceived crime problems (most commonly 
Egypt, Spain and the United States), ‘feeling safe’ on holiday was rated as less important than 
environment, weather, scenery, relaxation, and specific activities.  Mawby et al. noted that the 
relationship between incidence and perception of crime risk is contrary to that revealed in 
other (non-tourist) crime literature, where it is more common for fear to exceed risk.  
Similarly, in the risk perception literature a disparity between ‘actual’ risk and perceived risk 
is evident.  Fears associated with specific events including violent crime and nuclear accidents 
typically exceed technical risk estimates (Slovic et al., 1980).  Mawby et al.’s results 
regarding tourist perceptions of risk may have implications for tourist vulnerability and 
behaviour. 
 
Similarly, Sirakaya et al. (1997) suggested that safety and risk are not primary factors in 
tourist destination choice, yet they are likely to be important secondary features.  Using a 
scenario method to study how people were affected by information regarding a destination’s 
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safety, these authors found that perceptions of risk and safety had a stronger influence on the 
avoidance of destinations rather than likelihood of travel to them.  In other words, high safety 
is not a feature that will attract visitors, but low safety is one that may discourage them from 
visiting. 
 
Although some specific events (such as warfare, murders, and other ‘dread’ risks) are clearly 
associated with travellers’ avoidance of certain geographic locations, other perceived risks 
(such as natural hazards) may attract tourists to a destination.  Media coverage or promotional 
material may also encourage tourists to visit dangerous natural areas (D. Johnston, 1995).  
Carter (1998) claimed that guidebooks are often deliberately ambiguous on the subject of 
health and safety in order that feelings of both fear and excitement can be attributed to the 
place.  Some books employ the concepts of isolation or political instability to differentiate 
these locations from routine, mass tourism destinations – using the idea of risk to sell the 
destination to a market segment intrigued by possible danger. 
 
The effects of specific events on risk perception and travel behaviour have also been a feature 
of some research.  In particular, studies have focused on the safety of visitors to areas of 
conflict, war, and violent crime, and examined the impacts of these events on tourism.  
Brayshaw (1995), for instance, documented the negative publicity afforded to Florida as a 
tourist destination following a spate of violent attacks on visitors to that state.  Brayshaw 
reported that, between 1992 and 1994, nine tourists were killed as a consequence of theft-
motivated crimes (a figure not disproportionate to crimes inflicted on non-residents in 
previous years).  According to Brayshaw, the resultant media attention to these deaths had a 
major impact on tourism to Florida, with European newspapers referring to Florida as the 
“State of terror” and describing events as the “wave of killing” (Brayshaw, 1995).  In 1993, 
bookings for Florida among European and United Kingdom visitors fell by ten per cent, and 
25 per cent of tour packages to the state were cancelled (Brayshaw, 1995).  Smith (1999) 
reported similar effects following violent crimes against international tourists in other North 
American cities. 
 
Wilks, Pendergast and Service (1996) undertook a content analysis of selected Australian 
newspapers which showed that a high proportion of total tourism health and safety stories 
identified were negative in content.  Acknowledging the powerful influence of news media on 
public risk perceptions, the authors noted the potentially damaging effects for national and 
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international tourism destinations.  Ryan (1993) also observed that news media attention to 
adverse events such as civil unrest, terrorism, murders, and robberies might influence the risk 
perceived by potential travellers to affected regions. 
 
Sönmez and Graefe (1998b) studied the risk perceptions of tourists within the context of 
terrorism.  Like other researchers, they found that international tourism was seriously affected 
by the reactions of potential travellers to perceived risks such as political instability and 
terrorism.  The authors cite figures which show that “nearly two million Americans changed 
their foreign travel plans in 1986, following the previous year’s terrorism and the US-Libya 
military confrontation” (Sönmez & Graefe, 1998b, p. 113).  At the time of writing, it is still 
unclear what the effects of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon will have 
on the travelling public.  Initial indications are that air travel will become tightly monitored, 
and time delays and bomb threats will deter many people from using air transport for leisure 
travel.  A survey conducted by Yesawich, Pepperdine and Brown in October 2001 claimed 
that 22 per cent of American leisure travellers had changed their travel plans as a result of the 
attacks on Washington and New York (“Poll shows Americans still travel”, 2001).  The 
effects of the attacks, however, are likely to extend well beyond America’s borders.  Despite 
the isolated circumstances of the incidents, intense global media attention may have amplified 
the risk perceptions and lowered confidence among visitors to completely unrelated locations.  
Recent inbound tourism statistics for New Zealand also showed decreases in several 
international markets, including the United States and Japan (both down 15 – 25%) (Espiner, 
2001; “Some hefty losses”, 2001). 
 
In addition to crime and terrorism, accidents and injuries resulting from tourism and 
recreation activities can also have an impact on destination regions.  For instance, following 
the deaths of six Japanese tourists in a scenic flight accident at Milford Sound, New Zealand 
in 1989, it took three years for market confidence to return to this adventure tourism sector 
(Greenaway, 1996).  Page and Meyer (1997) attributed this slow recovery to adverse publicity 
about the destination in Japan.  Similarly, Clift and Page (1996) observed that India 
experienced a 70 per cent decline in foreign visitors following widespread international 
publicity about an apparent outbreak of pneumonic plague. 
 
In New Zealand, the Ministry of Commerce reacted to a spate of accidents in the adventure 
tourism sector by preparing a paper on safety management in that industry.  The authors of the 
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report found that well-publicised accidents involving participants in white-water rafting, jet 
boating, and ballooning, were followed by a drop in patronage.  The Ministry expressed 
concern at the “potential for long term damage to occur to the tourism industry if New 
Zealand is perceived by overseas travellers as unsafe” (Ministry of Commerce, 1996, p. 1). 
 
3.5 Interim summary 
Risk perception research in recreation and tourism has focused on intended travel behaviour 
and the safety perceptions of visitors to specific tourism and recreation settings.  In particular, 
the research emphasis to date has examined the impacts of crime and terrorism on tourism. 
 
Subjective assessments of relative risk and safety do appear to be features of the tourist’s 
destination decision making, although the dimensions are not clear-cut.  Research suggests 
that the risk perceptions of recreationists and tourists are influenced by setting characteristics, 
and knowledge of dangerous events.  Destinations perceived as dangerous are likely to suffer 
from reduced visitation in the wake of certain adverse and (especially) violent events, 
although there is no conclusive evidence showing which other perceived risks affect tourist 
choices.  Where a dreaded risk is publicised and evident to potential travellers and 
recreationists, it seems likely that resultant risk perceptions will lead to avoidance behaviour.  
In other situations, however, the relative safety of destinations appears to be less important in 
the destination selection.  Furthermore, not all tourists will respond identically to risk 
information, and some visitors may even evaluate certain risks or dangers as positive features 
of the destination. 
 
Research on risk perception has developed over four decades, and explored the subjective 
assessments of a wide variety of people in different contexts.  Common among the findings is 
that people perceive risk as greatest in situations where the dread factor is high, information 
about the hazard is scarce, and where many people are thought to be affected.  These 
outcomes are the result of perceptions about risk.  They are not objective assessments of the 
likelihood of harm, but personal, subjective feelings based on a variety of experiences (both 
personal and vicarious) and personality dispositions which, within a cultural context, combine 
to help determine attitudes and behaviour.  Studies have also indicated that there are 
differences between groups with regard to specific risk perceptions, including a significant 
divide between the general public and technical experts.  While risk perceptions may not seem 
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relevant to some experts, the ways in which individuals and communities respond to risk and 
risk information is entirely dependent upon their perception and understanding (Gough, 
1998b).  This is an important acknowledgement for risk managers to make, and implies the 
need for effective risk communication. 
 
3.6 Communicating risk and hazard 
When risks are present but not perceived, behavior based on these false 
perceptions may have serious repercussions (Bean, 1989, p. 17-18). 
 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The advent of mass communication has contributed to heightened risk perceptions in some 
parts of the world.  Information about exotic and sensational risks and hazards travel easily 
and rapidly between geographically distant communities, influencing the risk perceptions of 
millions (Kottak & Costa, 1993).  Because of its influence on perception, communication 
becomes an important aspect of risk management.  After all, it is people’s perceptions of risk 
that will determine their behaviour, rather than objective information about the risks 
themselves (Leiss & Chociolko, 1994; Sjöberg, 1998; Taig, 1998).  Slovic et al. (1980, p. 17) 
observed that people respond to the hazards that they perceive: “If their perceptions are faulty, 
efforts at personal, public and environmental protection are likely to be misdirected”.  
Understanding perceptions is crucial to effective decision making and risk communication. 
 
Risk communication includes all attempts to inform, persuade, or warn others about risks to 
which they might be exposed.  An important facet of this is understanding the risk perceptions 
and beliefs of the intended message recipients.  Effective risk communication is critical in 
many recreation and tourism settings because visitors will often have limited familiarity with 
the environment, and potential language and cultural differences may exist between 
management agencies and visitors. 
 
Risk communication can be viewed as serving two main purposes.  The most commonly 
identified of these is to advise people of risks and hazards, and to alter (or maintain) their 
behaviour to realise some specified outcome.  A less explicit purpose of risk communication 
is the transfer of some of the responsibility for risk.  As Fischhoff (1995, p. 144) noted, 
“effective risk communication can fulfil part of the social contract between those who create 
 72
risks (as a byproduct of other activities) and those who bear them”.  The majority of the 
literature focuses on the first of these purposes, although many public and private 
organisations have an interest in the latter. 
 
One dimension of the present study is how risk and hazards are communicated through static 
messages.  Hence, this section is limited to a review of research concerning written message 
effectiveness and warning compliance.  General literature is presented first, followed by 
discussion on the communication of risk and hazard in resource-based recreation and tourism 
settings. 
 
3.6.2 Communication 
At the most basic level, communication involves the transmission of an idea from one person 
to one or more others.  Modes of communication are many, the most common including 
verbal, visual, and written formats.  In general terms, the process of communication comprises 
four components: a source (the communicator of the message); the receiver of the message 
(subject to processes of perception, processing, and learning); the channel (the medium 
through which the message is transmitted); and the message itself (Burgoon & Burgoon, 
1975; Moscardo, 1999; Philipchalk, 1995).  These components each influence the outcomes 
of the communication, including effects such as change in attitudes, knowledge, action, or 
behaviour.  In this section, aspects of the communication process are discussed, and factors 
influencing message effectiveness are identified.  This is important material to review because 
how people perceive risk and hazard in natural resource settings is, at least in part, influenced 
by communication. 
 
3.6.3 Message effectiveness: Persuasion 
Message effectiveness can take several possible forms.  To be effective, a message must be 
recognised and attended to by its intended recipient.  Without this awareness, the 
communication will not proceed.  Hence, designers of advertisements will use eye-catching 
colours, phrases, or photographs to attract the attention of their target markets.  The second 
stage in effectiveness is the ability of the recipient to comprehend successfully (or decode) the 
message.  If the people for whom the message is intended are unable to decipher its meaning, 
the communication will be unsuccessful.  A third critical point, only reached if the initial 
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criteria are met, is the extent to which the message is accepted, believed, or acted upon by the 
recipient.  Message effectiveness can, therefore, be measured along several dimensions, 
including awareness of the message, recall of the message content, attitude change, and 
observed behaviour change.  The degree to which individuals alter attitudes or behaviour as a 
consequence of the information communicated is otherwise known as persuasion, the subject 
of thousands of social-psychological studies (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). 
 
Essentially, persuasion can be understood as a series of interdependent steps, incorporating 
message exposure, attention, comprehension, acceptance, yielding, and behaviour change 
(D.N. Cole, 1998; Manfredo & Bright, 1991; McCarthy et al., 1995; McGuire, 1985; 
Wogalter & Laughery, 1996).  Persuasive messages contain a set of arguments supporting a 
particular position and one or more recommended actions (Burgoon & Burgoon, 1975; 
McGuire, 1985; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981).  The primary goal of persuasive messages is to 
change (or produce) certain behaviours in the message recipient.  There are a variety of 
factors common to persuasive messages that are useful to review.  These factors exist within 
the broad framework of the communication process described above, relating to the 
components of the communication process. 
 
In their review of persuasion literature, Petty and Cacioppo (1981) found that several factors 
attributed to the message source influence persuasion.  For instance, research indicates that 
‘source credibility’ and perceived power will contribute to persuasiveness.  Communicators 
who are believable, physically attractive, and perceived to be similar to the message 
recipients, are likely to be effective in their communication (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981).  These 
and other authors (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty & Morris, 1983) have also 
determined that characteristics of the message recipients, such as intelligence, self esteem, and 
gender, can affect the likelihood of persuasion.  While the results are not always consistent, a 
common finding is that those with higher intelligence are less likely to be persuaded, while 
those with low self esteem are more likely to adopt the target attitude (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1981, 1986). 
 
Furthermore, recipients’ ‘need for cognition’ has been identified as an important factor 
influencing persuasion.  Cacioppo and Petty (1982) identified differences among individuals 
in their tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking.  ‘Need for cognition’ is the degree to which 
individuals seek to “structure relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways.  It is a need 
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to understand and make reasonable the experiential world” (Cohen et al., 1955; cited in 
Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, p. 116).  Individuals with a high need for cognition are more likely 
to scrutinise message content, and require quality arguments for messages to be effective in 
altering attitudes (Cacioppo et al., 1983).  Similarly, Chaiken (1980) reported that high levels 
of issue involvement led message recipients to systematic processing strategies in forming 
opinions, whereas low involvement recipients tended to rely on heuristic strategies.  
Chaiken’s conclusions imply that the degree of issue involvement influencing how a message 
is processed, lies within the ability of the communicator to effect.  This appears to be in mild 
contrast to Cacioppo and Petty (1979) who imply that ‘need for cognition’ is a personality 
disposition, and as such may be less likely to be affected by communicators. 
 
In addition to source and recipient characteristics, aspects of the message itself have a role in 
the persuasion process.  Elements such as the message complexity, number and order of 
arguments presented, degree of repetition, intensity of language, and use of fear appeals have 
all been shown to influence persuasion (Burgoon & Burgoon, 1975; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; 
Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Philipchalk, 1995).  It is recognised, however, that 
the relationships between persuasion and any of the above variables are not straight forward, 
and are subject to interactive effects.  For instance, while intense language may increase 
persuasion, this is mediated by the relationship between the communicator and the recipient.  
Extreme appeals are less likely to be effective if the communicator is held in low regard by 
the recipient (Burgoon & Burgoon, 1975). 
 
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) utilised some of the findings in persuasion research and developed 
a model in an attempt to illustrate the process of persuasion.  In their Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM), later adapted by Manfredo and Bright (1991) to help understand the attitudes 
and behaviour of recreationists, the authors argued that persuasion is ultimately influenced by 
the degree to which recipients are encouraged into message-relevant thinking (elaboration).  If 
elaboration is low, persuasion may take place, but only in a temporary sense.  In this 
circumstance, recipients are thought to adopt a ‘peripheral route’ to persuasion in which they 
are more likely to be influenced by features of the communicator, or presentation of the 
message, rather than message content.  The alternative, and more enduring persuasion is 
thought to occur when the ‘central route’ to persuasion is enacted (Manfredo & Bright, 1991; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Chaiken’s (1980) discussion of heuristic versus systematic 
information processing is analogous to the peripheral and central routes discussed by Petty 
 75
and Cacioppo, in suggesting that content-mediated opinion change will persist longer than 
source-mediated persuasion.  The ELM is used to describe the effects of communication on 
recreationists in Section 3.7.3.  The discussion now turns to another aspect of persuasive 
communication, compliance with warning messages. 
 
3.6.4 Warning compliance 
People in a wide variety of situations fail to respond to warnings directed at them, implying 
lack of awareness, poor comprehension, and/or limited confidence in the credibility of the 
message.  This section reviews literature on the effectiveness of warning labels and signs, 
most of which explores features of the message rather than characteristics of message 
recipients.  Further, few studies have evaluated actual behavioural compliance in warning 
situations, owing to the ethical difficulties associated with exposing people to potentially 
dangerous situations, and the highly labour intensive nature of observation research (Adams, 
Bochner & Bilik, 1998; Glover & Wogalter, 1997; Wogalter & Laughery, 1996).  
 
One of the themes in warning compliance research is the investigation of the signal words 
used to convey risk (Friedmann, 1988; Wogalter, Jarrard, & Simpson, 1994; Wogalter & 
Laughery, 1996; Wogalter & Silver, 1995; Wogalter & Young, 1991).  For instance, Wogalter 
et al. (1994) attempted to assess the influence of various signal words and a signal icon by 
presenting study participants with a range of common household consumer goods with 
hazardous potential.  Product labels were authentically altered to include different signal 
words including ‘note’, ‘caution’, ‘warning’, ‘danger’, and ‘lethal’, and a signal icon (an 
exclamation mark embedded within a triangle).  Following scrutiny of the labels, subjects 
were asked a series of questions about the products, one dimension of which was to ascertain 
the perceived hazard associated with each product.  The results showed that, for products 
where no warning was given, the hazard ratings were lowest.  The signal word ‘note’ led to 
significantly lower hazard ratings than did ‘danger’ and ‘lethal’, and ‘caution’ and ‘warning’ 
returned lower hazard scores than ‘lethal’.  The authors concluded that the presence of signal 
words on product labels will raise the hazard perceptions of consumers, although no 
significant differences in effect were found between the moderate signal words ‘caution’ and 
‘warning’.  Furthermore, no effect for the signal icon was demonstrated.  Wogalter et al. 
(1994, p. 554) suggested that although the signal icon may attract attention to the warning, “it 
has no additional influence beyond this (such as affecting hazard perception)”. 
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In other research on signal word choice, Wogalter and Silver (1995) investigated the 
responses of non-native English speakers to lists of signal words and found that perceived 
hazard levels did not differ significantly from fluent English speakers.  Poor comprehension 
of some signal words, however, such as ‘hazardous’ and ‘halt’ was found.  Wogalter and 
Silver argued that the choice of appropriate signal words for warning labels is important if an 
accurate message is to be given.  These authors cited examples of legal cases in which the 
words used to warn consumers have been determined as insufficient to communicate the 
extent of a hazard. 
 
Further research has examined the effects of warning colour and signal word on hazard 
perception level and safety compliance (Braun & Silver, 1995; Wogalter et al., 1997; Young 
& Wogalter, 1990).  Typically, the studies have shown that colour influences the awareness 
and recall of warnings, the level of hazard conveyed, as well as compliance behaviour.  In an 
experiment where subjects were set a simple task involving a fictitious adhesive product, 
Braun and Silver determined that signal words such as ‘danger’, ‘deadly’, ‘fatal’, and ‘lethal’, 
were significantly more effective in conveying serious hazard when compared to signal words 
such as ‘caution’, ‘attention’, ‘warning’, ‘notice’, and ‘important’.  Perceived hazard levels 
printed in red were significantly higher than for other colours tested.  Braun and Silver were 
also able to show that compliance with safety instructions was significantly higher among 
participants whose instructions were written in red compared to those who received green or 
black instruction information. 
 
In addition to signal word choice and colour, some research has looked at other ways to 
increase warning awareness and compliance through increasing sign salience.  Glover and 
Wogalter (1997) used a technique in which subjects were presented with a computer 
simulation of a mine evacuation to test the effects of different sign types.  During the 
experiments, participants (under several different treatments) were required to exit the ‘mine’ 
through a series of tunnels, shafts, and intersections.  In their efforts to complete this task, 
participants were exposed to warning signs that were of either high salience or low salience 
(high salience signs were larger and featured more prominent colours and fonts).  Signs either 
directed subjects towards the mine exit, or away from hazardous areas.  The researchers 
established that subjects exposed to high salience signs were significantly more likely to 
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comply with the directions than those exposed to the low salience signs.  The researchers also 
found that women were more likely than men to comply with the warnings. 
 
Pictorials and icons are commonly used in warning messages with the intention of simplifying 
communication, and conveying ideas without heavy reliance on words and language.  While 
some authors have claimed that well-designed pictorials have the potential to communicate 
concepts and instructions at a glance (Moscardo, Woods, & Pearce, 1997), others have found 
that pictorials often fail to convey the intended message through poor design or the 
inapplicability of the specific warning to the pictorial format (Hathaway & Dingus, 1992; 
Wogalter et al., 1997).  Wogalter et al. (1997) conducted a study in which they investigated 
subjects’ comprehension and recall of various pictorials.  Significant improvements in 
comprehension followed simple training and explanation of the most difficult to interpret 
pictorials, leading the researchers to conclude that a brief (verbal or textual) description of the 
pictorial’s meaning is sufficient to advance comprehension of pictorial warnings. 
 
Other message characteristics that have been found to influence effective warnings include 
the number of warnings presented and novel message formats.  While no studies directly 
assess the effects of increasing the number of signs or labels, McCarthy et al. (1995) 
suggested that recent research is indicative of an inverse relationship.  These researchers 
found that, as additional warning messages were issued, subject recall of specific warnings 
decreased.  The effectiveness of warnings is likely to decline when they compete with many 
other warning messages.  In addition, some research has indicated that out of the ordinary 
labels and signs may be more likely to gain attention and obtain compliance than those 
conforming to standards (Hathaway & Dingus, 1992; Wogalter & Young, 1994).  In one 
experiment conducted to examine the effectiveness of behavioural compliance with warning 
labels, Wogalter and Young revealed a significant difference between novel and conventional 
formats.  The study assessed the observed behaviour and other responses of subjects presented 
with a differentially labelled glue product and required to perform a model assembly task 
under incidental exposure conditions.  The authors concluded that warning noticeability was 
an important factor affecting compliance, a finding supported by both the experiment 
observations, and the post-task questions.  For instance, a strong relationship was found 
between reported awareness of the warning, accurate recall of its content, and compliance.  
The ability of the warning to attract the attention of the subjects appeared to facilitate 
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compliance.  Wogalter and Young (1994) also acknowledge, however, that, although noticing 
the warning is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition to ensure compliance. 
 
In addition to the recognised warning sign attributes accepted in the warnings literature, there 
are other social and psychological factors which are likely to affect compliance.  Much of the 
literature on the effectiveness of warning messages focuses on the message, rather than the 
source or target of communication.  However, effectiveness may also be a function of the 
message recipient’s assessment of the costs of compliance, and the role of normative 
influences.   For instance, McCarthy et al. (1995) argued that warning compliance imposes a 
‘cost’ on those at whom it is targeted.  Costs can include time, money, effort, lost opportunity, 
etc..  According to McCarthy et al. (1995, p. 2167), “people are frequently unwilling to take 
such simple steps as seeking another exit, going to the next room for protective equipment, or 
wearing a seatbelt”.  Where the cost of compliance is low, a greater proportion of people are 
likely to adhere to warning messages.  Where the compliance cost is perceived to exceed the 
potential compliance benefit, individuals are less likely to act in accordance with the warning 
message, than if the benefits outweigh the costs (Hathaway & Dingus, 1992; Wogalter & 
Laughery, 1996). 
 
Other beliefs and attitudes may affect how people process warning information.  Where a 
product is believed to be safe, for example, product safety information is less likely to be 
attended to, or accepted where it is contrary to existing beliefs.  Familiarity with a product 
also reduces the level of perceived hazard associated with that product, and reduces the 
likelihood that warnings will be read (Wogalter & Laughery, 1996). 
 
Adams et al. (1998) also attempted to explain message effectiveness by reference to the 
message recipient.  These authors suggested that lack of compliance with warning signs can 
be explained by processes including ‘psychological reactance’ and the ‘third person effect’.  
For instance, psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Manfredo & Bright, 1991) 
suggests that people do not like to be told what to do, and will oppose attempts to influence 
them when perceived control is at stake.  Further, the ‘third person effect’ (Davison, 1983) 
helps account for a sense of invulnerability to harm by shifting the nature of the problem on to 
other people.  Hence, warning messages can be interpreted as irrelevant to the individual, 
intended for other people who are less experienced or less skilled (Adams et al., 1998). 
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In another study, de Turck and Goldhaber (1989) found that subjects instructed to memorise 
all they could about a product had greater recall of its safe use, and were more likely to 
comply with recommended safety precautions than those simply instructed to form an 
impression of the product.  de Turck and Goldhaber argued that, because of the small 
cognitive effort required, most consumers adopt an ‘impression-set objective’ to information 
processing and, as a consequence, fail to internalise important safety information.  The 
authors concluded that consumers need to be encouraged to adopt a ‘memory-set objective’ 
and pay more attention to the specific content of warning messages, and be made aware of 
this objective before they examine safety information.  While the authors’ explanation for 
poor recall of safety instructions is plausible, their solution is potentially problematic. Given 
that individuals are likely to develop ‘impression-set’ approaches to information processing in 
order to cope with the volume of messages competing for their attention, attempts to 
encourage a less peripheral approach to information processing present considerable 
challenges.  
 
3.6.5 Summary 
The research literature indicates that, to a certain extent, it is possible to influence hazard 
perception and awareness of warning messages, although ‘real world’ situations are largely 
untested.  Most research on the effectiveness of warning messages has focused on the features 
of the message itself and, in particular, warning labels on consumer products.  It is recognised 
that warning labels differ from warning signs, and that behavioural compliance may be more 
difficult to achieve in the former (McCarthy et al., 1995).  While warning labels accompany 
virtually every consumer product, signs may be more effective because they are situation 
specific, and can be erected in relevant locations and conditions.  These features may increase 
the likelihood that sign content will be attended to and acted upon. 
 
According to the existing literature, to be effective, warnings need to be conspicuous relative 
to their context, with factors such as novelty, size, and contrast likely to affect salience.  
Signal words or icons, and pictorials also attract attention and can be used to convey the 
consequences of non-compliance.  Other components of the communication process are 
important in persuasion and compliance.  Factors such as source credibility, and the 
psychological disposition of message recipients will influence the efficacy of warning 
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messages.  So too will the perceived compliance costs and benefits and normative influences 
operating. 
 
3.7 Communicating risk in natural resource recreation and tourism 
settings 
Communication is a common activity in recreation and tourism settings, and a wide range of 
situations exist in which information needs to be given to visitors, including basic safety 
messages, orientation information, and heritage education (Moscardo, 1999).  It is possible to 
identify three primary management justifications for effective communication including 
enhancing visitor experiences, minimising visitor impacts, and managing visitor safety.  
While there is some literature on the development of interpretation as a tool for enhancing the 
visitor experience (Cable, Knudson, Udd, & Stewart, 1987; Hall & McArthur, 1996; Light, 
1995; Moscardo, 1996, 1999; Pierssene, 1999), and for the reduction of visitor impacts 
through communication (D.N. Cole, 1998; Hammitt & Cole, 1998; Vander Stoep & Gramann, 
1987; Roggenbuck & Berrier, 1982), few published studies have examined the effectiveness 
of risk and hazard messages in a natural resource recreation or tourism context. 
 
In nature-based recreation and tourism settings, the most common communication channels 
used by managing agencies are brochures, talks, signs, panels, and personal contact by agency 
staff (Knudson, Cable, & Beck, 1995; McCool & Braithwaite, 1992; Woods, Moscardo, & 
Greenwood, 1998).  Signs and panels are often considered to be the most cost effective means 
of communicating with visitors, although managers should not assume that the signs they 
erect will attract the attention of visitors or that they will stop, read, process, and recall the 
information, and act in accordance with it (Cole, Hammond, & McCool, 1997).  Sandiford 
and Kelly (1996, p. 27) argued that natural resource management agencies have become 
overly reliant on signs and other written text to convey messages, “despite research indicating 
that this medium is passive and one of the least effective forms of communication”. 
 
The importance of persuasion cannot be underestimated in recreation and tourism settings, 
where managers often seek to protect the biophysical environment from the impacts of 
visitors, or improve the safety of visitors themselves.  Gramann, Bonifield, and Kim (1995), 
for instance, observed that a major problem currently facing outdoor recreation management 
agencies is the damage to natural and cultural resources resulting from visitors’ violation of 
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protective rules.  The potential of effective communication to address this management issue 
was recognised by McCool and Braithwaite (1992, p. 318) who emphasised that persuasive 
messages can cause visitors to “question their initial attitudes, evaluate the recommended 
adoption of a new attitude, and provide the incentives for yielding to and retaining new 
attitudes”. 
 
Opinions on how to inform visitors of risks, and manage risk taking behaviour in natural 
settings, is part of a broader debate about direct and indirect management techniques (see 
Cole, 1995; Cole et al., 1997; Gramann et al., 1995; Hammitt & Cole, 1998; Manning, 1999; 
McCool & Braithwaite, 1992).  Some authors have urged caution in becoming too involved in 
what is essentially the visitor’s experience (Griswold, 1989; McAvoy & Dustin, 1990), 
including authors who advocate almost complete individual responsibility for safety (Hardin, 
1969; Sax, 1980).  In contrast, those with economic interests in the tourism industry are 
naturally cautious about how much emphasis to place on safety given the possibility that 
visitor perceptions of risk can lead to a decline in business.  With a growing emphasis on 
safety and agency accountability, risk management and risk communication has become a 
significant aspect of recreation and tourism provision, a phenomenon discussed further in 
Chapter 4. 
 
A review of the literature suggests that specific studies addressing the issues of message 
effectiveness in nature-based tourism and recreation settings are few (Cole et al., 1997; 
McCool & Braithwaite, 1992).  Signs and trailside information panels are widespread in 
outdoor recreation and tourism settings, yet little has been done to assess the impacts of these 
on visitor knowledge, attitude, or behaviour.  Moreover, studies investigating the impact of 
safety messages are virtually absent in the literature.  For this reason, and because the 
underlying principles are likely to have some applicability across a range of message topics 
and compliance situations, the literature reviewed in this section includes communication in 
recreation settings generally, rather than that which specifies a risk or safety focus only.  The 
material can be logically organised around what is known about the message content and 
format, the message source, and the characteristics of the message recipient.  The dimensions 
used as a framework for this discussion allow the various elements of persuasive 
communication to be identified. 
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3.7.1 Message characteristics 
Of the previously identified dimensions of communication, the most widely studied in the 
recreation context are the characteristics of the message itself.  This is consistent with the 
wider literature (Adams et al., 1995), and may reflect the fact that there is greater potential for 
manipulation of message characteristics compared to the characteristics of the message source 
and recipient.  Additionally, recreation and tourism providers have available to them a range 
of communication strategies in these settings, from personal guides or interpreters, to 
brochures, outdoor panels, and signs, and it is within the interests of most management 
agencies to make assessments of the effectiveness of the various strategies in order to ensure 
that benefits are maximised.  There are also aesthetic considerations in recreation and tourism 
management that may not be as important in some other settings where the natural character 
of the environment is less central to the individual’s experience.  The emphasis of recreation 
and tourism managers on the value of visitor experiences is a feature which makes 
communication, via written means especially, a challenging exercise. 
 
Several studies have revealed that signs can be effective in resource-based recreation settings, 
although the effectiveness is not always complete.  For example, Cole et al. (1997), in a study 
of the effectiveness of trailside bulletin boards in the back-country, found that recreationists 
exposed to messages encouraging low impact behaviour were more likely to acquire new 
knowledge about recommended practices than those not exposed to the messages.  However, 
according to the authors, a threshold of approximately two messages was evident, beyond 
which information overload appeared to result.  As the quantity of messages posted increased 
beyond two messages, attention per message and retention both declined.  This finding is 
supported by other researchers who report that the effects of abundant visual stimuli can 
reduce the chances of each message being identified and absorbed by visitors (Bitgood, 
Patterson, Benefield, & Landers, 1986; McCool & Braithwaite, 1992).  Cole et al. (1997) also 
found that only 55 per cent of visitors to the site stopped and looked at the messages on the 
board, and few visitors were willing to spend more than 25 seconds to read low impact 
messages.  This implies the need to select and promote key messages only, and the potential 
value of pictorial communication. 
 
D.N. Cole (1998) examined the effectiveness of written appeals for attention in a back-
country recreation context.  Six messages, comprising both text and basic illustration, were 
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systematically posted on a trailside bulletin board, and appealed to recreationists to comply 
with simple requests for appropriate behaviour in the wilderness setting.  Message 
effectiveness was assessed both in terms of the proportion of visitors who stopped to read the 
notices, and the length of time that attention was held.  Assessments were made in each of the 
six treatments and later analysed for differences.  Results showed that, overall, 61 per cent of 
visitors stopped to look at the messages, and that the mean length of time spent attending to 
the messages was 52 seconds.  Of the appeals used, the most effective was a simple appeal 
which read: ‘please take time to read these messages’, an appeal that increased visitor 
attention to the bulletin board by 88 per cent.  Notwithstanding the impact of this simple 
statement, D.N. Cole (1998, p. 77) emphasised that “compliance with a request for attention 
to messages, does not guarantee compliance with the behaviors recommended in those 
messages”. 
 
Another study of visitor response to low impact messages examined visitors’ understanding of 
pictorial messages at Great Barrier Reef, Queensland (Moscardo et al., 1997).  Managers of 
this natural attraction had reported continuing issues related to the protection of the sensitive 
reef environment from inappropriate visitor behaviour.  The researchers designed and 
constructed eight pictorial symbols, some with accompanying text, each of which was 
intended to convey a single aspect of reef visitor behaviour and its appropriateness (such as 
‘do not sit or stand on coral’, and ‘do not drop litter in the water’).  The study found that the 
pictorial communications resulted in improved knowledge about the reef in only a minority of 
the messages.  This was consistent for both English speaking and English as a second 
language groups.  The authors attributed this result, at least in part, to the high level of 
existing knowledge of appropriate reef behaviour among visitors.  Further, the authors 
concluded that the symbols were not effective in representing ‘grey’ areas, and should only be 
applied in situations where simple ideas can be conveyed.  Interpretation of symbols is also 
highly context dependent, and influenced by culture, implying that a single set of symbols for 
all visitor groups may not be realistic (Moscardo et al., 1997). 
 
Other studies have examined the potential of different information formats to influence visitor 
behaviour and knowledge.  Roggenbuck and Berrier (1982), for example, compared the 
effectiveness of an information brochure and personal contact as methods intended to 
redistribute use within a popular wilderness camping area.  The authors demonstrated that 
both treatments were effective in dispersing all recreationists, although when the treatments 
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were combined, the compliance was greatest for recreationists lacking experience in the 
setting.  The researchers concluded that even a message communicated by a simple brochure 
can be effective, and that early information is most effective in dispersing wilderness use.  
Overall, most studies have concluded that messages delivered verbally, especially by agency 
staff, are the most effective (McCool & Braithwaite, 1992; Moscardo, 1999). 
 
Vander Stoep and Gramann (1987) examined resource damage at a front-country recreation 
site, and found that inappropriate visitor behaviour (such as vandalism) could be reduced 
using management tools such as information and education brochures, signs, and personally 
delivered messages.  Another study looked at the effects of personality and situation on 
intentions to obey rules in outdoor recreation areas.  This laboratory study determined that 
“subjects were more willing to comply with regulations when they were told of the reasons 
for the rule, as well as the negative consequences... of not obeying them” (Gramann et al., 
1995, p. 340).  The authors concluded that information about consequences, in tandem with 
threats of sanction, could be an effective management strategy for directing visitor behaviour.  
If this conclusion is transferred to the hazard context, concrete examples that describe the 
consequences of risks may be more effective than vague suggestions that certain activities are 
dangerous. 
 
Moscardo (1999) also considered the elements of effective communication in recreation and 
tourism contexts.  She reviewed a small number of studies which identified features that 
attract visitor attention.  Common among these are extreme stimuli, movement and contrast, 
novelty, and personal interest (Moscardo, 1999).  Manipulating the size, colour, shape, and 
statements used in sign composition, can increase the likelihood that visitors will attend to the 
message (Bitgood, Benefield, Patterson, & Litwak, 1990).  Bitgood et al. (1986) also found 
that the more salient the sign, the greater the attracting and holding power it has.  The authors 
reviewed two studies both of which reported that by reducing the number of words on signs 
by approximately two thirds, sign reading increased by 25 per cent (Bitgood, Nichols, & 
Patterson, 1986; cited in Bitgood et al., 1986; Hodges, 1978; cited in Bitgood et al., 1986).   
 
From the research examining the features of effective messages in recreation settings, it is 
clear that enhancing the salience of the sign can increase visitor attention.  However, two 
caveats need emphasising: i) attention does not equate to acceptance or retention of the 
information contained in the sign; and ii) in some natural resource recreation settings it may 
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not be appropriate to use the extremes of size, colour, and movement to attract the interest of 
visitors. 
 
3.7.2 Source characteristics 
As identified in the earlier discussion on persuasion (Section 3.6.3), source credibility appears 
to be an important feature of successful hazard communication, and remains so in the 
recreation context (Manfredo & Bright, 1991; McCool & Braithwaite, 1992; Moscardo, 1999; 
Pearce, 1988; Pettigrew, 1996).  The source of the message is considered to exert a powerful 
influence over message acceptance, and on resultant behaviour.  Attractiveness, expertise, and 
trustworthiness are key features of increasing credibility (McCool & Braithwaite, 1992), and 
may have their greatest influence over people with an external locus of control (Pettigrew, 
1996). 
 
Highly credible communicators will be more persuasive, especially in situations where low 
processing occurs (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Source credibility, however, is not necessarily a 
characteristic exclusive to the communicator of a message.  Rather, source credibility may 
have as much to do with the recipient’s attitude.  For instance, compliance with regulatory 
signs may depend on the recipient’s attitudinal disposition toward the person or organisation 
responsible for the message.  Manfredo and Bright (1991), in their study of the effects of 
information and source credibility on visitors to a North American wilderness area, found that 
recreationists with more positive perceptions of the USDA Forest Service were more likely to 
devote attention to informational brochures distributed on site.  Attention does not equate to 
behavioural compliance, but it is an important step in the information processing chain, which 
may lead to persuasion. 
 
Another critical feature of the message source, likely to influence persuasion and message 
effectiveness, is the perceived power of the message source to effect penalty or punishment.  
D.N. Cole (1998) suggested that the recreation manager is likely to be more persuasive if he 
or she is perceived by recreationists as having a legitimate right to prescribe their behaviour.  
Similarly, research has found that the presence of uniformed authority figures increased 
subjects’ compliance with regulations in recreation settings.  For instance, Swearingen and 
Johnson (1995) found the presence of uniformed park employees to be a significant deterrent 
to off-trail hiking in a major North American national park.  Importantly, these researchers 
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also found that visitors accepted the presence of park staff where there was a perceived need 
for management action related to information dissemination, visitor safety, and resource 
damage.  The authors emphasised that park staff need not assume a confrontational, 
authoritarian stance, since “the mere presence of the uniformed employee may dramatically 
reduce non-compliance” (Swearingen & Johnson, 1995, p. 80).  Credibility and power of the 
message source is more potent if authority is physically present and the likelihood of 
punishment is more real.  This represents a problem in the New Zealand park management 
context, where only limited staff presence is possible.  Furthermore, penalties for non-
compliance with management messages may be perceived as unlikely or slight. 
 
3.7.3 Visitor characteristics 
Research on the characteristics of message recipients includes the examination of individual 
cognition, socio-economic features, levels of experience in the recreation setting, and 
normative influences on behaviour.  For instance, Manfredo and Bright (1991) adopted Petty 
and Cacioppo’s (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) in order to help explain the 
effects of communication on recreationists.  In Section 3.6.3 the ELM was described as 
comprising two pathways to persuasion, with the central route encouraging a high level of 
message relevant thinking, resulting in more lasting attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986).  Manfredo and Bright (1991) proposed that the likelihood of behaviour change is 
linked to the process of elaboration.  These authors studied the effects of six factors thought to 
influence elaboration: prior knowledge, direct experience, topic involvement, need for 
cognition, perceived status in social group, and perceived source credibility.  To a certain 
extent, all of these factors can be interpreted as characteristics of the message recipient.  
Results indicated that perceived source credibility and level of prior knowledge were 
significant factors influencing the generation of new thoughts and change of prior beliefs.  
These features of elaboration are considered to affect persuasion and, in turn, behaviour 
change.  Manfredo and Bright (1991, p. 14) concluded that information given to recreationists 
prior to their visits was “effective in influencing the behavior of less knowledgeable users and 
[did so] by generating thought and introducing new beliefs”. 
 
Other researchers have emphasised the importance of engaging the visitor in order to achieve 
management aims such as visitor responsibility, and the sustainability of both visitor 
experience and the biophysical resource (Moscardo, 1996; Pearce, 1988).  Moscardo (1996, 
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1999) used Langer’s (1989) concept of ‘mindfulness’ to describe a mental state in which 
visitors actively reconstruct their environment by creating new categories, thus directing 
attention to new contextual cues that may be consciously controlled.  According to Moscardo 
(1999), mindfulness is a necessary condition for learning new information and has been 
associated with better decision-making, increased self esteem, and other individual and 
societal benefits.  The theory implies that mindful visitors are more likely to respond 
positively to appeals relating to safety or the sensitivity of natural environments, although it is 
less clear how people’s minds are best engaged, especially on topics as peripheral to the 
visitor’s intended experience as risk and safety are likely to be. 
 
Message recipient factors beyond the cognitive realm are also thought to influence persuasive 
communication.  Important among these are normative influences, which can significantly 
affect the reception and acceptance of persuasive messages (Fishbein & Manfredo, 1992; 
McCool & Braithwaite, 1992).  For instance, the expectations of the social group concerning 
behaviour appropriate in the recreation setting are likely to mediate the effects of persuasive 
communication attempts by the agency.  This is especially important in natural resource 
recreation and tourism settings, given the fact that people rarely visit alone. 
 
In another study investigating aspects of message recipients, Gramann et al. (1995) used a 
laboratory-based experimental procedure to examine the effects of social responsibility and 
‘awareness of consequences’ information on subjects’ intentions to obey regulations in 
outdoor recreation settings.  Social responsibility was considered by the authors to be “a 
dispositional trait which reflects an individual’s dependability, sense of obligation to the 
group, and willingness to accept the consequences of his or her own behavior” (Gramann et 
al., 1995, p. 329).  The authors found partial support for their hypothesis that those with 
higher social responsibility levels would be more likely to accept and comply with messages 
pertaining to the negative environmental consequences of rule violation in outdoor recreation 
areas.  Given the study’s parameters, this result is unsurprising.  How traits such as ‘social 
obligation’ influence actual behaviour in the recreation setting remains unknown.  
 
3.7.4 Summary 
The central findings from the studies reviewed, suggest that there are multiple mechanisms 
through which to improve message effectiveness in recreation and tourism settings.  
 88
Understanding visitors is one aspect of this, as characteristics, perceptions, and beliefs will 
determine the appropriateness of particular communication approaches.  The form of the 
message itself is also central to its effect.  While the success of pictorial messages is largely 
untested in the recreation and tourism context, such approaches seem to have the greatest 
potential in terms of attention, salience, and comprehension.  (A pictorial message format is 
adopted in the present study).  The communicator of the message (the source) can also 
influence message effectiveness to the extent that it is perceived to be credible.  In many 
dispersed recreation settings, it is not feasible for agency staff to maintain a strong regulatory 
presence, which implies the need to adopt alternative strategies for fostering positive 
perceptions of the agency.  The characteristics of those for whom the messages are intended 
further influence the outcome of communication attempts.  Cognitive need and state, degree 
of social responsibility, level of experience, prior knowledge, as well as various social 
demographic features have been shown to affect communication in recreation settings.  With 
the important exception of prior knowledge, these latter dimensions are largely beyond the 
influence of recreation and tourism managers. 
 
Many of the principles of effective communication applied and tested in generic contexts are 
applicable in recreation and tourism settings.  It is important to emphasise, however, that 
recreation and tourism settings differ from the settings in which most persuasion research has 
been conducted.  In many workplaces and home environments, for example, signs, labels, and 
instructions are likely to be commonplace.  Similarly, consumer products all have labels, and 
people are accustomed, although not necessarily attentive, to the printed warnings and 
instructions on these.  In contrast, the volume of warnings and other information messages is 
likely to be both lower and less anticipated in natural recreation and tourism settings.  
Furthermore, visitors to most natural resource areas are a select group, not typical of the 
general public in terms of educational attainment, income, or occupation (Booth & Peebles, 
1995; Manning, 1999), factors likely to positively influence message attention and 
comprehension (McCool & Braithwaite, 1992; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  It is perhaps 
surprising, then, that the literature to date suggests that visitors attend only briefly to 
information messages in outdoor settings.  The communication of risk and hazard messages is 
likely to be complicated by visitors’ risk perceptions, attitudes, social influences, and 
perceived cost of compliance.  These are subjects of discussion in Chapter 6. 
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3.8 Chapter summary and conclusions 
Risk perceptions are influenced by what people believe, what they see, hear, and interpret for 
themselves.  They are also a function of social and cultural influences which help filter 
information, including risk communications, selecting that which is attended to and accepted.  
As Jungermann and Slovic (1993, p. 87) observed: “individual risk perception has turned out 
to be a function of both the qualities of our cognitive and motivational systems and of the 
conditions of our social, political and cultural environment”. 
 
This chapter has reviewed literature on risk perception and risk communication.  The chapter 
creates a foundation for the analysis of the current research which examines the risk 
perceptions of visitors to, and dimensions of communication effectiveness at, two natural 
attractions in New Zealand.  Aspects of communication and message effectiveness form an 
important part of the discussion on risk perception, and ultimately have an influence on 
behaviour in recreation and tourism settings.  The inclusion of this latter research is 
instrumental in addressing the issues of warning compliance and visitor management raised 
later in this study. 
 
To date, the research on risk perception and hazard communication in recreation and tourism 
is limited.  There are, however, a number of broad conclusions that can be drawn, supported 
by the wider, more comprehensive literature.  First, it is evident that individual judgements 
and decisions are influenced by perceptions of risk and safety.  These judgements, however, 
are often not related to ‘actual’ assessments of risk determined by technical means, and hence, 
recreationists and tourists are likely to engage in behaviours experts view as risky, yet fear 
things that are unlikely to harm them.  Second, risk perceptions are likely to be influenced by 
a variety of individual and situational factors.  Tourists and recreationists, then, can be 
expected to form perceptions based on their own experiences, expectations, and beliefs, as 
well as through wider social influences including the media, promotional material, site 
managers, and other visitors. 
 
Third, the communication literature suggests that people often ignore messages, and fail to 
comply with written instructions.  Multiple explanations for this phenomenon include limited 
awareness or comprehension, the perceived costs of compliance, over-confidence in personal 
ability, lack of personal relevance, and lack of confidence in the communicator.  While there 
is limited specific research on the effects of hazard communication in recreation and tourism 
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settings, the wider literature implies that recreationists and tourists are unlikely to attend to 
safety messages, potentially exposing them to physical risk in some natural resource 
environments. 
 
The literature reviewed in this chapter indicates several important gaps in tourism and 
recreation research.  In particular, there have been no studies examining how, or if, tourists 
perceive risk at New Zealand tourism destinations, or the significance of hazards at natural 
attractions.  Further, little is known about the effectiveness of communication in these 
settings, especially the communication of natural hazards such as those identified at the 
glaciers of Westland National Park.  The present study explores these questions, and considers 
the interaction between hazard communication and risk perception in the resource-based 
tourism setting. 
 
In Chapter 4, some of the risk management issues in recreation and tourism settings are 
introduced.  Specific attention is given to tourist behaviour and the visitor management 
challenges that arise from this, as well as the legal environment in which New Zealand 
managers must operate.  Chapter 4 extends the discussion established in Chapters 2 and 3, 
building on the argument that risk is a significant phenomenon in current Western society 
influencing both the management and visitor experiences of natural resource attractions.  
 91
 
Chapter 4 Natural hazards and risk in recreation and 
tourism settings 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Natural resource recreation and tourism form an important and increasingly significant 
portion of the developed world’s leisure and travel preferences.  While outdoor recreation has 
been popular in many countries since the early twentieth century (Devlin, 1993, 1995; 
Manning, 1999; Shultis, 1991), the emergence of nature-based tourism as a distinct form of 
commercial activity is a relatively recent phenomenon.  A new special interest tourism has 
developed, often differentiated from the traditional mass tourism by labels such as 
‘ecotourism’, ‘adventure tourism’, ‘alternative tourism’, and ‘green tourism’.  The 
phenomenon is especially apparent in New Zealand, where tourists’ use of natural heritage 
sites is increasing at a rate greater than the rate of inbound tourism generally (Higham, 1996).  
Notwithstanding the possibility of genuine differences between these styles, each implies 
close interaction between the tourist and the natural (or cultural) environment.  These forms of 
tourism appear to have grown in popularity throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century 
(Ewert & Shultis, 1997; Hall & Lew, 1998; McKercher, 1998; Valentine, 1992). 
 
The development of nature-based tourism has been facilitated by several important social 
trends that deserve comment.  First, access to communication technologies (including 
television and the internet) has exposed people to the world’s natural wonders, while other 
technological improvements have increased the comfort and accessibility of previously 
remote destinations.  A large industry in leisure clothing and travel equipment has been part 
of these developments, and new technologies have helped create strong, lightweight materials 
that allow the adventure recreationist to go further and faster than ever before.  Furthermore, 
advancements in other industries have improved the perceived safety of travel in remote 
regions.  Cell-phones and global positioning devices, for instance, now provide an enlarged 
‘comfort zone’ for those wishing to depart from more established travel routes. 
 
The second important social trend contributing to the interest in nature-based tourism, is an 
apparent increase in environmental awareness.  Various authors have observed that the 
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citizens of some developed nations, including New Zealand, have become concerned about 
human effects on the biophysical environment and, as a result, the social value of nature is 
relatively high compared to recent centuries (Boerwinkel, 1995; Bürhs & Bartlett, 1993; 
Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Philipsen, 1995).  Rather than resulting in net benefit for the 
environment, however, it is possible that concern for the environment has led to an increase in 
the number of people interested in travelling to unique and ecologically sensitive places, 
thereby creating a net disbenefit (Gössling, 2000; Wheeller, 1991).  This is, as yet, difficult to 
confirm.  There is little doubt, however, about the high level of interest in the various 
incarnations of nature tourism. 
 
The new level of interest in, and concern for, the environment may be related to the absence 
of nature experiences in the everyday lives of many people living in Western societies.  Most 
economies in the developed world dictate that a growing proportion of people live in urban 
environments.  It is possible to speculate that this contributes to a motive for people to 
‘escape’ built environments and visit places that are removed from the effects of industry and 
commerce (Pigram, 1993).  In this sense, nature-based tourism represents an opportunity to 
experience places of permanency in a world of rapid change. 
 
Superimposed on these other important social trends, is the influence of the risk society.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, a concern for safety is a characteristic of modern Western life, and is 
also a feature likely to influence the management and administration of recreation and 
tourism.  The concern for tourist safety and security is reflected in the World Tourism 
Organization’s recent publications directed at government and private sector officials 
interested in improving tourist safety in their destinations (WTO, 1996, 1998). 
 
Paradoxically, some travellers appear to react against the safety consciousness of their home 
environments and seek adventure and thrills through tourism.  The recent rise of adventure 
tourism is perhaps a reaction to the decreasing opportunities to experience physical risk in 
everyday life.  Western society is highly regulated with controls and systems that ensure that 
physical risk to citizens is minimised.  Adventure tourism activities, such as bungy jumping, 
white water rafting, and shark feeding provide thrills - albeit carefully managed – that are 
strenuously avoided in the course of normal modern living.  The adventure activities, 
however, are undertaken in the context of a society with low tolerance for genuine danger.  If 
these activities were, in fact, shown to be dangerous or risky, the majority of current 
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participants would not undertake them and, society, through the imposition of regulations, 
legal penalties, or simple ‘market forces’, would ensure the closure of such operations.  
Notwithstanding a genuine desire for adventure, most tourists no doubt want the thrills 
without the associated risk of injury.  In this sense, the identified paradox is only an apparent 
one.  As tourists, people may be drawn to activities that are thrilling, but are likely to be 
repelled by genuine risks to their safety.  Modern adventure tourism pursuits exploit this 
tension between the real and perceived risk by offering activities previously considered to be 
high risk but now made relatively safe through regulation and control.  The individual 
adventure tourist now participates in highly protected adventure, attracted to the notion of 
danger, yet expecting that the experience is contained within a regulated, safety-conscious 
environment. 
 
Within the context of this burgeoning interest in nature and adventure tourism, and against a 
general background of societal risk aversion, this chapter examines some of the hazards and 
risks faced by tourists and other visitors to natural resource settings.  Brief consideration is 
given to the adventure and thrill-seeking aspects of the tourist industry, although the emphasis 
of the discussion is on the risks that are not deliberately sought by visitors.  In the next 
section, the nature and scope of risks are outlined, and examples of hazardous situations, and 
attempts by agencies to manage the risks arising from them, are described.  Consideration is 
given to the legal context for the management and provision of recreation and tourism 
experiences in New Zealand.  Finally, literature from the field of tourism studies is reviewed 
to highlight aspects of tourist behaviour that are significant for risk and hazard management. 
 
4.2 The nature and scope of risk in natural resource recreation and 
tourism  
For the purposes of the current discussion, the nature of risk in natural resource recreation and 
tourism settings can be considered to be predominantly physical.  By ‘physical risk’ is meant 
the likelihood and significance of physical harm to visitors.  Tourists and recreationists also 
expose themselves to social, financial, psychological, and satisfaction risks (Cheron & 
Ritchie, 1982; Roehl & Fesenmaier, 1992), but the present study is principally interested in 
the influence of natural hazards and physical risk on tourists’ perceptions and behaviour.  
Financial and legal risks potentially incurred by managing agencies are included in the 
discussion presented in Section 4.3, and later in Chapter 7. 
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Observation of tourism trends suggests that, increasingly, tourists want to get close to nature.  
Adventure tourism, in particular, has become a high profile component of the tourist activity 
sector in New Zealand (Cloke & Perkins, 1998; Page, 1997; Page & Meyer, 1997).  This 
demand has increased the pressure on those agencies responsible for the provision of 
recreation and tourism opportunities to do so safely, without compromising the integrity of 
the tourist experience.  As the demand for authentic nature experiences increases, so too does 
the potential for accident, injury and death, as many natural attractions are inherently 
dangerous places for people to visit. 
 
There are many ways in which visitors to natural areas may be exposed to physical risk.  It is 
first important to differentiate between the hazards that confront recreationists, and voluntary 
recreation or tourism activities that entail elements of risk (McCool & Braithwaite, 1992).  In 
adventure tourism and risk recreation, participants are often testing mental and physical skills 
by engaging with natural hazards such as a rock face, a white water river, or the behaviour of 
wild animals.  The thrill or adrenalin rush achieved through balancing competency against 
danger can be an important part of the recreation experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Priest, 
1992).  The risk-taking recreationist is aware of the potential for injury, as well as actions 
needed to control exposure to hazards (McCool & Braithwaite, 1992).  In contrast, “to non-
risk-seeking visitors, hazards are impediments to an optimal experience” (McCool & 
Braithwaite, 1992 p. 294). 
 
4.2.1 The natural hazards of tourism and recreation 
In national parks and other protected areas around the world, people are frequently exposed to 
natural hazards, many of which they fail to recognise.  There are a variety of situations in 
which visitors to natural attractions can be exposed to hazards without intentionally seeking 
these.  The particular hazards are obviously highly site-specific.  In New Zealand, common 
(but not necessarily frequent) hazards to tourists and recreationists include extreme weather 
conditions, river crossings and floods, rockfall and avalanche, steep drops, ice collapse, 
volcanic eruptions, and thermal mud pools.  International examples include most of the above, 
with the addition of wildlife (bears, crocodiles, poisonous fish, etc.), lightning strikes, extreme 
heat, and others.  Ironically, it is often the attraction of these natural features that motivates 
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people to visit in the first place (Bean, 1989; Greenway, 1996; Johnston, 1989a; Martin, 
2000). 
 
Although natural hazards are not unique to New Zealand tourism, they are, perhaps, more 
significant than in some other tourist destinations owing to the centrality of nature experiences 
in the New Zealand tourism product.  In mountain settings especially, hazards are an inherent 
component of recreation, and not necessarily associated with the degree of public accessibility 
(Boyes, Thompson, Grant, & Newby, 1995).  Boyes et al. (1995) noted that relatively 
accessible outdoor recreation settings such as Mt. Taranaki could pose high levels of danger 
due to rapid weather changes.  Many other New Zealand settings are rugged, steep, or densely 
forested, and rivers, isolation, and weather conditions can all pose problems for visitors 
(Johnston, 1989a).  To this extent, it is possible to differentiate between natural area visitors 
generally, and those pursuing adventure activities, for whom risk is an important and integral 
element of the recreation experience.  Some members of the former group may accept risk as 
“a necessary condition” of recreation in particular environments, while “others remain totally 
unaware of the risk element until they experience it by chance” (Johnston, 1989b, p. 324). 
 
Although climate and terrain can create hazardous conditions throughout the natural areas of 
New Zealand, there are several popular attractions where specific concerns about visitor 
safety have been raised.  These areas include the geothermal areas of the North Island’s 
central plateau (Beetham & Mongillo, 1995), the Hunua Falls (K. Floyd, personal 
communication, March 9, 1998), the Huka Falls and Punakaiki Blowholes (P. Dale, personal 
communication, September 24, 1998), Tongariro National Park (Martin, 2000), and the 
glaciers of Westland National Park (DOC, 1997b; McSaveney & Davies, 1998; TRC, 1995).  
Each of these sites is easily accessible, receives high numbers of visitors each year, and 
contains some physical risk to visitors.  Injuries, near misses, and deaths have been recorded 
at each of these sites.  Accidents and incidents occur in these natural settings in part because 
people are present in large numbers.  There are also concerns about visitor behaviour at these 
sites, a factor identified as important in understanding risk in recreation and tourism further 
discussed in Section 4.5. 
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4.3 Risk management in recreation and tourism settings 
There is an inherent conflict between the visitor’s desire to see nature in its 
natural state, and at the same time to be protected from natural hazards which 
may arise (Martin, 2000, p.  48). 
 
A variety of circumstances exist in which visitors to natural settings can inadvertently be at 
risk.  Managing agencies usually recognise this fact and take steps to minimise the negative 
consequences.  Common to most parks and recreation agencies in North America, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, is the concept of a risk management plan for 
maximising visitor safety.  These plans take many forms but typically address the processes 
of identifying, assessing, controlling, and monitoring hazards and risks (Christiansen, 1987; 
Peterson & Hronek, 1992; Planck, 1996; Spengler & Hronek, 1995; Sutton, 1989).  Risk 
management is about developing a logical and systematic approach to managing uncertainty. 
 
Risk management in recreation and tourism settings usually addresses two central concerns: i) 
protection of the visitor from harm; and ii) protection of the agency from legal action, 
financial loss, or diminished reputation (Ewert & Boone, 1987).  In North America, in 
particular, there appears to be significant emphasis on the latter of these functions, to the 
extent that fears of litigation and rising liability insurance costs have meant that some outdoor 
recreation programmes have been made unavailable to the public (Brademas, 1991; 
Direnfeld-Michael, 1989; Ewert & Boone, 1987; Kozlowski & Mertes, 1990; McAvoy & 
Dustin, 1990).  Kozlowski and Mertes (1990, p. 27) argued that in order to limit the likelihood 
of visitor injury and agency liability, a “when in doubt, throw it out” strategy is best for 
dealing with possible premise facility defects. 
 
In natural resource recreation and tourism settings, there are commonly three basic 
approaches taken to the management of hazards, including removal of the hazard, limiting 
access to the hazard, and warning of the hazard (Christiansen, 1987).  The options selected by 
managers will vary according to the nature of the physical environment, the assumed 
competency of the visitors, actual or perceived legal duty, and the general ethos of the 
management agency regarding visitor responsibility and safety.  In many situations, removal 
of the hazard (such as a rock face) is either impractical or impossible.  Furthermore, if 
removal of natural hazards involves modification to the environment, this may be detrimental 
to both conservation and visitor satisfaction aims.  Similarly, the construction of barriers and 
railings can detract from the visitor’s perception of freedom in the natural setting and interfere 
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with the aesthetic character of the site.  Construction and maintenance of major structures is 
also a significant financial cost.  For these pragmatic and fiscal reasons, many outdoor 
recreation agencies elect to provide warning signs as an important strategy in their 
communication with visitors and in the management of hazards to which visitors might be 
exposed. 
 
Risk management plans and strategies have become part of the common discourse among 
park and recreation managers, as well as many tourism operators.  The initiative for risk 
planning can be traced to several sources including state or national legislation, moral 
obligation, and market forces.  The adventure tourism industry in New Zealand, for instance, 
was prompted to initiate a code of practice among its members in order to encourage safe 
operations (Adventure Tourism Council, no date).  While legal and moral motives may have 
been present, an important factor influencing the development of an agreed safety code was 
the threat that the perception of unsafe tourism experiences could have severe financial 
consequences for an industry so dependent on image.  In Canada, public policy directs that all 
national parks and historic sites complete risk assessments and produce a Public Safety Plan 
(Parks Canada, 1996).  The policy is justified on the basis of reducing visitor accidents and 
agency liability exposure, minimising agency expenditure in message development and search 
and rescue operations, and enhancing visitor satisfaction (Parks Canada, 1997).  Such policies 
are an acknowledgement of the general lack of visitor experience and understanding of natural 
environments, a consequence of their separation from the urban, developed setting. 
 
Some authors observe that risk management has become a major component of business for 
North American recreation and park agencies as a result of the liability insurance crisis 
experienced there (Gold, 1991, 1994; Kozlowski & Mertes, 1990; McAvoy & Dustin, 1990; 
Spengler & Hronek, 1995).  Risk management is one process through which agencies can 
reduce the likelihood of costly compensation settlements.  Gold claimed that never before in 
the history of park management had there been such compelling reasons to develop 
sophisticated risk management programmes.  According to Gold (1991), the principal factors 
driving this need included increasing participation by people who were not aware of the risks 
in natural resource recreation, a legal system that offered remedial action for people injured 
through the park agency’s lack of safety checks, and the technology and expertise to prevent 
many accidents.  It is interesting to note that Gold’s analysis did not include reference to an 
increase in the actual number of accidents or injuries among visitors.  It seems reasonable that 
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such a statistic would be an important justification for risk management planning.  This adds 
support to the suggestion that risk management planning is driven by factors other than the 
number of recreationists who are suffering injuries. 
 
The protection of visitors to natural settings is now an important feature of park management 
business.  Parks agencies in countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia have 
developed special programmes and processes for risk management and the communication of 
risk to the general public (Batt, 1996; Brown, 1999; Hamilton-Smith, 1996; Parks Canada, 
1996, 1997).  The Department of Conservation in New Zealand has also been active in the 
development of risk management processes for visitors to conservation lands, especially since 
the accident at Cave Creek10.  DOC is now committed to identifying and meeting best 
practice through its membership of agencies such as the Australian and New Zealand 
Environment and Conservation Council, and a hallmark of its Quality Conservation 
Management philosophy is an emphasis on reducing risk to the organisation and visitors 
(DOC, 1996a).  At the field level, DOC personnel are required to develop hazard management 
plans in which the suite of possible dangers to the public (and DOC employees) are identified, 
assessed, mitigated, or reduced (eg., DOC, 1997a, 1997b). 
 
In addition to the widespread development of risk management plans and codes of practice 
within the outdoor recreation and tourism industries, there are a number of risk management 
tools used at specific recreation and tourism sites.  For instance, common site strategies for 
limiting the risk exposure of both agency and visitor, include interpretation and education, 
agency personnel (such as guides and park rangers), and warning signs.  The latter are 
especially common in dispersed recreation settings (McCool & Braithwaite, 1992), and while 
their effectiveness is not well established (Sandiford & Kelly, 1996), signs are relatively 
inexpensive and may satisfy the agency’s duty of care and limit liability.  According to 
Fullagar (1996), in his discussion of Australian parks and recreation management, warning 
signs may, in fact, remove agency liability, although the author acknowledged that this will 
depend on the nature and obviousness of the hazard to ‘ordinary’ participants, the capability 
and experience of visitors to the site, and the adequacy of warning signs to convey accurately 
what the hazard is.  Planck (1996, p. 168), also discussing the legal value of warning signs in 
                                                 
10 In April 1995, 13 students and a DOC employee fell 30 metres to their deaths when a viewing platform 
collapsed beneath them.  The platform was the responsibility of DOC, and the accident resulted in a high level of 
scrutiny of the Department’s risk and safety management systems (see Chapter 7 for additional discussion).  
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Australian natural resource recreation areas, suggested that in order to meet their duty of care, 
agencies must adopt the Australian standard for danger signs (AS 1319), and the various 
specifications concerning design, shape, and colour.  Planck (1996) also noted that where it is 
identified that particular groups of international visitors are present, there should be a 
requirement for those languages to be used to convey warning messages.  Notwithstanding the 
need to communicate effectively with a broad range of visitors, such a requirement may be 
difficult to sustain as a management strategy in locations where a wide range of international 
visitors are present, and in an industry where markets are constantly changing.  Plank’s 
comments, however, illustrate the degree of concern about visitor risk and resultant liability 
among some recreation and tourism agencies. 
 
The following section describes the legislative framework within which New Zealand 
recreation and tourism agencies must operate.  The statutes reviewed are relevant to the 
discussion on managers’ perceptions of risk discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
4.4 The legal context for visitor management in New Zealand 
Some recreation and tourism agencies around the world operate within a highly litigious 
environment, where important financial implications can be associated with visitor injuries 
(Brown, 1999; Gold, 1991; Rankin, 1989, 1990; Spengler & Hronek, 1995).  In the United 
States, for instance, recreation and tourism providers may be sued for visitor injuries if their 
conduct is determined to be negligent.  To be found negligent, it must be proven that: i) the 
agency had a duty to protect the recreation visitor; ii) the agency breached that duty; and iii) 
the visitor was injured as a result of that breach (Christiansen, 1987; Rankin, 1989, 1990; 
Spengler & Hronek, 1995).  In Australia, there is also evidence of a legal impact on the 
recreation industry.  Concerns among managers of outdoor recreation sites have been 
exacerbated by the lack of clear law relating to the liability of public recreation authorities 
(Rigby Cooke, 1998). 
 
Parks, recreation, and tourism agencies in New Zealand have been protected from many of the 
legal and financial implications of visitor accidents due to the existence of a comprehensive 
accident compensation scheme which effectively limits the extent to which individuals or 
organisations can be held financially responsible for damages resulting from personal injury 
(see Section 4.4.1.3 below). 
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4.4.1 Specific legislation affecting recreation and tourism management 
There are several important laws which affect the management of risk and public safety in the 
protected natural areas of New Zealand.  These are important to review in the context of 
management perceptions of legal liability, which forms part of the discussion in Chapter 7. 
 
4.4.1.1 Occupiers Liability Act 
The Occupiers Liability Act (1962) is intended to ensure the safe use of premises by visitors 
or tenants.  At tourism sites such as Fox and Franz Josef glaciers, DOC, as the ‘occupier’ has 
a responsibility to ensure visitors are free from harm.  Although it does not specify recreation 
and tourism providers, the Act requires that managing agencies demonstrate the ‘common 
duty of care’ to all visitors so that the visitor may be “reasonably safe in using the premises 
for the purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there” (Section 4 
(2)).  In discussing the Act’s relevance to tourists, Heilbronn (1992, p. 326) stated that 
occupiers of all premises have a duty to protect travellers “from injuries suffered by: (a) 
dangerous activities performed there… and (b) the defective state of the premises”.  
According to Heilbronn (1992, p. 328), common law defines the ‘occupier’ as “any person(s) 
exercising control over the premises”. 
 
The degree of responsibility accepted by the management agency is likely to be affected by 
the nature of the activity, its locality, and the level of visitor competency or experience.  It is 
also important to emphasise that, under the common law rule of volenti non fit injuria11, the 
Department of Conservation has no obligation to visitors in respect of risks willingly accepted 
by the visitor.  According to the authors of DOC’s ‘Visitor Strategy’: “this absolves the 
Department from liability where visitors choose to undertake potentially dangerous activities 
knowing that these activities may be dangerous” (DOC, 1996b, p. 54).  In addition, Martin 
(2000) has argued that warnings that identify hazards and advise avoidance action are 
sufficient to provide management agencies with a defence under the volenti clause.  That is, it 
would be reasonable to expect that visitors, if warned, are then acting in acceptance of the 
known risks.  There are, however, two key elements to a plea of volenti: i) full knowledge of 
the risk; and ii) free and voluntary acceptance of the risk (Martin, 2000).  These are critical 
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elements to emphasise, given that it cannot be assumed that visitors to public conservation 
areas have recognised and accepted the risks arising from natural hazards. This is, of course, 
only relevant to the extent that a duty to protect visitors exists. 
 
4.4.1.2 Health and Safety in Employment Act 
Under the Health and Safety in Employment Act (HSE) (1992), managing agencies of 
recreation lands such as the Department of Conservation, as employers, are legally required to 
“take all practicable steps to ensure that people in the place of work, and in the vicinity of the 
place of work, are not harmed by any hazard that is or arises in the place of work” (Section 
16).  All practicable steps must also be taken to “ensure that no action or inaction of any 
employee while at work harms any other person” (Section 15).  Members of the public are 
classified as ‘other persons’, thereby making employers responsible for the safety of all 
people in the work place.  While the Act is primarily intended to protect employees at work, 
the safety of visitors on land managed by the Department of Conservation is also implied. 
 
The extent to which many conservation, recreation, or tourism areas can be considered 
‘workplaces’ is critical in terms of the implications for liability in recreation and tourism 
management.  This aspect defines the boundaries of the agency’s duty to non-employees but 
is open to interpretation, and is, as yet, undefined by case law (Martin, 2000).  For instance, if 
sections of the front-country and back-country of New Zealand’s national parks are defined as 
places of work (temporarily or permanently), this has important ramifications for DOC under 
the HSE Act.  If this were the case, a duty to visitors would be imposed, and any breach could 
result in the Department, or its employees being held accountable.  In this context it is 
instructive to note that in the Commission of Inquiry following the platform collapse at Cave 
Creek in 1995, it was determined that DOC had breached a duty to its visitors under this Act.  
An important factor in this ruling was that the platform itself could be considered a place of 
work (for the DOC staff member and the Polytechnic tutor accompanying the group).  Private 
organisations, or members of the public, might have been prosecuted in these circumstances 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 1995). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 “No harm is done to one who consents” (Todd, 1997, p. 1103). 
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Since the introduction of the HSE Act, there has been considerable concern, both in the public 
and private sector, regarding the extent to which individuals and organisations can be held 
responsible for accidents at their places of work (R. Moir, personal communication, July 7, 
1999).  Given these concerns, it is important to emphasise that the Act was intended to 
achieve two main purposes.  First, to achieve the comprehensive protection of employees, 
workers, and anyone affected by work (workplace visitors, for instance), the safety of these 
groups was coordinated under one single Act, rather than laws that covered groups of workers 
within specific industries.  Under previous legislation, the safety of workers was dealt with 
individually through occupation-specific statutes such as the Machinery Act (1950), the 
Harbours Act (1950), and the Agricultural Workers Act (1977).  With the passing of the HSE 
Act, the same principles applied to all work places, with only a few exceptions (Heffernan, 
1995). 
 
The second important intention of the Act was what its creators called a ‘transfer of 
ownership’, as the following comments illustrate: 
Historically, the legislation has tended to have the effect that safety was the 
government’s responsibility – that you didn’t worry about it until the inspector told 
you what to do, and then you did what the inspector told you to, and that was the 
end of it.  Everyone waited to be told what to do, and perceived no individual 
responsibility.  So the Health and Safety in Employment Act moved away from 
that by putting the responsibility on employers, and people who control 
workplaces, to be proactive and make an assessment of what could happen, its 
likelihood, and how it could be prevented from happening (R. Moir, personal 
communication, July 7, 1999). 
 
While the intention of the HSE Act was to transfer the responsibility for safety to employers, 
a degree of government involvement was retained under the new system.  This took the form 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Unit (OSH).  This unit administers the HSE Act, 
develops and monitors standards for the safety of people at work, investigates accidents, and 
provides education and advice to employers and others with responsibilities under the Act 
(Occupational Safety and Health Service, 2001).  The Unit, however, is small, and has a 
limited capacity to monitor the range of workplaces and employers covered by the Act (P. 
McIntosh, personal communication, July 9, 1999). 
 
The introduction of health and safety legislation can be interpreted as a microcosm of wider 
social change and neo-liberal policy in New Zealand.  The reduction of government influence 
within industry, and increases in individual responsibility and accountability, were consistent 
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with this stance.  Whereas previously the rules and technical requirements were prescribed, 
under the HSE Act employers (and others with responsibilities in the workplace) became 
obliged to construct their own safety indicators, with an emphasis on performance standards.  
The shift in responsibilities had the potential to heighten the perceptions of risk for those now 
held accountable for safety. 
 
4.4.1.3 Accident compensation and insurance legislation 
Since 1974, the New Zealand government has operated a no fault accident insurance and 
compensation scheme that aims to rehabilitate and financially compensate those people who 
suffer personal injury, irrespective of where or how the injuries occur.  The accident 
compensation legislation has also made it impossible to sue for compensatory damages 
resulting from personal injury, where provision for that injury is made in the legislation, 
thereby minimising liable cases in New Zealand to date.  This means that no party can sue any 
other party on the basis of personal injury in New Zealand.  Claims for damages other than 
personal injury (exemplary damages) may be sought, as these are not covered by the Accident 
Insurance Act (1998). 
 
Since its inception, the legislation governing the accident compensation scheme has been 
altered several times12.  Changes to the scheme, and the introduction of specific health and 
safety legislation, have both reduced the extent to which the State is willing to underwrite 
personal injury claimants, as well as increased the accountability of employers to provide safe 
working conditions (Wren, 1997).  Notwithstanding the significance of these changes, two 
key principles of the New Zealand legislative arrangements remain: i) it is not possible to sue 
for personal injury; and ii) compensation is payable to victims suffering injury accidents 
(although no longer in lump sum payments). 
 
Under the Accident Insurance Act (1998), overseas tourists suffering personal injury are 
eligible for compensation in the form of medical treatment and rehabilitation costs while in 
New Zealand.  Tourist entitlements are similar to those available to New Zealand citizens, but 
                                                 
12 The original scheme was administered under the Accident Compensation Act (1972).  In 1992, the Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act was introduced, later replaced by the current Accident Insurance 
Act (1998).  This act is to be repealed, as of April 2002, by the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Act (2001). 
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remain valid only while the claimant is in New Zealand, and do not extend to the costs 
associated with loss of income or altered travel arrangements (Page, 1997). 
 
New Zealand’s injury compensation legislation has prevented the development of a highly 
litigious environment as observed in some other parts of the world.  On the one hand, the 
legislation has allowed experiences and opportunities to be offered by recreation and tourism 
agencies, without the threat of tort law.  One the other hand, the existence of comprehensive 
accident compensation may have reduced the economic incentives for provision of ‘safe’ 
experiences.  In either case, the accident compensation scheme represents an important 
contextual feature of recreation management in New Zealand. 
 
4.4.1.4 National Parks Act and Conservation Act  
Although their primary purpose is not related to health, risk, or safety, the National Parks Act 
(1980) and the Conservation Act (1987) create the administrative context in which tourism 
and recreation are managed in many natural areas.  The Conservation Act (Section 6(e)), for 
instance, establishes a mandate for the Department of Conservation to “facilitate” recreation 
and to “allow” for tourism in the areas for which it is responsible.  Further, the National Parks 
Act contributes to the complexity of visitor risk management because it specifies “freedom of 
entry” to a large number of predominantly natural and unmodified areas, including popular 
visitor attractions such as the glaciers of Westland National Park.  The Act (Section 4(2)e) 
states: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act and to the imposition of such conditions and 
restrictions as may be necessary for the preservation of the native plants and 
animals or for the welfare in general of the parks, the public shall have freedom of 
entry and access to the park, so they may receive in full measure the inspiration, 
enjoyment, recreation, and other benefits that may be derived from mountains, 
forests, sounds, seacoasts, lakes, rivers, and other natural features. 
 
Managers of national parks, therefore, are limited in their powers to prevent people entering 
park areas where hazards exist, and indeed, managers are expected to keep rules and 
regulations to a minimum.  It is lawful, however, for DOC to close facilities (such as tracks, 
huts, or bridges) for reasons of safety or environmental damage (Booth, forthcoming; DOC, 
1999b; Martin, 2000), although in practical terms track closures are especially difficult to 
enforce.  There is limited literature on the restriction of public access to national parks and, 
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consistent with the intention of the National Parks Act, the focus to date has been the 
restriction of access for protection of natural and historic values, rather than for visitor safety. 
 
A review of the General Policy for National Parks (National Parks and Reserves Authority, 
1983) is also instructive.  The policy states that, “while individuals are primarily responsible 
for their own safety in national parks all reasonable precautions will be taken for the safety 
and protection of the public” (Section 28.1).  It is also clear that the protection of natural 
resources within a park take priority over providing “a reasonable level of safety for users” 
(Section 4.1).  Given the primary emphasis of the National Parks Act, this position is 
unsurprising.  Martin (2000) noted, however, that any policy or plan made under legislation is 
subject to challenge by judicial review.  Importantly, in the present context of this discussion, 
he also observed that: 
we live in libertarian times in which the rights of the individual are not lightly to be 
subordinated to ‘the public good’.  It is now very questionable whether the kind of 
prioritizing which we see in the National Parks Policy is a solid enough foundation 
for confident management decision making (Martin, 2000, p. 10). 
 
4.4.1.5 Other Acts 
In addition to the laws discussed above, several other statutes require brief acknowledgement 
of their influence on the activities of land management agencies.  For instance, the Resource 
Management Act (1991) is used to determine whether visitor facilities and services can be 
provided.  A ‘land use consent’ must be obtained before any new visitor facility can be 
developed.  The Building Act (1991) is also relevant as it specifies codes and regulations that 
help ensure that buildings and structures meet their intended purposes. These two acts provide 
the legislative basis for the initial land use approval, and the safe construction and use, of all 
structures or buildings, including those in national parks and other PNAs.  The Crimes Act 
(1961) is also part of the legal framework affecting natural hazard management.  Managers of 
recreation or tourism sites could face charges under this Act where it is proven that their 
negligence has led to death or injury. 
 
4.4.2 Risk and responsibility in natural resource settings: An emergent 
management paradox 
The visitor attractions in New Zealand are predominantly natural areas that are managed on 
behalf of New Zealand citizens by the Department of Conservation.  As such, these are public 
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areas where access is free to all.  People visit these areas for a variety of reasons, but common 
among these is the desire to escape the urban and developed aspects of life, experience 
something new, and to get close to nature (Bean, 1989; Booth & Peebles, 1995; Espiner & 
Simmons, 1998).  Managers of nature-based recreation and tourism settings attempt to satisfy 
visitor needs through the provision of opportunities aligned to these motives.  Herein lies the 
current paradox: managers must balance visitor demand for nature experiences with a 
growing demand for safety.  The paradox is mirrored in wider society where a balance is 
attempted between the freedom of the individual to act without restraint, and the desire of 
society to create environments that are devoid of unacceptable danger (Boyes et al., 1995; 
Hughes-Johnson, 1996). 
 
Managers of nature-based recreation and tourism areas have legal obligations to ensure the 
relative safety of visitors to these areas.  Yet managers face a difficult challenge because 
many of New Zealand’s recreationists and tourists are seeking close encounters with nature, 
and are unlikely to be satisfied with experiences that have been tamed beyond recognition.  
Internationally, New Zealand is marketed as a major adventure destination, and this aspect of 
the industry has grown rapidly in the last decade and a half (Bentley & Page, 2001; Bentley, 
Page, Meyer, Chalmers, & Laird, 2001; Berno, Moore, Simmons, & Hart, 1996).  Boyes et al. 
(1995, p. 3) observed that New Zealand is now referred to in promotional material as the 
‘adventure capital of the world’, a label they say has historical roots in New Zealand’s pioneer 
development.  Independence, challenge, and risk-taking were essential features of a nation 
based on a rural economy, “…and the consequences of such a lifestyle were accepted” (Boyes 
et al., 1995, p. 6).  Historically, the right of New Zealanders to access the outdoors was 
guaranteed through legislation allowing freedom of entry, and a welfare system that provided 
compensation in cases of injury and loss. 
 
Natural resource recreation managers must attempt to balance their obligations against public 
expectations for safety and natural experiences.  Various authors have cautioned against 
eliminating the risk from recreation (Batt, 1996; Bean, 1989; Greenaway, 1996; Griswold, 
1989; Hardin, 1969; McAvoy & Dustin, 1990; Sax, 1980; Shivers, 1986).  A common theme 
among the arguments is that it is not possible nor appropriate to fence entire cliff lines, 
construct pathways over rough terrain, or place warning signs at every foreseeable danger 
point (Batt, 1996).  Even if this were possible, it is important to recognise that the desire to 
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participate with risk, or simply get near to and experience natural features, is what motivates 
some recreationists (Shivers, 1986). 
 
McAvoy and Dustin (1990) argued that with too much emphasis on safety, the spectrum of 
recreation opportunities provided might be lost.  Moreover, the authors claimed that a  
“preoccupation with safety and risk is stifling.  At a time when the public needs more 
stimulation and adventure in their lives, the [recreation] profession is inclined to offer less” 
(McAvoy & Dustin, 1990, p. 58).  The argument here is that risk is an essential part of life, 
and to eliminate danger from recreation may reduce the potential benefits available to the 
individual.  Adopting a similar argument, albeit with a broader brush, Hanna (1991, p. 2) 
claimed that the development of standards, regulations, and numerous technologies have 
significantly reduced the risk of injury and premature death, to the extent that “the lives of 
most Canadians, while longer, have become relatively routine and mundane”.  In this sense, 
outdoor recreation and tourism are seen as mechanisms through which balance can be brought 
to “information rich and experience poor lives” (Hanna, 1991, p. 2).  Holyfield (1999) also 
argued that voluntarily placing ourselves at risk carries symbolic weight in routine lives. 
 
The arguments for retaining risk in recreation imply a social value for experiencing challenge 
or hardship, and assume that some people seek exposure to risk.  To suggest that, because 
many areas of life are secure and controlled, individuals will benefit from less comfortable 
physical conditions may be explained in evolutionary terms (see Chapter 3), as contributing to 
the survival of the species by taking chances.  An alternative evolutionary argument can also 
be developed that, in order to survive, people adopt strategies of risk avoidance, and minimise 
exposure to physical hardship.  Notwithstanding the possibility that some personal benefits, 
such as improved fitness and self-esteem, may be realised through participation in outdoor 
recreation, it seems most plausible that the conditions described by Hanna (1991) and others, 
contribute to the problem of people visiting unfamiliar natural resource areas with high 
expectations of safety.  The authors highlight some important characteristics of a risk averse 
society, yet do not acknowledge that many people are ill-equipped to deal with natural 
hazards in outdoor recreation environments. 
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4.4.3 Interim summary 
Visitor risk and safety in New Zealand’s natural resource settings is influenced by several acts 
of parliament, although none has been written specifically with the health and safety of 
recreationists or tourists in mind.  Hence, the legislative context for managing visitor safety in 
these settings is varied and at times ambiguous in meaning.  Despite this, a duty to protect 
visitors is evident in several statutes, contributing to an emergent paradox in which managers 
must respond to visitor demands and visitor competencies within a society concerned about 
risk.  A further complication in visitor management relates to the characteristics of tourist 
behaviour, the focus of the next section. 
 
4.5 Tourist behaviour and the relevance of risk 
One of the objectives in the present study is to investigate the nature of visitor perceptions of 
risk at natural attractions in New Zealand.  One component of this theme concerns the 
behaviour of tourists in natural recreation settings.  It is, therefore, important to review 
relevant literature on tourist behaviour, in order to explore the possibility that some 
characteristics of being a tourist influence risk perceptions and / or increase the likelihood of 
risk exposure.  This section considers claims that tourists are a vulnerable group in society, 
that accidents and incidents are common to the tourist experience, and that behavioural 
characteristics play a significant role in tourist risk exposure. 
 
4.5.1 The vulnerable tourist 
That tourism involves some out of the ordinary risks for many travellers is clearly illustrated 
in such basic components of the traveller’s armoury as water purification tablets, money belts, 
and travel insurance (Carter, 1998; WTO, 1996).  Roehl and Fesenmaier (1992, p. 17) evoked 
the risk concept with the observation that “the very nature of the travel experience promotes 
uncertainty as to its outcome”.  While this does imply that tourists are prepared for some risk 
during their travels, several authors have suggested that health and safety awareness among 
tourists is low.  As Wilks and Atherton (1994, p. 6) observed, in their discussion of marine 
tourism in Australia, “many tourists and holiday makers have a serious lack of appreciation of 
the potential dangers associated with swimming in unpatrolled beaches and inland 
waterways”.  Similarly, Clift and Page (1996, p. 6) recognised that tourism can “expose 
 109
unsuspecting and inadequately prepared tourists to new and dangerous threats to their health, 
which are not present in their home environment”. 
 
Tourists, by their nature as temporary migrants, may be a vulnerable sector of the population, 
especially in situations where there are language differences, a lack of local knowledge, and 
limited access to information.  This set of circumstances is compounded by the fact that many 
tourist destinations are located in natural hazard prone areas (Drabek, 1996; Greenway, 1996).   
 
Irrespective of the presence of natural hazards, tourist destination areas are likely to be risky 
in other ways.  Page and Meyer (1997) argued that tourists face risks in all aspects of their 
experience, including the risks associated with attractions, transportation, and activities.  
Furthermore, Mawby et al. (2000), in a study comparing British holidaymakers with the 
general population, found that tourists reported higher rates of crime than those who did not 
travel. 
 
Tarlow and Muehsam (1996, p. 19) also implied a certain vulnerability in their emphasis on 
the “make-believe” nature of tourism.  These authors suggested that tourists often let down 
their guards making them susceptible to crime, and fail to differentiate between safe and 
unsafe neighbourhoods, thus entering areas that locals might avoid.  Furthermore, Tarlow and 
Muehsam proposed that, in risky situations, tourists often confuse good luck with caution or 
proper planning.  The authors speculated that, “when tourists pass on their travel tales to their 
relatives and friends, unrealised risks that do not result in dire consequences by pure chance, 
may influence others to try the same.  Others who repeat these risks may not be fortunate 
enough to escape unscathed” (Tarlow & Muehsam, 1996, p. 20). 
 
Tourists might also be considered vulnerable because of the availability and accuracy of 
information they receive about a destination or attraction.  Many tourists are reliant on the 
host community for information about hazards, danger, and general security (Drabek, 1994), 
yet some information sources may be misleading.  The tourism industry is loosely co-
ordinated (Leiper, 1990) and, in particular, the links between the promotion and marketing 
information on protected natural areas, and its management and delivery are tenuous.  An 
incongruity may exist between the image presented of the insulated tourist experience and the 
potential consequences of that experience.  Greenway (1996, p. 195) has even suggested that 
information about natural hazards may be concealed by tourism industry stakeholders owing 
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to their reliance on “images of pleasantness and safety for attracting economic activity”.  
Similarly, Drabek (1994) reported a study of tourist business managers, among whom a 
common reason given for limited availability of hazard information at their premises was a 
fear of scaring customers and discouraging their patronage. 
 
Intuitively, it seems plausible that tourists should be considered vulnerable to risk, given their 
likely unfamiliarity with their destinations, the absence of personal contacts, and little 
knowledge of the host community’s systems and procedures.  If tourists are vulnerable to risk, 
as some authors have suggested, the consequences should be revealed in accident and incident 
statistics.  The following section examines available evidence for this claim. 
 
4.5.2 Tourist accident research 
To a certain extent, it appears that tourists are over-represented in the accident and incident 
statistics, although the evidence is not complete.  A small number of studies have explored the 
relationships between tourism and health (Clark & Clift, 1996; Clift & Page, 1996; Peach & 
Bath, 1999; Ryan & Robertson, 1997; Wilks & Atherton, 1994; WTO, 1996) including some 
attention to accidents (Bentley & Page, 2001; Bentley et al., 2001; Johnston 1989a, 1989b; 
Page, 1997; Page & Meyer, 1997).  Although the data are elusive, several New Zealand 
studies have attempted to explore the relationship between visitor origin and accidents in the 
adventure tourism industry.  Page (1997) and Page and Meyer (1997), using Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) records to analyse tourist accidents, found that overseas 
visitor claim rates were below those of New Zealanders for non-work injuries.  Page (1997) 
concluded that either tourists are less likely to experience accidents than their New Zealand 
counterparts, or less likely to register claims when they do.  Further, owing to the limitations 
of the available data, the research was unable to confirm whether or not adventure tourism is 
more dangerous than other tourist activities, although Page and Meyer (1997) were able to 
show that, for international tourists, ACC claims associated with travel and sport were two 
times greater than those made by the resident population of New Zealand.  This finding is 
unsurprising given that overseas visitors are wholly engaged in travel and recreation during 
their time in New Zealand. 
 
In other research, Bentley et al. (2001) studied hospital discharge and mortality records for 
non-New Zealand residents in order to determine the nature and extent of adventure tourism 
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injuries.  The authors claimed that there was evidence for the role of adventure tourism in 
overseas visitor injuries.  According to Bentley et al. (2001), adventure tourism activities 
represented approximately 20 per cent of all overseas visitor injuries.  Although the authors 
gave no indication of the proportion of tourists who participated in these activities, they did 
report an injury-incidence rate of approximately eight injuries per 100,000 overseas visitors.  
The authors suggested that this injury rate was “unacceptably high”, given the low exposure 
to adventure tourism activities in comparison with driving, for which there was an injury-
incidence rate of 12 per 100,000 overseas visitors (Bentley et al., 2001).  Further analysis 
revealed that the greatest number of accidents occurred in unguided, independent adventure 
activities, although it is unclear what proportion ‘unguided activities’ represented.  The 
authors concluded that the providers of tourism and recreation activities could do more to 
improve visitor safety, although they acknowledged that communication can be problematic, 
and that visitors may not attend well to safety messages when preparing to take part in 
activities (Bentley et al., 2001). 
 
Brown (1999) in a study of visitor accidents in Australia’s Uluru – Kata Tjuta National Park 
found that, while only 50 per cent of visitors to the Park were from overseas, this group were 
represented in 75 per cent of the accidents.  Greenaway (1996. p. 46) also implied that visitors 
to New Zealand were at higher risk than the domestic population, citing statistics from the 
New Zealand Water Safety Council to suggest that “a visitor to New Zealand is about four 
times more likely to drown than a resident during any one day”, although, once again, 
overseas visitors may be over-represented in water-based recreation pursuits at many times of 
the year.  Similarly, Page and Meyer (1997) reported that, of over 8,500 rescues undertaken 
by the Surf Life Saving Association of Australia in 1990-91, 60 per cent were migrants, 
visitors or residents living more than 50 kilometres away from the site.  While this allows no 
comparative analysis with the resident population, it does illustrate that visitors and tourists 
make an important contribution to accident statistics. 
 
Contrary to the recent research findings of Bentley, Page and others, Johnston (1989a, 1989b) 
found no evidence to suggest that overseas visitors to New Zealand’s mountain areas were 
exposed to more danger than their New Zealand counterparts.  Using coroners’ reports and a 
survey of visitors to outdoor recreation sites, Johnston revealed that visitor reports of near 
misses (and other experiences with risk), and recorded fatalities throughout the twentieth 
century, indicated that the domestic and international visitor populations were similar.  
 112
Johnston (1989b) suggested that the perception that international visitors experience more 
accidents is related to the sharp increase in international visitors to New Zealand’s mountain 
areas since about 1980, and the appearance of these recreationists in the accident statistics.  
Further, she speculated that “more frequent mention of non-New Zealanders might give the 
impression that accidents have increased out of all proportion to the increase in baseline 
numbers for that group” (Johnston, 1989b, p. 327).   
 
The available studies of tourist accidents are inconclusive on the subject of tourist 
susceptibility to accidents.  The apparent lack of consensus between studies may be due to the 
different research methods used and the limitations associated with available data.  For 
instance, Bentley et al. (2001) used hospital discharge records, whereas Johnston (1989a) used 
coroners’ reports and a visitor survey.  Furthermore, Johnston’s focus was a specialist 
recreation group (visitors to mountains, many of whom were experienced climbers), whereas 
Bentley, Page and associates were examining tourist accidents both more generally, and 
attributable to a broad range of adventure tourism activities.  Notwithstanding the absence of 
agreement, the potential for accident and injury is undoubtedly high.  The nature of the 
activities often pursued, and the contexts in which they are undertaken, imply that tourists are 
vulnerable to physical risk.  The next section examines some social psychological and 
sociological explanations for tourists' susceptibility to risk. 
 
4.5.3 Tourist behaviour: The freedom from constraint 
Concerns about how tourists behave in natural resource settings are growing.  This is not 
altogether surprising, considering the popularity of nature-based recreation and tourism in 
societies where access to the knowledge and resources required to travel is increasingly 
available.  Discussions about behaviour typically focus on two areas: i) visitor impacts 
(biophysical and socio-cultural); and ii) visitor safety. Visitor impacts are the subject of 
attention for those wishing to communicate more environmentally appropriate behaviour for 
resource protection purposes, as well as to maintain the quality of visitor experience 
(Gramann et al., 1995; Hammitt & Cole, 1998; Manning, 1999; Moscardo, 1999).  Concerns 
about the various social, cultural, and biophysical impacts of tourists have led to the 
development of voluntary codes of conduct for tourists visiting a variety of countries (Mason 
& Mowforth, 1996). 
 
 113
The issue of visitor risk and safety is a more recent development, and is probably a 
consequence of increasing numbers of tourists, a change in activity preferences, and the 
perceived potential for legal and moral accountability for accidents.  Some observations 
suggest that tourists act in surprisingly risky ways in a variety of unfamiliar settings.  For 
example, a recent media report documented tourist antics off the Australian coast, where 
members of a tour party had gathered to witness white pointer sharks feeding on a dead whale 
– thought to be the victim of a collision with a cargo ship.  Videotape footage (TV 3 News, 
Wednesday July 26, 2001) showed one tourist climbing from the boat onto the back of the 
dead whale to get a closer look at the feeding sharks.  Other tourists in the boats were 
observed to reach out and touch the frenzied sharks as they consumed the whale.  Reports 
from managers at other nature-based attractions, including New Zealand’s geothermal areas, 
the ‘blow holes’ at Punakaiki, Huka Falls, and the Glaciers, indicate that tourists often act in 
ways (either consciously or otherwise) that create the potential for injury or loss (see Section 
4.2.1).  Rushlo (1997) reported the case of Grand Canyon hikers who failed to perceive the 
risks to their health and underestimated the temperatures in the Canyon, a misjudgement that 
prompted 200 heat-related rescues in 1996, including four deaths.  According to Rushlo 
(1997), park rangers report that visitors are “shockingly unprepared” and “very naive”, 
comments that reflect the problem of unconditioned visitors in unfamiliar environments.  
 
In terms of tourist motivation, it is evident that tourists change their behaviour while on 
holiday, doing things they would not do while in their home environments (Page & Meyer, 
1997; Pearce, 1988; Peillon, 1993; Ryan, 1993; Ryan & Kinder, 1996).  This may include 
undertaking risks which they would not normally consider acceptable.  For example, Dawood 
(1993; cited in Page & Meyer, 1997, p. 62) noted that: “Motorists who wear seatbelts at 
home, use child seats for their children, observe speed limits and drink-drive laws, seem less 
inclined to do so abroad”.  One possible explanation for this difference is that people are more 
relaxed on holiday, and inclined to ‘throw caution to the wind’, and ‘make the most’ of their 
experience.  There may also be a perception of safety, or a feeling of invincibility in being a 
tourist.  Furthermore, because some activities and events undertaken by tourists are more 
organised or planned than at home, the responsibility for safety may be displaced onto the 
agency or industry thought to be responsible for providing the experience (Dann, 1996).  
Conversely, having travelled to places beyond their home environments, tourists can often be 
outside the structural contexts of their own societies.  Weber (2001) suggested that this 
separation may lead to a state of antistructure and liminality, in which social norms and rules 
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are suspended or ignored.  Some of these explanations for tourist behaviour are considered 
below. 
 
Ryan and Hall (2001) developed the liminality theme in their discussion of sex tourism.  The 
authors examined the relationship between prostitutes and tourists as two groups who (albeit 
temporarily for the latter) occupy the social margins.  Ryan and Hall (2001, p. 1-5) argued 
that to be a tourist “is to occupy a liminal role within a temporary marginality…. [existing] in 
an irregular world that is both strange and familiar”.  Kruhse-MountBurton (1995), and Ryan 
and Kinder (1996), both reporting on the deviant tourist, suggested that some tourists justify 
their indulgence in the sanctioned margins of behaviour because they are not at home.  In 
addition, Ryan, Robertson and Page (1996) suggested from their study of New Zealand and 
British university students on holiday, that some tourists were more likely to engage in risky 
behaviours while away. 
 
Further support for the idea of risk-taking as part of the tourist mentality is presented by 
Wickens (1997), who also used sex tourism as the subject matter.  Wickens (1997, p. 151) 
argued that some tourists take “voluntary health risks in pursuit of thrills and pleasure”.  
Reinforcing the claim that tourists occupy liminal space, Wickens (1997, p. 155) suggested 
that anonymity, and freedom from social constraints experienced by tourists, leads to a 
“suspension of customary rules of moral conduct.  The tourist experiences her / his holiday as 
a legitimated break from everyday life”, and risks are taken that may not be acceptable to 
either the individual tourist or his / her society.  Evoking Goffman (1967), Wickens (1997, p. 
156) contended that “in society there are special times and places set aside for role reversals, 
for opening up oneself to risks in the pursuit of thrills and adventures which are normally 
denied to us in everyday mundane and routinized life”.  Similarly, Ryan and Robertson (1997, 
p. 135) described holidays as “socially sanctioned escape routes into periods of 
irresponsibility”.  Holidays and travel offer such opportunities for experimentation and 
adventure in a variety of contexts.  Carter (1998, p. 350) also suggested that in visiting 
unfamiliar places, tourists experience a degree of alienation which “may elicit a sense of 
excitement and thrill”.  Hence, some tourists are drawn to marginal or dangerous places as 
they represent opportunities for activities or behaviour that are neither possible nor acceptable 
at home. 
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While the present research is not concerned with sex tourism or ‘marginal’ activities per se, 
the analysis of Ryan and Hall (2001), Wickens (1997) and others, may have some 
applicability to other manifestations of tourist behaviour.  If it is possible to generalise from 
the findings of these researchers, it is reasonable to suggest that tourists act in a variety of 
ways that are distinct from their behaviour at home.  This is no major revelation; it has long 
been observed and, indeed, it is a key assumption of all tourism businesses, that when on 
holiday people are more relaxed, consume more food and drink, spend more money (Dann, 
1996; Peillon, 1993), and undertake activities that they may not otherwise attempt.  Peillon, 
for example, described the holiday as an inversion of everyday life, during which the 
principles of ordinary living are challenged: “Sensitivity to nature, care for the body, sensory 
gratifications, creativity, spontaneity and autonomy, those are the values which are placed at 
the centre of the holiday experience” (Peillon, 1993, p. 259). 
 
The themes of freedom, absence of constraint, vulnerability, and paternalism are brought 
together in Dann’s (1996) analysis of the tourist as child.  According to Dann, the liberty 
offered by tourism can be interpreted as a return to the realm of childhood, a time of fun, sun, 
and no responsibilities.  If this analysis is accepted, it is also possible to consider that tourist 
behaviour will be affected by this temporary state, and that as tourists, people will sometimes 
act in ways inconsistent with their behaviour in the home environment.  We might expect 
tourists to be irresponsible, take risks, or be less aware of threats to their safety, as well as less 
willing to accept responsibility for their actions.  If Dann is right about the tourist frame of 
mind, this places considerable pressure on managers of tourist settings to adopt highly 
paternalistic approaches to visitor management. 
 
4.6 Chapter summary and conclusions 
This chapter has indicated that tourists to natural resource recreation settings in general are 
confronted with a variety of hazards and risks, many of which are not sought or anticipated by 
the visitor.  This has become a significant risk management issue for recreation and tourism 
management agencies who hold, or perceive, legal and moral responsibilities to protect 
visitors from harm at the sites over which they preside.  In New Zealand, several laws 
combine to impose both a duty of care, and of open access to many natural areas.  This 
contributes to a paradox for managers, which is further complicated by the likelihood that 
tourists act in ways that make them vulnerable to risk.  A potential tension is evident between 
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the views of some authors who contend that risk in recreation is important to retain (Griswold, 
1989; McAvoy & Dustin, 1990; Shivers, 1986) and the conclusions of Dann (1996) and 
Peillon (1993) who suggest that tourists can be irresponsible and unaware of risks to their 
safety. 
 
Despite relatively limited attention in the literature to date, the subject of risk is highly 
relevant to the study of tourism, including that tourism which occurs in natural resource 
settings.  Such settings represent some unique challenges to managers of protected natural 
areas because of circumstances such as: communicating safety information to non-English 
speaking visitors; counter-acting preconceptions of the site obtained via tourist guidebooks 
and promotional material; a lack of familiarity and experience with natural settings among 
visitors; a desire to experience nature first-hand; and the transient status of most visitors, for 
whom the peripheral and less interesting topics of health and safety are unlikely to be high 
priority. 
 
The purpose of the current research is to explore the phenomenon of risk and its significance 
in natural resource recreation settings, including their management.  To a certain extent this 
aim has been addressed within Chapters 2, 3, and 4, in which aspects of social context, 
individual perception, communication, risk management, and tourist behaviour have been 
considered.  The more specific objectives are addressed in Chapters 6, 7, and 8.  The next 
chapter (Chapter 5) outlines the multiple strategies used to collect data, and presents a 
discussion on the various ethical dimensions of the study. 
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Chapter 5 Methods 
[Our research methods should be] a choice made according to the requirements 
of our problems, not a necessity that follows from an epistemological dogma 
(Mills, 1959, p. 74). 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a consideration of the theoretical foundations upon which the 
selected research strategies and tools are based.  A brief description of the case study area 
(more fully described in Chapter 1) is then given, including criteria used for its identification 
and selection.  This is followed by a detailed explanation of the specific methods and tools 
employed in this study, as well as a discussion of various ethical issues raised during the 
selection, development, and implementation of the methods.  The chapter is concluded 
following a consideration of research limitations and the unique challenges of social research 
in predominantly natural environments. 
 
5.2 Theoretical bases  
Research methods of any kind are the means through which researchers investigate a 
particular topic, situation, or circumstance.  In deciding which method is appropriate, more 
than mere technicalities are at stake.  Research methods are strongly embedded within 
theoretical viewpoints and associated ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
 
Implicit in all social theories is some conception of the individual and society, and the 
relationship between the two.  This is also true of the methods used to study social life.  
Research methods are dependent upon both the researcher's commitment to a particular theory 
(whether made explicit or not), and the nature of the material to be studied.  Ackroyd and 
Hughes (1981, p. 9) acknowledged the interdependence of method and ontological and 
epistemological assumptions in saying: "methods should not be regarded as atheoretical tools 
which do their job independently of any other consideration....  They do their job because of 
other justifications which serve to underpin them".  A researcher’s theory about the nature of 
social phenomena affects which method is chosen.  In addition, every method itself makes 
implicit assumptions about social phenomena.   
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Although in using particular methods it is impossible to be free of such assumptions, it is 
possible to be aware of them and, by being aware, to achieve the richest interpretation of the 
material that is possible.  Such awareness is also part of what Bell and Newby (1977) have 
termed ‘methodological pluralism’.  This pluralism implicitly rejects the exclusiveness and 
certainty of specific research paradigms.  This is not, of course, a claim that there should be 
no method, but, rather, it is an attempt to dispel the belief that there can be only one method 
that is to be the method for any particular situation or research question. 
 
The present study aimed to assess the hazard and risk perceptions of visitors to natural 
resource tourism settings, and to investigate the wider influence of risk on the management of 
New Zealand’s conservation estate.  The multifarious nature of the research topic necessitated 
several distinct research tools.  The tools have sometimes been viewed as representing 
competing perspectives (Hammersley, 1989), yet combine here to clarify different aspects of 
the topic under examination.  In order to investigate visitor awareness of hazards, for instance, 
a quantitative survey instrument, combined with a field experiment, has merit.  This is 
especially so given the researcher’s interest in examining the effect of alternative warning 
messages on the visiting public’s hazard perceptions.  This should not imply, however, that 
other methods could not have been used.  Qualitative interviews with visitors to the glaciers 
were also undertaken, and served to enhance some of the responses obtained through the 
initial quantitative survey.  In this instance, the two methods can be used to explore the 
phenomenon of visitor hazard and risk perceptions. 
 
Simmons (1984) and Simmons and Berno (1995) have discussed the merits of integrated 
methods in the study of tourism.  These authors have concluded that formal surveys can 
improve all stages of less structured work, especially with regard to the representativeness of 
cases.  In addition, qualitative methods can add to the success and depth of formal 
investigation (Simmons, 1984).  Similarly, Sieber (1972, p. 1337) claimed that the 
“integration of research techniques within a single project opens up enormous opportunities 
for mutual advantages” in research design, data collection and analysis.  A more detailed 
account of the specific quantitative and qualitative methods used follows the description and 
discussion of the research site. 
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5.3 The identification and selection of a case study area 
The study had two core interrelated themes: i) the management of risk in natural resource 
recreation and tourism areas; and ii) visitor perception of hazards and risk.  In order to address 
the first of these, public lands managed by the Department of Conservation were selected for 
several reasons.  First, areas managed by DOC are predominantly unmodified areas (including 
national parks, conservation parks and reserves), and as such include features and 
circumstances that imply risk in a variety of forms.  Second, almost without exception, New 
Zealand’s most popular tourism and recreation sites exist within the lands administered by 
this agency.  Third, DOC is a national organisation with area, regional, and centralised 
decision-making procedures.  This contributes to a high level of co-ordination and coherence 
and allows the Department’s risk management beliefs and practices (both past and present) to 
be examined at several levels. 
 
The research also required the selection of a case study site that allowed the perceptions, 
attitudes, and behaviour of visitors to be investigated.  Several sites were assessed for 
suitability on the basis that the area must be: 
 managed by the Department of Conservation; 
 predominantly natural and unmodified; 
 accessible to most visitors, thereby attracting people from across a broad 
spectrum of ability and experience; 
 a high use site (attracting a minimum of 100,000 visitors annually); and 
 understood (by experts, locals, and/or managers) to include, within its immediate 
boundaries, a degree of physical risk to visitor safety. 
 
Following consultation with the supervision team, tourism and conservation agency 
personnel, and public authorities, the Fox and Franz Josef glaciers of Westland National Park 
were identified as fulfilling the criteria outlined above.  Collectively, these two sites attract 
approximately 400,000 domestic and international visitors each year (see Chapter 1), most of 
whom are classified as ‘Day Visitors’ (DVs) or ‘Short Stop Travellers’ (SSTs) (DOC, 1996b, 
1997).  Consistent with this classification, the glacier access tracks are maintained at a 
standard appropriate to the inexperienced visitor.  Despite the ease of access at Fox and Franz 
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Josef glaciers, a number of natural hazards are known to exist, several of which may not be 
immediately obvious to an inexperienced observer (refer to Chapter 7). 
 
5.4 Quantitative tools 
A quantitative survey was used to assess visitor risk perceptions, and to assess the relative 
effectiveness of alternative hazard warning styles at the glaciers.  The latter dimension was 
approached in two ways: i) intermittent presentation of introduced warning signs; and ii) 
structured observations of visitor behaviour.  The first of these strategies was directly linked 
to the quantitative survey, and perception responses later analysed in relation to the specific 
signs present at the time of survey completion.  The visitor observation dimension of the 
study was not connected to the survey responses.  The visitor survey and each of its 
dimensions is described below. 
 
5.4.1 The survey 
5.4.1.1 Aims and construction 
A questionnaire was designed for specific use at the glacier valley sites (Appendix A).  The 
main objective of the survey was to determine, using Likert-type scales, three aspects of 
visitor perception or attitude: i) the extent to which visitors were aware of hazards in the area 
visited; ii) the extent to which visitors felt safe in the area visited; and iii) the extent to which 
visitors felt responsible for their own safety while at the site.  Respondents used a seven-point 
scale to show extent of agreement or attitude.  The survey also assessed awareness of existing 
and introduced hazard signs, and self-reported behaviour on-site.  Other aspects included 
typical visitor characteristics and visitation information. 
 
An important consideration in the construction of any survey is its target population.  Both the 
style and content of the survey must be appropriate to the intended respondents.  In the case of 
the glaciers, visitors were expected to represent a range of domestic and international origins 
(NZTB, 1996; TRC, 1995).  The convergence of a large number of visitors who originate 
from places outside New Zealand, meant that it was necessary to consider English language 
comprehension among potential respondents.  Using available descriptive data (DOC, 1996b; 
NZTB, 1996; TRC, 1995), it was estimated that some groups of international visitors would 
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not be sufficiently competent in their use of the English language to complete an English 
language questionnaire.  German and Japanese visitors were identified as the largest of the 
affected groups and, hence, the survey was translated into these two languages (Appendix A). 
 
Assessing attitudes in a cross-cultural setting is potentially problematic.  Segall (1986, p. 266) 
emphasised that considerable effort is required to “ensure that the methods are reliable and 
valid...[and] yield information consistently and in a fashion that is not misleading”.  One 
strategy that is used to compensate for potential cross-cultural complications is a technique 
called ‘back-translation’ (Segall, 1986).  In back-translation using the English language as the 
source, a bilingual speaker translates from the original language to the target language.  A 
second bilingual speaker then converts the first translator’s work back to the source language.  
If identical English versions result, it is likely that the translation is sufficiently equivalent to 
the original to allow for comparisons to be made (Brislin, 1986; Segall, 1986).  In the current 
study of visitor perceptions, the English survey was translated into two target languages 
(German and Japanese), then back-translated to English.  Minor amendments and negotiations 
resulted in three survey questionnaires that were sufficiently similar to allow cross-cultural 
comparisons in the analysis. 
 
5.4.1.2 Development of attitudinal scales 
Three scales were created for the purposes of the visitor survey.  Items for each of the scales 
were designed to determine the extent to which visitors: i) perceived the sites as hazardous; ii) 
perceived the sites as safe; and iii) considered themselves responsible for their personal safety 
while at the glaciers.  Following accepted practice in the construction of scale items (Brislin, 
1986; Kline, 1993; Loewenthal, 1996; Ryan, 1995), statements were written, each of which 
was either mildly positive or mildly negative in relation to the attitude under scrutiny.  
Statements were presented in both positive and negative directions and later reversed for the 
analysis.  Scale items and the various hazard warning designs were pre-tested over two days 
in December 1997. 
 
Likert scales were chosen as the most convenient and appropriate means to assess perceptions 
of visitors.  This method is widely used and accepted in psychological testing, and for 
gathering data on attributes of people, events or activities (Bryman & Cramer, 1997; Kline, 
1993; Loewenthal, 1996; Segall, 1984), including those investigating risk perceptions 
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(Hartenian et al., 1993; Roehl & Fesenmaier, 1992; Slovic et al., 1985).  A seven point, 
graphic scale was used, employing ‘completely agree’ and ‘completely disagree’ as anchors.  
Respondents indicated their extent of agreement by choosing a number between 1 and 7 for 
each scale item.  Guilford (1956; cited in Kline, 1993) showed that using a greater number of 
steps increases the reliability of a scale.  The literature appears to support this up to a certain 
point, after which it seems little can be gained through the addition of further steps to the 
scale.  Reviewing several psychometric studies which concluded that nine categories is the 
memory threshold for most respondents, Kline (1993, p. 160) claimed that it was “obvious 
that Likert scales should have either seven or nine steps”. 
 
Following factor analysis, which resulted in the removal of items which loaded heavily on 
more than one factor, or where item-total correlations were poor (below 0.25) on the original 
scale (Bryman & Cramer, 1997), 28 items were used in the analysis (see Section 5.7.1). 
 
5.4.1.3 Implementation 
Three field workers implemented the survey over a total of 14 days, which spanned late 
January, February and March 1998.  The initially decided upon and preferred method had 
been to survey visitors at the two glacier valleys concurrently.  Owing to the closure of the 
Franz valley access track in mid January 1998, this method was revised, and a consecutive 
implementation plan adopted.  A comparison of the two valleys was made possible with the 
reopening of the access track in March 1998. 
 
All questionnaires were administered on site by trained interviewers, with the exception of 
those completed by visitors whose preferred language was Japanese or German.  These latter 
respondents self-completed questionnaires provided in their own language on-site, and 
returned them to the interviewer directly.  Visitors to each of the research sites were sampled 
on a random (next to pass) basis according to a prepared implementation schedule (see 
Appendix B).  Detailed field notes were written to maximise consistency between 
interviewers in their application of the survey instrument (see Appendix C for details 
concerning the selection of respondents). 
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Interviewees were provided with a set of response cards, which were bound together in the 
exact question sequence.  Each card presented the question in large bold font.  Participants 
were asked to select the majority of their answers from the response cards which were 
contained in a flip-folder and laminated in order to protect them from the weather and 
frequent use. 
 
The response cards increased the efficiency of 
the survey interview in two main ways.  First, 
the clarity of each question was maximised 
given that it was both read aloud by the 
interviewer, and available in print for the 
respondent to read.  Second, the interviewer was 
able to direct the flow of the questionnaire more 
successfully by asking each respondent to turn 
to the next response card at the appropriate time.  
Respondents appeared to appreciate the 
structured nature of the procedure, as there was 
little ambiguity over what was required of them.  
The negative consequence of this structure, 
however, is the loss of some opportunity to 
discuss responses with visitors.  This, of course, 
is often the nature of quantitative surveys and is a constraint of the method that is difficult to 
overcome.  An attempt to reconcile this limitation was made, in part, through the addition of 
less structured visitor interviews later in the research implementation (see Section 5.6.5).  
Questionnaire completion times varied between ten and fifteen minutes. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Fox Glacier valley map 
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Surveying was conducted at predetermined locations on 
each of the glacier access tracks.  At Fox Glacier, the 
interviews took place at the top of the small incline 
above the current carpark, adjacent to an area known 
locally as the ‘[19]60s moraine’.  At Franz Josef, 
interviewing was undertaken on the riverbed 
immediately following the point at which the track 
exited the bush.  In Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, a star 
shape marks the interview point.  The dotted lines 
represent the walkways leading to the glaciers.  All 
interviews were carried out as visitors returned from 
their walk13, ensuring that all respondents had equal 
opportunity to form impressions of the site and its 
characteristics.  The visitor carpark areas were 
deliberately avoided as interview locations to ensure 
that all visitors surveyed had some exposure to the 
glacier sites and the introduced warning signs. 
 
5.4.1.4 Response rate 
Over the sampling period, 428 visitors were approached for interviews.  Of these, 378 
(88.3%) complied.  When responses at the two visitor sites were compared, Franz Josef had 
the higher response rate (92.6%).  Summary 
data on non-respondents were recorded 
(Appendix D).  The majority of those 
visitors who declined to take part in the 
study gave reasons relating to time (64%), 
weather (16%), or language difficulty (12%).  
The overall response rate of nearly 90 per 
cent is well above the generally accepted 
minimum level (Babbie, 1989; Loewenthal, 
                                                 
13 It was not assumed (nor considered important) that all visitors had completed the walk to the glacier terminus.  
The survey indicated that approximately 70% of visitors had done so (Chapter 6). 
 
Figure 5.2: Franz Josef Glacier valley map 
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Figure 5.3: Survey response rate 
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1996; Singleton, Straits, & Straits, 1993), and is an important component in the representative 
nature of the results.  It should be emphasised that the sample of 378 respondents is intended 
to represent visitors to the Westland glaciers during the period between January and March, 
and is not necessarily representative of annual visitation to the region. 
 
5.4.2 Introduction of pictorial hazard warning signs 
One aspect of the study was an assessment of the existing and an introduced hazard warning 
sign style, in terms of the effectiveness of each in conveying hazards to visitors.  In order to 
do this, surveys and behavioural observations were undertaken during times when different 
numbers and varieties of signs were in place.  At all 
times, the existing DOC warning signs remained in 
place (see Section 5.8).  The maximum number of 
introduced signs at either site was five, and the 
minimum was zero. 
 
Six pictorial hazard warning signs were constructed 
and temporarily erected along sections of the access 
tracks in both the Fox and Franz valleys as per the 
limitations of weather and terrain.  These signs were 
presented intermittently at the sites, and visitors’ 
perceptions of hazards monitored during the 
different conditions.  Signs were placed in logically 
consistent and credible locations and followed 
accepted principles for the placement of warning 
messages (DOC, 1998; Western Ergonomics, 
1995). 
 
Each of the introduced pictorial messages was designed to represent one of the following 
conditions (also see Table 5.1): 
1. Hazards that were currently both present and identified in DOC signs  
2. Hazards that were currently present but unidentified in DOC signs 
3. Hazards that were currently neither present nor identified in DOC signs 
 
Plate 5.1: Introduced pictorial warning sign 
(rockfall) at Fox Glacier 
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The hazards in condition 3 are bogus 
messages. This was an important 
methodological inclusion, without which it 
would be difficult to determine if visitors 
were reporting hazards that were evident to 
them, or hazards about which they had been warned via the signs.  Following Cole et al. 
(1997), visitors were considered to have been exposed to the messages if the signs were 
erected when they visited the site.  The introduced pictorial signs used in this study are 
contained in Appendix E. 
 
The choice of message 
content in the introduced 
hazard signs was made 
following site inspection 
visits by the researcher, 
and in consultation with 
the Department of 
Conservation field 
managers.  Selecting 
suitable ‘bogus’ messages 
involved a balance 
between hazards that 
were plausible in the 
environment, and those which, to the average visitor, were ludicrous.  Signs warning of the 
presence of bears, for instance, might have drawn special attention from visitors, many of 
whom would be suspicious about such a sign and question its credibility. 
 
                                                 
14 The slipping / falling hazard sign was damaged during transit to Fox Glacier early in the fieldwork phase and 
was unable to be used further. 
Table 5.1: Content of introduced pictorial warning signs 
Condition Hazard Message 
 
1  Falling rocks 
 Falling Ice 
2  Slipping / Falling14 
 Falling into the river 
3  Strong winds 
 Stinging insects 
 
Plate 5.2: Introduced pictorial warning sign (stinging insects) at Fox Glacier 
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Signs were designed in direct contrast to 
the existing hazard warning signs at the 
sites.  The key points of differentiation 
are evident in comparisons of Plate 5.1, 
Plate 5.2, and Plate 5.3.  In summary, the 
introduced signs were pictorial, rather 
than text-based; triangular, rather than 
rectangular; and employed black figures 
and some brief text on a bright yellow 
background, rather than yellow text on 
dark green background.  The introduced 
signs all included the words ‘attention’ 
and ‘caution’ beneath the pictorial 
image.  Moderate signal words were chosen for consistency and credibility reasons.  Strong 
signal words such as ‘lethal’ and ‘deadly’, although successful in the product warning 
literature (eg., Wogalter, et al., 1994), were considered inappropriate in the glacier 
environment. 
 
The introduced signs were designed to correspond in their style to those used for international 
road signs.  Two of the designs (strong winds and stinging insects) were adapted from 
existing research on warning signs in which effectiveness in Canadian field settings had been 
established (Western Ergonomics, 1995).  All signs had to be adapted to the glacier situation, 
and followed identical design elements.  Sign colour and shape have been found to affect sign 
salience and influence visitor attention and recall of the message (Bitgood et al., 1990; Glover 
& Wogalter, 1997; Western Ergonomics, 1995; Wogalter & Laughery, 1996).  A schedule 
was constructed detailing the employment of particular signs, behavioural observation times, 
and questionnaire distribution (Appendix B). 
 
5.4.3 Behavioural observations 
Another objective of the study was to observe visitor behaviour at the glacier sites.  This 
evolved out of management’s concern for the way visitors were thought to ignore hazard 
warnings issued by the Department of Conservation, thus exposing themselves to the risk of 
 
Plate 5.3: Conventional Department of Conservation warning sign 
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injury.  Such had been the concern of management, that several hazardous zones were roped 
off in order to dissuade visitor entry (see Plate 5.4). 
 
During the fieldwork phase of this study, many observations were made, both formal and 
informal.  In order to quantify these impressions, a structured set of observations was 
undertaken at the terminal face of each glacier.  The observation locations were chosen on the 
basis that the terminal face at both sites: 
a) represented natural end points for many visitors, and logical and 
convenient places at which to position observers; 
b) had been identified as a hazard of significant magnitude; and 
c) included a history of visitor compliance problems. 
The presence of common features at both Fox and Franz Josef Glacier allowed inter-site 
comparisons to be made. 
 
Behavioural observations were planned for each day of the study period.  While weather or 
access conditions did not always allow this, a consistent procedure was used throughout.  The 
observer located him or herself in a pre-determined place, from which a good view of the 
glacier’s terminal face and approaching visitors could be gained.  At both sites, this position 
 
Plate 5.4: Roped closure at Franz Josef Glacier 
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was approximately ten metres back from the rope closure erected by the Department of 
Conservation aimed at restricting access to the unstable terminal face (see Plate 5.4).  As the 
observations were covert, the observer was required to act in such a way that it would appear 
to others that he or she was simply another visitor admiring the view or eating lunch.  Discrete 
recordings were made of the total number of visitors who reached the terminal face, and of 
those visitors who entered the restricted areas (ie., those who proceeded beyond the rope 
closure).  Observations were usually for a period of between one and two hours (Appendix F). 
 
5.4.4 Interim summary 
A survey questionnaire and formal behavioural observations formed the basis of the 
quantitative assessment of visitor hazard awareness.  Introduced pictorial warning signs were 
used in a quasi-experimental fashion in order to estimate the influence of non-verbal warnings 
on visitor perception of hazards.  In addition to these methods, qualitative tools were 
employed to augment aspects of the quantitative findings, and as the cornerstone of the 
study’s second major investigative component. 
 
5.5 Qualitative tools 
In addition to the visitor survey and structured observations of visitor compliance behaviour, 
the research strategy included qualitative interviews with both visitors and key informants.  
These processes are described below. 
 
5.5.1 Visitor interviews 
In order to enrich the data collected through the quantitative survey of visitors, a small 
number of semi-structured interviews was conducted.  Fifteen visitors, including eight women 
and seven men, were contacted on site at either Fox (6) or Franz Josef Glacier (9) and asked 
to take part in the interviews.  The primary themes of these interviews included visitors’ 
attitudes to individual responsibility while at the attractions, reasons for their on-site 
behaviour, and perceptions of safety while visiting the glaciers.  Interviews took place at both 
glacier attractions during October 1998, and ranged between 20 and 60 minutes duration.  All 
interviews were recorded on audiocassette and later transcribed for analysis. 
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5.5.2 Key informant interviews 
Other important objectives in the research were to investigate the perceptions and beliefs of 
DOC managers with regard to risk and hazard, and explore the ways in which risk is 
presented to PNA visitors.  The case study site fulfilled part of this purpose, but the wider 
context of risk management at natural attractions was also considered important.  In order to 
address these objectives, a number of key informants were interviewed, having been 
identified as holding positions or viewpoints of interest regarding risk management on New 
Zealand’s conservation estate.  The parameters of the study dictated that many of these 
informants held policy or management roles within the Department of Conservation, at the 
field, regional, or national level.  Other key informants included geomorphologists (with 
specialty interests in natural hazard identification and mitigation), outdoor recreation and 
tourism providers, occupational health and safety advisors, and legal experts (a complete list 
of key informants is contained in Appendix G). 
 
Each interview was developed independently and in the context of the interviewee’s expertise 
and experience.  Thus, questions and topics of discussion were tailored to individual 
participants in the study.  Interviews followed the flexible format adopted by Lofland and 
Lofland (1984), in which a guide is prepared for each interview.  Consistent with this 
approach, the interview guide in the present study was not a tightly structured set of 
questions, but a list of points or questions to raise while talking to the informant.  According 
to Lofland and Lofland (1984, p. 59), such interviews “might more accurately be termed 
guided conversations” (italics in original). 
 
Intensive interviews, which ranged from one hour to three hours in duration, were conducted 
between March 1998 and July 1999.  A total of 30 potential informants was identified prior to 
and during this time, of which 22 were interviewed.  Informants were initially contacted by 
letter (or electronic mail), and meeting arrangements confirmed via telephone.  Interviews 
took place on the West Coast, in Canterbury, and in Wellington.  In all but two situations, 
interviews were recorded on audiocassette with the consent of interviewees (see Appendix I).  
In cases where audio recording was not possible, contemporaneous notes were made. 
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5.6 Ethical considerations and strategies 
 
Social research is often, ironically, very personal behavior.  Assessing it, 
therefore, must be done with considerable sensitivity (Segall, 1986, p. 286). 
 
It is interesting to consider the limits of acceptability when research is undertaken involving 
people.  The question of ‘who decides the limits?’ is likely to be under constant negotiation 
both among researchers, and between researchers and the subjects they study.  One thing is 
reasonably certain.  In the late twentieth century, most social researchers have a far healthier 
respect for their subjects than was generally held by their historical counterparts.  According 
to Lofland and Lofland (1984, p. 18), the social science perspective on research ethics was 
traditionally one where “everything that could be studied should be studied by anyone who 
had or could obtain access”.  Representing a more contemporary stance on ethics, Segall 
(1986, p. 286) reminded his readers that people are “not guinea pigs and should not be treated 
as such”.  Experiments such as those undertaken by Milgram (1963) on obedience would be 
considered ethically indefensible by many social scientists today. 
 
Segall (1986, p. 286) emphasised that there must be very good reasons for examining social 
behaviour, the ultimate test of which is whether or not the subjects of the inquiry will be 
direct or indirect beneficiaries of the research.  “When they [respondents or subjects] 
contribute to our research, they are incurring a cost; such cost must, for moral and ethical 
reasons, be matched or exceeded by benefit” (Segall, 1986, p. 286). 
 
Ethics, then, are an important consideration in modern social science research, and this study 
is not exempt from this.  Efforts were made to stay within the accepted practices of current 
social research, and respondents were given opportunities to withdraw their participation at 
any stage.  The on-site phase of the project was reviewed by the Department of Conservation, 
and a formal application to Lincoln University’s Human Subjects Ethics Committee was 
approved. 
 
The various methods outlined in this chapter raise several interesting ethical issues related to 
social research.  These include the protection of participants, informed consent, use of 
information, covert observation, and mild deception.  These issues are discussed below in 
relation to the methods through which they arise. 
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5.6.1 Protection of participants 
Good social researchers today take all practicable steps to protect the subjects of their 
inquiries (Babbie, 1989; Gans, 1982; Lofland & Lofland, 1984; Segall, 1986; Singleton et al., 
1993).  Part of this process involves identifying and, where necessary or appropriate, reducing 
the likelihood of inflicting physical, social, or emotional harm to subjects.  In the current 
study, no physical risks were identified as arising directly from the research.  It should be 
noted, however, that the nature of the settings utilised in the project did present some 
possibility of physical risk – one of the assumptions of this research topic.  These risks existed 
irrespective of the study outlined here. 
 
While physical harm to subjects was not of concern in this study, it was important that some 
consideration be given to the study’s potential contribution to any emotional distress among 
visitors.  The questionnaire, for instance, required respondents to give their attitudes and 
feelings toward issues, including safety and individual responsibility at natural attractions, as 
well as report their awareness of hazards or risks.  For some people (who may have 
experienced unsafe conditions in the past, or who may have lost a friend or family member in 
a natural setting), these questions had the potential to provoke unpleasant memories, or cause 
other distress.  Furthermore, it was also remotely possible that some visitors would suffer loss 
of enjoyment as a consequence of perceiving the sites as more dangerous than they actually 
were.  Conversely, it may have been just as likely that the hazard signs contributed to visitor 
enjoyment and sense of personal esteem. 
 
In order to reduce the possibility of these negative consequences, questionnaires were 
sensitively worded, hazard messages appropriately designed, and respondents advised of their 
right to discontinue their involvement at any stage.  More specifically, in line with the current 
accepted practice in research involving human subjects, a range of precautions was taken to 
ensure the sensitivities of respondents were protected. 
 
5.6.2 Visitor survey 
Those visitors who were asked to participate in the quantitative survey initially received a 
short verbal explanation of the study, and an assurance of the anonymity of their responses.  
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This verbal statement was reproduced in written form on the questionnaire itself in a language 
appropriate to the respondent (Appendix A).  In addition to this, a more detailed information 
sheet was offered to respondents upon completion of the questionnaire.  This provided 
information about the study, which, if given prior to the survey’s completion, might have 
significantly influenced responses.  The detailed information sheet (Appendix F) served to 
debrief visitors, and represented informed consent15.  Respondents were advised of their 
entitlement, at any stage and for any reason, to withdraw the information they had provided.  
The researcher’s contact details were supplied to all respondents for this purpose. 
 
Survey respondents were also advised that completed questionnaires could only be referred to 
using a code, which had no association with a respondent’s name or other information that 
might lead to the identification of the individual.  Codes were printed on each questionnaire 
and its corresponding information sheet.  Respondents were informed that, should they decide 
to withdraw information, it was possible to contact the researcher and, quoting the code from 
the information sheet, have their data deleted from the sample. 
 
5.6.3 Introduction of hazard signs 
The introduction of bogus hazard warning signs can be interpreted as a form of mild 
deception.  This was carefully considered and designed to minimise any negative effects on 
visitors’ experiences, but warrants brief additional explanation and discussion. 
 
In order to gain an understanding of the effects of safety messages, it was necessary to create 
and introduce signs that identified hazards not, in fact, present in either of the glacier valleys.  
By interchanging the presence and content of such signs, and continuously assessing visitors’ 
perceptions, it was intended to determine which level of hazard warning was most effective at 
influencing visitors’ awareness and perceptions.  Informing visitors of the spurious nature of 
some signs at an early stage would have served to undermine this objective.  Thus, an 
approach that involved the mild deception of visitors was adopted. 
 
                                                 
15 The author acknowledges that informed consent is normally understood to occur prior to participation in 
research.  Given the potential influence of the information on the participants’ responses, however, it was 
decided to withhold some information about the study until immediately after the survey was completed. 
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According to Singleton et al. (1993, p. 482), the “basic rationale for deception is that it is 
necessary in order to place research participants in a mental state where they will behave 
naturally.  If subjects knew the true purpose of a study, the results are meaningless”.  These 
authors maintain that the prevailing sentiment among social scientists is not to rule out 
deception entirely. 
 
In partial remedy to this ethical dilemma, a written information sheet, which contained full 
details of the study’s practices, was supplied to all survey respondents on completion of the 
questionnaire (Appendix H).  For those people who were not participants, but who may 
inadvertently have come into contact with the introduced hazard messages, no information 
was distributed.  This was an unavoidable limitation of the method.  However, these people, 
like any other visitors to the conservation estate, were subject to management decisions made 
by the Department of Conservation, which has statutory responsibility to control these areas.  
The introduction and manipulation of hazard and safety signs is one such management 
decision.  It is important to emphasise that, while the project hazard signs were presented and 
removed at different times during the survey implementation and observations, no current 
hazard or safety signs were manipulated, occluded, or contradicted. 
 
5.6.4 Behavioural observations 
In order to appreciate further how visitors to natural attractions behaved around natural 
hazards, and the effects of hazard warning signs on that behaviour, visitors to particular parts 
of the attractions were monitored for short periods of time and their actions recorded.  The 
observations were covert but involved the collection of no personal details. 
 
While out of favour among some social scientists (see Erikson, 1967; Lofland & Lofland 
1984), the covert observation technique was believed to be unharmful in this case, and crucial 
to the collection of accurate data.  Although public places (such as airports and national parks) 
are, by definition, places where anyone has a right to be, researchers intent on assessing social 
behaviour in these settings may still face criticisms related to the ethical nature of their 
practice.  It may be argued, for instance, that, in failing to disclose the true purpose of his or 
her presence, the researcher is guilty of deceit.  Lofland and Lofland (1984, p. 22), however, 
dismissed this criticism and argued that: i) it is never possible to remove deceit entirely; ii) 
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observation alone is unlikely to result in harm to the subjects; and iii) the attitude of those 
under simple observation is often one of indifference. 
 
While the act of observation itself, or indeed, the use of the information recorded, was not 
considered to be in any way harmful to the visitors under scrutiny, the observations did raise 
another ethical issue for the observers.  This was related to the necessity for fieldworkers to 
become familiar with the management operations of the glacial valleys, including the current 
levels of hazard information and risk management practices.  Each of the observers was 
acutely aware, for instance, of the hazards associated with getting too close to the terminal 
face of either glacier.  Furthermore, it was common practice for DOC staff to issue verbal 
warnings to visitors who moved beyond roped safety zones16.  A dilemma arose for one 
observer when he was required to witness visitors entering an area he knew to be hazardous.  
The observer also knew that his intervention would potentially undermine one of the 
objectives of the research.  While this circumstance had the potential to become a serious 
ethical concern, it should be emphasised that Department of Conservation signs warning 
visitors of the hazards were in place at all times during the observations. 
 
Unlike observations in some urban public places (Damer, 1974; Humphreys, 1975; Karp, 
1980), making observations at the glaciers involved few issues of access and disclosure.  As 
tourists, the vast majority of people observed were transients at the glaciers, and few remained 
at the terminal face for more than 30 minutes.  The presence of an observer, therefore, 
attracted minimal special attention of the kind possible in a public place with regular 
occupants who were familiar to each other.  The observers did make themselves known to the 
Department of Conservation staff and commercial guides who, in the course of their daily 
work, frequented the observation sites.  These people were not the subjects of any 
documented observation. 
 
5.6.5 Visitor interviews 
Those visitors agreeing to participate in qualitative interviews had the study explained in full 
prior to their interview.  On completion of the interview (which was recorded on 
                                                 
16 DOC staff were never stationed at the terminal face during the research period.  Such warnings were issued in 
cases where the staff member was in the area assessing conditions or attending to the maintenance of visitor 
access. 
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audiocassette), informants were asked for their written consent with regard to the use of the 
interview in the study (Appendix I).  As above, the opportunity to withdraw all responses (or 
certain responses only) was offered. 
 
5.6.6 Key informant interviews 
Those people agreeing to participate in the study as key informants, some of whom held 
positions that made them personally identifiable, have been given pseudonyms.  Where 
respondents specified, a suitably general title is used to describe his or her position. 
 
5.7 Data analysis 
5.7.1 Quantitative data analysis 
Survey responses were entered into a spreadsheet programme (Lotus 123) and later 
transferred to the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) for analysis.  The data were 
subjected to several univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses.  Statistical manipulations 
included descriptive statistics, factor and item analysis, cross tabulations (non-parametric) and 
t-tests (parametric tests).  Table 5.2 (page 138) provides details of the multiple scale items, 
including mean item and scale scores, item-total correlations, and reliability coefficients 
(Cronbach’s alpha).  Three scales are represented, corresponding to hazard awareness (HAS), 
individual responsibility for safety (IRS), and safety perceptions (SPS). 
 
According to Kline (1993) and Loewenthal, (1996), the reliability coefficient is the best index 
of reliability in the sense of internal consistency, and should, ideally, be higher than 0.7.  
Table 5.2 shows that internal consistency for each of the scales used in this study was good 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7951, 0.7208, and 0.8595 for the HPS, IRS, and SPS scales, 
respectively).  Item-total reliability scores were also within accepted ranges.  Loewenthal 
(1996, p. 105) stated that: “Correlations of the order of 0.15 or less could definitely mean the 
death sentence for any item”. 
 
Where a scale comprises a small number of items (fewer than about 10), slightly lower 
reliability coefficients might be expected (Loewenthal, 1996).  In this on-site study it was 
vital that the length of the survey be kept to a minimum.  The time, terrain, and climatic 
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constraints influencing visitors to the glaciers necessitated shorter scales than was considered 
ideal by Kline (1993).  It would not have been appropriate to detain visitors for anything like 
the maximum length of time that Kline suggested was acceptable for adults (one hour).  Other 
authors, such as Loewenthal, appear less concerned about the minimum number of scale 
items, rather emphasising the tendency for some test constructors to inflate reliability by 
increasing the number of scale items beyond what is necessary. 
 
The data are analysed both as a single glacier visitor sample, and as site-specific sub-samples.  
It was considered valid to approach the analysis in this way due to the many similarities in 
visitor classification, visitor activities undertaken, and the physical and managerial nature of 
each of the two locations (see also Sections 5.3 and 5.4.3). 
 
5.7.2 Qualitative data analysis 
Interviews were recorded on audiocassette and later transcribed for analysis.  Transcripts were 
examined and indexed by theme, using numerical and colour codes to represent roles, 
responsibilities and recurrent ideas of participants.  These themes were then collated and 
analysed with regard to the various affiliations of the respondents (such as visitor, policy 
analyst, senior and field-level managers, or natural hazard expert).  The data were then used to 
illustrate aspects of the quantitative results, and to create a coherent account of how risk and 
safety is perceived and communicated by those responsible for the management of New 
Zealand’s natural attractions. 
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HAS This natural area appears to be stable and predictable 1 7 4.07 4.07 0.5008  
 I would be surprised to find out that this is a dangerous 
place to visit 
1 7 4.13 4.13 0.5372  
 I am not aware of any natural hazards in this area 1 7 5.59 5.59 0.5136  
 I have not thought about hazards at this glacier 1 7 4.61 4.61 0.4818  
 There are dangers at this glacier which are obvious to me 1 7 5.76 2.24 0.3759  
 I would not be surprised to learn that this is a dangerous 
place to visit 
1 7 3.55 4.45 0.5851  
 While here, I have often thought about hazards to which I 
might be exposed 
1 7 3.04 4.96 0.4829  
 I am aware of natural hazards in this area 1 7 5.95 2.05 0.3101  
 This area strikes me as unpredictable and unstable 1 7 3.84 4.16 0.5515  
  9 63  40.05  0.7951 
IRS Managers should do more to protect visitors from harm in 
natural areas 
1 7 5.21 5.21 0.3563  
 While I am at the glacier, my safety is the responsibility of 
those who manage the area 
1 7 5.57 5.57 0.3972  
 I would like to see more obvious evidence of management 
at this glacier 
1 7 5.5 5.5 0.4014  
 Management should prevent access to areas which might 
be dangerous 
1 7 2.79 2.79 0.3113  
 I am reliant on others for my safety at this glacier 1 7 4.81 4.81 0.4749  
 I prefer others to be in charge of my safety in this area 1 7 5.12 5.12 0.3791  
 Those who manage this area have an obligation to inform 
me about all things which might affect my safety 
1 7 2.06 2.06 0.2762  
 I should be allowed to decide where it is safe to go 1 7 5.36 2.64 0.4492  
 I prefer to look after my own safety while at this place 1 7 3.83 4.17 0.5297  
 If visitors will not accept responsibility for their own safety 
they should not visit this glacier 
1 7 1.68 6.32 0.2532  
 As a visitor to this site, I feel responsible for my own safety 1 7 1.47 6.53 0.2520  
  11 77  50.84  0.708 
SPS This seems like a safe area to visit 1 7 2.88 5.12 0.5161  
 While at the glacier, I have not been concerned for my 
personal safety 
1 7 3.38 4.62 0.4766  
 While visiting the glacier I have felt secure 1 7 2.06 5.94 0.6996  
 As a visitor to this area, I feel as though I am exposing 
myself to physical danger 
1 7 5.77 5.77 0.6543  
 The physical nature of this area makes me concerned for 
my personal safety  
1 7 5.66 5.66 0.6546  
 At this glacier, I have at times felt unsafe 1 7 5.79 5.79 0.6849  
 I feel physically vulnerable in this area 1 7 5.52 5.52 0.6338  
 I feel as though I am taking a risk in visiting this glacier 1 7 5.58 5.58 0.6669  
  8 56  44.0  0.8595 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 The adjusted mean represents those items where the anchors have been reversed to reflect their direction of 
influence on the scale. 
Table 5.2: Scale items, scores and reliability measures 
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5.8 Limitations of the research 
Every attempt was made to ensure that the data collected were as robust as possible.  It is an 
inevitability of all research, however, that limitations exist.  It is sound methodological 
practice to at least allude to these. 
 
1. The quantitative data of this study were limited to summertime users of the specific sites 
surveyed.  While some generalisation to other seasons and sites is possible, this can only 
be tentative.  Data collection was originally scheduled to occur concurrently at the two 
sites in two implementation phases.  However, following the closure of the Franz Josef 
access track between January and March 1998, a consecutive approach was adopted.  
While not affecting the total data set, one consequence of this non-concurrent data 
collection method is that the comparison between sites is less precise. 
 
2. Because of the sensitive nature of visitor safety, manipulation of the existing (DOC) 
hazard signs was not possible.  Manipulation was limited to the introduction and removal 
of pictorial signs only.  It is, therefore, not possible to attribute modification in perception 
or behaviour to the introduced signs alone.  Effects may be the cumulative consequence of 
additional signs, rather than the effects of the sign content or form.  However, the analysis 
revealed no statistically significant relationship between the number of introduced signs 
and the extent of visitor hazard awareness, or compliance with access restrictions. 
 
3. Observers, while covert, may have influenced the behaviour of visitors under observation.  
For instance, by remaining at the perimeter of the restricted access area, the observer may 
have inadvertently encouraged others to do the same, thereby affecting the results.  The 
only way to avoid this is to hide the observer completely from view, or use video 
surveillance.  Neither strategy was considered to be practical or appropriate. 
 
4. Owing to language differences, qualitative interviews with non-English speaking visitors 
were not possible.  Given the importance of communication with international visitors, 
and potential differences in comprehension and expectation, this is an important avenue 
for future research. 
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5. Undertaking research in field settings is naturally distinct from the laboratory environment 
in which the majority of intervening variables can be controlled.  Natural attractions make 
complex settings for quasi-experimental research methods as utilised in the current study.  
Several unpredictable variables remain outside of the researcher’s control, including the 
weather, access conditions, and urgent hazard management decisions.  While efforts have 
been made to minimise the effects of these factors, it is impossible to completely remove 
their influence on the results.  In addition, conducting visitor interviews in outdoor 
environments such as the glaciers, presents a number of challenges relating to visitor 
comfort and response rate.  The high rainfall on the West Coast was an especially 
frustrating feature of the fieldwork, which necessitated some innovative interview and 
audiotape recording strategies. 
 
5.9 Chapter summary and conclusions 
This study undertook to assess both perceptions of risk in natural settings, and the ways in 
which risk is communicated and managed in these contexts.  The glaciers of Westland 
National Park were used as site-specific case studies, and the Department of Conservation’s 
risk management processes and practices were examined in order to understand further the 
presentation of risk on the conservation estate.  The research objectives have required the 
application of multiple methods, the details of which have been outlined in this chapter. 
 
The quantitative survey, behavioural observations, visitor interviews, and key informant 
interviews, while not necessarily making equal contributions to this study, have each played 
an important role in examining aspects of health and safety in the context of visitor 
management in New Zealand’s protected natural areas.  The attempt here to embrace and 
integrate a variety of methods represents a strength of the research and is compatible with a 
case study approach.  The use of a single qualitative or quantitative approach would not have 
yielded the breadth of data realised in this study. 
 
In order that a good level of coherence is achieved, the research results are divided between 
Chapters 6 and 7 in the initial presentation and later combined to form an integrative 
discussion and summary in Chapter 8 (Conclusions).  The two results chapters address 
different research questions, which together allow a greater understanding of the significance 
of natural hazards and the phenomenon of risk in recreation and tourism settings. 
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Chapter 6 Tourists and risk: Perceptions, attitudes, and 
behaviour of visitors to Fox and Franz Josef glaciers 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents results obtained from the quantitative survey, field observations, and a 
small number of visitor interviews undertaken at Fox and Franz Josef glaciers.  The aims of 
this chapter are to: 
i) describe the characteristics of visitors; 
ii) examine the level of hazard awareness among visitors and to assess the effects 
of introduced warning signs on awareness; 
iii) examine the perceptions of safety and risk among visitors, and to determine any 
cross-cultural differences between visitors; 
iv) investigate visitors’ attitudes towards responsibility for safety at the glaciers; 
and 
v) explore the issue of visitor compliance with warning signs and access 
restrictions. 
 
The quantitative data are drawn from the responses of 378 visitors to Fox and Franz Josef 
glaciers, and observations of on-site visitor behaviour between January 27 and March 26 
1998.  The survey responses represent a response rate of nearly 90 per cent (Figure 5.1).  
Brief descriptive data were obtained from non-respondents who were found to be broadly 
representative of the respondents in terms of age, gender, and nationality. 
 
In addition to the quantitative survey data, this chapter is supplemented by qualitative data 
collected from visitor interviews conducted during October 1998.  Visitors to the glaciers 
during October were not considered to differ in significant respects from those visiting in 
January and March, although the volume of visitors is lower in October (DOC, 1999b; 
Statistics New Zealand, 1998).  Furthermore, the separate data collection periods served 
different purposes, and the latter qualitative component is used to clarify dimensions of the 
survey data, rather than for comparative means. 
 
The results are presented in five sections.  The first of these describes visitor characteristics 
and general visitor information, including age, gender, origin, group composition, level of 
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experience, and visit duration.  The next three sections examine the main attitude dimensions 
under consideration in this study.  Respectively, these are: i) hazard awareness; ii) perception 
of safety; and iii) individual responsibility.  The fifth section of the results concentrates on 
aspects of visitor behaviour (both self-reported and observed) with special regard to natural 
hazards in the two glacier valleys.  The findings are then discussed within an integrative 
summary which represents the conclusion to Chapter 6. 
 
6.2 Characteristics of the sample 
6.2.1 Visitor origin 
Consistent with the general trend evident in other recent visitor studies of New Zealand’s 
natural attractions (Booth & Peebles, 1995; NZTB & DOC, 1993), the majority (80.4%) of 
visitors to the glaciers were from 
overseas (Figure 6.1).  The most 
common visitor origin was Australia 
(21.8%), followed by New Zealand 
(19.6%), and the United Kingdom 
(17.2%).  Visitors from Asia were 
conspicuous by their absence from the 
glacier sites, comprising only 5.3 per 
cent of the overseas visitors.  On a 
nation-wide scale in 1997, Asians made 
up nearly 20 per cent of the New 
Zealand international visitor market 
(NZTB, 1998). 
 
The low representation of Asian visitors may be explained by the economic turbulence 
experienced in several Asian countries (notably Korea, Taiwan, and Japan) during the late 
1990s.  A review of international arrival statistics for New Zealand as a whole shows a 27 per 
cent decline in total visitors from Asia in 1998 (Collier, 1999; Statistics New Zealand, 1998).  
In addition, the sampling criteria used in the present study may have contributed to the under-
representation of Asian visitors surveyed.  In order to enter the sampling frame, visitors had to 
leave the car park and its immediate surrounds (see Chapter 5).  Travellers who were part of 
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Figure 6.1: Visitor origin 
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large coach parties often appeared to have neither the time nor the inclination to venture more 
than a few hundred metres from their transport, thus limiting their inclusion in the sample.  
Given that Asian tourists are over-represented among organised coach tourists (Moore et al., 
2001; NZTB, 1996), this might also contribute to their under-representation in this study. 
 
When the two visitor sites were compared (also Figure 6.1), the most striking difference was 
the proportion of Australian visitors recorded at the glaciers.  At Fox Glacier, Australian 
visitors comprised 13.6 per cent of all respondents, compared with 29 per cent of respondents 
at Franz Josef.  This may reflect a genuine preference for Franz Josef among Australian 
visitors, or arise out of logistical features of Australians’ travel itineraries.  It is also possible 
that the difference is the consequence of the slightly different data collection periods at each 
of the two sites (see Chapter 5), although this is unlikely since there was no perceptible 
difference between the number or proportion of Australian visitors to New Zealand in January 
compared with Australians visiting in March of 1998 (Statistics New Zealand, 1998).  
 
Regional analysis of New Zealand visitors shows that the greatest proportion (55.4%) 
originated from South Island areas, and nearly one third (31.1%) were from Canterbury. 
(Figure 6.2).  When Fox and Franz Josef Glacier are compared (also Figure 6.2), a slightly 
different trend is evident.  For instance, while over half (55.3%) of all New Zealand visitors to 
Franz Josef originated from 
the North Island, visitors 
from this region 
represented only a third 
(33.3%) of visitors to Fox 
Glacier.  Visitors from 
Canterbury (41.7%) clearly 
dominate at Fox, but 
account for only one in 
every five (21.0%) visitors 
to Franz Josef.    
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Figure 6.2: Origin of New Zealand visitors 
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6.2.2 Age 
At both glaciers, the most 
common visitor age group was 
25 – 29 years (16.5%).  The 
smaller proportion of visitors 
aged between 35 and 49 years 
(20%) is illustrated by a 
prominent dip in the centre of 
Figure 6.3, creating a bimodal 
distribution.  This age group 
represents a stage of the life cycle in which children and careers may reduce the potential for 
travel.  Those with children are both less likely to travel, and less likely to explore natural 
areas (Bagnall, 1998; Espiner, 1995).  This is supported by the finding that only a small 
proportion (7.2%) of visitors were accompanied by children for whom they were responsible.  
It is typical of both the nature of the attraction, and the age structure of tourists in general, that 
nearly 40 per cent of visitors to the glaciers were aged fifty years or older.  When compared in 
Figure 6.3, it is apparent that Fox Glacier has a slightly younger visitor age profile than its 
northern counterpart, a difference that may reflect the higher profile of Franz Josef Glacier, 
especially among those visitors following the main tourist ‘circuit’ and those on package tours 
(who are also likely to be older). 
 
6.2.3 Gender 
As is common in many on-site visitor surveys 
(Booth & Peebles, 1995), men (55%) were 
slightly over-represented in the results (Figure 
6.4).  This may be attributable to what has been 
described as the ‘male leader bias’ (Devlin, 1976).  
However, attempts were made to reduce this 
effect (see Appendix H).  Other visitor studies at 
national parks and outdoor recreation areas have 
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found a male: female ratio similarly close to 60:40 (Booth and Peebles, 1995).  The effect is 
more pronounced at Fox Glacier (58.2% men and 41.8% women) than at Franz Josef (52.8% 
men and 47.2 women). 
 
6.2.4 Visitor group 
Consistent with other studies of leisure, recreation and tourism participation (see for example, 
Burch, 1969; Colton, 1987; Holman & Epperson, 1984; Kelly, 1980; Labone & Wearing, 
1994), the majority of visitors to the glaciers were accompanied by others (Figure 6.5).  Most 
commonly, respondents were visiting with a partner (42.0%), but family (17.9%) and friends 
(18.4%) were also frequently mentioned.  Fewer than ten per cent of respondents were 
visiting the glaciers alone, and only one visitor in twenty (5.3%) was visiting as part of an 
organised tour group.   
 
Once again, it is likely that those visitors travelling as part of organised tours are under-
represented in the survey.  Possible explanations for this include the time constraints on tour 
group members, and the lack of willingness to explore the sites observed among coach 
parties.  This is not a bias in the sample but, rather, it is a consequence of the chosen sample 
frame (which included only those visitors who walked at least part of the way to the glacier). 
It is also feasible that some organised tour group members identified more closely with one of 
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Figure 6.5: Visitor group 
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the other choices offered in this question.  The range of categories was intended to be 
mutually exclusive, yet might not have differentiated sufficiently between all categories. 
While respondents were asked to select one option that best described the group with which 
they were visiting, some respondents may have considered their group as ‘with partner’, yet 
also part of an ‘organised tour’. This is a weakness of the survey instrument.  
 
The life stage of visitors is broadly reflected in the composition of visitor groups.  For 
instance, 71.4 per cent of those travelling alone, and 73.9 per cent of those travelling with 
friends, were aged under 40 years.  Conversely, 63.5 per cent of visitors who were 
accompanied by their partners were aged 40 years or older.  These differences were found to 
be statistically significant (x2=38.9, df=5, p<0.001). 
 
6.2.5 Level of experience 
In order to gain an 
understanding of visitors’ 
familiarity with relatively 
natural environments, 
respondents were asked to 
approximate the frequency 
with which they visited 
‘largely unmodified natural 
areas’ when resident in their 
home countries.  This 
question produced an 
unexpected result, in that 
while 36.5 per cent of respondents reported visits to such areas two or fewer times per year, as 
many as 31.2 per cent claimed to visit more than ten times per year, thus placing themselves 
in the most experienced visitor bracket (Figure 6.6).  Taken at face value, this result implies 
that an important proportion of visitors to both glaciers were quite familiar with natural and 
unmodified environments.  However, this result should be interpreted cautiously.  The 
researcher’s observations of, and discussions with visitors, suggested that many were less 
familiar with largely unmodified environments than is indicated in the result above. 
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Figure 6.6: Frequency of visits to natural areas 
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There are at least three possible explanations for the high proportion of respondents who 
classed themselves as frequent natural area visitors.  The first is that the visitors represent an 
experienced group of nature-based tourists and outdoor recreationists, an explanation that 
contradicts the observations, and some other findings reported here.  Another possibility is 
that visitors consider themselves more familiar with natural environments than they really are, 
or at least, they are unfamiliar with the level of naturalness often associated with New 
Zealand’s natural attractions.  This suggestion is partially supported in an analysis of the level 
of experience and visitor origin.  For instance, among those who reported more than ten 
annual visits to unmodified natural areas, visitors from the UK and Ireland (23%) and the 
USA and Canada (19%) were significantly over-represented (x2 =26.6, df=10, p=0.003).  That 
few genuinely unmodified environments exist in the UK and Ireland at least, suggests that 
visitors from these localities consider themselves more familiar than may be the case in a New 
Zealand context. 
 
A third explanation is that the question may reveal more about how visitors perceived the 
term ‘unmodified’ than it does about visitor experience of natural environments.  Given the 
highly modified environments from which most visitors to New Zealand originate, ‘largely 
unmodified’ becomes an especially relative term.  The rolling pastures of Ireland for instance, 
while heavily cultivated landscapes, may be perceived as largely unmodified natural areas 
owing to the absence of built structures.  If this is the case, the question is not successful in 
revealing level of experience in environments such as those found at Fox and Franz Josef.  It 
is perhaps sufficient to assume that, for many overseas visitors to New Zealand, the glaciers 
represent unfamiliar environments.  Observation of visitor behaviour and the comments of 
individual respondents support this assumption. 
 
A lack of experience is evident in comments made by visitors during short interviews.  For 
instance, despite his claims to the contrary, one middle-aged Australian man revealed his 
unfamiliarity with the sub-alpine West Coast riverbed environment with these comments: 
I’ve done a lot of bush walking - we’re bush trained, you see - but I didn’t feel 
entirely safe on this track because I’ve got a crook back – arthritis in the base of 
the spine, and I haven’t got any recovery if I start to stumble.  The only 
suggestion I’d make is to get the unemployed people up here – and there’s a 
myriad of flat rocks – I don’t mean the really big ones – and plan out a track, and 
get these guys to lay them in a stable condition, so that you know when you 
stand on that rock, it’s going to be there for you. 
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This visitor’s suggestion is impractical to anyone familiar with the power of the river, and the 
scree slides that continually erode into it, to shift large volumes of debris every day 
(depending on rainfall).  No ‘paved’ track would last more than a few weeks in the glacier 
valley environment. 
 
Other visitors made unrealistic comments about potential improvements in the glacier valleys 
which also implied a limited understanding of the environment.  An English woman 
suggested that small cabins be provided in case of rain, while her partner proposed an easier 
access track and a “coffee or water bottle stand” at the foot of the glacier.  Numerous 
comments such as “why would ice fall from the glacier today when it’s been like that for 
hundreds of years?”, and “I’d like to see access to a safe bit [of the glacier] just for touching, 
but I guess thousands of human hands may damage it”, reflect a lack of awareness and 
understanding of the dynamic state of both glaciers.  Although some visitors may have 
experience of natural environments, the majority have not gained it in areas such as these. 
 
6.2.6 Time spent at the sites 
Visitors were asked to estimate the time spent on the glacier access tracks.  Overall, more than 
three quarters (76.1%) of the sample spent between one and two hours at the sites.  The most 
commonly reported visit time was 1.5 hours.  When the glacier sites are compared (Figure 
6.7), there are significant differences between them (x2 = 32.2, df=9, p<0.001).  It is evident 
that visitors spent longer at Franz Josef (mode = 90 minutes) than at Fox (mode = 60 
minutes).  Of those visiting Franz Josef Glacier, 69.5 per cent remained at the site for more 
than one hour, compared with 38 per cent of visitors to Fox Glacier.  These differences are 
largely attributable to the slightly longer access track at Franz Josef. 
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Figure 6.7: Approximate length of visit 
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6.2.7 Visits to one or both glaciers and the information centre 
Most respondents (71.8%) visited both glacier attractions.  The remaining 28.2 per cent stated 
that they would only visit one glacier.  When the sites are compared (Figure 6.8), it is clear 
that a significantly higher proportion of respondents at Fox Glacier intended to also visit 
Franz Josef (79.4%)18, than was the case 
for those visitors to Franz Josef who 
intended to visit Fox Glacier (65%) 
(x2=9.6, df=1, p=0.002).  Those visiting 
only one of the attractions may have been 
more likely to choose Franz Josef as it is 
the first of the glaciers reached by 
travellers moving north to south.  Studies 
of the geographical distribution of tourists 
in New Zealand have confirmed this north – south travel pattern on the West Coast (Forer & 
Simmons, 1998).  Furthermore, Franz Josef has the higher profile of the two glacier 
attractions, and as such is likely to be foremost in the minds of both visitors to the region, and 
the tour operators who influence which attractions are included in tour itineraries.  That a 
majority of visitors intended to visit both glaciers is consistent with Corbett’s (2001) study 
undertaken at Franz Josef, but contrary to the findings of TRC (1995), who claimed that 
visitors to South Westland are principally interested in visiting one glacier. 
 
Visitors were also asked if they had visited 
the Department of Conservation Information 
Centre before their trip to the glacier access 
track.  In the combined sample, the majority 
of respondents (63.7%) had not visited the 
Centre prior to arriving at the glacier (Figure 
6.9).  While the proportions differ slightly 
between the two sites, the overall trend 
                                                 
18 This is despite the fact that at the time of sampling at Fox, the access track to the Franz Josef glacier was 
closed to visitors. 
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Figure 6.9: Information visits prior to arrival at the glaciers 
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remains clear.  This finding has important implications for the positioning of visitor 
information about the area, and, in particular, the dissemination of information relating to 
hazards at the two sites. 
 
6.2.8 Summary 
Visitors to the glaciers of Westland National Park are broadly typical of SSTs in other 
national parks and natural attractions in New Zealand.  For instance, the results show that 
visitor age distribution was bimodal, reflecting the life stages of the majority of long-haul 
travellers, and a broad cross-section of visitor nationality was evident.  Other New Zealand 
studies have also revealed high proportions of overseas visitors, although few as high as 80 
per cent (Booth & Peebles, 1995; NZTB, 1993).  Compared with visitors to national parks in 
general, however, it is likely that glacier visitors are slightly atypical.  The most obvious 
difference is the greater proportion of domestic visitors recorded in most studies of national 
park visitation.  These visitors stay for longer periods of time overall, and have higher levels 
of experience in New Zealand’s unmodified natural environments.  Furthermore, male and 
female visitor representations are more disparate than reported in the current study, although 
visitor group ratios appear similar.  
 
The glacier visitor characteristics reported here present management with a number of 
challenges and potential concerns, some of which are unique to the region.  For instance, 
while short walks are extremely popular attractions throughout New Zealand (DOC, 1996b; 
NZTB, 1996), many access tracks are not of the duration found at Fox and Franz Josef 
Glacier.  Typical visits to the glaciers are of approximately 90 minutes duration, sufficient 
time for visitors to be exposed to a range of natural hazards.  Furthermore, with the majority 
of visitors to the glaciers originating from overseas, it is clear that the management focus 
cannot afford to be on New Zealanders alone.  With significant proportions of visitors likely 
to be from countries where English is not the first language (estimated at 34% of the total 
sample in the present study), care is needed in selecting the most appropriate strategies for 
conveying hazard warnings.  In this regard it is salient to note that visitors generally did not 
visit the Department of Conservation information centres prior to their arrival at the glacier 
access tracks.  Attempts to increase the hazard awareness of visitors should be cognisant of 
this fact.  In addition, the results show that most people intend to visit both glaciers while in 
South Westland.  This finding stresses the value of continuous and consistent hazard 
 151
management strategies between the two sites.  Management at one site has the potential to 
affect awareness and behaviour at the other site. 
 
The next section examines visitor awareness of hazards, and the effects of hazard signs on 
visitors’ perceptions and behaviour. 
 
6.3 Visitors’ perceptions of natural hazards and risk 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Risk perception is a multi-faceted concept, which includes an individual’s assessment of the 
likelihood of loss in any given situation.  The degree to which individuals perceive risk is 
likely to be affected by a variety of factors identified in the literature review as primarily 
individual or situational.  Important among these is the nature of the physical and social 
environments, previous exposure to information about the hazard or risk, and personality 
disposition. 
 
The current study assessed visitors’ perceived risk using awareness of natural hazards, and 
feelings of safety at the sites.  Those visitors who perceived risk to be high at the glaciers 
were those who had high hazard awareness and low feelings of safety (ie., they identified 
specific dangers and felt a degree of concern for their personal safety).  A low level of 
perceived risk was measured as a poor awareness of hazards coupled with a high feeling of 
safety.  In this section, hazard awareness is explored, and the effects of alternative warning 
signs are assessed.  Safety perceptions among visitors are then discussed, after which visitor 
perceptions of risk at the glacier sites are estimated. 
 
6.3.2 Hazard awareness 
Visitors’ awareness of hazards in the Fox and Franz Josef valleys was determined in several 
ways.  These included recording the specific hazards identified by respondents, the 
application of a hazard awareness scale, and calculating the total number of hazards 
identified. 
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6.3.2.1 Hazard identification 
Visitors were asked to recall any hazards observed during their time on the glacier access 
tracks.  Overall, one in five (19.3%) respondents claimed that there were no hazards at the 
sites.  Of those who were able to identify hazards, rockfall (58%), tripping or slipping on 
loose stones (33.2%), icefall (31.6%), and falling in the river (26.5%) were the most 
frequently reported19 among total visitors (Figure 6.10). 
 
When the sites are examined independently (also Figure 6.10), some clear differences are 
apparent.  For instance, visitors to Fox Glacier appeared to be more aware of rockfall (67.8%) 
and falling in the river (24.9%) than their Franz Josef counterparts, of whom 49.2 per cent and 
8.6 per cent identified the respective hazards.  This is interesting because, technically, the 
river is a greater hazard at Franz Josef than it is at Fox Glacier (DOC, 1997a).  Of the other 
hazards (6.4%) reported by visitors, the most common were ‘other tourists’, and a small 
number of visitors who, believing that the track marker posts were, in fact, hazard markers, 
went to great lengths to avoid them. 
 
                                                 
19 Visitors were not prompted with any information about hazards (or possible hazards) at the sites.  Responses 
reflect the range of visitor perceptions, beliefs, and understandings. 
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Figure 6.10: Hazards reported by visitors 
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6.3.2.2 Hazard awareness scores 
The extent to which visitors reported awareness of hazards was calculated using a scale 
created for the specific purposes of this study (see Chapter 5).  The Hazard Awareness Scale 
(HAS) comprised nine items, the scores on which have been standardised20.  High scores 
represent a high level of hazard awareness.  The maximum possible score was 100, and the 
mean for all visitors was 64.2, representing a moderate21 level of awareness. 
 
Figure 6.11 represents a summary of the key comparative findings relating to hazard 
awareness scores.  Those with highest hazard awareness include visitors to Fox Glacier, 
visitors from New Zealand, women, visitors aged under 40 years, and those originating from 
places where the first language is English.  Statistically significant differences were found for 
visitor origin (t= 3.03, df=119.5, 2 tailed p<0.01), age (t= 2.48, df= 348, 2-tailed p<0.01), and 
for language (t=5.93, df=352, 2-tailed p<0.001). 
 
                                                 
20 All multiple item scores in this study have been standardised by dividing the raw score by the maximum 
possible score and multiplying by 100. 
21 See Appendix J for information relating to the classification of ‘low’, ‘moderate’, and ‘high’ for all scale 
scores. 
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Figure 6.11: Mean hazard scores 
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Further analysis of visitor origin also showed statistically significant differences (F5, 348 = 
7.51, p<0.001).  For instance, visitors from the UK and Ireland had a higher hazard awareness 
(69.2) than Continental European (52.0) or Asian (55.8) visitors.  Figure 6.12 illustrates the 
mean hazard awareness scores for visitors from Australasia, Continental Europe, Asia, the 
USA and Canada, the UK and Ireland, and Other.  A post-hoc comparison (Scheffe, 1953) 
revealed that, in terms of hazard awareness, Continental Europeans differed significantly from 
visitors from Australasia, the USA and Canada, and the UK and Ireland. 
 
6.3.2.3 Total hazards identified 
The final measure of hazard awareness was the total number of hazards identified by 
respondents.  While one in five (19.3%) visitors did not identify a single hazard, 
approximately one quarter (27%) identified three or more hazards.  The mean number of 
hazards reported by visitors was 1.8. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
UK
 &
 Ire
lan
d
Au
str
ala
sia
US
A 
& 
Ca
na
da
Ot
he
r
As
ia
Co
nti
ne
nta
l E
uro
pe
Visitor Origin (n=354)
M
ea
n 
H
az
ar
d 
S
co
re
 
Figure 6.12: Mean hazard awareness and geographic region 
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When examined, these results demonstrate significant differences in site, origin, information 
centre use, and age (Figure 6.13).  For instance, visitors to Fox Glacier had a higher mean 
number of reported hazards (2.1) than their Franz Josef counterparts (1.4) (t=4.78, df=372, 2-
tailed p<0.001).  Visitors from New Zealand also identified a greater number of hazards than 
those visitors from overseas, with means of 2.24 and 1.62 respectively (t=3.7, df=372, 2-tailed 
p<0.001).  Interestingly, those visitors who had visited the information centre prior to their 
arrival at the glacier reported a higher number of hazards than those who had not visited the 
information centre.  This result was also found to be statistically significant (t=3.09, df=369, 
2-tailed p=0.002).  Finally, those aged under 40 years of age reported a significantly higher 
mean number of hazards than those 40 years and over (t=3.04, df=371, 2-tailed p=0.003).  
The mean number of hazards identified correlates positively with the previous hazard 
awareness measure (r=.3738, n=351, p<0.001).  Those visitors who were unable to identify 
any hazards also generated the lowest HAS scores (mean = 49.3), compared with visitors who 
identified four or five hazards whose scores were 78.3 and 77.6 respectively. 
 
6.3.2.4 Summary 
Following an assessment of specific hazard identification, hazard awareness scores, and the 
total number of hazards reported, it is concluded that hazard awareness among visitors to the 
glaciers is only modest, and in some cases it is poor.  The majority of respondents were 
unable to identify any natural hazards at the sites other than rockfall.  Respondents with the 
lowest levels of awareness include visitors to New Zealand, and visitors aged 40 years and 
over.  Visitors to Franz Josef Glacier, and those who did not visit the information centre prior 
to their arrival at the site, were also less aware of hazards on their walks.  One explanation for 
these differences is related to visitors’ familiarity with surroundings and level of information 
available.  Visitors to New Zealand are less likely to recognise the hazards in environments 
such as those found at Fox and Franz Josef Glacier.  Awareness of hazards at Franz Josef may 
be lower than at its southern counterpart owing to the broader, less imposing valley in which 
the visitor access track is located (see Chapter 1).  Fox Glacier may appear more ‘wild’, 
distant, and forbidding. 
 
That age should influence hazard awareness to a significant extent is perplexing.  Factors 
associated with age, such as life stage and experience may be influential.  Although age was 
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found to be related to visitor group (see Figure 6.5), no significant differences between group 
and hazard awareness were identified.  Other explanations for limited hazard awareness 
among visitors, such as those associated with communication, attitudes towards risk 
responsibility, and the leisure context in which most people visit, are discussed in Section 6.6. 
 
6.3.3 Awareness and effect of hazard signs 
An important objective of this study was to ascertain the effectiveness of warning signs in 
alerting visitors to the presence of hazards.  In order to assess the influence of signs, pictorial 
hazard warnings were introduced to the glacier sites, and placed at credible locations along 
the two walkways.  Visitor awareness of hazards was assessed in both the absence and 
presence of the introduced signs (for a more detailed description and illustrations, see Chapter 
5). 
 
Visitors were asked if they 
were aware of any hazard 
warning signs on the access 
tracks.  Most respondents 
(91.4%) reported that they 
were aware of hazard signs 
at the sites.  The signs 
reported are presented in 
Figure 6.14. 
 
The awareness of hazard signs followed a similar pattern to the awareness of hazards (shown 
in Figure 6.10), with rockfall (64.1%) and icefall (39.9%) the signs most commonly reported.  
Signs or structures restricting access (38.3%) and a ‘no stopping for 200 meters’ sign (13.9%) 
were also noted by visitors, especially those visiting Fox Glacier.  Despite the variety of 
hazard signs identified, with the exception of rockfall, more than six in ten visitors were 
unaware of important hazard messages, such as those warning of icefall, restricted access, and 
falling in the river.  The pattern of signs identified also suggests a continuum of recognition, 
from the most spectacular hazards to the least spectacular.  This implies the notions of 
cognitive and affective salience, and some degree of processing to work out the salience of 
each. 
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Figure 6.14: Reported hazard warning signs 
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In order to gain some impression of the effectiveness of hazard signs, it was important to 
compare visitor responses both at times when the introduced signs were present and when 
they were absent.  The analysis found no significant difference between sign conditions with 
respect to visitor hazard awareness.  In contrast, differences were apparent in the extent to 
which visitors reported awareness of the hazard signs themselves.  Figure 6.15 reviews the 
effectiveness of five signs used at both glacier sites.  In all cases, the differences in visitor 
sign identification are statistically significant (stinging insects (x2= 89.7, df=1, p<0.001); 
rockfall (x2= 4.32, df=1, p<0.05); icefall (x2= 7.67, df=1, p<0.01); fall in river (x2=55.8, df=1, 
p<0.001); strong winds (x2=32.01, df=1, p<0.001)).  For instance, rockfall hazard signs were 
reported by 33.9 per cent of visitors when only the DOC signs were present.  With the 
introduced signs also in place, the proportion of visitors reporting rockfall increased to 66.1 
per cent.  Although less dramatic, the effect is similar for the icefall hazard warning.  The 
other three hazard signs examined all returned results as expected.  For instance, the strong 
winds hazard was not reported prior to the introduction of the sign simply because there is no 
existing sign (or anything similar to it).  The introduced signs show that at least some visitors 
were aware of the specific warning signs at the sites; they were not simply using their own 
intuition or experience to determine what hazards were present. 
 
In summary, while the introduced signs were effective in raising the level of hazard sign 
reporting, no effect on reporting of actual hazards was evident.  This is not altogether 
surprising and suggests that visitors were able to differentiate between those hazards they had 
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Figure 6.15: Effectiveness of warning signs 
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been warned about (via signs) and those hazards of which they were personally aware at the 
sites.  If visitor management agencies are interested in increasing individual responsibility for 
safety at natural attractions, and ensuring visitors have adequate information about the risks in 
these environments, more explicit signs may have a role to play. 
 
6.3.4 Perceptions of safety 
Another objective in this study was to determine the extent to which visitors to the glaciers 
felt safe in the immediate surroundings.  Visitors’ perceptions of safety were examined using 
Likert scales, the items of which contributed to an overall safety score out of 100.  A high 
score on the scale is indicative of a strong feeling of safety. 
 
Overall, visitors appeared to have a high perception of safety at both glacier sites, with a mean 
safety score of 78.6.  This pattern appeared to be consistent across virtually all visitor groups, 
with only small variations between site, gender, and origin.  Statistically significant 
differences are apparent when visitors are compared on the basis of age (t= -4.26, df=349.2, 
2-tailed p< 0.001) and visitor group (F5,345=. 3.13, p=0.009).  Those aged 40 years and over 
perceived themselves to be considerably safer at the glacier (mean = 83.2) than those under 
the age of 40 years (mean = 74.5).  This is an unexpected finding considering that younger 
people are often portrayed as less risk averse (Bromiley & Curley, 1992; Deery, 1999; Tobin 
& Montz, 1997), although Fischhoff (1992) has argued that this claim is often 
unsubstantiated.  This is, however, consistent with the earlier finding that this same younger 
age group had a greater awareness of hazards in the area.  The result also concurs with the 
findings of Pinhey and Iverson (1994) who found that older visitors to Guam reported feeling 
safer than did the younger visitors.  The findings may reflect differences in the activity 
preferences of visitors, with members of the younger age group more likely to engage in risky 
behaviour such as touching the glacier and exploring beyond the marked safety zones. 
 
Travelling companions may also exert an influence on the extent to which visitors feel safe in 
their surroundings.  For instance, those travelling with partners reported feeling significantly 
safer than did those travelling in other groups.  The greatest difference was between those 
travelling alone (mean safety score = 71.6) and those travelling with their partners (mean 
safety score = 83.1).  Further analysis suggested that some of the variance in group 
composition may be explained by age.  For instance, 63.5 per cent of those travelling with 
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partners were aged 40 years or more.  Similarly, 71.4 per cent of those travelling alone were 
under 40 years of age (x2= 38.9, df=5, p<0.001). 
 
In another part of the 
survey, respondents were 
asked to score three 
different locations on a 
safety scale.  Visitors 
rated (i) New Zealand; 
(ii) their own country (if 
other than NZ); and (iii) 
the glacier site they were 
currently visiting.  Consistent with other measures of visitor safety perception in the study, 
respondents generally rated all three places high in terms of safety22, although there were 
significant differences between age groups (t=-3.81, df=364.7, 2-tailed p<0.001) and visitor 
origin (t=-4.91, df=93.16, 2-tailed p<0.001).  Overseas visitors scored New Zealand ‘as a 
tourist destination’ considerably higher in safety terms than did New Zealanders (Figure 
6.16).  Similarly, visitors from overseas rated their own countries as less safe than either New 
Zealand, or the specific glacier site.  The glaciers were also rated as safer by overseas visitors 
than by their New Zealand counterparts.  In other analysis (not illustrated), a strong 
perception of safety among those aged 40 years and over is evident.  When asked to evaluate 
the glacier attraction in terms of safety to visitors, older respondents rated it higher than did 
younger visitors.   
 
That perception of safety was higher among overseas visitors is likely to be related to a lack 
of knowledge or awareness about New Zealand.  The news and tourism promotion media are 
likely to influence risk perceptions (Elms, 1998b; Kottak & Costa, 1993; Pearce, 1988; Singer 
& Endreny, 1993; Wildavsky, 1993) through control over information about natural hazards, 
levels of crime, road safety, and so on.  The images of New Zealand to which potential 
visitors are generally exposed is likely to reinforce stereotypes of a clean, green and safe 
destination (Cloke & Perkins, 1998; Dilley, 1986; NZTB, 1997).  A recent promotional 
campaign designed to attract additional visitors, described New Zealand as ‘100% pure’ 
                                                 
22 The results of this scale have been re-coded so that a high score represents a high level of perceived safety. 
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Figure 6.16: Safety ratings for tourist destinations by origin 
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(Tourism New Zealand, 2000).  The slogan aimed to invoke an unblemished, innocent, and 
fresh image which, no doubt, was intended to contrast, in the visitor’s mind, with the urban, 
complicated, tarnished, and unsafe settings found in other parts of the world. 
 
Knowledge of a site or an activity is likely to affect visitor perceptions and may explain the 
different safety assessments made by New Zealand and overseas visitors.  Levine and Gorman 
(1994) found that skiers’ ratings of danger in their sport increased when knowledge of 
previous accidents was high.  Overseas visitors are unlikely to be familiar with the local 
history of New Zealand’s natural attractions, or the activities undertaken within them.  As a 
consequence, they are likely to rely heavily on the stereotypical images found in promotional 
materials in making their safety assessments. 
 
A related explanation for strong feelings of safety among visitors to the glaciers is that people 
do not expect to find unsafe conditions when they travel in the developed world.  This is 
especially true for international tourists, who may believe that their experiences are somehow 
controlled or managed for personal safety.  This possibility is raised by the Ministry of 
Commerce (1996) in a report on adventure tourism operator standards.  The authors note that, 
internationally, New Zealand is viewed as: 
A developed country with an advanced economic, legal, political and social 
infrastructure.  For this reason alone, travellers may assume that regulatory 
structures for the New Zealand tourism industry are similar to those in other 
developed countries and that operators are obliged to meet reasonable 
standards of training and competency when operating in potentially dangerous 
environments (Ministry of Commerce, 1996, p. 1). 
In reality, the adventure tourism industry rarely requires new operators to undergo peer safety 
reviews, safety audits, certification, or training (Adventure Tourism Council, no date; Bentley 
& Page, 2001; Ministry of Commerce, 1996), and has no explicit organisation responsible for 
monitoring safety and accidents (Bentley et al., 2001; Page, 1997; Page & Meyer, 1997). 
 
The highly regulated societies from which the majority of visitors to the glaciers originate, 
may condition visitors to assume someone else has made the experience a safe one.  As one 
female visitor from the United Kingdom commented: “they wouldn’t let us come here if it 
wasn’t safe, would they?”.  This remark suggests an assumed social contract between visitors 
and site managers; an implicit belief or trust in ‘the system’ is evident.  Compared with their 
domestic counterparts, overseas visitors may differentiate less between locations, seeing them 
all as ‘New Zealand managed’.  In an era of privatisation and the contracting out of services, 
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however, no such consistency exists.  What is less certain is the extent to which visitors 
appreciate that many of the natural hazards at the glaciers cannot be controlled by 
management.   
 
A male visitor from the Netherlands expressed a similar trusting attitude, and implied that 
other New Zealand experiences have an influence on how people perceive safety and its 
management at the glaciers: 
I think that if it was really dangerous, then they would close it up.  Just like when 
we went to Milford Sound, and we were just in time because the road closed at 
five o’clock, because they keep an eye on it all the time, and if it gets dangerous 
they just close the road, and you have to stay at Milford Sound.  We were going 
back at about 3.30, and the boat captain warned us that if we were planning to 
leave Milford we should beware because the road will close at 5 pm.  I think they 
don’t take any risks.  They say ‘it’s heavy rain coming, and we’ll close the road as 
a precaution’. 
 
New Zealand visitors also expressed a strong feeling of safety at the glacier attractions, but 
may do so for different reasons.  Some overseas visitors have combined trust and ignorance, 
the result of which is not to question the safety of their experience.  New Zealanders, 
however, may express a belief in the safety of their experience because of strong feelings of 
propriety over the sites.  This includes the belief that they can make their own minds up about 
the conditions and whether a site is safe or not.  This is especially evident in the New Zealand 
visitor attitudes to individual responsibility discussed in Section 6.4. 
 
6.3.5 Perceptions of risk 
As discussed above, an important aim of this study was to ascertain the level of perceived risk 
among visitors to the glacier attractions.  In order to approximate this, the data from the 
previous two sections (hazard awareness and safety perception scores) have been combined to 
generate a perceived risk score (PRS) for each visitor or visitor group.  This summary score 
has involved several simple arithmetic stages, each of which is outlined below.  The 
combination of the two scales is based on the assumption that perceived risk is related to both 
awareness of hazards and feelings of safety.  For instance, a visitor who has a high awareness 
of hazards and a low feeling of safety will demonstrate high perceived risk. 
 
First, it was necessary to establish a relationship between the scales assessing hazard 
awareness (HAS) and perception of safety (SPS).  A modest negative correlation (r=-.3314, 
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n=345, p<0.001) indicated that high scores on one scale correlated with low scores on the 
other.  Second, in order to reflect this negative relationship in terms of a score out of 100, the 
safety scores were inverted (ie., a low score equated to a high perception of safety) and added 
to the hazard awareness scores.  So that the scores could be standardised, the total was then 
halved.  Hence, HAS + (100-SPS) / 2  = PRS. 
 
The PRS is not intended to represent an assessment of visitor traits.  Rather, the score is a 
convenient way in which to evaluate the extent to which visitors perceive risk at the glacier 
sites.  When examined, the perceived risk scores confirm the findings reported in earlier 
sections.  Differences in perceived risk are evident in each of the variables presented in Figure 
6.17.  Statistically significant findings appear in heavier shading.  The greatest differences in 
perceived risk are found in origin (t= 2.03, df=352, 2-tailed p=0.043), age (t= 4.55, df= 350, 
2-tailed p<0 .001), language (t= 2.34, df= 181.5, 2-tailed p=0.021), and awareness of warning 
signs (t= 3.89, df=349, 2-tailed p< 0.001).  The highest perceived risk scores were generated 
by New Zealanders, those aged under 40 years of age, and visitors originating from places 
where the first language is English.  Those who claimed to be unaware of hazard warning 
signs at the sites had the lowest perceived risk scores. 
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Figure 6.17: Perceived risk by multiple variables 
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6.4 Attitudes toward individual responsibility 
If you trip on a rock and break your leg, then it’s not the rock’s fault is it? 
(New Zealand visitor to Franz Josef Glacier) 
 
Visitors to the glaciers were assessed on the extent to which they held attitudes linked to 
feelings of individual responsibility for safety.  An appreciation of these attitudes is important 
in terms of understanding the expectations of visitors, and will influence the nature and extent 
of signs and other hazard management tools employed. 
 
Respondents’ attitudes were explored using Likert scales.  The individual responsibility for 
safety scale (IRS) used eleven items that combined to generate a standardised score out of 
100.  A high score on the scale represented a strong feeling of individual responsibility for 
safety.  The mean score on the IRS scale was 65.9, representing a moderately high acceptance 
of individual responsibility among total visitors. 
 
When visitor groups were compared on the IRS, there was generally a high level of 
consistency between them.  The exception to this general trend was visitor origin.  As 
expected, visitors from different parts of the world varied in the extent to which they accepted 
responsibility for their own safety while at the sites.  Figure 6.18 illustrates the mean scores 
by geographic region, between which there are statistically significant differences (F5,327= 4.8, 
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Figure 6.18: Mean scores for individual responsibility by geographic region 
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p<0.001).  A Scheffe test revealed that the greatest difference was between visitors from Asia, 
and those from Continental Europe, USA and Canada. 
 
The findings here lend some support to other studies implying differences between tourists on 
the basis of nationality.  In their review of studies examining tourist behaviour and 
nationality, Pizam and Sussmann (1995) claimed there was evidence to suggest that 
nationality influences tourist behaviour.  In their own research, the authors confirm this 
general finding, observing that Japanese tourists are most distinct, with greater tendencies 
towards passivity and lack of adventure.  In their discussion, Pizam and Sussmann (1995, p. 
915) speculated that the Japanese learnt through cultural conditioning to be “timid and 
reserved in new social situations”. 
 
It is interesting to note that, despite the reported ‘liability crisis’ in the United States (Gold, 
1991; Hanna, 1991; Rankin, 1989, 1990; Spengler & Hronek, 1995), visitors from this region 
scored highest on the IRS scale (mean = 70.3).  This is surprising given that a strong culture 
of liability and blame might be assumed to contribute to higher safety management 
expectations among this visitor group.  For example, one woman, visiting from the United 
States claimed to be impressed by the walks she had been on in New Zealand (including the 
Franz Josef access track), but was surprised that they were open to the public: 
Many walks like this would not be allowed in the US for fear of litigation. I was 
very pleased that access was not closed here, but I was amazed! 
 
A further difference in individual responsibility scores was found when comparing those 
respondents who had visited the information centre prior to their glacier visit (IRS = 64.3) 
with those who had not (IRS = 66.9).  Visitors who had not been to the information centre had 
significantly higher scores on the IRS scale (t=1.7, df=327, one-tailed p<0.05).  While visiting 
the information centre may suggest a higher awareness of hazards (and consequently less 
confidence in accepting individual responsibility), there is no evidence of a correlation 
between hazard awareness and acceptance of individual responsibility for safety in the data 
(r=-.012).  This suggests that hazard awareness is not influencing the degree to which people 
accept responsibility for their own safety. 
 
It is also useful to note a small positive correlation between individual responsibility and 
perception of safety scores (r = .234, n=333, p<0.001).  Higher safety scores appear to be 
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related to higher scores for individual responsibility.  Either, visitors were prepared to accept 
individual responsibility because they felt that the glacier attraction was safe, or they felt safe 
because they accepted responsibility for themselves.  The former explanation seems more 
plausible and is partially supported by visitor comments such as: “they wouldn’t let us in here 
if it wasn’t safe ” – an implicit reference to a responsible authority, and representing an 
assumption that one side of the ‘social contract’ had been met.  High scores on the SPS may 
also help explain reasonably high IRS scores. 
 
Further analysis suggested that individual responsibility for safety was influenced by 
differences in visitor group (F5,324 =2.32, p=0.044).  Those visitors accompanied by family 
and friends had highest scores (IRS = 71.2), while those travelling on organised tours scored 
lowest (mean IRS = 60.3).  This finding is not entirely unexpected given the likely feelings of 
control associated with being a member of an independent group of family or friends.  
Conversely, those on organised tours may have felt reliant on others to ensure their safety at 
the glacier sites.  Expectations of those on organised tours are likely to be higher than those 
who travel independently, with respect to safety management. 
 
While the visitor interviews also revealed strong thematic trends within countries of origin, 
these cannot necessarily be grouped in order as in Figure 6.18.  In all interviews, visitor 
attitudes to individual responsibility were similar, but some expressed these more strongly 
than others.  Among visitors, those from New Zealand and Australia appeared to hold the 
strongest views. 
 
For instance, a male visitor from Australia, who was visiting Fox Glacier at the time, was 
very clear about where responsibility for safety lies: 
I don’t think it’s anyone else’s responsibility.  I’m totally opposed to this idea of, 
you know, you go somewhere, and you fall over and break your arm, and you try 
to sue somebody – I’m totally opposed to that.  I think that when a person walks 
past here, it is one hundred per cent their own responsibility. 
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Similarly, a New Zealand visitor emphasised the need to accept personal responsibility in the 
outdoors: 
As individuals we are responsible.  I don’t really agree with this OSH23 business 
that you can sue the environment, so to speak, just because you fall over and 
twist your ankle!  When that happens, it’s a bit sad I think, because in the long 
run a lot of people suffer because the areas get closed off. 
 
This visitor went on to comment on the extent of restriction at the glacier, questioning its 
necessity, although recognising management’s likely rationale: 
When you come to see the outdoors and what have you, it is sometimes a bit of a 
shame when you come across these fences and signs saying what to do and 
where to do it.  I think it’s a bit of an overkill, but there are people out there that, 
possibly they need that.  I guess if they go over there and fall off you can say: ‘it’s 
your fault, you went over the fence’, then you’ve covered yourself a little bit 
haven’t you? 
 
Another New Zealand respondent also felt that the number of warnings about safety were 
excessive: 
The government goes over the top with trying to warn people about hazards. 
They have to realise people have to take more responsibility for their own safety.  
They can’t be led by the hand all the time.  You can’t stop people going where it 
is dangerous - it’s part of the attraction. 
 
Here the speaker is clearly of the mind that people need to look after themselves more 
actively in natural environments.  Like other comments, these are based on the assumption 
that all visitors have an equal level of knowledge about the conditions and hazards inherent at 
the sites. 
 
One final remark helps characterise the New Zealand respondents’ attitudes to responsibility 
in the outdoors: 
There’s no need for managers to inform visitors about every hazard here. One 
sign would be enough.  Too many signs will spoil the place.  As far as risk is 
concerned, I reckon a thumping great sign here [gesturing toward the beginning 
of the track], that a blind man can read, saying: ‘you’re welcome to come in here 
and look at the glacier – there it is up there – but past this point, you do so at 
your own risk, and no compensation is payable’.  If you step on a bridge and it 
falls apart, that’s your problem – you didn’t have to do it! 
 
                                                 
23 OSH refers to the Occupational Safety and Health Unit of New Zealand’s Department of Labour. 
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This last comment implies the importance of voluntariness in risk acceptance (Leiss & 
Chociolko, 1994; Slovic et al., 1982).  The visitor appears to believe that if he uses the 
recreation site, he does so of his own free will, and at his own risk.  How these attitudes might 
play out in the event of an accident is unknown. 
 
Other visitor comments illustrate an anti-litigious stance that was almost universal among 
those interviewed.  So too is the New Zealand ‘do it yourself’, ‘she’ll be right’, and ‘you’re on 
your own’ cum ‘pioneer spirit’ that many enjoy in their outdoor recreation (Watson, 1993).  
The negative attitude to warnings and ‘over-management’ also implies a degree of 
psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Manfredo & Bright, 1991).  New Zealand 
visitors may object to being told what to do in places they perceive as ‘their own’, and react 
negatively to any perceived loss of freedom or control in these environments. 
 
While supportive of individual responsibility, visitors from the United States and the United 
Kingdom were more conservative in their views.  For instance, a young couple from Colorado 
used their experiences in the USA as a context for their attitudes: 
In the US, the fence [the rope barrier restricting access to the glacier face] would 
be way back there [gesturing back down the valley, away from the glacier], just 
because there is so much liability with all the suing and so forth.  If something 
happened to us here, like if a block of ice fell on us now, I think my father would 
ask a lot of questions and say that more should have been done to protect us – 
just because of the legal situation we are used to over there.  But for us [the 
couple], we wouldn’t because we know what the risks are ahead of time, 
especially when you’re warned like that, you know it’s completely your fault if 
you’re up there [in the restricted area]. 
 
Another visitor to Franz Josef Glacier, a woman in her 50s from the United Kingdom, 
complained that the access to the riverbed through the bush was “too slippery”.  She 
maintained that: 
Management has a responsibility to provide a safe path through the bush.  I have 
a right to expect this. 
 
Similarly, other visitors insisted that the responsibility was a shared one between those who 
visit and those who manage the site.  A male visitor from the Netherlands commented: 
We always think of it this way: If we are on the road, we are responsible for our 
own lives, not other people; but it is good when other people who know the area 
and who put up the signs there, then it is a help for us of course – it’s a guide. 
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This view was shared by other overseas visitors, including a woman from Australia who said: 
I think they [the management] should tell us the dangers, and point them out to 
us like they have done, and warn us, and then it’s up to us whether we take that 
risk. 
 
In summary, both the quantitative findings, and the individual comments of visitors, 
demonstrate a moderately strong sense of individual responsibility at the glacier sites.  It is 
difficult to assess, however, the extent to which this might translate into practice in the event 
of an accident – especially for those visitors from beyond Australasia24.  Also evident in the 
comments of New Zealand, Australian and some American visitors is an anti-litigious stance.  
Some visitors believed that New Zealand could learn from the American situation regarding 
the right to sue.  Such legal arrangements, they believe, have the potential to destroy the 
outdoor recreation and nature-based tourism experience should they ever be reintroduced. 
 
Part of the strong New Zealand feeling about individual responsibility is a reaction to the 
signs and restrictions erected at both Fox and Franz Josef Glacier.  This response may be 
linked to a sense of propriety among domestic visitors.  New Zealanders may not appreciate 
being told what to do in their own place.  Overseas visitors, however, appear happy that 
advice is given to guide them in an unfamiliar environment.
                                                 
24 Unfortunately, it was not possible to gain useful comments from visitors who were not fluent in English. 
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 Origin  Age  Sex  Information 
Centre 
 Language  Site  All 
 NZ Overseas Under 40 
years 
40 years 
and over 
Male Female Visited Not 
visited 
English first Non-English 
first 
Fox Franz  
Hazard 
Awareness 
70.6 
MOD 
 
62.7 
MOD 
67.1 
MOD 
61.6 
MOD 
62.6 
MOD 
66.6 
MOD 
64.8 
MOD 
64.3 
MOD 
 
68.0 
MOD 
53.4 
MOD 
66.1 
MOD 
62.5 
MOD 
64.2 
MOD 
Total Hazards 
Identified 
2.2 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.4 2.1 1.5 1.8 
Perceptions of 
Safety 
78.5 
HIGH 
78.7 
HIGH 
74.5 
HIGH 
83.2 
HIGH 
79.2 
HIGH 
78.1 
HIGH 
77.7 
HIGH 
79.4 
HIGH 
80.4 
HIGH 
73.6 
HIGH 
78.4 
HIGH 
78.8 
HIGH 
78.6 
HIGH 
Individual 
Responsibility 
for Safety 
66.9 
MOD 
65.6 
MOD 
66.4 
MOD 
65.6 
MOD 
65.8 
MOD 
66.2 
MOD 
64.2 
MOD 
66.9 
MOD 
66.1 
MOD 
64.9 
MOD 
65.7 
MOD 
66.0 
MOD 
65.9 
MOD 
Perceived Risk 46.1 
MOD 
42.0 
LOW 
46.3 
MOD 
39.2 
LOW 
41.7 
LOW 
44.2 
MOD 
43.6 
MOD 
42.4 
LOW 
43.8 
MOD 
39.9 
LOW 
43.8 
MOD 
42.0 
LOW 
42.85 
MOD 
 
*Statistically significant differences (p<0.05) appear in shaded cells 
LOW = Low  range 0 - 42.8 
MOD = Moderate range 42.9 – 71.3 
HIGH = High   range 71.4 – 100 
 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the various hazard awareness, safety, and individual responsibility scores.  The combination of the first two 
scales has led to the conclusion that perceived risk among visitors to the glacier attractions is relatively low.  The most consistent findings are 
those related to the influence of visitor origin and age.  No significant relationship between these two variables was found, suggesting that the 
influence of each is independent of the other.
Table 6.1: Summary of mean scale scores 
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6.5 Visitor behaviour 
From Section 6.3, it is evident that, among some visitors, awareness of hazards and the degree 
to which risk is perceived at the glacier sites is low.  It is possible that a sense of complacency 
among these visitors is a factor contributing to the unsafe behaviour previously reported at the 
sites by management.  An attempt to increase visitor awareness of hazards at the sites was 
undertaken using the introduced signs (described in Section 6.3.3, and more fully in Chapter 
5).  The effects of the signs on visitor compliance with warning messages were monitored. 
 
This final results section examines the behavioural dimension of the glacier visitor study.  
This component was used in addition to the questionnaire in recognition of the fact that there 
are potential differences between what respondents say, and what they do (Fishbein & 
Manfredo, 1992).  While it is not possible to validate one method against another (and 
determine precisely any differences), it is useful to present the additional data to complement 
the other findings.  The behavioural data have been divided into those that were reported (ie., 
obtained via the questionnaire), and those that were observed (ie., obtained via a series of 
scheduled observations made by the researcher and/or his assistants). 
 
6.5.1 Reported behaviour 
Visitors were asked about their actions while at the glacier site.  For instance, one question 
sought to determine what proportion of visitors had walked as far as the track terminus.  Of 
the total sample, 69.5 per cent reported walking at least to the present closure immediately 
before the terminal face25.  Of these visitors, nearly one in four (23.8%)26 claimed to get close 
enough to touch the ice face.  To touch the ice at the time of the study visitors needed to go 
beyond the roped closure.  This level of self-reported non-compliance is identical to that 
found by Corbett (2001) in his study of visitors to Franz Josef Glacier.  Corbett (2001) found 
that 81 per cent of visitors walked as far as the track terminus, 24 per cent of whom proceeded 
beyond the rope barrier restricting access to the glacier.   
 
                                                 
25This figure refers to visitors who ventured beyond the car parks and immediate surrounds.  No visitors were 
interviewed in the car park or its close proximity.  Refer to Chapter 5 for a description of the interviewing 
locations. 
26 This represents 16.6% of the total visitor sample. 
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It is possible that the present study’s findings under-represent the true extent of 
transgressions.  For example, it is plausible that respondents avoided admitting to something 
that they perceived as rule breaking or socially undesirable.  It is partly for this reason that an 
observation component was included in the study design (see Section 6.5.2 below). 
 
It is clear that touching or getting close to the glacier is very important to many visitors.  The 
majority (69.6%) of all visitors expressed a desire to ‘get closer to’ the glacier than was 
possible at the time of their visit.  This was especially true for visitors to Fox Glacier, where 
nearly three in every four visitors expressed a desire to get closer to the ice face.  This 
perceived benefit effect has been identified as an important influence on degree of compliance 
with messages (McCarthy et al., 1995; Wogalter & Laughery, 1996).  Similarly, the perceived 
cost of compliance with the message will affect the compliance rate.  At the glaciers, some 
visitors are likely to have perceived the cost (loss of the benefits) of remaining within the 
safety zone as too great.  This analysis assumes, of course, that visitors are aware that the 
roped closures are intended to restrict non-guided access to the glaciers. 
 
The importance of getting close to the glacier is also evident in the data obtained through 
visitor interviews.  Many visitors expressed discontent at not realising this ambition.  One 
New Zealand visitor to Fox Glacier expressed his disappointment in the following way: 
I reckon it’s a pity you can’t get any closer to the glacier than this [the roped 
closure].  My key thing is that it’s bloody pathetic that at the start it says ‘here’s 
the walk to the glacier’, and at the end you don’t actually get there.  It’s not 
actually the walk to the glacier and it shouldn’t say that! 
Another visitor, a woman also from New Zealand, expressed a similar sentiment: 
Everyone was really brassed off, because it [the glacier] was all roped off.  It said 
‘danger rock falls’, and yet they were taking guided groups up there, so you had 
to wonder how dangerous it really was!  We felt that restrictions at the glacier, 
which limited access to guided groups, was only for paying people and not really 
the danger. 
The perception among some visitors was that if you were prepared to pay, entry to restricted 
areas was possible.  To a certain extent this is accurate, as commercial guiding companies will 
operate at times when, and in areas where, the Department of Conservation has deemed 
conditions unsuitable or unsafe for the general public.  The fact that guided groups are able to 
get very close to the glacier face is a source of resentment for some visitors – especially 
domestic visitors who feel that they should not have to pay to experience attractions in their 
own country.  In addition, the ‘pay to access’ situation has the potential to undermine the 
credibility of warning messages issued by the Department of Conservation. 
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Visitors from overseas were also disappointed that they could not to get closer to the glacier.  
A female visitor from India commented: 
There should be a safe access for visitors to go and touch the ice and maybe 
access into the cave.  We’ve come from far away only to be disappointed that we 
couldn’t get into the cave. 
Similarly, a woman from Hong Kong said: 
Keeping behind the ropes meant that the experience did not reach my 
expectation.  I really would have liked to have to physically touched the glacier 
and it’s very disappointing not to have done so. 
 
These remarks suggest that some visitor expectations are not fully realised.  Promotional 
materials for the West Coast glaciers often include close-up images of the ice cave, and even 
photographs of people standing within the cave mouth.  The Department of Conservation has 
been advised to remove items in its visitor centre displays which contradict its on-site safety 
messages (Espiner, 1998).  The mixed messages, however, are also a consequence of the 
promotional literature distributed by the tourism industry, an influence that is difficult to 
moderate.  The potential for promotional material to create unrealistic impressions has also 
been noted by other authors.  Pearce (1988, p. 154), for instance, claimed that “the 
truthfulness or honesty of the message in tourism advertising is not always paramount and 
overly positive, unbalanced messages are frequently presented”.  Messages from tourism 
promoters can provide a false sense of security about tourist destinations, with an emphasis on 
scenery, excitement, and fun that is rarely balanced with hazard warnings and safety messages 
(Parks Canada, 1997). 
 
6.5.2 Observed behaviour 
Visitors to the glaciers were observed at the terminal face for short periods of time on each 
suitable day of the study.  These observations were undertaken in a covert fashion, and notes 
made detailing the number of visitors arriving at the track terminus, and the number and 
behaviour of those who elected to proceed beyond the ropes and signs which were designed to 
restrict access.  In order to estimate the effect of introduced pictorial hazard signs, this 
procedure was carried out in both existing and introduced sign conditions. 
 173
 
Figure 6.19 provides a comparative 
illustration of visitor behaviour at the 
terminal faces of Fox and Franz Josef 
Glacier.  For the total sample27, 
approximately 60 per cent of the visitors 
who walked as far as the track terminus 
complied with the existing hazard signs.  
Conversely, four in every ten visitors 
chose to ignore the access restrictions, 
and ventured beyond the rope closure.  
The compliance rate was lowest at Fox 
Glacier (50.8%), where only half of the visitors remained within the recommended safety 
zone.  Interestingly, compliance appeared to rise dramatically when the introduced signs were 
employed28.   Total compliance increased from 59.1 per cent to 78.9 per cent, while at Fox 
Glacier the increase was from 50.8 per cent to 81.8 per cent. 
 
These dramatic results suggest that the introduced hazard 
signs influenced visitor behaviour at the terminal face of both 
glaciers.  It is possible that existing signs were of insufficient 
impact or contained ambiguous meanings, resulting in high 
levels of non-compliance.  The introduced signs may have 
conveyed a clearer message regarding appropriate visitor 
behaviour, providing an explanation for restricted access via 
the pictorial nature of the messages.  
 
The literature reviewed in relation to warning compliance 
suggested that the salience of the message has an important 
effect on attention given to the presence and content of a 
message (Braun & Silver, 1995; Glover & Wogalter, 1997; 
                                                 
27 This sample is completely independent of the sample used in the survey questionnaire. 
28 Logistical factors, such as available space and hazard credibility meant that a maximum of three introduced 
signs was used at any one time.  Introduced pictorial signs used at the terminal face included those warning of 
icefall, rockfall, and river hazard (near the ice cave). 
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Figure 6.19: Observed visitor compliance at glacier terminals 
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Franz Josef Glacier 
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Wogalter & Laughery, 1996).  Furthermore, the novel shape and pictorial features of the signs 
used in the introduced sign condition may have increased the attention of visitors in a way 
that the traditional text-only signs did not (Hathaway & Dingus, 1992; Wogalter & Young, 
1994). 
 
It is not possible, however, to state categorically that improved compliance was directly 
attributable to the effect of the introduced signs.  It is conceivable that the difference was 
caused by the cumulative effect of increased signage, although this is not likely given that no 
relationship between the number of introduced signs and visitor awareness of hazards was 
found.  The sensitive nature of hazard and safety management on public lands at the time the 
fieldwork was undertaken did not allow for extensive manipulation of signs and, therefore, 
remains one of the limiting features concerning the hazard communication aspect of this 
study. 
 
It is also important to emphasise that the results presented in Figure 6.19 represent average 
compliance rates, determined from observation sessions covering multiple days at each site.  
Naturally, there was considerable variation between observations, demonstrating the 
situational effects related to the weather, general access conditions, and the presence of other 
visitors.  For instance, during some observation periods, very few visitors were non-
compliant.  At other times, virtually all visitors who arrived at the track terminus continued 
beyond the rope closure.  The likelihood that the presence and actions of other visitors 
influenced visitor behaviour suggests that situational factors were important.  The notion of 
‘social facilitation’, for instance, may be valuable in understanding visitor behaviour at the 
glaciers. 
 
Social facilitation is described as a type of social modelling behaviour, and occurs when the 
behaviour of one (or more) person(s) facilitates a second person’s doing the same thing 
(Baldwin & Baldwin, 1986).  Popular examples of social facilitation include joining a crowd 
of on-lookers, and mass donations to publicised causes.  People are drawn to things that they 
observe other people doing.  During observations at the glacier attractions, visitors appeared 
more likely to move beyond the restricted access zones if other visitors were clearly already in 
the restricted area.  The effect of social facilitation, in some ways, minimises the role of 
hazard signs in attempting to modify visitor behaviour, and shifts the emphasis to the effects 
of visitors on each other. 
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A similar effect is reported by Harrell (1991), albeit in a very different physical setting.  In a 
study of urban pedestrian behaviour, Harrell found that the presence of large numbers of 
pedestrians on the opposite side of the street served to reduce cautiousness among the people 
he observed.  The author concluded that a “diffusion of responsibility effect may have 
occurred in which the subject delegated the task of checking to other pedestrians” (Harrell, 
1991, p. 371).  When fewer people were available to act as lookouts, the pedestrians appeared 
to assume the responsibility for themselves.  At the glaciers, the presence of visitors within 
restricted areas may have legitimised non-compliant behaviour, and contributed to the 
perception that, because other people were already beyond the rope barrier, the area must be 
safe. 
 
The high rate of non-compliance at the glaciers is a complex phenomenon, unlikely to be the 
result of a single variable such as inadequate warning signs.  The results presented in this 
section suggest that the contributing factors include the importance to visitors of getting close 
to the glaciers, unrealistic expectations of proximity (perhaps linked to tourism promotion 
materials), ambiguous hazard warning messages (and some mixed messages), and the effects 
of other visitors.  These ideas, and the influence of the tourism context on visitor behaviour, 
are discussed in more detail in Section 6.6.5. 
 
6.5.3 Tourists as risk takers 
The observations recorded in this study indicate that many tourists expose themselves to risks 
as a consequence of their behaviour at the glaciers.  At least two scenarios can be imagined.  
First, tourists act in risky ways because they are unfamiliar with local environmental and 
social cues, and therefore unwittingly expose themselves to dangers.  Second, tourists may 
behave in ways that promote risk simply because they feel free from the constraints of their 
ordinary lives.  Chances may be taken as symbols of this freedom to choose, or in a deliberate 
act of defying local rules which are rationalised as not applicable to them.  Dann (1997, p. 
244) supports this latter contention with his observation that tourists are partially motivated 
by a desire to escape temporally from “a world of proscription and prescription”, one 
consequence of which is that much of the tourist’s behaviour is uninhibited. 
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Further, when people are away from their home environments they are exposed (both 
deliberately and non-deliberately) to risks they would not normally face (Carter, 1998; Page 
& Meyer, 1997; Tarlow & Muehsam, 1996; Ryan & Kinder, 1996; Ryan & Robertson, 1997; 
Wickens, 1997).  The visitor observations and interviews in the present study provide some 
evidence to support this claim.  For instance, in the context of her recent visit to Nepal, a 
young American visitor admitted taking “a few more risks than I needed to”.  She explained: 
You have to take risks if you want to trek there.  There were avalanches and 
landslides, but if you wanted to do the trekking, you had to do it in areas which 
might be dangerous.  It’s kind of the same thing here [at the glacier], I think.  If 
you want to ice climb, or go up on the glacier, there will always be risks, but if you 
don’t take them, what do you see? 
 
A ‘now or never’ attitude to touring is also evident in the remarks of an older woman visiting 
from Belgium: 
We wanted to fly in a helicopter, and you could say that was risky.  In our home 
country, if the weather was not so good, we could say ‘let’s do it next month, or 
so’, but when you’re here [at the glacier] you have to take risks sometimes to see 
something you might not see again. 
 
Here the visitor is implying that, even if the conditions are perceived as slightly unsafe, she is 
prepared to take a risk in order to gain the experience desired.  Some of the visitors who fail 
to comply with the access restrictions at the terminal faces of the glaciers are likely to hold 
these views.  For instance a male visitor from the UK, having walked to a point directly below 
the Franz Josef Glacier so that he could lick it with his tongue, commented: 
It was very important for us that we got to touch the glacier face.  I felt a bit 
naughty about ignoring the barrier, but I’d do it again, even though I now know 
more about the danger of ice falling.  I’ll probably never get another chance! 
 
Naturally, not all visitors felt this way about compliance with signs.  Several of those 
interviewed were appalled that others would simply disregard the safety warnings and 
restrictions.  Some explained their decisions to remain within the ‘safe’ zone through 
references to their cultures, such as: “We are from Germany; we will do as the signs say!”.  
Another visitor from the Netherlands said that, although many Dutch people would not obey 
signs, she did so because: “I want to go back to my Holland again – all in one piece!”.  An 
Australian man with his young family also reflected a cautious stance typical of those (few) 
visitors with children: 
We’re pretty conservative actually – we don’t go jet boating or anything like that.  
You know, with kids you want to play it safe.  Like there’d be no way that we’d 
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follow the track up there [pointing to the glacier] and then jump on the glacier up 
top and say ‘hey hey we’re here, cop this’! 
 
An additional explanation for visitor non-compliance at the glacier sites is related to the 
meanings conveyed in the hazard warning messages.  In Chapter 3, potential differences in 
message interpretation are discussed with reference to cultural identity.  A simple text only 
sign warning of the danger of rockfall may be sufficient to deter visitors with one set of 
experiences, yet not explicit enough for others.  The issue of message interpretation is 
illustrated well in the comments of an Australian visitor who was on a self-drive tour of New 
Zealand: 
In New Zealand you’ve done very well in numbering your corners on the roads as 
65km/h and so on.  The problem is, we found that we could do the 65s at 85 
km/h, and the 85s at 100km/h, so when you come to this place [the glacier], what 
does “danger” mean?  So what do your signs mean when they say “danger – 
falling ice”?  We take these signs with a pinch of salt. 
 
Here the visitor is ‘reading between the lines’.  He has made an assessment that, in other parts 
of New Zealand life, regulative statements may be conservative.  He then questions the 
credibility of warning signs at the glacier on the basis of his other New Zealand experiences. 
 
Self-reported and observed behaviour at the glaciers indicates that compliance with warning 
messages is a significant management issue.  The degree of compliance is likely to relate to 
both individual and situational factors, only some of which are within the potential control of 
managers.  The situational effects of being a tourist, for instance, may be especially important 
in the context of risk perception and exposure.  The interrelationships between perception, 
behaviour, communication, and context are discussed in Section 6.6, and represented 
diagrammatically in Figure 6.20. 
 
6.6 Chapter summary and conclusions 
Visitors to the glaciers form perceptions about risk, and respond to hazard messages on the 
basis of their own intuitive assessments of the physical and social conditions, and the 
credibility of the warnings they see.  Their perceptions and behaviour are also a function of 
their previous experiences, knowledge, expectations, and attitudes toward risk, and the 
institutional context in which risk is presented to them, as well as the cultural context from 
which they originate.  The complexity of risk perception and visitor behaviour at the glaciers 
 178
is simplified in Figure 6.20, where the various elements are posed diagrammatically.  The 
central themes of the current chapter are reviewed below. 
 
 
The factors contributing to visitor risk perception and behaviour at the glaciers are multiple.  
For convenience, these factors have been represented as comprising two primary dimensions 
in Figure 6.20.  These dimensions refer, broadly, to the individual and society.  Each 
dimension contributes a variety of features which influence risk perceptions at the glaciers.  
For instance, the visitor’s home country, the tourism promotional material read, the people 
who visit the glacier at the same time, and the ‘holiday’ context of the trip, will all influence 
risk perceptions, which ultimately affect behaviour.  Similarly, individual factors such as 
awareness of physical features, attitude towards risk acceptance, belief in management’s 
hazard messages, and need for excitement, will determine the extent to which any threat to 
safety is perceived.  While perceptions per se may not lead directly to behaviour, the former 
will influence the latter.  Once risk perceptions are formed, the decision to act (or not to act) is 
likely to be especially dependent on the three factors of risk disposition (personality), 
compliance cost or benefit (what the experience is ‘worth’ to the individual), and the micro-
 
 Awareness & emotional influence of 
physical environment 
 Perception of safety 
 Previous experience of natural 
environments 
 Belief in hazard messages 
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 Attitude towards management 
 Macro-social context (cultural & 
institutional) 
 Leisure & tourism context 
 Micro-social context (what others are 
doing) 
 News & tourism promotion media 
 Management actions (eg., warning 
signs) 
Risk Perceptions 
Behaviour 
Risk disposition  Compliance cost / benefit Micro-social context 
Individual       Situational 
 
Figure 6.20: Dimensions of visitor risk perception at the glaciers 
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social context (what other visitors are doing at the site).  For instance, the risk perception of 
one visitor may be low, yet he or she may not transgress the hazard warning because of social 
pressure implicit in the behaviour of other visitors who are complying with the warnings and 
access restrictions.  Another visitor may perceive the risk to be high, yet may choose to ignore 
the warning messages because the associated benefits of touching the glacier (such as 
satisfying curiosity, or social status) outweigh the likelihood of perceived costs (such as 
injury, or retribution). Additional aspects of the model are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
 
The main objectives of this part of the research were to explore visitor awareness of natural 
hazards, and to determine the extent to which visitors felt safe during their experiences, and 
responsible for their own safety.  These assessments were then combined in order to evaluate 
how different visitor groups perceived risk at the two sites.  At the same time, the influences 
of both the existing and an introduced pictorial warning signs were estimated in terms of their 
effect on visitor awareness and behaviour. 
 
6.6.1 Visitor awareness of hazards 
The hazard awareness of some visitors can be described as moderate, and among some 
visitors it is low.  In particular, visitors to Franz Josef, and overseas visitors to both sites, 
appeared to have the poorest hazard awareness.  With the exception of rockfall, less than one 
third of all visitors identified any other hazard at either site.  Furthermore, while over ninety 
per cent reported an awareness of hazard signs, six visitors in every ten were unaware of any 
specific hazard sign, other than rockfall.  Visitor awareness of hazard signs did, however, 
increase significantly when the introduced signs were in position at the glacier sites.  This 
latter finding suggested that either the introduced signs were less ambiguous than the existing 
Department of Conservation signs, and/or that the increased hazard awareness was a function 
of the cumulative effect of the two sign forms. 
 
While no previous research on natural hazard awareness among tourists was found, the poor 
general awareness of hazards and risk among visitors to the glaciers is consistent with the 
small number of studies on the subject of tourist safety (Clift & Page, 1996; Page & Meyer, 
1997; Wilks & Atherton, 1994), where it is argued that often tourists have a limited 
understanding of potential dangers in the places they visit.  
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6.6.2 Visitor perceptions of safety 
Visitors’ perceptions of safety were high at both glacier sites.  Visitors did not perceive either 
glacier as an especially dangerous place to visit, relative to New Zealand in general, or their 
home localities as tourist destinations more specifically.  While it may gratify management, 
from a visitor satisfaction perspective, that the sites were not seen as unsafe, an issue remains 
in that perceptions of safety and security among visitors can lead to over-confidence and 
inappropriate actions. In perceiving the sites as ‘safe’, it is also possible that visitors pay less 
attention to hazard warning messages.  Wogalter and Laughery (1996) found that where 
consumer products were perceived as safe, warning messages were less likely to be read. 
 
6.6.3 Visitor perceptions of risk 
Reflecting both moderately low awareness of hazards and a moderately high feelings of safety 
among visitors, the perceived risk scores of many visitors was identified as low.  This is in 
partial contrast to the findings of some previous studies which imply that risk perceptions in 
environments novel to the individual are likely to be high (Carter, 1998; Westover, 1985).  
Perception of risk is thought to decrease with uneventful exposure (de Turk & Goldhaber, 
1989; Lee, 1981; Margolis, 1996; Oskamp, 1982; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Slovic et al., 1981).  
While it has not been possible to show this effect at the glaciers, it is likely that the 
availability heuristic has influenced risk perceptions, and contributed to the feeling of safety 
among visitors.  Combined with the possible belief that their experiences are well-managed, 
visitors may view themselves as personally immune to hazards, in the same way that 
members of the public generally rate their personal risk of accident as low (Greening & 
Chandler, 1987; Slovic, et al., 1982, 2000c).  When accidents are observed, they appear to 
happen to ‘other’ people (Jungermann & Slovic, 1993; Leiss & Chociolko, 1994).  Low risk 
perception and a belief in immunity have obvious implications for risk communication.  
Those who (incorrectly) perceive themselves to be less at risk than others may be less 
receptive to information campaigns or hazard warning messages. 
 
Among the current findings on risk perceptions, visitor origin is an important factor.  
International visitors had lower risk perceptions, perhaps reflecting a lack of familiarity with 
both the natural environments and the ways in which hazard and risk are communicated in the 
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New Zealand park context.  Differences in perceptions of how risk is managed and 
communicated have important implications for tourism in natural resource areas, and for the 
visitor experience. 
 
6.6.4 Individual responsibility for safety 
Managing visitors at natural attractions requires the level of intervention to be appropriate.  
Part of determining this appropriateness is understanding the extent to which visitors are 
prepared to assume responsibility for their own experiences (including safety).  At Fox and 
Franz Josef glaciers, there appeared to be a relatively high level of individual responsibility 
for safety among visitors.  The exception to this finding were certain overseas visitors, who 
clearly assumed lower levels of responsibility for individual safety compared with New 
Zealand visitors.  These findings, however, need to be interpreted within the context of the 
other results.  For instance, visitor awareness of natural hazards at the sites was low or 
moderate, and perception of safety was high.  These perceptions are likely to influence the 
degree to which risk responsibility is accepted by the individual. 
 
In general, visitors reported that they were prepared to assume responsibility for their own 
safety within certain limits.  Visitors expressed a reliance on managers to inform them of 
potential dangers, and to provide modest facilities to allow their access to the attractions.  For 
other visitors, there was strong reaction against over-management of the areas.  The prevailing 
attitude among such respondents was: “If you ignore the warnings and advice of managers, 
then you have only yourself to blame”.  The acceptability of risk is likely to depend upon the 
extent to which exposure to it is voluntary (Gough, 1998b; Leiss & Chociolko, 1994; Singer 
& Endreny, 1993), which, in turn, is reliant on knowledge of the features that create the risk.  
Many visitors to the glaciers appear unaware of natural hazards, a finding which raises 
questions about the capacity of visitors to accept responsibility for risk.  Several authors have 
observed that the greatest social condemnation occurs in situations where the perceived risk is 
low among those exposed, yet known to be high among those seen as responsible for the 
conditions creating the risk (Davidson, 1996).  Risk acceptance is likely to be greater when 
the product or situation is known to be dangerous (Laughery et al., 1995; Slovic, et al., 1982). 
 
According to Martin (2000), in New Zealand there is an historic assumption that people who 
visit natural areas assume the risks that they find there.  This may be attributed to several 
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things, including a cultural identity as pioneers (Watson, 1993; Devlin, 1995), and for ‘doing 
it yourself - getting on with the job’, and low-key, ‘she’ll be right’ attitudes.  In addition, New 
Zealand’s accident compensation legislation has protected agencies from court action, and 
compensated individuals for accidents and injuries. 
 
6.6.5 Visitor behaviour and communication effectiveness 
The majority of those surveyed reported walking at least as far as the existing closures.  Of 
these, nearly one quarter reported getting close enough to touch the ice.  Proximity to the ice 
was very important to visitors.  In terms of visitor compliance with the hazard signs, 
observations suggested that six in every ten visitors complied with the current 
recommendations.  When the introduced signs were employed, the rate of observed 
compliance increased to eight in every ten visitors, although there were differences between 
sites.  This finding suggests that the current DOC signs are inadequate in expressing the 
message to visitors.  It is important to acknowledge, however, that hazard signs are not the 
sole influence on visitor behaviour.   
 
When a direct attempt to warn individuals is unsuccessful, several explanations are possible.  
One explanation is that the intended recipient of the message remained oblivious to the 
presence of the message.  Some research suggests that increasing the salience of warnings can 
improve awareness of hazards (Glover & Wogalter, 1997; Wogalter et al., 1997; Wogalter & 
Young, 1994).  Another reason for warning message ineffectiveness is related to the visitor 
perception that the risk is low.  This may be influenced by factors such as visitor 
comprehension, and the availability heuristic (Slovic et al., 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982).  Inability to comprehend the meaning of existing hazard messages, however, is likely 
to apply to only a small proportion of all visitors to the glaciers, and affect non-English 
speaking visitors more than others.  Existing Department of Conservation signs are more 
likely to produce this consequence because of their text only nature, and the fact that the signs 
do not differentiate between general information and hazard warning messages. 
 
Those visitors who do understand the warning signs, yet ignore the message contained in 
them, may lack faith in the credibility of the messages, or the agency delivering the message.  
It is evident that some visitors, and New Zealand visitors in particular, believe that the signs 
and barriers are unnecessary and over-cautious in their content.  Considerable media attention 
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on the issue of safety on New Zealand’s conservation estate, and, in particular, the removal of 
Department of Conservation structures deemed to be unsafe, has contributed to a modest 
backlash of public opinion.  New Zealand visitors may now interpret closures and warning 
signs with an ‘insider’s knowledge’ of what the sign really means.  When message credibility 
is low, persuasion is less likely to occur (Manfredo & Bright, 1991; McCool & Braithwaite, 
1992; Moscardo, 1999; Pearce, 1988; Pettigrew, 1996; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  In addition, 
the third person effect (Davison, 1983) may explain why some visitors perceive themselves to 
be immune to the hazard warnings.  Warning messages may be viewed as not applicable to 
some individuals, but considered highly relevant to others who are perceived to lack 
experience or skill in that environment. 
 
A further reason for the lack of response to warnings is that the perceived benefits of non-
compliance outweigh the individual’s assessment of potential negative consequences, such as 
having fun, social image, or conforming with a group (McCarthy et al., 1995; Wogalter & 
Laughery, 1996).  For instance, the cost / benefit evaluation is likely to be affected by visitors’ 
strength of desire to get close to the glacier, particularly apparent among visitors from 
overseas.  Even visitors who appeared to comprehend the messages, and the existence of 
hazards, were often prepared to take the risk.  For overseas visitors, this may also be 
explained by features of the tourist situation, such as their transient nature, the uniqueness of 
the opportunity, and a sense of invincibility.  For New Zealand visitors, a sense of propriety, 
and a degree of psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981), is more likely to be the 
motivating force for non-compliance. 
 
Visitors feel safe at the glacier sites, perceiving few risks.  They also appear to accept a 
moderate degree of personal responsibility for their safety while at such sites.  These visitor 
attitudes and perceptions, to a certain extent, contradict those of some managers and natural 
hazard specialists, an issue that will be explored in the next chapter.  The fact that visitors to 
the glaciers continue to ignore the requests of site managers to act in accordance with their 
safety recommendations, suggests that visitors either cannot comprehend the warning 
messages, do not believe the messages, or are prepared to take a chance in order to realise 
their expectations.  Any one of these scenarios has the potential to result in a serious 
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accident29 involving visitors to the glacier attractions, an event that may have wide-ranging 
moral, legal, and promotional consequences.  The extent to which managers and policy 
makers choose to adopt additional strategies to mitigate this outcome, will depend on their 
knowledge and interpretation of health and safety legislation, their perspectives on risk 
management, and their beliefs about where responsibility for their visitors lies. 
 
The next chapter explores the concept of risk in natural attractions from the perspective of 
agency managers, policy makers, and natural hazard management specialists. 
 
                                                 
29 During the writing of the current work, an Asian visitor to Fox Glacier was severely injured when she was 
crushed by a 500kg block of ice.  According to a newspaper report (Ross, 2000), the tourist had ignored DOC 
warning signs and safety barriers in order to touch the ice and to take a photograph. 
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Chapter 7 Managers’ perceptions of risk  
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of Department of 
Conservation staff with regard to their roles as risk managers, both at the glaciers, and in New 
Zealand more generally.  Part of this aim involves identifying the ways in which DOC 
presents risk and safety messages, and investigating the perceived legal and moral obligations 
that underlie the hazard management strategies used.  Management perceptions are important 
to investigate because they illustrate the relationships between the wider social context and 
managers of a parks agency, and between visitors to and managers of nature-based tourism 
sites.  The links between the individual visitor, the management agency, and the macro-social 
context are an important theme in this study.  Thus, an appreciation of the nature and 
significance of risk in resource-based recreation and tourism settings is not complete without 
this dimension.  
 
The hazard and risk mitigation strategies employed by recreation managers are determined by 
several factors, including their own perceptions of the degree of visitor risk, the extent to 
which they feel accountable for this, and the socio-political expectations that comprise the 
context for the area’s management.  This chapter explores how risk is perceived and presented 
by the agency responsible for visitor management at the glaciers of Westland National Park.  
Following an outline of the risk management setting and details of managers’ perceptions, 
four key factors affecting managers’ perceptions of risk are identified and discussed.  The 
final component of this chapter is devoted to an examination of the risk and hazard 
communication strategies used, and the factors influencing these.  The chapter’s themes are 
drawn from data collected through document analysis and 22 key informant interviews 
undertaken between 1997 and 1999 (see Chapter 5 and Appendix G).  The names and precise 
job descriptions of informants have been changed to protect their true identities. 
 
7.2 The context for risk and hazard management at the glaciers 
The Fox and Franz Josef glaciers are key tourism attractions on the West Coast of New 
Zealand’s South Island (see Chapter 1).  Visitors travel to these sites in order to witness two 
of the most visible and easily accessible glaciers in the southern hemisphere.  The glaciers are 
located within Westland National Park, which, like New Zealand’s other national parks, is 
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SST Short Stop 
Travellers  
Users of natural areas along 
main access routes. Visits of 1 
hour or less. 
Seeking “instant immersion” in 
nature, high scenic or historic 
value.  Low risk expectation. 
DV Day Visitors  Users of sites on the edges of 
the back-country.  Visit 
duration range from 1 hour to 
full day. 
Seeking experience in natural 
setting, with a sense of space 
or freedom.  Low risk 
expectation with safe facilities. 
ON Overnighters Users of campsites or 
accommodation at back-
country drive-in sites. 
Seeking overnight experience 
in natural setting.  Low risk 
expectation. 
BCC Backcountry 
Comfort 
Seekers 
Users of walk-in natural 
settings with some facilities 
provided.  Visits mostly 2 – 5 
days. 
Seeking a comfortable, low 
risk experience within a 
natural setting.   
BCA Backcountry 
Adventurers  
Users of walk-in natural or 
remote settings with basic 
facilities.  Visits mostly 2 – 7 
days. 
Seeking experience that has 
challenge and freedom.  
Accept a degree of risk and 
discomfort. 
RS Remote 
Seekers 
Users of walk-in remote or 
wilderness settings with few or 
no facilities.  Visits mostly 3 – 
7 days. 
Seeking challenge and 
complete freedom.  Users 
accept higher levels of risk 
associated with the area. 
TS Thrill Seekers Users of highly accessible 
sites with natural, often 
spectacular backdrop. Visits 
up to 1 day in duration. 
Seeking controlled risk 
activities as part of exciting 
experience. 
DOC (1996) 
managed and administered by the Department of Conservation.  As per its statutory 
obligations, DOC provides for visitors’ recreational access and enjoyment at the glaciers, 
including the development and maintenance of walking tracks which lead from the road-end 
car parks, to the terminal face of each glacier.   
 
 
To address the management issues arising from increasing visitor numbers, fiscal constraints, 
and diverse visitor requirements, DOC has adopted a nation-wide market segmentation 
approach to visitor management.  This approach recognises that there is a spectrum in visitor 
skill, need, and resources, and that this diverse range can be closely aligned with the existing 
range of natural resource recreation opportunities administered by DOC.  In its Visitor 
Strategy, the Department outlines seven visitor classes, each of which helps determine the 
extent of visitor facilities and services provided in recreation areas (Table 7.1).  On this basis, 
each recreation site is defined and managed in accordance with its predominant user group.  
For instance, sites which are difficult and time-consuming to access, and where a high degree 
of personal reliance is required, are identified and managed as ‘remote seeker’ sites.  
Accordingly, facilities are minimised, and visitors are expected to accept a high degree of 
responsibility for themselves.  At the other end of the user spectrum, the majority of visitors 
to conservation lands are SSTs and DVs, who require a completely different set of facilities 
Table 7.1: Department of Conservation visitor group classification  
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and standard of care.  A graduated standard of facilities is a fundamental premise of DOC’s 
visitor management approach (DOC, 1998). 
 
This brief overview is relevant to the discussion because it is within this administrative 
context that the current consideration of visitor safety management at the glaciers occurs.  The 
majority of visitors to the Franz and Fox Glaciers are SSTs and DVs (DOC, 1997b, 1999b).  
As such, they are identified as inexperienced beginners who are “engaged in an activity at a 
basic skill level or engaged in an activity with a low level of risk.  [Visitors within this group 
are] usually reliant on a leader or the department for safety measures” (DOC, 1996b, p. 54).  
To this extent, DOC has made a considerable commitment to provide facilities and 
information for visitors who cannot be expected to have the knowledge or experience 
necessary to visit the glacier attractions in an environmentally sensitive or safety conscious 
manner.  One senior DOC officer interviewed for this study described SSTs in the following 
way: 
As an SST, you can cruise out there in your stiletto heels and your gold braid 
handbag, and do one of the tracks, and you’re going to be fine.  But you’re not 
going to walk up the Whataroa valley30.  And you accept that because you’re just 
here for the short stop experience where you have a little look at nature but not 
get too involved. 
This description of the short stop traveller clearly implies a perception of limited competency.  
Such perceptions are likely to have an influence on how visitors are managed at nature-based 
sites. 
 
7.3 Management of hazard and risk 
Essentially, the Department is managing two areas which are geologically very 
dynamic and large scale, visited by large numbers of people with little or no 
experience or understanding... of either the natural processes of a glacier valley, 
or of the hazards presented to the unwary (New Zealand Mountain Safety 
Council [NZMSC], 1996, p. 2). 
 
The Department of Conservation has described the glacial valleys of Westland National Park 
as dynamic and sometimes dangerous (DOC, 1997b).  Falling rock and ice, as well as 
unpredictable river levels and flows, make creating suitable walking access a continuous 
challenge.  Yet there remains both a statutory requirement and a commercial imperative to 
                                                 
30 The Whataroa valley track is located 20km north of Franz Josef, and is suitable for intermediate and 
experienced trampers who are prepared to spend several days in the mountains. 
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maintain visitor access.  Management is, quite literally, caught “between the rock and the wet 
place”, a metaphoric remark made by one field level manager to illustrate the physical and 
philosophical conundrum with which the Department is faced at Fox Glacier.  The intent of 
the legislation enables unrestricted access to national parks, yet the Department faces a legal 
and moral obligation to ensure that such access is safe (a dilemma previously introduced in 
Chapter 4).  Managers’ perceptions of the risks to public safety, and their attempts to improve 
this at the glaciers, are described later in this chapter. 
 
From the management’s perspective, the glacier sites contain several natural hazards that 
potentially threaten the safety of visitors to the area.  In order to reduce the likelihood of 
injury or death, those responsible for the management of the glaciers have erected warning 
signs and (in recent years) some rope barriers to prevent people getting too close to the 
terminal ice face, or to areas where rockfall is considered possible.  It is not certain when the 
policy of using signs to warn visitors formally of the dangers inherent in the area began, but 
the problem of visitors ignoring such notices was recorded as early as 1966: 
Apparently some visitors to the Franz Josef glacier do not share the view that it is 
dangerous to stand too near the terminal face.  Despite warning signs, tourists 
have been repeatedly seen standing on sites dangerous enough to cause their 
death if a huge chunk of ice was to fall away (“Danger exists”, 1966). 
 
Similarly, in his report on the stability of a rock slope at Fox Glacier in 1980, Paterson (1980) 
noted a concern for the safety of tourists who visited the area.  In particular, Paterson (1980, 
p. 1) observed that “there is also the possibility that warning signs erected by the National 
Park Board may be ignored, and that people may cross the slope at the foot of the bluff where 
the danger is greatest”. 
 
Reports of unsafe visitor behaviour can be found in both management records and reports in 
various media stories throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  In the 1960s, attempts to 
communicate risks to visitors were clearly being made through the use of signs.  It is also 
evident, however, that the management felt its role was limited in terms of ensuring visitor 
safety.  Following the deaths of a father and son under a rockfall at Fox Glacier in 1980, a 
newspaper reported the comments of the chief ranger of Westland National Park at the time:  
He [the chief ranger] said there was always a danger of rock falls in this type of 
country, but Friday’s fall of about 800 tonnes happened beneath a solid rock face 
where no problems had been expected.  “Anybody going into the mountains must 
accept the fact that there is some danger from rock falls” (“Death spot avoided”, 
1980). 
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These excerpts serve to demonstrate that the glacier valleys can be unpredictable and 
dangerous, and that management’s concern about visitor behaviour is not just a recent one.  
What does appear to have changed is management’s perception of the extent and seriousness 
of the problem, the degree of responsibility taken, and the strategies used to address it.  It is 
assumed here that the natural hazards at the glaciers have remained relatively constant over 
the last 40 – 50 years at least.  Therefore, hazard and risk management can be seen to have as 
much to do with political and social variables as they do with any more quantifiable criteria.  
In this chapter it is contended that hazard and risk management approaches are strongly 
influenced by social and political factors, the identification of which follow the description of 
hazard management at the glaciers. 
 
7.3.1 Identification and management of hazards at the glaciers 
The policies and strategies for the management of visitor safety in Westland National Park in 
general are set out in its management plan.  For instance, the plan states the intention of 
managers to: 
Inform park visitors and concessionaires of potential natural hazards in the park 
[and] to create an awareness and understanding of natural hazards while 
recognising that visitors will be primarily responsible for their own safety (DOC, 
1999b, p. 74). 
 
More specifically, the process governing the management of natural hazards at the glaciers is 
documented in the Hazard Identification and Management Plan originally written in 1997, 
and updated annually.  These plans outline the operating procedures through which safety “for 
all staff and visitors in this often unstable and highly changeable environment” can be sought 
(DOC, 1997a, p. 3).  A ‘Glacier Access Planner’, in conjunction with a ‘Visitor Facilities 
Programme Manager’, has the responsibility for the creation and maintenance of the plan.  
Ultimate responsibility for the hazard management plan, however, is that of the Area 
Manager. 
 
The plans require a strict set of operating procedures to be followed.  Hazards in each valley 
are identified and strategies developed for their mitigation or control.  An excerpt from the 
plan itself best illustrates the level of detail and technical specification: 
A hazard assessment of the glacier access road and track will be completed and 
radioed to the Franz Base by 0900 each day.  This information is to be recorded 
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Hazard Risk 
Rocks falling from 
moraine walls 
Rock fall injuring people.  
Water crossings Sudden rise in water levels can restrict 
return & debris flow; or water, may sweep 
people off their feet. 
Rock or ice falling 
from terminal face 
Ice collapse or perch rocks fall onto people 
below. 
Glacial lake outburst 
caused by collapse 
in ice dam 
Dam burst causes sudden rise in water 
level, restricting visitor return or washing 
them downstream. 
River outflow at 
terminal face 
River surge caused by cave roof collapse 
can change course of river, restricting 
return of visitors or washing them 
downstream. 
River banks 
unstable 
Collapse of river bank may cause visitor to 
fall into river causing injury or swept 
downstream.  
Changing river 
channels 
River channels can change rapidly and 
without warning, trapping or sweeping 
visitors away. 
(DOC, 1997a) 
and distributed on the Glacier Access Update Form....  When rockfall activity is 
present, or rainfall begins to exceed a rate of 100mm in 24 hours, or 20mm/hr for 
longer than 30 mins (defined as significant rainfall), further monitoring may be 
required.  A breach of rain thresholds will be relayed to Reception during the daily 
hazard assessment.  Reception will advise the Glacier Access Planner who will 
implement additional monitoring as required to ensure that visitor safety 
standards are maintained (DOC, 1997a, p. 8). 
 
The plan documents identified risks to the safety of visitors at each of the glacier attractions.  
Each hazard is specified in terms of its location, risk to visitors, frequency, and mitigation.  
Seven primary hazards have been identified at Franz Josef, which serve to illustrate the nature 
of the environment, and management’s perception of it (Table 7.2).  Many of the hazards 
identified are more likely to occur during or after periods of heavy rain, rapid glacial advance, 
frosts, warm temperatures, or flooding. 
 
In order to reduce the risk to visitors at the 
glaciers, a number of strategies are 
employed.  Current management practices 
include the daily hazard assessments of the 
track and glacier conditions, signs warning 
of specific hazards, instalment of ropes and 
barriers restricting access to areas thought to 
be hazardous, and the option of closing the 
walking track facility.  These strategies, 
documented in the hazard management plan 
for each area, demonstrate a commitment to 
reducing risk not previously observed in New Zealand.  This new commitment to risk 
management will be discussed in Section 7.5.3. 
 
7.4 Perceptions of hazard and risk among managers and experts 
DOC has an obligation to provide for the safe access and enjoyment of the public on the 
conservation estate.  In the case of the glaciers, ‘the public’ includes visitors from overseas, 
who may have little experience of similar natural environments.  Defending the decision to 
Table 7.2: Hazards and risks identified at Franz Josef Glacier 
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close the access to Fox Glacier temporarily, by erecting a barrier across the walking track, 
Keith, a field level manager31, described the situation in the following way:  
In this environment, I’m comfortable with closing the track, because it’s a front- 
country environment, it’s a high interest, high use site – but it’s also extremely 
dangerous, to the point where, at times, I’m extremely uncomfortable about being 
up there, or having any of our staff working up there.  So it’s a bloody dangerous 
environment.  We could say: “we suggest you don’t go there”, which we can 
easily do in the back-country, and experienced people will take that advice or 
ignore it based on their level of experience.  But here [at the glaciers], we’re not 
dealing with experienced people, and that’s the difference we’ve got.  So up here 
I’m quite happy to close it off, and we will close it. 
 
Further illustration of managers’ perception of the dangers at the glaciers is apparent in the 
comments of Neil, a recreation planner at Franz Josef: 
One of our guys was up the glacier a couple of weeks ago, when [the access 
track] was still closed, and he said there were people up there, right under the 
cave!  A little bit of ice fell down, so they moved away a little bit, and the next 
minute there was a massive [ice] collapse.  And if they hadn’t moved away, when 
that first wee bit of ice fell, they would have been killed.  Just like that.  So, I 
mean, [some people have] just no idea! 
 
The extent of management’s belief in visitor ignorance, and the problem this presents for 
DOC, is evident in the comments of Jock, one of the Department’s senior representatives in 
the Westland area: 
If we were completely honest, we would say that the glacier valley is a hazardous 
environment, and we would put a fence around it and keep people out.  But we 
are charged, under the National Parks Act, with preserving the environment, and 
encouraging public use where appropriate.  And then we obviously have a 
mandate for public safety.  So the management dilemma is how do you control 
for use of a site and still have it safe? 
The glacier valleys are interesting in that they are a hazardous environment, but 
they’re also hugely popular.  You’ve got a huge number of people that are 
uncontrolled – that is, they are not with a commercial operator, they are just free 
agents – entering a hazardous environment which they don’t see as being 
hazardous.  I’ve also worked at Taranaki, where you can get out of your car at 
5000 feet and walk 200m off the edge of the car park and be in a hostile alpine 
environment.  But it’s perceived as being hostile, and people understand fairly 
quickly - as their feet start getting cold and their noses start freezing - that this is 
not a city any more.  At Franz Josef, you can walk up into the hazardous 
environment in your high heels if you’re determined enough.  There’s just no 
perception of a hazard there. 
 
                                                 
31 In this context ‘field level’ refers to managers who, as part of their normal employment, are stationed at the 
DOC office at either Fox Glacier or Franz Josef Glacier, rather than those managers who work at the Head 
Office in Wellington, or at the Regional Offices in Hamilton, Wellington, and Christchurch. 
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The combination of the dynamic environment and inappropriate visitor behaviour appears to 
add to management’s perception of risk to visitor safety.  Expressing some surprise at the 
small number of recorded fatalities in the glacier valleys, Keith commented:  
I think it’s bloody good luck.  I really honestly think so, it’s good luck.  With what I 
see happens up in these valleys, hell!  We had a rockfall during that last decent 
flood a couple of weeks ago, with six days of rain.  The ‘60s’ rockfall, was 
dropping rocks nearly the size of this room.  And look how much the [river] fan 
has built up, it’s quite incredible – three or four metres in about six months!  So 
it’s amazing, you know; it just shows you how volatile the thing is. 
 
Similarly, Mike, a more senior manager, commented on visitors entering the glacier ice cave 
at Franz Josef, access to which DOC attempts to restrict: 
I’m buggered if I know how we’ve avoided injuries in there.  I mean, I don’t like 
going in there, and I’m pretty good at assessing risk.  I look up there and think: 
“where’s that crack going, and where’s that shaft going” and I don’t like it.  
There’s no way I’d go into it at the moment – it’s so volatile.  But you see photos 
of parties of people, whole coach parties, posing in there.  So, it’s good luck and 
good management.  I’d like to think now that we’ve swung away from the luck 
and more to the management. 
 
The perceived risk among field level managers appears to be high.  Despite very few reported 
accidents, and only two accident-related fatalities in the previous twenty years, these 
managers hold strong views about the extent of the dangers in easily accessible parts of the 
Fox and Franz Josef valleys.  There is a range of possible reasons for this which include 
managers’ previous experiences in the outdoors, access to information regarding natural 
hazard events, a sense of obligation to visitors, and the influence of events such as the 
accident at Cave Creek in 1995 (see Section 7.5).  Such beliefs also support the need for a 
detailed hazard management system, which itself may help to deflect any challenge that 
management is complacent, should an accident occur.  Managers claim that the absence of 
hazard management would see injuries dramatically increase, despite history suggesting 
otherwise.  Having such a system is crucial in terms of demonstrating to themselves, and to 
the community more generally, that something is being done to impose a degree of control on 
the situation.  Ironically, such a comprehensive system may work against DOC’s ultimate aim 
of increased individual responsibility.  Through a highly paternalistic approach, people may 
come to assume that the risks have been removed from the environment, yet this is not the 
case.  Visitors may also assume (incorrectly) that the absence of signs and barriers at other 
sites signifies the absence of hazards or risks to their safety. 
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Tour guides and operators also perceived the risks in the glacier valleys to be high under 
certain conditions.  The personal experiences of Stan, the director of a glacier guiding 
business, illustrated his surprise at the low number of fatalities at both Fox and Franz Josef: 
I have actually seen massive rockslides and ice and mud and river surges in a 
path which missed us by minutes, really.  Either we were going there, or we’d just 
been there.  So, I think that’s just absolute timing, and it’s not because it was 
planned, it was just because it was luck.  So, it could happen any time, I’m well 
aware of that.  Even from the rope barrier, if a huge piece of ice blocked the cave, 
it would create a hell of a surge - you’d be in big trouble.  Which way do you run?  
You just don’t know which way it’s gonna go.  So that really is luck.  I’ve been on 
the glacier with a group of people, looking downstream, and at one point saw no 
river at all, it’d completely dried up because there was a massive icefall inside 
[the cave], and then just moments later, a huge surge of water goes tearing down 
the valley.  It would have been a metre and a half high I suppose - cruising down 
the valley.  And it leaves ice everywhere.  And it can go any way.  It can go into 
the overflow channels and head down the true left of the valley, blocking people’s 
paths.  Or it could go in their paths.  I think it’s just luck that it hasn’t happened. 
 
The existence of natural hazards at the glaciers is supported by New Zealand experts in the 
field.  Mick, a specialist in alpine hydrology and geomorphology, described the potential 
hazard issues at the glacier sites: 
I’m always horrified when I see people going up this incredibly steep ice face at 
Franz, and the walking access - some of the routes taken to get there, and the 
potential things that will drop.  At one stage, when the road was out, they [DOC] 
put a walking track across an horrendous major rockfall site, where most of the 
time you couldn’t have seen the tops where rocks were falling from because of 
the cloud.  The other major problem is people getting caught out in the river bed 
going up to the Franz Josef, when one of the glacier bursts occurs – a blockage 
of the river and sudden surge out.  You can get huge floods that will cover the 
entire riverbed.  Another real hazard in both Franz and Fox is to the people 
walking up the valleys when the alpine fault moves.  They might be lucky, but the 
likely scenario is no one comes out.  And, depending on the time of year, that 
could be two or three thousand people. 
 
Like the DOC managers, Mick is surprised at the low frequency of accidents and deaths at the 
glaciers: 
The thing that’s impressed me about the suite of hazards at the glaciers is that, 
for all the horrendous hazards there are, when you look at the number of tourists 
that have been killed, the few that have been killed have been on hazards that 
none of us would have recognised.  We don’t know about the near misses. I 
presume there are reasonable numbers of near misses. 
 
Todd, another glacier expert, was also concerned about the potential risks to people visiting 
the glacier valleys.  He described the danger associated with the Waiho River (adjacent to the 
Franz Josef Glacier access track – see Figure 5.2) during heavy rainfall: 
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In the December ‘95 flood, something like a quarter to a half a million cubic 
metres of sediment was deposited overnight, and that deposit reached almost as 
far as where the kiosk used to be [a distance of approximately 1.5km from the ice 
cave at the terminal face of the glacier].  There’s a great big lozenge-shaped 
deposit of sediment, up to about five metres thick, plopped down in the middle of 
the valley. And that must have taken place very quickly, probably in something 
like half an hour. And you can imagine, if you’ve got people anywhere in the 
valley when that starts to happen there’re going to be problems.  It’s going to be 
pouring down with rain, the visibility is going to be very poor, there’s going to be a 
lot of noise around.  It’s likely that they won’t know it’s happening until they find 
that there is water at their feet starting to rise very quickly, and if they’re lucky, 
they can scramble up the moraine wall, or up onto Champness Rock or 
something, but heck, I wouldn’t like to be up there when that happens.  
 
Further, Todd emphasised the character of New Zealand’s natural attractions relative to those 
of other countries, suggesting that overseas visitors are completely unprepared for the 
conditions: 
I think a lot of visitors have probably been to the mountains in Germany and 
France and Britain and they’ve got their own appreciation of the way mountains 
behave, which is a lot less dangerous than the way our mountains behave. We’ve 
got one of the most active tectonic plate boundaries in the world down there, in 
the roaring forties, in one of the highest rainfall areas in the world. It is one of the 
worst situations in the world I think, and it’s compounded by the fact that New 
Zealand’s a relatively advanced country, with the facilities and technology to 
actually get paying visitors to these places. So you’ve got a lot of people able to 
be harmed in what is potentially a very active weather and geomorphic situation. 
So it could be a fairly subtle trap. 
 
While there appears to be agreement among managers and natural hazard experts on the 
existence of hazards and risk at the glaciers, there are contrasting explanations given for why 
accidents are relatively infrequent.  The geomorphologists assume that the low accident rate 
implies either luck or that the hazards are less significant than estimated.  Mick’s comments 
illustrated this view: 
Given the volume of people that go up there, and the very minimal number of 
fatalities, it would appear that we’re making up this problem.  It must look worse 
than it really is, or we wouldn’t have accidents waiting to happen, we’d see them 
happening. 
 
Mick is also highly sceptical about managers’ influence over the safety record: 
Perhaps the present management is acceptable, but clearly there isn’t just one 
form of management that would be relatively successful.  You could change it 
and things would be the same, you wouldn’t notice the difference.  The present 
management is successful and that can only be because the hazards are not as 
bad as what we think they are.  It can’t have anything to do with management; it 
must be totally independent of it.  I think what’s probably happened over the last 
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five years or so, is that they’ve made the safe areas safer, but areas where there 
is real risk to visitor safety have remained much the same. 
 
In contrast, some managers imply that the high safety record is related to the actions of the 
managing agency.  For instance, Keith, a manager at the glaciers, made the following 
comment in response to the suggestion of a reduced management presence: 
In my opinion it would be a nightmare.  We’d have people bowled over left right 
and centre on a regular basis.  I think the level of hazard management that we’re 
providing is essential for the safety of visitors, because they just don’t know. 
 
Similarly, Jock, a senior manager at Franz Josef, indicated a solid belief in the approach to 
natural hazard management in the area: 
I probably wouldn’t sleep as well as I do if we didn’t have a really active 
management plan in place for dealing with those hazards and dealing with that 
risk.  If we just had no controls in there whatsoever – no ropes, no fences, no 
checks, no balances, and it was a free for all, then, yes, you’d be worried – you’d 
be thinking that any day now, someone’s going to get squashed by a big lump of 
ice, or caught up there in a rain storm. 
 
Not all DOC managers view the glaciers as especially hazardous places.  Peter, a senior 
manager based outside the Westland region, viewed the glaciers as similar to several other 
high use attractions in New Zealand, such as the Huka Falls, Dolomite Point (Punakaiki), and 
the thermal areas of Rotorua.  He believed the management approach to visitor safety at these 
places should be consistent:  
The visitor groups are very similar, the consequences are potentially similar and 
the actual occurrences are probably about the same.  So I think we’ve got to 
approach it in a consistent way. 
 
This informant’s perception of the problem at the glaciers is conceived in the ways in which it 
affects him.  That is, from a policy implementation point of view, Peter is looking for 
management consistency across a number of sites.  Visitor accidents at the glaciers are 
unlikely to lead to scrutiny of his actions, whereas the action (or inaction) of staff based at 
Fox and Franz Josef may attract criticism.  In addition, the respondent in this case is 
concerned with risk management in a much wider context than those in field management 
roles at the glaciers.  Peter is quite frank about how DOC considers its visitor risk: 
Over Easter three years ago, 14 people were killed [at Cave Creek].  But two 
years after that we only killed 3, and we felt really good about it.  We’re only 
going to kill that many at Mt Cook over the summer, and we’re not going to kill 
even that many at the glaciers. 
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Loss of some lives is to be expected given the nature of the places people are intent on 
visiting.  Peter is stating that DOC accepts this, but does not accept responsibility for it.  
Rather, he is keen to work on strategies that increase public awareness of shared responsibility 
in the outdoors.  Peter’s attitude here is similar to the way in which businesses or investors 
view risk.  There is an acknowledgement that losses will occur, but the general principle is to 
ride out the bad times and hopefully effect an overall gain. 
 
7.4.1 Interim summary 
This section has outlined the perceptions of experts and managers with regard to natural 
hazards at the glaciers.  The belief that the glacier region is a highly volatile area, in which 
luck has played an important role in visitor management, is very consistent among 
respondents.  Most informants believe that it is a matter of when, not if an accident will 
happen.  Two main themes are evident: i) both managers and experts perceive the glacier 
attractions to be dynamic and dangerous places; and ii) both managers and experts express a 
degree of surprise that more visitors have not been injured or killed in these environments.  
There is less agreement about the reasons for this outcome.  The next section identifies four 
key factors that have influenced managers’ perceptions of risk. 
 
7.5 Factors influencing managers’ perceptions of risk 
Managers’ perception of hazards and risk at the glaciers is high, especially among those with 
employment responsibilities at the sites themselves.  The risk perceived is not limited to the 
physical risk to which visitors may be exposed, but includes the social, financial, and political 
risk to the management agency and management staff.  In order to gain a more comprehensive 
view of risk, and to appreciate its significance to managers, the discussion now turns to an 
examination of factors that affect managers’ risk perceptions.  The analysis of the data 
generated through interviews with key informants identified four primary factors that 
contribute to the current level of risk perception among managers: perceived legal and moral 
obligation, the accident at Cave Creek, a transformed organisational culture, and perceived 
changes in social expectations.  Although the themes are presented individually, this is not 
intended to imply that they are unconnected.   
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7.5.1 Perceived legal and moral obligations 
A common theme among the respondents was reference to legal and moral obligations 
associated with managing visitors at the glaciers.  This was true for managers and staff at the 
field level, as well as management based in other areas.  Clearly, DOC has a legislative 
mandate under the Conservation Act (1987) to provide recreation opportunities to the public 
(see Chapter 4).  In addition to this, the Department, in providing facilities and recreation 
opportunities to the public, must adhere to several other acts of parliament which, in effect, 
provide for the health and safety of visitors to the conservation estate. 
 
7.5.1.1 Perceived legal obligations 
As discussed in Chapter 4, DOC is subject to numerous legal requirements in the course of its 
work.  Two acts in particular (the Occupiers Liability Act [OLA], (1962) and the Health and 
Safety in Employment Act (1992)), have generated concern among DOC managers, apparent 
in the discussions with informants in this study. 
 
One of the issues among DOC staff and managers working at the glaciers was ambiguity 
surrounding the specific nature of their legal liability.  Laws can be vague to the layperson 
and are open to interpretation, and with few precedents to guide them, some managers 
appeared uncertain about what their legal obligations were concerning visitor safety.  At 
times, the result of this has been a cautious approach to hazard management which has drawn 
criticism from some members of the public and, in particular, from outdoor recreation groups 
who view DOC’s safety practices as over zealous and as an imposition on free access and 
quality visitor experiences (see Section 7.5.4.4). 
 
Martin (2000, p. 3) has argued that the law as it currently stands “leaves conservation 
managers uncertain about the scope of their potential liability for natural hazards”.  According 
to Martin, this ambiguity has led to uncertainty and inefficiency in decision making.  Martin 
contended that the uncertainty can be principally traced to an historical emphasis on 
preventing harm to others, ambiguities in the HSE Act, and frequent repositioning of judicial 
reasonableness.  Brown (1999) and Batt (1996), both reporting on risk management issues in 
Australian park settings, also observed a mounting paranoia among land managers concerning 
what is reasonable in the protection of visitors. 
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The OLA and HSE Act appear to have been instrumental in the adoption of new practices 
within DOC and other agencies associated with outdoor recreation in New Zealand.  In 
particular, the HSE Act had an immediate effect on the perceived responsibilities of those in 
the outdoor recreation and adventure tourism industry, including school recreation 
programmes.  According to Gabites, executive director of New Zealand’s Adventure Tourism 
Council, some tourism operators are “running scared” of the HSE Act, with misinformation 
and fear of the unknown the most common problems (Major, 1995, p. 21).  Similarly, one 
respondent, a director of a recreation organisation in New Zealand, suggested that the new 
legislation had created some nervousness and encouraged some businesses to re-evaluate their 
services.  He made these observations: 
In the late ‘80s and early ‘90s there was a massive growth in adventure tourism 
where you had people demanding wild and exciting times - down the river or 
whatever.  Safety was not talked about too much.  Then the HSE came along and 
some people in the business quite rightly got very nervous.  Some people got 
much more nervous than they needed to, while others didn’t get as nervous as 
they should have done. 
 
Davidson (1996) has been sceptical about the positive effects of the new legislation on the 
safety of visitors to outdoor recreation settings.  Reflecting on his own experiences as an 
outdoor educator and instructor, and on the impact of HSE Act requirements, Davidson (1996, 
pp. 200-201) argued that the “current risk management practices are a poor imitation of the 
complex judgement processes occurring in the brain of an experienced and seasoned 
instructor”. 
 
DOC appears to place considerable emphasis on both the HSE Act and the OLA in relation to 
the safety of its visitors (DOC, 1996b, 1997b).  Interpreting the OLA in 1995, a Department 
solicitor outlined its significance to DOC: 
An occupier has a common duty of care to ensure… that a visitor will be 
reasonably safe in using the land for the purposes for which s/he has been 
invited or is permitted by the occupier to be there.  The fact that the permission is 
a statutory one does not alter the situation….  Even if a visitor has been warned 
of a danger by the occupier, the warning will not absolve the occupier from 
liability unless in all circumstances it was enough to enable the visitor to be 
reasonably safe (NZMSC, 1996, p. 4). 
 
Further evidence of the Department’s concern over legal liability is evident in hazard 
management documents prepared for the glacier region: 
The HSE Act imposes penalties for failure to comply with that Act, while the 
Occupiers Liability Act is more powerful, allowing people who suffer injury or 
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damages on a landowners [sic] property, land or premises to sue and recover 
damages where a duty of care which is owed to visitors is not met (DOC, 1997b, 
p. 9). 
This statement is only partially accurate, given that the right to sue for personal damages was 
removed in the accident compensation legislation of 1972.  Furthermore, it assumes that DOC 
is legally the occupier of the lands it administers.  Statements made in documents like this one 
are important to acknowledge as they help shape management perceptions and actions on the 
issue of visitor safety. 
 
The Department’s concern with the OLA rests on the assumption that DOC, or its Minister, 
can be considered the occupier of the land.  However, legal opinion provided to the NZMSC 
in 1996, casts some doubt over the extent to which DOC can be considered as ‘occupier’ of 
the lands it administers.  This is a fundamental issue that will influence the Department’s legal 
liability in the event that injury to visitors occurs.  According to the NZMSC report: 
DOC would be unlikely to be held to be an occupier in terms of the Act.…  In 
most areas DOC is unable to prevent members of the public entering National 
Parks etc, the so-called DOC estate, and the Courts will be very reluctant to 
impose any liability where there is no legal ability to control (NZMSC, 1996, p. 5). 
 
This view is, however, contrary to Martin (2000) who indicated that DOC can be considered 
‘the occupier’ of the land it administers, although this may not extend to responsibility for 
natural hazards.  Similarly, Fullagar (1996, p. 98), discussing outdoor recreation and law, 
claimed that the occupier “attracts its duty of care by providing facilities which encourage the 
public to use the premises”.  Under the Conservation Act (1987), DOC is mandated to 
perform this latter function. 
 
Given the contradictory interpretations of the two statutes that impose a duty of care on the 
Department, it is not altogether surprising that some recreation managers are uncertain about 
the level of legal liability.  Martin (2000, p. 10) argued that the current lack of legislative 
guidance results in over cautious approaches to hazard management and, ultimately, will lead 
to “increasing intervention for the purposes of securing public safety”. 
 
The degree to which the HSE Act actually has a bearing on DOC’s obligation to visitors is 
also open to interpretation.  Sam, a senior advisor from the Occupational Safety and Health 
Unit outlined some of the difficulties:  
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One of the issues we’ve had [with the HSE Act] is that because of people’s 
uncertainty about what the legislation means, sometimes they overreact and 
become over cautious in relation to their perceived legal liability.  One instance of 
this is farmers refusing to allow members of the public access onto their farms 
because, for some reason, they perceived the risk of being prosecuted by OSH 
as far greater than the risk that anyone will actually be injured. 
 
It is also instructive to consider the reasons for OSH prosecutions, which suggest that DOC 
may be overreacting to the HSE legislation, or using it to justify an emphasis on visitor safety 
management.  According to Wren (1997), the Occupational Health and Safety Unit is likely to 
prosecute for two main reasons: i) as a final measure to gain compliance from an employer, or 
to send a message to others in similar situations; and ii) where an employer has been negligent 
with regard to safety, OSH may elect to prosecute in order to punish the employer.  These 
factors, coupled with the OSH admission that outdoor recreation workplaces are a low priority 
for them (R. Moir, personal communication, July 7, 1999), suggests that concerns among 
some DOC staff about the HSE Act may be unwarranted. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the relevance of the HSE Act to visitor management on the 
conservation estate is also critically dependent on whether or not the site can be defined as a 
‘place of work’.  Martin (2000, p. 26) argued that, “since the parts of the public conservation 
land where natural hazards are likely to arise are unlikely to be a ‘place of work’, the HSE Act 
has limited bearing on natural hazard management in such areas”.  Martin (2000, p. 26) 
acknowledged, however, that there are “very real political and public relations reasons for 
taking all practicable steps to address natural hazards”.  This is further recognition of the 
perceived need within DOC to appear proactive in risk management. 
 
7.5.1.2 Perceived moral obligations  
At another level, some DOC staff suggested that, ideally, the emphasis should be the moral 
obligation to visitors rather than simply meeting legal requirements.  Tim, a senior manager 
based in Wellington, acknowledged DOC’s various obligations: 
I think, having invited people onto the conservation estate, we have both a legal 
and a moral obligation to provide them with information.  Perhaps not necessarily 
on site – perhaps before they get to the site – but, having said that, every visitor 
also has a personal responsibility to ensure that they inform themselves about 
where they’re going, and that they take the necessary precautions prior to getting 
there.  Now, in high volume visitor sites where you can actually drive to the 
location [such as the glaciers], there is probably more of an obligation on the 
Department to inform people at the point of arrival, rather than prior to arrival.  
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But at low volume visitor sites, I think it’s on the visitor themselves to make sure 
they are well informed or experienced and equipped to cope with the situation. 
Here Tim is differentiating the Department’s obligations to visitors on the basis of the 
dominant visitor group.  This is the approach clearly evident in the Department’s strategic 
plan (DOC, 1996b), yet, in part, its effectiveness is reliant on visitors being aware of their 
responsibilities as SSTs or DVs. 
 
Tim is also keen to emphasise that the Department is more concerned about visitor safety than 
it is about ensuring its own safety from liability: 
We are driven by the features of the HSE and OLA, but I think, more than that 
though, we’re driven morally to ensure that we provide either a safe environment, 
or enough information that would enable people to visit safely.  So, you’d go 
through the Occupiers Liability Act and you’d tick off all those things that we must 
do, and you’d say: “Having done all those things, does that ensure that the visitor 
is safe?”.  If it doesn’t ensure that the visitor is safe – and we’ve decided they 
must be safe to go there, then we would look to do what is required to ensure that 
they are.  It’s exactly the same with the Health and Safety in Employment Act.  I 
think the Department would want to say: “We want to ensure visitors are safe. 
These are the actions that we’ve taken. We thought those were reasonable at the 
time; we will continue to improve wherever we can, and when we can afford it”. 
 
Other management respondents articulated a strong moral obligation to visitors attracted to 
their areas.  Keith, for instance, a manager at the glaciers commented: 
I suppose it sounds a bit idealistic, but morally I believe we have an obligation.  
Say, for example, you take away the Occupiers Liability Act, so that the health 
and safety legislation wasn’t there.  I still think we have a moral obligation to 
meet.  That’s me, personally, that’s regardless of the legislation.  That’s our role.  
If our role is to provide opportunities for visitors to experience conservation land, 
then we should be able to let them experience it safely.  And you can take away 
all that legislation and I believe that we’ve still got that obligation. 
 
These comments clearly reflect a belief that the safety of people visiting the glaciers overrides 
any legislative requirement affecting DOC.  Ensuring that the safety of visitors to many 
natural areas is absolute is almost impossible, and certainly not practicable.  It is accepted that 
a key element of management’s contribution to visitor safety is to warn people of the specific 
dangers and the likelihood of their occurrence.  That warnings are an important part of 
management’s limited opportunities to affect visitor safety and awareness is acknowledged by 
DOC staff at the glaciers, and policy makers at regional and national level.  There is, 
however, less agreement on the level, mode, and effectiveness of warnings currently issued by 
DOC at Fox and Franz Josef glacier, a point that is expanded in Section 7.6. 
 
 202
7.5.1.3 Summary 
The legal circumstances that give rise to DOC’s responsibilities are ambiguous and may be 
misunderstood by its managers in field situations such as the glaciers.  Obligations are evident 
under the HSE Act, although its application emphasises the safety of work and workers rather 
than visitors to outdoor recreation settings.  The OLA also imposes a duty of care on the 
occupier to protect the safety of visitors, but lacks real legal power, especially since the 
introduction the Accident Compensation Act (1972), which removed the right to seek 
personal damages through the courts.  It is also worth noting that the OLA and HSE Act were 
never designed with recreation and tourism in mind (R. Moir, personal communication, July 
7, 1999), yet they have played a part in raising the health and safety consciousness of DOC, 
and others working in outdoor recreation and tourism provision roles (Davidson, 1996). 
 
The discussion in this section has reflected on the primary legislative context for the 
management of visitor safety at the glaciers, and explained part of the rationale for 
management interest in visitor safety.  Two reasons are most apparent: i) there is a perceived 
moral responsibility to protect people; and ii) there is a legal obligation to ensure safety.  
While the former rationale is evident, it is the latter that appears to preoccupy the attention of 
managers, a point that is further illustrated in the sections following.  This is partially 
attributable to the lack of clarity in the legislation but, more importantly, managers’ 
perceptions reflect the social value currently placed on safety, applicable even in settings 
where absolute safety is impossible to ensure.  This contention is the subject of further 
discussion in Section 7.5.5. 
 
7.5.2 The influence of Cave Creek 
One incident in New Zealand’s recent history stands out for its influence on attitudes to 
visitor safety and risk management.  The deaths of 14 people, and the resulting public furore, 
redirected the future of visitor management in tourism and recreation, and altered attitudes to 
health and safety throughout the country.  Now an established part of the New Zealand 
vernacular, ‘Cave Creek’ is often cited when justifying the imposition of safety regulations in 
situations as diverse as school playgrounds, back-country recreation facilities, and public 
staircases in civic centres.  This section will review the events that occurred at Cave Creek, 
and discuss its relevance and symbolism with regard to the current examination of 
management perceptions and practices at the glaciers of Westland National Park. 
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7.5.2.1 Tragedy at Cave Creek 
Cave Creek is a Department of Conservation recreation site, situated a short distance north 
east of Punakaiki within Paparoa National Park on the South Island’s West Coast.  The area 
has been described as an impressive limestone landscape of sculpted rock and underground 
cave streams (Potton, 1998).  In part, it was these scenic qualities that contributed to DOC’s 
decision to develop and upgrade recreation facilities in the area, including the construction of 
a viewing platform above a spectacular gorge in 1993/94. 
 
On the morning of Friday April 28, 1995, twenty outdoor recreation students, on a field 
excursion from their polytechnic in nearby Greymouth, were on an interpretative walk to 
Cave Creek.  Also on the walk were the local Department of Conservation field centre 
manager, and a polytechnic tutor.  At approximately 11.30am, eighteen people – seventeen 
students and the manager – were standing on a platform that overlooked a gorge.  The 
recently built platform collapsed, falling thirty metres, killing fourteen (including the DOC 
manager), and injuring four others (Dewar, 1997).  The weather was reported as calm and 
sunny.  There was no hint of danger, and no suggestion that the students contributed to their 
own fate through foolish or careless behaviour (Hunt, 1996). 
 
Recognising the social and political importance of the Cave Creek event, the government’s 
response to the accident was prompt.  Ten days after the tragedy, a Commission of Inquiry 
was established to investigate the causes for the platform’s collapse.  The Commission 
determined that the primary cause was the failure of the structure to support the weight of the 
people on it.  In fact, some engineers expressed astonishment that the platform had not 
collapsed sooner – under its own weight (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995).  The inquiry 
found that the structure was not built in accordance with accepted building practice, the plans 
for the platform were deficient and not available on site during the construction, no building 
consent had been granted, the platform was never inspected or approved, and was not issued 
with a loading limit.  Neither the platform designer, nor any of those who constructed the 
platform was appropriately qualified.  Judge Noble, presiding over the inquiry, concluded that 
the platform was: 
Not designed or constructed to appropriate standards, was completely unsuitable 
for the use for which it was designed and constructed and was unsafe for any use 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 1995, p. 77). 
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In his final analysis, Noble declared that it was not appropriate to point the finger of blame at 
any one individual and, rather, described the processes leading to the accident as “uniquely an 
institutional failure” (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995, p. 86).  The Department acted 
unlawfully, but as an agent of the Crown could not be prosecuted under the Building Act 
(1991) or the HSE Act (1992). 
 
Some commentators have been highly critical of the Commission of Inquiry and its findings.  
Hunt (1996, p. 28), for instance, argued that DOC was “as guilty as sin for the death of 14 
young people yet as free as a bird”.  In his book, Scandal at Cave Creek, a scathing attack on 
New Zealand’s public sector, Hunt (1996, p. 2) described the outcome of events as “a 
shocking failure in public accountability”.  Although less abrasive in his criticism, Hughes-
Johnson (1996) also called for greater agency accountability, codes of practice among 
operators, and increased communication about the risks inherent in outdoor recreation and 
tourism. 
 
Dewar (1997) adopted a different analysis of the Cave Creek event, suggesting that the 
accident resulted from years of budget cuts and neglected staff training requirements.  Dewar 
(1997) also contested the public sector’s adoption of free market principles, and claimed that 
“one of the major problems was the existing system of management, which was basically an 
[sic] zealous application of business practices that may not have been suitable for such a 
public organisation” (Dewar, 1997, p. 59).  It is interesting that Dewar interpreted the Cave 
Creek tragedy in terms of the ideology that led to the accident.  He claimed that the root cause 
of Cave Creek was the emergence of managerialism.  Certainly, these ‘symptoms’ are evident 
in the management and restructuring of the Department of Conservation in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Other commentators have implied that it was the lack of sound business practice 
in the public Department that led to sloppy systems and inevitably a major accident (Hunt, 
1996).  In particular, Hunt advocated a more direct set of accountabilities in the public sector, 
and bemoaned the fact that no single person was ever held responsible for the deaths at Cave 
Creek. 
 
At the field level, the accident at Cave Creek can be interpreted as having several important 
effects, not least of which was its influence on staff perceptions of their obligation to visitors.  
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Jock, a senior conservation manager on the West Coast admitted that he had a difficult job 
attempting to reassure his staff that they could trust themselves to make good decisions:  
They’re frightened.  That’s the legacy of Cave Creek. And I see that now, even 
after trying for two and a half years to beat that out of people – a reluctance to 
make a decision because that might imply some responsibility or accountability.  
People [DOC staff] have lost the ability to correctly manage hazards because 
they are frightened of their capabilities – they’re frightened to take responsibility 
for it.  And they’ve been frightened by Cave Creek and the witch hunt after that – 
even though no one was dealt to in the end. 
 
The same manager, who was outside New Zealand at the time of the Cave Creek accident, 
and only returned a year after the event, illustrated the changes in safety management he 
witnessed on his arrival back in New Zealand. 
When I came back to New Zealand, they’d had this big catastrophe and there’d 
been a knee-jerk reaction.  There was a bit of a witch-hunt going on and the 
inquiries were just coming out.  But the pendulum had swung right out to one side 
where people were wanting to get every single hazard – no matter how small – 
identified, inventoried, assessed, labelled, and either minimised or eradicated.  
The pendulum is starting to swing back now to a more common sensical 
environment where hazards are always inventoried, always assessed, but the 
threshold at which they are described as being hazardous is a lot lower.  I mean, 
I’ve seen a hazard report for a small bridge that’s about as long as this table 
[approximately 1200mm x 600mm], and it’s over a big puddle outside the Butler 
Junction Hut.  You have to walk for eight hours through the most miserable tiger 
country to get to that hazard, including scaling a 300-foot cliff using roots alone!  
So there’s no point in worrying about this hazard because, for anyone who’s got 
to this point, it’s probably the best part of the track they’ve seen all day!  So you 
have to put the hazard into the context of the environment, and I don’t think that 
was being done after Cave Creek. 
 
This informant’s comments help illustrate the reaction of some staff within DOC to the events 
surrounding the Cave Creek accident.  A fear of allowing themselves to be held accountable, 
and an over zealous approach to the identification and management of hazards typify this 
reaction according to this manager. 
 
Mike, another of DOC’s senior representatives in the West Coast region, also emphasised the 
influence of Cave Creek on the Department’s management practice, although he identified 
some positive outcomes: 
Cave Creek was an appalling tragedy, but good will come out of it.  Those deaths 
weren’t in vain.  It’s just a shame it took fourteen people to die to force the 
change.  In saying that, if someone had fallen off the platform and broken their 
elbow, it would it have been: “oh gosh, lucky it wasn’t serious – carry on”.  There 
might have been a reprimand because, you know, the platform fell to bits, but it 
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might not have been enough of a quantum push to effect that level of change.  
It’s an appalling price, but it certainly hasn’t been a waste. 
 
The influence of Cave Creek goes beyond the management of visitors and facilities in 
protected natural areas.  Management practice in businesses, schools, and local authorities 
have come under scrutiny since the accident in 1995.  Peter, a regional level DOC manager, 
expressed his experience of the widespread empathy for DOC at the time: 
I really expected that other government departments, and some of our like-
minded colleagues in local government and district councils would be saying: 
“bloody DOC – hopeless bastards.  No wonder it happened to them”.  And not 
one person said that.  Every district council manager that I’ve talked to has said: 
“thank god it was you, because it could have been us”.  Suddenly they realised: 
“gosh – how comfortable am I that my crew are actually out there doing the right 
thing?” 
 
Out of Cave Creek and its aftermath, emerged a public land management agency very 
different in organisational culture and management practice from that observed between 1987 
and 1995.  The accident at Cave Creek made a significant contribution to the perception of 
moral and legal obligation held by DOC managers towards the visiting public.  It was also a 
major impetus behind the creation of a new management structure, and a plethora of safety 
systems that now govern the Department’s work in field settings.  Importantly, the Cave 
Creek event provided a rationale for a focus on asset management, and the rationalisation of 
some facilities and services.  Dave, a senior health and safety advisor within DOC, summed 
up his perception of Cave Creek’s influence in this way: 
We can’t understate the impact of Cave Creek; it was an all-encompassing event. 
When you get an event on that scale - a tragedy of that consequence, it does 
focus the mind in a major way. It transformed the views and the perceptions of 
this organisation and without it I don’t imagine a lot of the initiatives would have 
been taken. 
 
7.5.2.2 Summary 
The nature of New Zealand society is such that we have not always been overly 
concerned with exacting standards nor definitive areas of responsibility and 
liability…. Our functional society has existed well with baseline philosophies of 
‘get on with the job’ and ‘she’ll be right’ (Allan,1984; cited in Bamford, 1987, p. 3). 
 
Cave Creek had two major impacts on DOC managers: i) it created an atmosphere of legal 
and moral concern for visitor safety on the conservation estate, and increased the perceptions 
of risk among management and other staff; and ii) it led to an overhaul of the Department of 
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Conservation’s organisational structure and an attempt to impose a new culture of risk 
consciousness.  Furthermore, Cave Creek contributed to the adoption of more business-like 
practices, and ultimately justified the development of an asset management approach. 
 
In addition to the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry (Department of Internal Affairs, 
1995), the accident at Cave Creek can be viewed as a consequence of multiple factors 
including the significant restructuring of the Department of Conservation (down-sizing and 
budget cuts), increasing public expectations of the agency, and a contrasting field level ethos 
of ‘do it yourself’ and ‘she’ll be right’.  If there was previously a casual attitude towards 
visitor management within DOC, this has now been replaced with a strong emphasis on risk 
management at multiple levels of the Department.  From the State Services Commission 
through to the national and regional offices, and at the field sites themselves, a new ideology 
has emerged, one of risk control, mitigation, and management, driven by perceived moral and 
legal obligation and the memory of Cave Creek. 
 
7.5.3 Emergence of a new organisational structure and culture 
For much of the 20th century, conservation lands, and recreational areas within these, were 
administered by the New Zealand Forest Service and the Department of Lands and Survey.  In 
1987, a single organisation was formed which inherited many of the responsibilities from pre-
existing conservation agencies (see Chapter 1).  DOC became responsible for thousands of 
visitor facilities, many of which were never originally intended for recreational use (DOC, 
1998).  Furthermore, there was no national inventory of facilities, no standards for operation 
or maintenance, and little agreement over their sustainability (DOC, 1998). 
 
Since its inception, the Department has undergone several periods of restructuring (DOC, 
1995; State Services Commission, 1995), the overall outcomes of which have been fewer 
fulltime staff, fewer financial resources, an emphasis on cost recovery, and increased 
emphasis on generating income through concessions.  There has also been a steady 
progression within the Department towards a ‘user pays’ orientation, consistent with the neo-
liberal political climate of New Zealand in the 1990s (Le Heron & Pawson, 1996).  Services 
and facilities not seen as ‘core business’ have been deleted or offered to the private sector as 
concession operations. 
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According to Dewar (1997), the government restructuring that occurred in the 1980s 
contributed to the loss of important institutional knowledge and systems, one of the 
consequences of which was the accident at Cave Creek.  This claim was supported by the 
comments of a DOC senior policy analyst (Bob), who suggested that there was little in the 
way of direct transfer of ideas from pre-existing agencies in the 1980s: 
The first Director General of DOC [in 1987] took a blank sheet approach and 
said: “I accept that all this stuff has happened in the past, but we are a new 
organisation and we need to develop our own systems”.  Rather than saying: 
“okay there are five parent agencies; we’re looking for a visitor safety system, it 
seems to me that the one the Forest Service has looks to be the best”, and 
migrating that across and adapting it.  There was a kind of hiatus where there 
was no continuity from the parent agencies to the present.  We were operating 
without some of the systems that had been around previously.  There were lots of 
systems and processes in place [prior to DOC] but a lot of these visitor safety 
things just didn’t track through.  So you have this kind of history, or knowledge, 
that kind of got lost between 1987 and 1995. 
 
These comments emphasise the pre-Cave Creek problems associated with restructuring the 
public sector, the reduction of staff, and other attempts to create efficiencies.  With reference 
to visitor safety on the West Coast in particular, it is also salient to note that a comprehensive 
visitor facility and safety system had been developed for this region in 1984 under the 
auspices of the New Zealand Forest Service (Adams, 1984; Groome & Davies, 1985).  
Known as the Recreation Operations Planning System (ROPS), it is unclear how widely 
implemented the scheme was prior to the disestablishment of the Forest Service. 
 
The most recent restructure of the Department has resulted in a strong line management 
framework, and the addition of a regional dimension to its operations.  The aim was to make 
responsibilities and accountabilities clearer for managers, and to reflect DOC’s commitment 
to a ‘Total Quality Management’ approach (see Section 7.5.4.1).  The adoption of a business 
model for the management of conservation in New Zealand is often justified by reference to 
Cave Creek, and, according to some informants, is a structure toward which the Department 
may have evolved over time irrespective. 
 
Various aspects of DOC’s management since 1995 imply that a change in organisational 
culture was in process.  The commitment to a quality management framework, the creation of 
additional systems and procedures for operation, and the emphasis on professionalism and 
health and safety, are examples of this.  At the level above these systems, there is a clear 
commitment to a risk management ethos which appears to be driving many of these other 
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developments.  For instance, the State Services Commission has specific expectations 
regarding risk management within the public sector, and requires each department’s chief 
executive officer to produce a statement on risk management relevant to both strategic and 
operational contexts (DOC, 1999a).  Risk management is also expected to become 
incorporated into regular communication with staff, creating an organisational culture which 
promotes risk management.  This includes:  
Raising staff awareness, knowledge and skills and encouraging their participation 
in risk management, and not merely compliance with policies and procedures – 
developing a sense of commitment in staff to managing risks (DOC, 1999a, p. 
17). 
 
Probably the most clear cut evidence that safety and risk management were a low priority 
within DOC until the Cave Creek accident, can be gained from analysis of the development of 
the Department’s visitor strategy, the guiding document for DOC’s management of visitors 
and facilities.  The comments of Bob, a senior policy analyst who helped create the strategy, 
illustrated this point well. 
The visitor strategy was in process for about two years before Cave Creek, and I 
think that it’s fair to say that, the whole issue of risk management and visitor 
safety was something that no one really picked up on.  At the genesis [of the 
strategy] there were several rounds of public consultation and the main debate 
was on tourism development versus traditional users, and the debate waged 
backwards and forwards around that.  We had something like 350 submissions in 
one round, and about 90 in another and no one mentioned visitor risk or visitor 
safety as an issue.  So, the visitor strategy came to a bit of a grinding halt at the 
time of Cave Creek, and the focus then really went on putting in place systems to 
deal with those kinds of issues.  After about six months, the strategy was picked 
up again and moved towards final publication.  As a result of the things that we 
learned from Cave Creek, a section dealing with visitor safety and risk 
management was added. 
 
Bob’s comments clearly imply that, had it not been for the accident at Cave Creek, the 
Department’s guiding document on managing visitors on the conservation lands would have 
included few strategies concerning safety or risk management.  This is revealing in terms of 
DOC’s organisational culture prior to the defining event at Cave Creek. 
 
Further examples of the culture in DOC prior to the Cave Creek accident were provided by 
John, a senior manager in Head Office with responsibilities for the implementation of the new 
systems and processes for managing risk on the conservation estate. 
Most of them [the field staff] were ‘jack of all trades', and they thought that, with a 
little bit of help from where they could get it, they could build whatever they 
needed.  And they were fiercely independent and proud of what they could do.  
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So that was the sort of mentality we had to deal with. And when we started 
building the processes and standards and putting these things in place, the staff 
sort of said: “this is too difficult”.  It takes away all the old, ‘number eight fencing 
wire’ thing where people would say “well I've got a few sticks of timber in the 
store, we’ll go and build a bridge over this gully”. It’s not done any more. 
 
The “mentality” noted by John is also a feature of Bob’s interpretation of events leading up to 
the accident at Cave Creek: 
I think Cave Creek was underpinned by the ‘good keen man’, ‘she’ll be right’ 
attitude.  You know, it was weekend building – a few mates or volunteers, and a 
few beers at the end of it. 
 
The rhetoric used in the two previous excerpts serves to emphasise the incompetence of the 
previous style of operation, and implies that it was only a matter of time before an accident of 
the magnitude of Cave Creek occurred.  At the same time, the comments emphasise the 
perceived value of the ‘new’ organisational structure and systems, and the positive effects 
these have on visitor safety on the conservation estate.  It is interesting to note, however, that 
up until Cave Creek, DOC had operated its facilities and structures for nearly ten years 
without reported mishap.  Furthermore, John later disclosed that, following a major inventory 
and review of all DOC facility structures, nothing of the Cave Creek magnitude was 
identified. 
 
Senior DOC staff, in particular, appear to have made a strong commitment to risk 
management.  The Department recently appointed a manager to a position that encompasses a 
wide range of risk management perspectives, including financial, political, legal, and 
operational risks.  A key responsibility of this position is to create an integrated risk 
management framework that meets the expectations of the State Services Commission and 
Minister of Conservation, as well as being applicable at the field management level.  Part of 
this is the identification of risks to the Department, and the insurance thereof.  In particular, 
DOC is insured against property loss or damage (to boats and huts, for example) and 
professional indemnity for some of its staff.  In terms of insuring against claims for 
compensation resulting from visitor injuries on the DOC estate, the Department is taking a 
cautious approach, as Kirk, a risk manager pointed out: 
Injury compensation is certainly an exposed area for us, which is another reason 
why we are heavily into benchmarking because it seems to us that it’s a creeping 
tide. Ultimately it will get to here. It’s gotten into Australia and it’ll get into New 
Zealand. We’ve already paid out some compensation to people who’ve been 
injured on the estate. We’ve got some internal struggles over some of that. There 
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are some people who don’t believe we should be paying out and I’m one of 
those. Others think we should, and argue that it’s easier to pay the money and 
forget about it. There’s been some injuries on the West Coast we paid out for. A 
woman slipped and dislocated her back or something and we paid some money 
for that. But generally our policy is not to. The issue is that we don’t have a 
particularly good framework for staff to operate to and procedures for them to 
follow to avoid that situation. And that’s certainly an area where we’re doing a lot 
of work. We don’t want to get into that compensation scene. 
 
These comments need to be considered within the context of the current accident 
compensation laws in New Zealand.  The existing legislation has, since 1972, effectively 
removed the right to sue for personal injury (see Chapter 4).  Subtle changes to this 
legislation, or developments in common law, could alter the situation and create a significant 
potential for compensation claims against DOC.  It is clearly in the Department’s interests to 
avoid such a scenario, and the strategic elements within DOC are evidently considering ways 
to reduce this possibility and minimise potential liability. 
 
In this sense, DOC is pursuing mechanisms through which it can discharge its duty to the 
public on the conservation estate, as Kirk explained: 
DOC makes reasonable efforts to give people the right information about what 
they’re up against in the outdoors.  I think that’s probably our first position.  We 
[DOC] tell you about the hazards that we know about where we can.  Generally 
the philosophy in New Zealand is, if you go out in the back-country it’s your 
business.  And we’re still operating from there. But we really want to be in a 
position of saying: “We’ve discharged our general duty of care to visitors on our 
land, these are what we perceive to be reasonable duties that we’ve discharged, 
and we’ve benchmarked them against what other people are doing”. 
 
This comment illustrates the concern senior managers have for legal liability, a concern that at 
times appears to take priority over the prevention of visitor injuries in the first place.  This 
attitude is also evident in the comments of Kyle, another senior manager who acknowledged 
the need to act strategically: 
I think individual accountability is driving a move towards demanding 
compensation.  In the past the Forest Service weren’t too concerned about it, 
because of ACC which was a good safety net for people to fall into.  If you got 
injured, your employer tended to look after you and if that didn’t work too well, 
then you normally had a lot of sick leave and the compensation system to fall 
back on.  So I think life was a little bit easier. But as people have moved towards 
individual accountability, organisations like ours have had to get more geared up 
for that because people are looking at how they can keep their income streams 
coming, or how they can get something else to help them out. So an organisation 
like ours is thinking: “well, we better be a bit careful here because we might get 
stung for this”. There’s less of a safety net, so people are out there trying to look 
after themselves really, and they’ll have a go at anyone they can.  So I think our 
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first reaction is to say: “well, how can we avoid this? How can we avoid these 
people having a go at us?” 
 
The comments of this informant evoke the notion discussed in Chapter 2 of a society in which 
individuals feel increasingly vulnerable and responsible for their own life outcomes.  
Increasing individual responsibility creates a situation of uncertainty in which people may 
perceive greater risk.  In this case, the organisation is implicated as a victim of the public’s 
potential demand for compensation. 
 
In order to protect itself from the risks perceived by DOC’s senior managers, the organisation 
developed a number of important processes which reflect the new organisational culture.  The 
following section examines several of these management systems to illustrate further DOC’s 
risk management approach, and to emphasise the degree of organisational change since the 
mid-1990s. 
 
7.5.4 Systems of control: Quality Conservation Management and Visitor Asset 
Management 
7.5.4.1 Quality Conservation Management 
The Commission of Inquiry into Cave Creek established that ‘systemic failure’ was among 
the factors contributing to the accident (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995).  In his 
recommendations to the Department, the Commissioner emphasised the need to develop a 
nation-wide project management system appropriate to each of DOC’s 14 conservancies and 
66 field centres.  In response to the Commission, DOC adapted existing ‘quality management’ 
models to create its own system entitled ‘Quality Conservation Management’ (QCM).  QCM 
was based on an international safety rating system, and aimed to provide a process to evaluate 
systematically the safety of the organisation’s operations and identify actions required to 
prevent loss (DOC, 1996a). 
 
In 1996, DOC established a specialist QCM unit as an internal consultancy, with the task of 
implementing the new system throughout the Department.  Following the implementation 
period of three years, the responsibilities of the QCM Unit were devolved to the Department’s 
newly established regional offices.  The QCM unit facilitated the development of standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) governing the Department’s work across its range of 
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responsibilities.  These procedures and standards, for instance, now apply to the design, 
construction, inspection, maintenance and repair of all visitor facilities (DOC, 1996a). 
 
The QCM system comprises four key elements which include setting objectives for managing 
risk, accepting accountability for actions, developing procedures for objectives and 
accountabilities, and identifying standards to ensure consistency (DOC, 1996a).  Further, 
through QCM, the Department aims to: 
Ensure that the work that is undertaken conforms as a minimum to the statutory 
requirements set out in legislation – and that over time, this work will be 
undertaken in accordance with the best practices known wherever practicable.  
This will ensure risks are sensibly managed and a quality service is offered to 
Government, taxpayers, and visitors within the resources available.... [The] 
adoption of the generic quality conservation management system ... will ensure 
quality is built into our operations and risks both politically and to life and property 
are controlled and managed (DOC, 1996a, p. 8-13). 
 
The development of QCM represented a considerable addition to the Department’s 
administrative systems and reflected a belief in, and commitment to, a systems approach to 
managing visitor safety and its own accountability to the public.  The QCM principles can be 
interpreted as cornerstones of the post-Cave Creek culture which senior management is 
attempting to establish within the Department.  This is evident in the comments of Bill 
Mansfield, the (then) Director General of Conservation, to his staff:  
You must each make a commitment... to follow this philosophy of quality in 
everything we do – even to the extent that we do less of some things so that we 
can maintain a high level of quality in all the work we do undertake” (DOC, 
1996a, p. 1). 
QCM was seen as an important strategy to restore both sound management principles and 
public confidence in DOC. 
 
Kirk, a senior DOC representative with a wide risk management portfolio, explained the 
rationale for the new risk conscious approach of which the QCM is part: 
We’re trying to see risk as just the same as any other management process.  So 
it’s just a management insurance process.  We’re trying to get into the situation 
where all our managers understand risk and can show how they are doing risk 
management in all their work.  Basically, so it’s not an add-on – it should be 
number one.  And once we get past that, where it’s not seen as an add-on, then it 
just becomes part of our normal management process.  That’s certainly where 
we’re trying to get to. 
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The comments of other senior managers make it clear that their perception of the way forward 
for DOC is within a culture of quality management that adheres strictly to approved systems 
and reflects a strong image of professionalism.  The focus of the new approach is on 
management processes that create satisfied customers.  John, a senior representative of the 
QCM Unit explained: 
Basically what senior staff are saying, is that continuous improvement is what 
we’re about.  We’re going to continually improve our systems, we’re going to 
have quality management, we’re going to have quality systems and continually 
improve them, and the end product will be satisfied customers.  A lot of 
companies do something similar.  If we start off with good clear leadership from 
the general managers, and we have quality processes, which is our QCM 
process, we’ve got the policy and planning and we have the people - which we 
always say is our biggest resource - good information, a customer focus and then 
we get our performance.  And that’s our quality framework.  So people started to 
see that this organisation was changing. 
 
It is evident from these comments, and those of some other senior staff, that DOC is 
increasingly viewed as a business.  John’s language also illustrated this point with phrases 
such as ‘products’, ‘customer focus’, ‘business’, and ‘performance’.  Kirk, implied a similar 
business orientation: 
[DOC is] certainly a customer focused business, and that’s come about through a 
lot of our focus on quality work that we have introduced – which is focused on the 
customer and the end product that we’re delivering to them. 
Further evidence of DOC’s new orientation is presented in Section 7.6, where the 
organisation’s corporate identity is discussed in relation to communicating with the public. 
 
7.5.4.2 Visitor Asset Management 
The first application under the QCM framework was the Visitor Asset Management 
Programme (VAMP), an initiative that illustrated the organisational changes since 1995.  The 
rationale behind the development of the VAMP was the perceived need to reconcile the 
Department’s asset size, required maintenance, and replacement programmes with the 
Department’s budget.  According to DOC (1998), the VAMP allowed the Department to 
become a good asset manager through creating a system for recording current assets and their 
condition, improving decisions about assets, allowing for risk assessments to be made, 
justifying work programmes, and increasing accountability in the use of public resources. 
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One of the early priorities of VAMP was to oversee a comprehensive inventory and 
assessment of the Department’s structures – a task that involved 80 temporary employees and 
60 engineers over a two-year period (K. Lewis, personal communication, July 8, 1999).  
Collectively, these employees and consultants walked 12,000 kilometres of track, and 
recorded, inspected and assessed nearly 16,000 structures.  The information on sites and 
structures, as well as each site’s predominant user group, was entered into a database and 
formed the initial core data of the Department’s Visitor Asset Management System (VAMS).  
The cost of this upgrade and development was $30 million. 
 
The inventory of structures on conservation lands was undertaken in order to establish base-
line information on the existence, status, and condition of the facilities for which DOC is 
responsible.  Each structure has now been logged into the VAMS, and its priority for 
maintenance, repair, or replacement recorded.  Standardised processes have been established 
for the inspection of each structure, and life-cycles attributed to each structure type.  For 
instance, huts have been given a life of 50 years, and platforms 25 years.  Assets are managed, 
and their replacement costs calculated, on the basis of these estimated life expectancies 
(Ombler, 2001).  The VAMS data allow for conservation and recreation sites to be ranked 
using criteria such as current and projected visitor use, educational value, and potential 
heritage importance.  The site scores are used to help determine funding priorities. 
 
The inventory of structures was unprecedented in New Zealand’s conservation management 
history.  The process revealed over 4000 bridges, 8000 boardwalks, nearly 1000 staircases, 
and 250 viewing platforms (DOC, 1998).  Prior to the inventory, DOC was unaware of the 
extent, diversity, or replacement cost of these assets, and there was no knowledge of the cost 
of a maintenance regime.  Many facilities used by visitors had been constructed for purposes 
other than recreation (Lawson, forthcoming), and no standards existed for visitor facilities 
(Ombler, 2001).  The replacement value of DOC’s 16,000 structures has been calculated at 
$188 million (DOC, 1998). 
 
Using the VAMS, the site scores, and by calculating the ‘structure risk’, DOC is able to 
justify how it prioritises its resources throughout conservation lands.  For instance, where 
structure risk and site score are both high, DOC will prioritise remedial work (DOC, 1998).  
The majority of high priority sites are located in the front-country, high use areas close to road 
ends and service areas. 
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Through the implementation of the QCM principles to visitor structures, DOC has aimed to 
reduce risk, improve public safety and confidence, and justify the funding it receives.  Kyle, a 
senior manager from the now disestablished QCM Unit explained:  
What’s happened is that we’ve built the operating systems, and the standards 
which the people on the ground need to use.  And it’s through the application of 
consistent procedures and standards and with clear accountabilities that we 
minimise the public risk.  We know that wherever we go in the country we can 
expect to find structures that are safe and the people who are working on them 
are maintaining them to a set standard.  It’s the same standard everywhere, and 
they’re using the same procedures.  It works.  And not only does it work, it 
actually reduces cost as well. 
 
Although this manager emphasised the high utility of the new systems in achieving the aim of 
improved visitor safety, the systems can be seen as effective in other ways too.  VAMP 
“works” because it allows DOC to balance its budget and be seen as doing something positive 
about potential risks to visitor safety.  It is not clear, however, whether public safety was ever 
under threat from hazards arising out of DOC structures.  The greater risks were financial and 
legal risks to the agency and its political leaders. 
 
A political and financial risk dimension is evident in the comments of John, another DOC 
manager who implied that visitor safety and the creation of an asset management system had 
more to it than a concern for visitor safety: 
The government gave us an extra 6 million dollars to keep our structures in good 
condition.  We got that because the government realised it had a safety risk, and 
it had to manage that because the government itself was vulnerable if there was 
another accident.  But [DOC also received the money] because of the Visitor 
Asset Management System, and all the information we’ve now got on structures, 
where they are and what condition they’re in.  All that information is what got us 
the extra money.  Being able to go along and say: “this is what we have, this is its 
condition, this is how long its going to last, and this is the maintenance cost for 
whatever period”.  And that’s what got us the money - having good solid 
information. 
 
These comments imply that the way Treasury allocates financial resources to government 
departments has encouraged DOC to adopt an asset-based approach to the management of the 
conservation estate.  Kyle explained: 
What we're doing is we’re looking at all of visitor facilities as assets.  And as an 
asset it is created, then it’s managed, it’s replaced and we’ve been able to secure 
more dollars from government because we have all this information and we have 
a clear process.  What we now understand is that we actually need to start 
thinking about all of our conservation assets in this way.  So, we’re starting to 
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move along that track with our conservation assets, as we’re starting to call them 
- at least in Wellington we’re starting to call them that.  Because when you’re 
talking to Treasury, trying to get money to do this sort of work, if you haven’t got 
really good information, and if you can’t put dollar costs against the work and 
show clearly what the outcome of spending that money is, then you’re going to 
miss out. 
 
As part of its new systems, Head Office has also developed a process through which field 
level staff can establish and use standard operating procedures (SOPs) for each and every 
work operation (from possum baiting to hazard management).  Bob, a senior policy advisor, 
made the following remarks: 
We decided that if we’re wanted to systemise this organisation, we needed to 
have simple standard operating procedures for all work.  So we built what we call 
the SOP tool kit, which is basically a document control system, so every 
document now has to be numbered and is centrally controlled for amendments. 
 
The development of SOPs demonstrates the strength of commitment to a rigid operating 
system within DOC post-Cave Creek.  The utility of the SOP method was also enhanced by 
the developments in technology that have allowed documents to be centrally located and 
modified.  Staff working in field offices throughout New Zealand have the ability to access 
up-to-date SOPs relating to specific work areas.  This reduces reliance on potentially out-of-
date manuals and ensures consistency across the national network of DOC operations. 
 
The comments of Kirk, a senior manager in DOC’s Head Office, illustrated the intent of the 
QCM process and the SOPs more specifically, as well as the degree to which some managers 
thought it necessary to prescribe standards. 
The question we considered [regarding SOPs] was: “Can we run the business 
essentially by numbers?  Can we develop a series of quite prescriptive quality 
conservation management systems that would detail the procedures that our 
managers are required to follow when carrying out a particular piece of work?” 
That’s the system.  There’s no departure from it.  Our managers are expected to 
follow those systems.  We simply developed a set of SOPs covering the work the 
Department does, and attention to health and safety issues is a sub-set of those 
systems. 
 
With the expansion of systems management within DOC, there appears to be a growth in 
confidence that the systems will protect the Department from future accidents such as Cave 
Creek and, importantly, protect the Department from public vilification.  This confidence is 
evident in various levels of the Department, including Head Office, senior field managers, and 
the field officers themselves.  For instance, Kyle, a Head Office manager commented: 
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In four years we’ve gone from having inadequate policies and procedures to 
having a lot better policies and procedures, especially in our high-risk areas.  The 
major risk areas for us are visitor facilities and use of toxins.  We’ve improved our 
systems out of sight and everything’s available on everyone’s desktop.  We’ve 
dealt with our two biggest risks which were killing people by falling off things and 
killing people by letting them get hold of toxins.  Public safety, apart from people 
doing silly things, is basically guaranteed. 
 
Although the necessity for improvements to public safety is less obvious, it is apparent that 
through the establishment of SOPs and other risk management strategies, DOC has reduced 
its own risk.  Two other systems are useful to review in order to appreciate some of the effects 
of safety systems at the site-specific level. 
 
7.5.4.3 Safety Watch and Hazard Reports 
In addition to its comprehensive review of the structures on land it manages, DOC has 
developed safety management tools through which it monitors the safety of facilities.  These 
include the ‘Safety Watch’ and ‘Hazard Report’ mechanisms, both of which enable members 
of the public (the former via toll-free telephone number) to report hazards they identify on the 
conservation estate.  DOC has a detailed system in place for dealing with each report, 
including minimum response times and direct line accountabilities. 
 
As several respondents have emphasised, DOC was very keen to appear safety conscious in 
the time immediately following the Cave Creek incident.  Safety Watch is one example of 
DOC’s response to the perceived need to be more vigilant about hazards.  In part, the decision 
to provide the public with a channel through which to report safety issues, is an 
acknowledgement that Department staff are limited in their capacity to identify and assess 
hazards across the wide spectrum of sites for which they are responsible.  Encouraging the 
public to work with DOC to help create safer conservation lands was one way the Department 
could be safety conscious and do so in a cost-effective fashion. 
 
Despite the possible merits of the Safety Watch system, there are issues of efficacy and 
efficiency emerging.  One problem for the Department is that, while the public has an 
opportunity to approach DOC formally with site-specific safety concerns, DOC is then 
committed to investigate, assess, prioritise, and (if necessary and appropriate) mitigate each of 
these.  Managers assessing the reports must evaluate the hazards as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ 
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and ascribe a time-bound action, processes that absorb Departmental resources.  Wayne, a 
recreation planner in Wellington, had mixed feelings about the utility of the process: 
It’s a good way of getting feedback about management issues in general, but we 
get a lot of reports which aren’t really safety issues.  I mean, they’re annoyance 
issues.  For example, ‘slippery track’, ‘poor track marking’, ‘overgrown track and 
bees’.  So we have to think: “are these safety issues or not?”. Then you’ve got to 
go out and check the hazard - if that’s the action you’ve prescribed. 
 
Neil, a manager on the West Coast, also expressed some doubts about the value of the Safety 
Watch system, claiming that most of the reports received were inappropriate, either because 
DOC was not responsible for the site or facility in question, or the hazard was of a minor 
nature.  He also gave some examples: 
One [report] was that the plug was missing from the sink in Pioneer Hut, one was 
that there was a small slip across the highway just out of town here, and another 
was that someone had got a nasty splinter off the Okarito Wharf.  None of these 
facilities are ours!  Here’s another: “spring-loaded door has got too much spring 
in it”, and this person was bitten on the thigh by the metal toilet roll holder! 
 
According to these informants, the Safety Watch and Hazard Reports are often used for rather 
general complaints about the condition of facilities on (and off) the DOC estate.  The 
frustrating part for managers is that the process in place requires action to be taken on each 
reported case, as Jock, another West Coast manager pointed out: 
I interviewed the woman who reported a tree across the state highway.  I said: 
“why did you do that?”.  This is an horrendous process.  Because these are 
individually numbered documents - they’re a pain in the bum.  I mean, they’re 
good for ensuring accountability, but when you get it wrong, you still have to go 
through the process.  This [hazard report] form has got to go to me – within 12 or 
14 hours.  It’s also got to go immediately to the Conservator, and to the 
Recreation Planner, and then I’ve got to follow up, ascribe an action, and get 
somebody out there to look at it.  Then it’s got to go through more process and 
finally be signed off.  I mean that involves five or six people and it takes a month.   
 
This excerpt illustrates how systems can become unnecessary and wasteful.  Safety Watch 
and Hazard Reports are examples of systems which reflect a safety conscious organisation, 
yet their utility is yet to be proven. 
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7.5.4.4 Resistance to the new way 
The introduction of a new direction or philosophy for DOC was not necessarily embraced by 
all staff at the time, as Kyle, a senior manager acknowledged: 
When QCM first came out, it didn’t go down too well.  A lot of people said: “oh 
rubbish; I mow lawns or whatever, that’s of no interest to me”.  There’s also been 
a ton of cynicism.  But you don’t change the culture of an organisation of 1500 
people in 80 different places around the country overnight.  It’s taken two years, 
but we’re starting to move into a culture of quality management where people are 
expecting to use established standards and procedures for their work.  It all 
means that the Department is reducing its risk and going about its business in a 
very professional manner. 
 
DOC’s adoption of a strong risk management focus has also drawn public criticism, 
especially from recreation groups who feel that recreational facilities on conservation lands 
are under threat of removal (Barr, 1996; Buchanan, 2000; Round, 1999: Sinclair, 1998).  With 
its newly acquired knowledge of the extent of its asset base, DOC’s senior managers readily 
acknowledge that the current government funding will not sustain the assets (DOC, 1998).  In 
order to maintain the safety standards to which the Department now aspires, some facilities 
and recreational opportunities are likely to be removed. 
 
Jim, the director of a voluntary organisation closely aligned to DOC and the provision of 
recreation opportunities on conservation lands, linked his criticism to the influence of Cave 
Creek on the Department’s management style and decisions: 
Cave Creek and the talk of organisational failure impressed itself enormously on 
the managers [DOC staff].  All of a sudden there was this concept of 
organisational responsibility.  The HSE Act wasn’t very clear – all the indicators 
were talking about visitors to a place of work.  But DOC got really hammered on 
the concept of responsibility, and they inevitably were looking very hard to see 
how they could clear themselves on this whole business [of responsibility for 
visitor safety].  Now, if you go anywhere in New Zealand and you come to a 
stream that is two meters wide, it’s got a plank across it, it’s got a number on 
each end and it says how many people the loading will be.  I mean, it’s insane if 
you think about it in terms of the traditional tramping thing.  People either put foot 
on it or they didn’t.  They’d splash through the stream otherwise! 
 
Another criticism is that DOC, in its attempt to ensure the safety of its facilities, has actually 
created a risk to the public through the removal of huts, shelters, and bridges that would 
otherwise afford protection to visitors in the event of harsh weather or floods (“Plan creates 
risk”, 1999).  Jim gave examples of this: 
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In one case, there was a bridge that crossed a gorge.  The track deliberately led 
to the bridge of course – a little swing bridge.  Because somebody thought it was 
unsafe, they chopped it.  That means the track now goes to the wrong place, 
because that is not where you cross the river if there’s not a bridge.  So you’re 
actually led into danger by the track! 
 
And it bothers me even more with huts.  Very rarely has a hut been put in for no 
reason.  If you take the huts in the Tararuas, most of them were put in because 
something went wrong – someone had died there.  They were put there because 
that was where people got into difficulties.  Huts don’t usually present a hazard to 
the public, even if they’re derelict – it may still be a valuable shelter even though 
the door’s fallen off. 
 
Tim, a manager in DOC’s Central Regional Office explained the Department’s stance on 
safety, and defended its decision to remove some facilities: 
There’s no doubt about it, the Department had to be seen to be focussing on 
safety.  So it did.  Now that might have taken us too far, but I don’t think that’s 
necessarily a bad thing.  Cave Creek made us have a good look at what we were 
providing, although we probably would have had to do that anyway.  It would 
have come from the financial point of view, regardless of the safety issues.  
There’s no way we could have sustained our asset base.  There’s no way we 
were keeping up the ongoing maintenance of those structures and assets and we 
were getting to the point where Treasury was forcing us to look at that anyway.  
So it would have come.  We would have been removing structures from some 
sites.  The safety aspect has certainly given us a justification for the 
rationalisation.  There’s no doubt about that.  We certainly used it, and combined 
it with the financial issues.  And we did use the inventory information that we had, 
that was one of our prime goals [for collecting the asset information] – to use the 
information we gained about our assets to run arguments back at Treasury, 
there’s no doubt about that.  We’ve been criticised by them for years for not really 
being able to mount a proper case for extra funding because we didn’t know how 
many assets we had.  And they were always able to avoid giving us extra 
funding.  So when we were able to turn around and say: "well, actually we’ve got 
16,750", they were in a very difficult position. 
 
The comments of this senior representative imply that Cave Creek, and its consequential 
emphasis on visitor safety, provided a convenient rationale or justification for the further 
restructuring of DOC and the adoption of more business oriented practices.  The remarks also 
indicate how imperative it is to quantify DOC’s role and the outputs for which it is 
responsible. Assets are simple to count, whereas the value of visitor experiences are more 
difficult to calculate. 
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7.5.4.5 Summary 
In its quality conservation management approach, customer focus, and the rhetoric of asset 
management, DOC has attempted to create a more transparent and accountable set of 
operations relating to risk management and visitor safety.  Some of the impetus for change (in 
culture, style of operations, and specific methods for undertaking work) can be traced to the 
accident that occurred at Cave Creek in April 1995.  The subsequent inquiries and internal 
reflection resulted in major reorganisation of DOC’s priorities, structure, and management.  
The accident, in combination with the organisational changes for which it was a catalyst, have 
been important factors in the way managers and field staff at the glaciers perceive hazard 
management and their responsibilities to the visiting public.  Another important factor 
motivating the new approach was the perceived need to adopt business principles and 
rationalise assets. 
 
Two questions remain unanswered.  First, was the time and money invested in significant 
development of systems actually required to identify and mitigate genuine hazards to the 
public, or were the initiatives a reaction to a perceived need to do something (or look like 
something was being done), and to ‘play the accountants’ game’?  Second, has public safety 
been improved through the development of the new risk management systems? 
 
These are difficult questions to answer definitively, although the evidence presented in the 
chapter to this point suggests that the primary motive for change within DOC included the 
need to reduce its own liability and help justify expenditure more convincingly.  The new 
range of approaches also contributes to the agency’s own financial, political, and legal risk 
management, while the effects on visitor safety (to the extent that this was ever an issue under 
DOC’s control) will only be possible to estimate in retrospect.  Cave Creek, and the ‘new 
morality’ of visitor safety, provided both the impetus and justification for the wholesale 
adoption of a new set of practices.  The new organisational culture and approaches to visitor 
management allow DOC to justify the rationalisation of recreation facilities, secure additional 
government funding, and reduce risks to the agency itself.  Visitor safety may have been 
enhanced, although the extent to which this was necessary remains speculative. 
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7.5.5 Perceptions of societal expectation  
In Chapter 2, it was argued that, in some Western societies, there is a growing aversion to 
risk.  Although many people have never been so physically healthy, or so protected from 
accident, these same communities appear to be increasingly concerned about safety and risk 
(Dwyer, 1991; Furedi, 1997; Hanna, 1991; Lübbe, 1993; Slovic, 1999; Wildavsky, 1988; 
Wren, 1997).  It appears contradictory that, while many societies are increasingly 
individualistic, there is a decreasing tendency for people to accept the hazards and risks to 
which they are exposed. One consequence of this is that the responsibility of risk and safety 
becomes a specialisation levelled at governments or other organisations perceived as holding 
some power over life outcomes. 
 
Allied to this social tendency is the development of a culture of blame, and an unwillingness 
to accept responsibility for accident or injury (Douglas, 1992; Dwyer, 1991; Hughes-Johnson, 
1996).  This development is also apparent in the recreation and tourism sector, as the 
comments of Jim, an outdoor recreation director implied: 
People sometimes claim that they’re responsible [for their own safety], but when 
you do get an event that occurs, they’re pretty quick to shift the blame onto DOC 
or some other governing authority.  Increasingly, we’re wanting to find someone 
responsible for when things go wrong. 
 
The same informant gave an example showing how he believed the public attitude to risk and 
safety in the outdoors was different in the past from what it is today. 
I came to New Zealand and started a tramping club where I was teaching.  Two 
years later, three of the guys who I had started tramping were in the Three Johns 
Hut when it went over the edge.  I had to go down and identify the bodies.  The 
hut was above the Mueller Glacier and it went down in a storm.  They [the 
national park staff] heard nothing on the radio, and when they went up there to 
see what had happened and why people were not responding, there were four 
wires sticking up out of the ground and the hut was a thousand feet lower down, 
smashed to bits in the valley below.  Well, luckily it wasn’t the days of the HSE 
because there would have been some good questions asked.  Essentially, none 
of the families were asking questions of the land managers.  It was a huge storm 
and it took the hut out.  The wires all snapped, the hut just disintegrated and went 
over the edge, and these guys, the three of them, were killed in the hut.  But 
none of the families were saying: “we blame the person who built the hut”.  That 
wasn’t their thinking. 
 
The comments of this informant imply that under today’s health and safety laws, this accident 
may well have attracted the attention of prosecutors – suggesting that the hut’s design or 
location was suspect.  The hut was never replaced.  Jim’s comments are used here to 
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emphasise that, even a few decades ago, such an incident was accepted as part of the set of 
possible outcomes associated with recreating in mountainous environments. 
 
Davidson (1996) argued that New Zealand has entered a new age of recreation and tourism 
management where new rules and stricter accountabilities are in place.  Expectations are 
higher and recreationists and tourists expect professional standards, a trend also observed in 
other parts of the world (Boerwinkel, 1995).  According to Davidson (1996, p. 197), the new 
era represents a change from the recent past when enthusiastic amateurs would take others 
into the outdoors: 
When things went wrong it was considered just one of those things that happens 
when you venture into the mountains or bush.  People were seldom held 
accountable, the incident was quickly swept under the carpet and passed over as 
an unfortunate ‘act of God’. 
 
Wayne, a recreation planner with DOC, reiterated this view.  Discussing DOC’s inheritance 
of facilities such as huts and tracks, he emphasised that these were built at a time when 
society was not thinking so carefully about safety: 
Historically, many tracks were put in to make an easier or more obvious route.  
Forty or sixty years ago people weren’t thinking “we’re putting in a track, we’d 
better put handrails on it”.  I think the awareness of safety has become more 
apparent as time has gone on. 
 
Neil, a DOC manager working on the West Coast, also recognised that the safety emphasis 
within his agency is evident elsewhere in New Zealand.  He attributed the observed changes 
in work practices to the HSE Act and the Cave Creek accident and aftermath. 
It’s not only in DOC.  It’s also through other forms of governments, local 
authorities, regional councils, and district councils. I mean, most New Zealanders 
will appreciate that in the last four to five years, hazard management for 
employees has improved dramatically.  Even simple little things like driving down 
the road and seeing roadworks.  Everyone’s got coloured jackets on; there’s 
vehicles with flashing lights for miles; there’s signs out on the road – it’s obvious 
there’s a hazard, you know.  Whereas before [the HSE] you’d quite often come 
around a corner and there was someone in the middle of the road, leaning on a 
shovel looking at a pothole. 
 
These comments serve to highlight the role of recent legislation and the effect of Cave Creek 
on attitudes to safety.  Acknowledgement is also made of the degree to which DOC initially 
went to manage natural hazards in the period immediately following the accident at Cave 
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Creek.  Similar comments are made by other staff members with reference to the 
Department’s new systems for hazard reporting (see Section 7.5.4.3 above). 
 
Managing risks and hazards in a manner appropriate to the environment is a key strategy 
further identified by Keith, a manager at the glaciers: 
You don’t see people crying about avalanches.  You know, you get taken out by 
an avalanche on the Central Divide: “Well, that’s what mountain climbing is all 
about pal”.  If you get killed by an avalanche on a ski field, it’s a different story.  
People say: “Well, heck, the ski patrol should have seen that, detected it and 
dealt with it – or closed off the field”.  So there’s a difference.  People expect a 
level of service, and when they don’t get that, they get upset. 
 
This notion of a risk acceptability spectrum is reflected in some previous research.   Several 
authors have concluded that injuries and deaths in activities perceived as risky are more 
acceptable than if the accidents occur in common activities (Bean, 1989; Ewert & Boone, 
1987; Haddock, 1995).  Similarly, Page (1997) observed an apparent tolerance for 
internationally recognised activities that include an element of danger (such as mountain 
climbing).  In contrast, “there appears to be a greater expectation of safety for commercialised 
action-packed tourist activities that have developed more recently” (Page, 1997, p. 4). 
 
While there is likely to be little argument over the claim that management must be matched to 
the physical setting, it is equally important that the visitors to these sites recognise the 
standard of hazard management and nature and extent of hazards to which they may be 
exposed.  In areas such as the glaciers, visitors from a wide range of backgrounds may 
interpret the degree of management responsibility and care very differently, making it more 
difficult to state with any certainty what the public’s level of acceptable service is with respect 
to risk management. 
 
An increased social concern for safety can be observed in the comments and actions of 
respondents and the agencies they represent.  As noted elsewhere in this chapter, the 
perceived social concern for safety and risk management can act as a rationale for the 
reduction of services and facilities.  Tim, a senior regional manager, expressed this view, 
although distanced the comment from the Department’s official stance: 
One of the logical consequences of this increasing need for safeness in society, 
and the idea that life should be risk free, is that everywhere the visitor goes 
becomes hugely more expensive to manage.  I can’t see - although the 
Department would defend publicly that this isn’t the case - any logical outcome 
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other than pulling back. Fewer experiences done properly and more safely if you 
like.  That’s fine, but it is one of the consequences of [a high priority for safety]. 
 
Social attitudes and acceptance of risk are important for DOC to comprehend.  If the 
organisation intends to share the burden of responsibility for safety with those who visit the 
attractions it manages, unambiguous understanding needs to be achieved.  Dave, a senior 
manager at DOC’s Head Office, believed that New Zealanders have traditionally expected a 
lot from their governments, and this attitude extends to the outdoors. 
[The New Zealand public] certainly have very high expectations of a government 
agency to provide things to them, and I think that it’s probably that ‘cradle to the 
grave’ mentality that New Zealanders are still growing up with.  Hopefully, 
personal responsibility is becoming a more important part of people’s lives, but, 
you know, we expect health care, we expect social welfare support, we expect 
free access to New Zealand’s natural places, we expect clean water – those sorts 
of things.  A lot of past government philosophy has been to take responsibility for 
every one of those things all of the time. Now, I don’t think society – government 
in terms of representing society – can support it any longer. 
 
These comments imply a belief that individuals should take greater responsibility for their 
own lives, rather than relying on governments or other organisations to provide for them.  
This position is consistent with a neo-liberal approach to governance, and helps justify the 
creation of policies that reduce government funding and support ‘user-pays’ philosophies.  
According to the respondent above, a highly paternalistic approach to visitor management is 
not sustainable.  This suggests that DOC is keen to share the responsibility for safety with its 
visiting public at least as much for the recognition of what is possible with current resources 
as for some basic philosophy or moral stance.  Any attempt to increase individual 
responsibility for risk, however, will necessitate effective communication strategies. 
 
A fundamental component of effective risk communication is understanding visitors’ 
perceptions of risk and their previous experience of natural environments.  So too is the 
accurate alignment of risk management and social expectation.  Discussing the challenge of 
risk communication, Tom, a Head Office manager, emphasised the changes he had observed 
in New Zealand society which contribute to the difficulty in getting the safety message across 
to visitors.  His comments imply that few assumptions can be made regarding what visitors 
perceive in natural environments. 
Your average Joe, a 19-year-old living in Howick, has no experience of natural 
places. Twenty years ago, when you and I were kids, you might have belonged to 
scouts or a tramping club or something like that. These days not many people go 
tramping.  There are so many more recreation things to do that tramping, and 
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going into the back-country are no longer popular.  You and I have a basic 
understanding of the outdoors, and we know what’s kind of sensible.  But 
somebody who’s a couple of years off the boat from Taiwan who’s living in 
Howick comes from a different planet, and they don’t understand all the risks. 
 
This implies a belief that the social environment has changed and that the norm transmission 
process, backgrounds, and experiences cannot be assumed.  According to the informant, this 
is especially true for visitors originating from outside New Zealand. 
 
A similar observation is made by Wayne, one of DOC’s recreation planners, reinforcing the 
perception that many visitors to highly unmodified areas, New Zealanders included, have a 
poor understanding of the hazards they might encounter: 
I think there’s less awareness [among visitors] now than there was in the past.  I 
don’t think there are that many people who, as they grow up, are taken into the 
hills by their father or whatever, or who join a tramping club, or go out with 
scouts.  I mean, those things still happen, but I think that the sort of city-based 
nature of society means that people aren’t getting that familiarity, and if you don’t 
get that familiarity, you don’t know what you’re getting yourself in for.  We still get 
loonies who think that a two-day tramp in the Tararuas means throwing a 
sleeping bag and a loaf of bread in your pack, and they get lost and occasionally 
they get flown out in a body bag. 
As noted earlier in the discussion, managers’ perceptions of social change and visitor 
competency are likely to have important influences on how hazard and risk is managed at 
nature-based recreation sites. 
 
Changes in hazard awareness, and the public’s acceptance of risk, are key features affecting 
hazard management in New Zealand and overseas.  Jane, a visiting regulatory specialist 
employed by Parks Canada, commented on changes to the management style in Canada, 
which illustrate this relationship between management perception and social context: 
The measures taken with respect to public safety in parks over the past five or 
ten years in New Zealand are also happening within Parks Canada.  And I would 
say we are responding to societal change and societal impacts on our parks.  It’s 
not that we just like safety measures and we want to put in as many as we can, 
it’s the fact that society has evolved into a fairly urban type of user that seems to 
like to come to parks, and they have a very limited understanding of hazards and 
risks of the natural setting.  They are heavily influenced by the media, and media 
perception of fun and challenge and group interaction and what the opportunity 
can provide them with. 
 
The perception that social expectations of safety have increased over time, irrespective of its 
accuracy, has contributed to the risk perceptions of DOC managers.  Their interpretation of 
 228
the community’s demand for safety influences the risk management style adopted, may justify 
the application of strict safety standards, and, potentially, limits the provision of natural 
resource recreation opportunities. 
 
7.5.6 Summary of factors affecting managers’ risk perceptions 
The risk perceptions of DOC managers at various levels of the organisation appear to differ in 
terms of the focus of their interests, such as personal liability for visitor injury, and financial 
or political risk to the agency.  Critical to the risk perceptions at all levels of the organisation 
are the perceived legal responsibilities, the accident at Cave Creek, the development of a new 
organisational culture of risk management, and perceptions about social acceptance of risk.  
These historical, administrative, and social factors are important to identify as they influence 
the risk management tools and policies established by the agency, including the mechanisms 
through which the Department elects to communicate risk and hazard to its visitors.  
Communication of risk, and DOC managers’ perceptions of its purpose, is the subject of the 
final section of this chapter. 
 
7.6 Communication of hazard and risk  
This section examines the ways in which risk and hazard are communicated to visitors at 
public conservation sites in New Zealand, with specific reference to the glaciers of Westland 
National Park.  The risk management strategies adopted are discussed in the context of factors 
identified in Section 7.5, including perceived legal obligation, and the importance of business-
oriented practices.  In particular, the discussion emphasises managers’ perceptions of the 
value and intention of risk communication.  Through examining communication of hazard and 
risk, this section identifies a tension between DOC’s moral and legal commitments, and its 
desire to present a corporate identity. 
 
7.6.1 The value and purpose of warning signs 
The rationale for communicating hazards to visitors at the glaciers, and at other recreation 
sites throughout New Zealand, is driven by both the legal and moral context in which DOC 
operates.  As outlined in Chapter 4, various statutes combine to impose on DOC a significant 
responsibility for visitor access, experience, and safety.  DOC’s current interpretation and 
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practice under the HSE Act and OLA has created a strong acceptance of the duty of care owed 
to visitors on lands administered by the Department, which extends to an obligation to inform 
visitors of the dangers inherent at specific visitor sites.  To the extent that the legislation 
invites and encourages people to visit conservation lands, a moral obligation is also present, to 
warn visitors that there is potential danger in natural environments.  That the existence of 
natural hazards is sometimes not apparent at the glaciers (see Chapter 6) increases the 
perceived moral duty of the Department’s staff to make risk more explicit at these sites. 
 
For these perceived moral and legal reasons, DOC has elected to communicate the existence 
of hazards at the glaciers through installing warning signs and information panels both on-site 
and at the visitor centres in the nearby townships of Fox Glacier and Franz Josef.  Despite the 
use of warning signs, visitors to the glacier sites frequently disregard the messages, 
compounding managers’ fears of visitor injuries.  This situation raises the questions of why 
DOC continues to use warning signs as its primary hazard communication strategy, and what 
purpose the current signs serve.  Several possible reasons are discussed below, including the 
perception that the use of signs improves visitor information, discharges DOC’s moral and 
legal obligation to visitors, and maintains the Department’s corporate identity.  
 
Signs are used extensively by DOC for visitor information, hazard warning, and regulatory 
purposes.  In 1994 a national signs manual was written in which details of standardised styles 
and dimensions were specified.  Prior to the establishment of a standard approach to signs, 
conservancies were independently responsible for signs.  Roy, a member of DOC’s national 
signs coordinating group, recalled the transition, and the justification used for the new 
approach: 
In the past, everyone did their own thing – it’s as simple as that.  We’d come from 
parent organisations where there was a strong feeling that because we were 
managing important natural landscapes, we should develop sign systems that 
were appropriate to the local situation – the local landscape.  Once we became 
encompassed under DOC, it was felt that the local approach was failing in many 
respects.  One argument was that signs should blend into the landscape, but 
others of us said: “Hang on, we want people to find the sign!  The reason we put 
a sign up, is to get a message across!”.  The other thing we wanted to achieve 
with the signs was to establish the Department as a single agency.  The 
Department, even now, has quite a weak profile believe it or not.  We still get 
confused with regional councils, Landcare, Ministry for the Environment – all 
sorts of different agencies.  The ‘signs standard’ was one step to establish the 
Department in the public mind if you like.  Now you can drive anywhere in the 
country and you see a sign and you know that it’s all this one big family.  
Previously, as you moved from one area to another, you’d get quite distinct styles 
of presentation. 
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Roy’s comments imply that the development of standards for signs placed limited emphasis 
on their effectiveness, and more on the establishment of the Department’s efficiency and 
creating a corporate identity.  Tom, a manager within DOC’s External Relations Division, 
reinforced this conclusion with his comments on the importance of a standardised approach.  
Describing his arrival in the organisation, Tom alluded to the existing individualised approach 
to signs within DOC: 
When I came in, we had a diverse and messy set of identities around the place.  
It was a horrible sight; a mix of Lands and Survey, you know, the old stuff, three 
or four parent agencies, and just a shambles from an identity point of view.  Now 
we’ve got the sign standards, stationery, uniforms, and cars, and there’s definitely 
a link between them.  See the ranger, see the car, see the buildings, see the 
sign, see the publication, and there’s elements across them - like the band, the 
corporate signature, and the typeface - all those things bring it together.  DOC 
was slow to realise the generally accepted benefits of having a corporate identity 
that’s together - the benefits of credibility and cost savings if you get it right.  
Basically there’s big value in representing the organisation professionally – it’s 
unquantifiable, but all corporates take it on board. 
 
This exercise in image creation was a deliberate attempt within DOC to increase the external 
and internal perception of professionalism, and was not undertaken without resistance.  While, 
according to Tom, the shift in emphasis had senior management support, others were less 
enthusiastic about changing the way DOC operated: 
The organisation was, and to a lesser extent still is, full of individually minded 
people with recreation or wildlife management backgrounds.  They don’t have 
experience with this sort of thinking, so they don’t understand the value.  They 
regard spending any money on these things [corporate identity] as a waste – 
money that could save a species, or build another track.  My argument, and the 
argument of senior management, is that by getting these things right, firstly you 
save some money by rationalising your printing costs [for instance], but also the 
more professional you appear, the more money is going to come your way.  The 
better people think of you, the more credible you are, the better job you are seen 
to be doing, regardless of whether you’re doing a good job or not, the more 
goodies are going to come your way, and the more tracks you can build, the 
more species you’re going to save. 
 
The adoption of a commercial model to this aspect of conservation management is interesting.  
While some DOC staff in the business of image creation clearly see the Department as 
delivering a product like any other organisation in the market place, it is debatable whether 
DOC needs to differentiate itself from others in the same sense that market competitors must.  
While credibility can make an important difference to communication effectiveness 
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(Manfredo & Bright, 1991), support for the agency’s work is unlikely to be dependent on 
corporate image. 
 
In addition to the contribution the standardised signs could make to enhancing the 
Department’s profile and identity, it can also be argued that their deployment is a cost 
effective means to ensure that the perceived legal and moral obligations are met.  This claim 
is implied in the comments of Roy, a manager with national responsibilities for signs: 
Whenever we recognise a need to communicate something, we are supposed to 
canvass all the options.  Signs are relatively cheap and simple and, I guess, more 
often than not they are going to be the most appropriate means, because you 
know that every person who visits a site is going to go past a sign.  Now, I’m not 
completely convinced that this is what we should be doing to communicate to 
people.  Quite often, what we are really doing when we put up one of these signs 
is meeting our legal requirement.  We have complied with the letter of the law in 
the sense of “you have put up a sign”.  I say: “Okay, you’ve put up a sign, how 
has that altered the public’s appreciation of the situation?”. 
 
Tim, a senior manager in DOC’s Central Regional Office, strongly refutes the notion that 
DOC is using signs at hazardous sites to discharge its legal obligation to visitors: 
I believe that the Department takes visitor safety very seriously in those high 
volume places.  The way we’ve chosen to convey the message may not get the 
message through to as many people as we want – it may not get the message 
through to anyone.  It doesn’t mean that we don’t take the responsibility very 
seriously.  We have, either for practical or financial, or aesthetic reasons, chosen 
to put [the safety] messages within, or alongside other messages that we are 
trying to convey. From the Department’s point of view, it probably has more to do 
with our technical ability and communication skills than with our desire to ensure 
that the Department isn’t liable. 
 
Hazard warning signs are the primary means of risk communication between DOC and the 
visiting public.  In Chapter 6 it was suggested that warning signs at the glaciers were often 
ineffective, with visitors either ignoring the warning messages, failing to notice the signs, or 
failing to comprehend the message content.  Furthermore, despite the fact that many visitors 
to the glaciers are from outside New Zealand, signs are without exception in English, and 
predominantly text-based.  Considering the target audience, the messages contained in signs 
are reasonably complex in some cases, as this example demonstrates:  
Warning: visitors to the Fox Glacier please note that the terminal face of the 
glacier is very unstable and dangerous.  Visitors should not go beyond the rope 
barriers and warning signs unless accompanied by an experienced guide. 
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With reference to the use of language on some signs, and the absence of more simple graphic 
images depicting the potential hazards, Jock, a senior manager based in Westland, gave his 
interpretation of the situation: 
The corporate signs were designed post-Cave Creek, and people [DOC 
management] were pretty keen to get the message across.  It’s more of a legal 
warning, you know: “This is your first legal warning that a hazard exists”.  We 
want visitors to actually enjoy the area, but at the same time, we want them to 
appreciate that there’s a risk.  In saying that, I don’t think that five lines of text in 
green and gold is going to do that. 
 
This respondent is acknowledging the limitations of text-based hazard communication signs 
in terms of improving visitor awareness of danger.  It is implicit in his comments, however, 
that DOC has issued a formal notice of the hazard and thereby discharged some of its 
responsibility to the public. 
 
This view is further illustrated by the comments of Wayne, a recreation planner working in 
Wellington: 
We [DOC] tend to use signs whenever we get a problem – the thing we do is put 
up a sign.  Often that’s because it’s the cheapest option.  If you’ve got a problem, 
you put up a sign and say: “watch out for this”, rather than dealing with it. 
 
DOC managers are presented with a paradox in their attempts to communicate risk to visitors.  
On the one hand, there are sound aesthetic and individual freedom arguments for limiting the 
number, style, and content of signs in natural areas.  On the other hand, there is a strong 
perception among managers of legal and moral obligations to the public, and a prevailing 
organisational doctrine of risk and safety management which implies the need to take 
effective communication seriously. 
 
7.6.2 Summary 
Risk is communicated to visitors at the glaciers through a variety of means, including hazard 
warning and information signs on site and at the two visitor centres, physical presence and 
advice of Department of Conservation staff, and (to a lesser extent) via tourist brochures and 
publications available to visitors at multiple points in their planning for, and enactment of, 
travel to the glaciers.  Prior to 1994, individual conservancies designed signs and messages 
for their own unique situations.  It is not known how successful the communication of hazard 
messages was at this time, at the glaciers or elsewhere.  More recently, there has been a move 
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within DOC to create a corporate identity for the Department, one of the principles of which 
is consistency of signs throughout DOC administered land (DOC, 1994).  This principle is 
defended on the basis of a commercial model aimed at strengthening public and financial 
support for the organisation.  The incident at Cave Creek served to highlight the potential risk 
to visitors on DOC land, and increased the level of emphasis on safety issues, including the 
communication of hazards to visitors.  Strategies for achieving this appear to have focused on 
the provision of additional signs, barriers, and temporary facility closures rather than an 
examination of the process of communication itself.  To this extent, management beliefs about 
the intended value and purpose of warning signs at the glaciers reflect both a perceived legal 
obligation and a commitment to corporate identity. 
 
7.7 Chapter summary and conclusions 
It is argued in this chapter that attitudes towards the management of natural resource 
recreation and tourism strongly reflect wider social processes related to risk and safety 
consciousness.  In particular, it is evident that managers’ perceptions and attitudes toward risk 
are shaped by personal knowledge and experience of natural hazards, perceived legal liability, 
the events surrounding the accident at Cave Creek, a new organisational culture, and 
perceptions of social expectations regarding health and safety.  Furthermore, how managers 
choose to communicate risk and hazards to visitors is influenced by their own perceptions of 
what is at risk, commitment to a corporate identity, and a focus on legal liability.  In this 
regard, it is clear that hazard and risk management approaches are heavily influenced by 
social and political factors. 
 
The aim of the chapter was to explore the management dimension of perceived risk.  It is 
evident that managers at the different levels of the organisation perceive risk differently.  For 
instance, at the field level, risk is expressed in terms of visitor safety, and some fears about 
the legal liability of individual staff.  The rationale for hazard communication is to prevent 
visitors behaving in ways that may lead to injury, and consequently implicate the site 
managers.  At a more senior level, and away from the glacier sites, risk assumes a slightly 
different significance, and relates less clearly to threats to visitor safety.  The risks at this level 
are discussed in terms of the threats to the agency and its leaders (financial, legal, and 
political).  For the senior managers, the prospect of visitor risk has contributed to the 
justification and adoption of a new organisational style, structure, and systems that ultimately 
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enhance the agency’s corporate image, and improve the likelihood of successful funding bids.  
It is considered important by such managers that risk communication strategies comply with 
the corporate identity, a stance which emphasises the focus on agency risk. 
 
The final chapter in this thesis presents an integrative discussion of risk in natural resource 
settings, incorporating the individual perceptions of visitors, the beliefs of agency managers, 
and the wider social context in which these both exist. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions: Nature-based tourism and 
recreation in the risk society 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The intention of this research was to explore the complex interplay between how visitors to 
natural tourism settings perceive risks, and how managing agencies communicate risk to 
them.  At one level, the research is a study of how individual visitors perceive hazards at 
natural resource recreation sites, and the factors that underpin these perceptions.  At another 
level, the research explores the role of park managers and officials in interpreting their legal 
and moral obligations, in the context of macro societal conditions that place a strong emphasis 
on safety and the avoidance of risk.  In this sense, the thesis has attempted to locate the 
individual tourist within society, and, in particular, the risk society identified by Beck (1992).  
 
Following a brief review of the research objectives, this chapter presents a summary and 
examination of the key research themes, including an integrative model to help illustrate the 
relationships between the various components of the study.  As some research findings have 
applied value, a section on implications and management recommendations is considered 
important.  Also critical are the suggestions for future research.  The current work adopted a 
broad scope, and in the process many ‘stones were left unturned’.  The potential for further 
risk research in tourism is discussed. 
 
8.2 The research problem re-visited: An appraisal of the research 
objectives  
The impetus for this study was the observation that at several popular nature-based tourism 
attractions in New Zealand, visitors were potentially exposed to a variety of natural hazards.  
At these sites, some visitors appeared to disregard warning signs and behave in ways that 
threatened their safety.  These observations led to the formation of questions concerning the 
extent to which visitors were aware of the hazards and risks in such environments, the degree 
of willingness to accept responsibility for known risks, and whether any differences between 
visitors were related to country of origin.  The visitor’s physical experience at the sites also 
occurs within a management environment, which was presumed to have an influence over risk 
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and hazard awareness.  To this extent, the perceptions and actions of managers at the 
recreation sites were also seen as important avenues of inquiry. 
 
In order to examine visitor behaviour, and the concepts of hazard awareness and risk 
perception, the glaciers of Westland National Park were selected as a case study site.  These 
two attractions provided the medium through which the multiple dimensions of risk were 
explored.  The specific research objectives are reiterated below, after which an appraisal of 
these is presented. 
 
8.2.1 Research aim and objectives 
The fundamental aim of this study was: 
 To examine the nature and significance of risk in the management of parks, recreation, 
and tourism in New Zealand. 
 
More specifically, the research objectives were: 
 To identify and evaluate visitor awareness and perception of natural hazard and risk at 
Fox and Franz Josef glaciers on the South Island’s West Coast. 
 To identify and evaluate visitor attitudes toward individual responsibility for safety at 
the glaciers. 
 To assess the extent of behavioural compliance with warning signs among visitors to 
the glaciers, and to measure the relative effectiveness of introduced pictorial warning 
messages. 
 To determine the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of DOC managers with regard to 
their roles as risk managers, both at the glacier sites, and within New Zealand more 
generally. 
 To identify and assess how DOC presents and communicates risk and safety messages 
in natural resource recreation settings such as the glaciers, and to examine what 
perceived legal and moral obligations form the basis of these strategies. 
 To explore the relevance of the theory of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992) to 
understanding risk perceptions and risk management in the New Zealand tourism and 
recreation context. 
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In Section 8.3, the outcomes of the research objectives are addressed in relation to the main 
findings of the study. 
 
8.3 Dimensions of the risk construct 
The central aim of the study was to examine the significance of risk in the management of 
recreation and tourism settings.  The various dimensions of the risk construct identified in this 
research are depicted in Figure 8.1.  The essential features of the model are described before a 
discussion of the main dimensions is presented. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGICAL  
 
 
Individual Dimension Administrative Dimension Social / Historical Dimension 
Personal factors 
 Risk-taker 
 Risk-averter 
 Experience 
 Culture 
Legal obligation 
 Perceived 
 Actual 
 
Risk society 
 Societal acceptance / 
tolerance 
 Individualism 
 Vulnerability and choice 
Cognitive factors 
 Hazard awareness 
 Knowledge 
 Perception of environment 
o Physical 
o Social 
o Management 
Organisational culture 
 Risk management focus 
Cultural and legislative change 
 Decline of ‘pioneer’ approach 
 Health and safety laws 
 
Visitor context 
 Freedom from constraint 
 Perceived invulnerability 
 Compliance cost / benefit 
 Novelty 
Management action 
 Risk management plans 
 Staff training 
 Agency policy 
 Hazard warning signs 
Antecedent events 
 Cave Creek 
 Tourist accidents 
 Media & promotional material 
 Scientific / Expert information 
 
Potential outcomes (risks) 
 Experience gains 
 Experience loss / injury 
Potential outcomes (risks) 
 Financial loss 
 Moral condemnation 
 Legal action 
 Political consequence 
 
Potential outcomes (risks) 
 Increased risk aversion 
 Decreased trust and 
tolerance 
 High expectation 
 Lost opportunities 
   
VISITOR MANAGEMENT SOCIETY 
Visitor action affects 
management response 
Management action affects 
visitor response 
Macro social situation affects 
management and visitor response 
 
 
Figure 8.1 represents dimensions of the risk construct operating in the glacier case study.  
Some elements of the model have applicability elsewhere, especially in the New Zealand 
context.  In essence, the model depicts factors influencing the perception and presentation of 
risk in natural resource recreation and tourism settings.  The discussion in the current study 
Figure 8.1: Dimensions of the risk construct in natural resource recreation and tourism settings 
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has relied largely on social psychological and sociological explanations in order to make 
sense of the individual, administrative, and socio-historical aspects of risk.  The underlying 
assumption of the model is that risk in natural resource recreation and tourism settings is most 
accurately understood through an examination of the interrelationships between visitors, 
managers, and society as a whole.  Visitors to the glaciers perceive risk on the basis of their 
own intuitive assessments of the physical conditions, drawing on personal knowledge and 
previous experiences to make this judgement, which is also influenced by personal risk 
propensity.  But individual perceptions are also socially constructed, and involve influences 
from the social environment (such as the behaviour of other visitors) and management 
environment (such as risk communication attempts).  Furthermore, the glaciers are visited in a 
leisure context, by tourists who seek novelty and fun, as well as temporary freedom from 
constraints associated with their home environments.  These features make a collective 
contribution to risk as experienced by the individual visitor to the glaciers.  Visitor 
perceptions of risk, and subsequent visitor behaviour, will also influence the risk 
communication strategies of management. 
 
For DOC managers, risk is experienced through actual and perceived legal obligations, an 
emergent risk and safety culture within the organisation, and their own awareness and 
knowledge about natural hazards.  The threats to managers (risk outcomes) include financial, 
legal, moral, and political losses, effects which are unevenly distributed throughout the 
management levels of the organisation. 
 
The management of, and visits to, the glaciers occur within a broader social context which 
includes social, cultural, and historical features.  These are especially evident in their 
influence on visitor management at the sites.  The broad social context includes influences of 
the ‘risk society’ in which a diminished tolerance of risk is apparent, and where individuals 
perceive greater responsibility for life outcomes, and greater potential for loss.  In New 
Zealand, the macro-social environment includes changes to health and safety laws, recent 
accidents involving tourists and recreationists, and the promotion of its attractions as natural, 
safe adventures.  The potential outcomes of the risk society for parks, recreation, and tourism 
management in New Zealand are multiple.  Increased risk aversion and community 
intolerance of risk may lead to a diminished sense of good will between providers and 
consumers of recreation and tourism experiences.  Unrealistic expectations of safety standards 
may lead to the loss of some recreation opportunities. 
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Further discussion of the three broad dimensions of risk is presented within the summary and 
review of the research findings below. 
 
8.3.1 Visitors and risk 
The visitor is one dimension of the risk construct at the glaciers.  This section reviews 
findings that are considered most important within the individual component of the model. 
 
8.3.1.1 Visitor perceptions of, and attitudes to, risk and safety 
Visitor awareness of hazards, perceptions of 
safety, and attitudes toward individual 
responsibility were assessed at the glaciers 
using a survey questionnaire and visitor 
interviews.  The analysis showed that, for 
most visitors, hazard awareness was moderate 
or low, while perceived safety was high.  
These features were combined to create a risk 
perception estimate which indicated that risk 
perceptions were lowest among visitors from 
outside New Zealand and those aged 40 years 
and older.  Consistent with the moderate to 
low risk perceptions of visitors, attitudes to 
individual responsibility for safety were 
mostly favourable.  It is useful to emphasise, 
however, that in order for risks to be accepted, 
they first need to be recognised (Gough, 
1998b; Wagenaar, 1992).  To this extent, the 
willingness of glacier visitors to accept responsibility for their personal safety requires further 
investigation. 
 
The limited visitor perceptions of risk can be interpreted in several ways.  For instance, the 
glacier environments are not within the common experiences of most visitors.  While some 
 
Plate 8.1: The rush to experience Franz Josef Glacier 
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literature suggests that novel situations are likely to produce higher risk perceptions (eg., 
Carter, 1998; Margolis, 1996; Oskamp, 1982), it is possible that for visitors to the glaciers this 
is overridden by a perception that others are in control of the hazards at the site.  Perceptions 
are also influenced by how other visitors are behaving, and the preconceptions of New 
Zealand as a safe destination.  Promotional images of the glaciers also emphasise fine weather 
conditions and scenic vistas, and contain few safety messages. 
 
8.3.1.2 Visitor behaviour and communication effectiveness 
A high proportion of visitors at the glaciers failed to comply with the written appeals of 
managers to stay within the marked safety zones.  There are multiple explanations for non-
compliance, although these can be summarised as two main possibilities.  First, tourists may 
not perceive any risk or recognise the managers’ attempts to warn them of the hazards.  This 
implies that the non-compliance issues are a consequence of ambiguous or incredible hazard 
communication.  Second, tourists may acknowledge and accept risk in order to realise their 
ambitions, or as a consequence of evaluating compliance costs and benefits.  This implies that 
non-compliance is a result of factors beyond the basic elements of effective communication.  
The findings of the current study suggest evidence of both possibilities.  Further discussion of 
these explanations is presented below. 
 
Visitor behaviour at the glaciers has concerned managers and hazard experts because it is 
sometimes perceived as unsafe.  Several explanations for visitor behaviour are presented in 
this dissertation, informed by the literature review in Chapters 3 and 4.  One explanation links 
perceptions with behaviour.  If perceptions of risk associated with an activity are low, the 
individual is less likely to be dissuaded from the activity.  Risk perceptions are influenced by 
multiple factors, including individual expectation, experience, attitude, and personality 
disposition (Leiss & Chociolko, 1994; Slovic et al., 2000c; Tobin & Montz, 1997).  
Perceptions are also influenced by situational factors such as the nature of the physical 
environment and the behaviour of other people.  The situational context includes 
communication, and the current management agency uses text-based warning messages in its 
attempt to influence visitor behaviour. 
 
At the glaciers, there is some evidence to suggest that the introduced pictorial signs were 
influential in increasing warning compliance.  This is consistent with other studies where 
 241
increases in compliance have been associated with greater salience  (Glover & Wogalter, 
1997; Hathaway & Dingus, 1992; Wogalter & Young, 1994).  Observations of visitors also 
suggested that the behaviour of other people was an important factor influencing compliant 
behaviour.  When visitors were observed beyond the recommended ‘safety’ zone, this 
appeared to legitimise the behaviour of ignoring the access restriction.  This social facilitation 
effect has been noted in many different contexts (Baldwin & Baldwin, 1986; Harrell, 1991). 
 
In addition to the social-psychological dimensions of communication, it is also likely that 
behaviour at the glaciers is influenced by the cultural and institutional contexts to which 
individual visitors have been exposed.  The literature in Chapter 4 suggested, for instance, that 
people travelling away from their home environments and communities, often act in ways that 
they would not while at home (Peillon, 1993; Ryan, 1993; Ryan & Kinder, 1996; Ryan & 
Robertson, 1994).  Some authors have linked the risk behaviour of tourists to the absence of 
clear norms and social rules (Kruhse-MountBurton, 1995; Ryan & Hall, 2001; Ryan & 
Kinder, 1996; Weber, 2001; Wickens, 1997).  Tourists may act in non-compliant ways 
because they are temporarily ‘out of society’.  Moreover, if Furedi’s (1997) identification of a 
‘new moral consensus’ of safety is accurate, tourists who deliberately disregard 
management’s requests at the glaciers can be seen as transgressors of the new morality.  In 
this sense, tourism and recreation represent opportunities to cast off ‘sensible’ constraints. 
 
Freedom from the normative constraints of home societies, combined with a leisure context of 
relaxation and novelty, is also likely to prompt more risky behaviour (Wickens, 1997).  For 
some tourists, responsibility for safety may be (subconsciously or otherwise) delegated to 
those perceived to be providing the experience (Dann, 1996), although there is little direct 
evidence for this in the present work. 
 
8.3.2 Managers and risk 
The second important aspect of the study was the investigation of managers and risk.  An 
appreciation of managers’ risk perceptions is an important dimension in understanding the 
significance of risk in natural resource recreation and tourism settings. 
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8.3.2.1 Managers’ perceptions of risk 
While not quantified in the present study, it is evident that the risk perceptions of managers 
differ from those of visitors to the glaciers.  This is consistent with the pattern in other risk 
perception research where experts and the public have been found to differ (see Section 
3.2.1).  In general, glacier visitors perceive risk to be moderate or low, whereas managers 
(especially those working at the field level) perceive risk as high.  Factors affecting managers’ 
experiences of risk include perceived obligations, organisational culture, the legacy of Cave 
Creek, and beliefs about social intolerance of risk. 
 
The Department of Conservation has two key interests in its management of risk at the 
glaciers, and at other recreation and tourism sites: i) loss incurred by visitors (injury and 
accident); and ii) loss incurred by the agency (legal, financial, and political).  Although it is 
not possible to determine which of these takes overall priority, the evidence presented in 
Chapter 7 suggested that different interests exist at two distinct management levels.  
Managers who work in the glacier environment portray risk in terms of threats to visitor 
safety, and their own sense of vulnerability to legal liability.  Managers in more senior roles 
emphasise the range of risks to the agency (financial, political, and legal), and can be seen to 
have used the accident at Cave Creek, and the ‘new morality’ of public safety, to justify the 
development of business-oriented systems, and to achieve improved funding outcomes for the 
agency. 
 
8.3.2.2 Risk management and communication 
At present, DOC appears focused on risk management, giving rise to a plethora of systems, 
checks, and balances for averting risk to visitors and the agency.  As a result of this recent 
emphasis, DOC has amassed a great deal of information about the hazards faced by visitors 
and the risks to visitors and the agency.  Little is known by DOC, however, about the visitors 
themselves. 
 
Risk communication at the glaciers is undertaken for two main reasons.  First, there is a 
perceived obligation to inform visitors of natural hazards, and to encourage appropriate 
behaviour.  Second, risk communication can be interpreted as an attempt to transfer some of 
the responsibility for risk at the glaciers.  Despite management attempts to present a message 
of risk, the evidence presented in Chapter 6 demonstrated that many visitors remain ignorant 
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and even dismissive of the extent of risk to their safety.  Some explanations for this are given 
in Section 8.3.1 above.  Further, in assuming responsibility for hazard management at the 
glaciers, DOC has reduced the likelihood that responsibility for visitor safety will be a shared 
one.  What initially appears to be a comprehensive risk management strategy for improving 
the safety of visitors is deficient in the sense that it does not focus on visitor behaviour. 
 
The communication of hazard and risk at the glaciers is difficult, not least because of the 
leisure context and transient nature of tourists, visitors’ tendency to focus on the attraction 
(rather than messages peripheral to their experiences), language difficulties, and reluctance 
among tourism promoters to suggest to their clients that risk exists.  Aesthetic considerations 
further complicate the communication challenge.  Given the natural character of settings such 
as the glaciers, written communication is expected to remain appropriate to the sites.  This 
limits the nature and scope of hazard warning signs in many natural recreation areas.   
 
8.3.2.3 Legal and administrative context 
The perceived legal and moral obligations of DOC managers were investigated in order to 
understand their influences on risk communication and hazard management.  The findings in 
Chapter 7 suggested that managers at different levels of the organisation perceived strong 
legal responsibilities to insure against risk.  How the risks were defined appeared dependent 
on the status of the manager.  The perceptions and attitudes of managers can be interpreted 
within the context of wider social and historical influences such as changes to health and 
safety legislation, the demand for greater organisational accountability (ethically and 
financially), and the accident at Cave Creek.  Several managers remained uncertain about 
their specific responsibilities to visitors, yet perceived a general social ‘mood’ of risk 
intolerance. 
 
8.3.2.4 Balancing expectations of safety with demands for nature experiences 
Ambiguous legal obligations, visitor interest in experiencing natural settings, and 
communication challenges, suggest an emerging dilemma for managers of protected natural 
areas in New Zealand.  DOC managers perceive a high degree of social expectation for safety, 
as well as a strong demand for nature-based experiences.  DOC’s problem is compounded by 
an unusual set of circumstances such as unrestricted public access, physically dynamic 
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environments, active promotion of many natural sites, and the limited experience of visitors.  
While some visitors to the glaciers engage the services of professional guides, the vast 
majority are independent travellers who rely on their own judgement and available 
information to negotiate the sites.  The dilemma for managers exists in their attempts to 
balance the rights of public access and visitor demand for exploring natural settings, while 
satisfying perceived legal and moral responsibilities for safety. 
 
8.3.3 Society and risk 
Several sociologists have claimed that Western societies are currently experiencing a rise in 
individualism and a related pre-occupation with risk (eg., Beck, 1992; Furedi, 1997; Giddens, 
1994; Luhmann, 1993).  Describing the ‘risk society’, Beck (1992) argued that individuals 
must now construct their own biographies, free from the constraints of social structures that 
previously made most aspects of life fixed and inevitable.  An important consequence of this 
development is that many life outcomes are now the responsibility of individuals, thereby 
increasing levels of uncertainty, and perceptions of risk.   Similarly, Furedi (1997) argued that 
the fragmentation of agreed social roles has contributed to an atmosphere of doubt and 
vulnerability, and an obsession with health, safety and security.   
 
The risk society is the macro-context in which some tourists make their visits to natural 
resource settings, and in which managers attempt to provide opportunities for satisfying 
visitor experiences.  The attitudes and risk perceptions of DOC managers are consistent with 
the notion of societal risk aversion claimed by Furedi (1997), Lash et al. (1996) and Lübbe 
(1994).   The findings and analysis in Chapter 7 suggested that DOC managers are 
significantly influenced by legal and moral obligations, a risk management culture, and 
perceived social expectations of safety.  In turn, these factors have an impact on how DOC 
approaches visitor management, including the communication of natural hazards. 
 
Visitors to the glaciers, however, do not appear to be the ‘cautious’ and safety conscious 
individuals that may have been anticipated in a risk and safety obsessed society.  While most 
visitors originated from societies where risk aversion is thought to be emphasised, many 
interviewees manifested the discourse of risk acceptance, rather than risk aversion.  For 
instance, visitors (especially those from New Zealand) often rejected the idea that 
management should do more to protect visitors at the sites, and articulated a theme of 
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personal responsibility for safety.  If Beck (1992) and Furedi (1997) are correct in their 
contention that people from these societies are more risk aware than ever before, it might have 
been expected that visitors to the glaciers would be more safety conscious, and less prepared 
to accept risk than they appeared to be.  The findings on risk and responsibility, however, 
need to be interpreted in their full context.  Visitors also appeared ignorant of many natural 
hazards and, therefore, their assumption of responsibility for safety remains uncertain. 
 
Visitors and managers operate in different risk dimensions.  For the visitor, hazards are not 
apparent, and the risks are small.  They experience the glaciers in a leisure context, to explore, 
have fun, and see places they may never see again.  To the visitor, the glaciers are like any 
other tourist attraction: well managed, consumable, and safe.  For managers, risk is a major 
part of their experience of the glaciers.  Risk may be magnified for managers through their 
own experiences of the natural hazards, observations of visitor behaviour, perceptions of legal 
obligations and consequences, and their belief in the social demand for safety (the ‘new moral 
consensus’).  The implications of this, and those of other findings are discussed in Section 8.4 
below. 
 
8.4 Implications of the research findings 
There are clear, indisputable physical risks to visitors at the glacier sites.  The settings are 
dynamic places where the natural processes of rock, water, and ice represent hazards to 
visitors who are largely inexperienced and unprepared.  Management records, the media, and 
other incident reports document that fatal accidents, injuries, and near misses have occurred at 
Fox and Franz Josef glaciers on a regular, although infrequent, basis.  
 
The existence of risk at the glaciers is a simple function of the presence of people in areas 
where natural hazards inhere.  Far more complicated are the decisions about how significant 
the risk actually is, and how it should be managed.  This research has established that most 
visitors to the glaciers have a limited understanding of natural hazards, and perceive risk as 
low at the sites.  That hazards are present but not recognised by visitors raises some important 
ethical and political issues about the extent to which it is necessary to inform visitors about 
the risks that natural areas may contain.   
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The findings of the present study make it clear that some managers interpret the glaciers as 
high risk environments.  It is possible that these managers overestimate the risks to visitors as 
a consequence of their anticipated obligations.  One outcome of managers’ risk perceptions is 
an over-emphasis on physical risk that will undermine visitor satisfaction and experience.  
Similarly, a preoccupation with agency risk will threaten the experience opportunity 
altogether.  This research has identified an element of confusion among some managers 
concerning where their responsibilities to protect visitors begin and end.  In order to avoid 
unnecessary focus on hazard management, the Department’s legal position needs to be 
clarified for managers.  It is critical that risk management is balanced with management of 
other aspects of the visitor experience. 
 
Key informant interviews in this study established that managers at the glaciers are concerned 
about some aspects of visitor behaviour, especially the low level of compliance with agency 
appeals for visitors to remain within identified safety zones.  Observations of visitor 
behaviour confirmed the nature and extent of transgressions, and indicated that current DOC 
strategies were ineffective in ensuring compliance.  Other findings implied that some 
increases in visitor hazard awareness, and increased compliance, were possible through 
manipulation of sign salience and use of pictorial messages.  Observations and interviews 
suggested, however, that multiple factors contribute to the non-compliance situation, and that 
signs alone will not effect the level of behaviour change sought by DOC to ensure visitor 
safety at the glaciers.  
 
Among the factors likely to influence visitor perceptions of risk and appropriate behaviour at 
the glaciers, are the expectations of visitors and social norms operating within and between 
groups.  To the extent that managers of recreation and tourism settings wish to effect 
behavioural change, they also need to understand the salient outcomes for specified reference 
groups (Adams et al., 1998; Fishbein & Manfredo, 1992; Pearce 1988).  The importance to 
tourists of particular experiences (such as touching the ice) need to be identified.  It is also 
necessary for managers to recognise that a diverse visitor population will require a variety of 
communication approaches and programmes to achieve compliance with management 
requests.  Tourists at the glaciers are not a uniform group, and represent cultures where 
natural settings, expectations of management, as well as the first language spoken, may well 
differ from those in New Zealand.  Effective persuasion is more likely if messages can be 
tailored to particular audiences (McCool & Braithwaite, 1992).  This reinforces the point that 
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natural resource recreation and tourism agencies must understand the visitors in order to 
manage hazards and risk effectively. 
 
Risk aversion is an emergent characteristic of the social structure in many modern Western 
societies.  There are multiple implications of this phenomenon for visitors to, and managers 
of, natural resource recreation and tourism areas.  For managers, there may be a tendency to 
overestimate the hazards and risks to visitors, and pursue unsustainable and unnecessary 
mechanisms in order to reduce the natural hazards to visitors and risks to their agencies.  For 
visitors to high-use, front-country sites, the implication is that experiences will be subject to 
increasing management, with additional signs and barriers to facilitate ‘safe’ experiences.  In 
turn, this is likely to raise visitors’ expectations of management, and the illusion of 
management’s control over hazards and risk.  An additional consequence of high safety 
expectations is agencies and operators reluctant to offer some recreation opportunities, unless 
their liability can be waived. 
 
The extent to which managers are willing, obliged, or expected to become involved in 
managing risks inherent in the visitor’s experience has important implications for freedom in 
natural recreation and tourism settings.  Communication of risks and hazards to visitors exists 
on a continuum traversing information, advice, and explicit warning, and should be matched 
to the likely visitor group.  The challenge for managers of natural resource settings in New 
Zealand is that often a diverse group of people visit these areas, differing in age, experience, 
and country of origin.  Perceptions of risk and hazard among these visitors differ, as do 
responses to risk communication attempts by the management agency. 
 
If management intends to enhance visitor awareness of risk at natural resource sites, further 
research and attention to hazard communication strategies is required.  The redesign of 
warning signs is one aspect of this, especially given likely increases in visitors from travel 
markets such as China and Thailand, where language and cultural differences will present 
obvious communication challenges.  Other strategies should include the development of a 
safety code, and improved co-ordination between the land management agency and the wider 
tourism industry.  Creating more realistic visitor expectations and appropriate visitor 
behaviour is not solely the responsibility of DOC.  The industry must play a role beyond the 
promotion of New Zealand as a safe, friendly, and fun-filled destination, and help to improve 
visitor appreciation of the hazards inherent in the dynamic landscapes they come to enjoy. 
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It is also important to acknowledge the importance of the economic context within which 
DOC operates, at both the site-specific and national level.  The glaciers are at the heart of 
West Coast tourism, any interruption of the access to which, potentially threatens the 
economic and social viability of the region.  In this regard, although the present study 
established that visitors to the glaciers perceived the sites as ‘safe’ places for tourists, it is 
clear from other research that tourism destinations are vulnerable to changes in consumer 
confidence and travellers’ perceptions of risk.  Even isolated incidents have the potential to 
influence negatively the numbers of tourists to specific destinations. 
 
8.5 Future research ideas: Natural hazard, risk, and tourism research 
in New Zealand 
This research has suggested that risk is an important and multi-faceted phenomenon that has 
increasing relevance to recreation and tourism management.  The study has also revealed 
additional questions, which may form the basis of future research projects.  Some of these are 
identified below. 
 
1. Further examination of message compliance in recreation and tourism field settings is 
required.  This should include specific focus on the factors affecting compliance, with 
an emphasis on tracking and gaining qualitative information from visitors.  In 
particular, information will be useful from visitors whose English language 
comprehension is limited. 
2. A detailed study of how international visitors perceive the responsibilities of tourism 
and recreation managers is needed.  Such a study would allow the concept of implicit 
social contracts to be explored, including the specific expectations of, and assumptions 
made by, visitors to natural resource and other tourism settings.  This topic requires 
qualitative attention beyond the scope of the present study. 
3. Research on hazard and risk awareness among visitors to other recreation and tourism 
sites in New Zealand is required.  A range of sites would give useful comparative 
information. 
4. Additional research on the effectiveness of communicating hazard (and other) 
messages using pictorial signs is needed, and should explore a range of texts and 
illustrations.  Initial studies might consider formally recording visitor responses to 
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pictorials as these have the potential to be ambiguous, contentious, or interfere with 
the visitor experience. 
5. A broad-based study of the risks tourists perceive in their visits to New Zealand is 
required.  The media image of New Zealand as ‘clean, green, friendly, and safe’ is one 
that demands critical examination.   
6. There is potential to study the role of guidebooks and other promotional material in 
contributing to the formation of hazard and risk perceptions of specific sites within 
New Zealand.  Prospective visitors might be interviewed prior to their arrival at the 
sites (or even prior to their arrival in New Zealand) to determine their levels of 
comprehension concerning hazards present in their itineraries.  They could then be 
interviewed on return. 
 
8.6 Concluding remarks 
Risk is a complex concept present in a diverse range of situations including the experience 
and management of recreation and tourism.  Individuals, organisations, and societies differ in 
their assessments of what is at risk, how significant the risk is, and who is responsible for it.  
In protected natural areas, the ‘true’ risk to visitors or management agencies cannot be known, 
yet the perception of risk clearly influences how such places are used and managed.  An 
understanding of risk in recreation and tourism settings is only possible when the linked 
dimensions of individual visitors, those responsible for park management, and the macro-
social context are considered together. 
 
Most tourists to natural attractions in New Zealand conduct their visits in relative autonomy, 
yet have little or no understanding of the settings they enter.  The tourist industry itself is 
largely uncoordinated, and visitors are free to construct their own travel itineraries, and 
explore natural places independently.  This freedom principle is embedded within the New 
Zealand natural resource recreation experience, a feature which represents significant 
challenges for managers, especially in the context of a risk-oriented society.  The extent to 
which the risk phenomenon continues to influence tourist experience and visitor management, 
will depend upon the level of individual hazard awareness, and the social acceptance of 
hazards as inherent aspects of New Zealand’s natural resource settings. 
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Together, the multiple dimensions of this study represent an interesting and complex 
situation, in which tourists to natural attractions seek to escape the limits and constraints of 
their everyday urban lives for a temporary experience of nature.  Most tourists, however, 
originate from within the ‘risk society’, and, therefore, they carry part of this culture with 
them in their travels.  To this extent, they are not completely free from the constraints of their 
home lives, and may even assume that a similar safety culture exists in New Zealand. 
 
Yet tourists do not demonstrate an awareness of risks at the glaciers.  Perhaps this is because 
they interpret the natural setting as free of the technological and environmental risks which 
surround the urban environment.  The reaction of some visitors to attempts by DOC managers 
to restrict access at the glacier sites is also indicative of the freedom that tourists seek in their 
recreation, although it is open to speculation just how accepting of risk tourists would be in 
the event that the apparently benign natural conditions turned against them.  Underlying the 
attitudes and behaviour of some visitors in this study, is a likely belief that the risks and 
hazards are well controlled by management, and that no access would be permitted if the sites 
were genuinely dangerous.  In this sense, tourists are unlikely to accept the negative 
consequences of freedom, and will expect a degree of safety to underpin their experiences.  
These physical, individual, and social features create an especially complex problem for 
managers who must attempt to balance the visitor experience between a desire for freedom in 
nature, and an implicit expectation of safety.  This may be the partial escape that tourists seek, 
a virtual freedom within the confines of the risk society. 
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Appendix A: Glacier visitor surveys 
 
Glacier Visitor Survey 1998 
 
PLEASE HELP BY COMPLETING THIS SURVEY NOW! 
We are interested in your views about hazards and safety in this area.  We need to learn more 
about how you feel so that this natural area can be managed in the best way possible.  This 
survey is part of a larger study being undertaken throughout 1998.  All answers are valued 
and strictly confidential. 
 
Most questions ask you to rate your opinion on a scale.  You do this by choosing the number 
that most closely matches your view.  Some statements may appear repetitive.  Please do 
your best to give an answer for each. 
 
Please give your own answers.  Do not give the answers of other people, or answers which 
you think may be more acceptable.  We are interested in YOUR views.  There are no 
correct or incorrect answers. 
 
*1 In your opinion, how safe is:    (please circle one number only) 
New Zealand as a tourist destination ....................................... very safe   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   very unsafe 
Your own country (if other than NZ) as a tourist destination .. very safe   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   very unsafe 
This glacier as a tourist destination ......................................... very safe   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   very unsafe 
 
*2 Please show how much you agree or disagree with the statements provided.  On the 
scale, the number 1 = complete agreement with (or support for) the statement, while 
the number 7 = complete disagreement with (or no support for) the statement. 
 
 STATEMENT CIRCLE THE NUMBER WHICH SHOWS YOUR VIEW 
1 This natural area appears to be stable and 
predictable 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
2 This seems like a safe area to visit Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
3 I feel as though I’m taking a risk in visiting this 
glacier 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*4 Any hazards at this glacier appear to be well 
controlled by management 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
5 As a visitor to this area, I feel as though I am 
exposing myself to physical danger 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
No. 
 278
 
6 I would not be surprised to learn that this is a 
dangerous place to visit 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*7 The physical nature of this area makes me 
concerned for my personal safety 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
8 While here, I have often thought about hazards 
to which I might be exposed 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
9 I am aware of natural hazards in this area Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*10 At this glacier, I have at times felt unsafe Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
11 This natural area strikes me as unpredictable 
and unstable 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
12 I have not thought about hazards at this glacier Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*13 While at the glacier, I have not been concerned 
for my personal safety 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
14 There are dangers at this glacier which are 
obvious to me 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
15 Any hazards here seem to be beyond the control 
of management 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*16 While visiting the glacier, I have felt secure Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
17 I would be surprised to find out that this is a 
dangerous place to visit 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
18 I feel physically vulnerable in this area Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*19 I am not aware of any natural hazards in this 
area 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
20 As a visitor to this site, I feel responsible for my 
own safety 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
21 Visitors should be held more accountable for 
their actions in natural areas like this one 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*22 Managers should do more to protect visitors 
from harm in natural areas 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
23 As a visitor to this glacier, I have assumed that I 
am well protected from any dangers 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
24 While I am at the glacier, my safety is the 
responsibility of those who manage the area 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
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*25 I would like to see more obvious evidence of 
management at this glacier 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
26 Management should prevent access to areas 
which might be dangerous 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
27 I should be allowed to decide where it is safe to 
go 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*28 I prefer to look after my own safety while at this 
place 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
29 I am reliant on others for my safety at this 
glacier 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
30 If visitors will not accept responsibility for their 
own safety they should not visit this glacier 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
*31 I would prefer less obvious management in this 
area 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
32 I prefer others to be in charge of my safety in 
this area 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
33 A little danger is an accepted part of visiting a 
natural area like this 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
34 Those who manage this area have an obligation 
to inform me about all things which might affect 
my safety 
Completely Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Completely Disagree 
 
 
*3 What hazards or dangers (if any) have you been aware of while visiting this glacier?  
Please use these spaces to list. 
1 6 
2 7 
3 8 
4 9 
5 10 
I am not aware of any hazards at this glacier   
(tick  only if this applies) 
 
 
*4 While visiting this glacier, have you been aware of signs or messages 
warning you of hazards or dangers? (please tick ) 
 YES 
 NO 
(if NO go to Q6 
on the next page) 
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5 If YES can you recall what these signs or messages have warned you about? (please list) 
1 6 
2 7 
3 8 
4 9 
5 10 
I have been aware of the signs or messages, but I can’t recall what they have warned me about 
 
 
*6 While visiting this glacier, have you been aware of signs or structures which 
have restricted your access to parts of the glacier? (please tick ) 
 YES 
 NO 
(if NO go to Q8) 
 
7 If YES, did you enter any restricted areas? 
(please tick ) 
 YES, with a professional guide 
 YES without a professional guide 
 NO 
 
*8 How close did you get to the glacier face 
itself? (please tick  one only) 
 I did not go all the way to the glacier face 
 Close enough to touch the glacier face 
 I went as close as the barrier would allow 
 
9 Would you have liked to get closer to the glacier face? (please tick )  YES 
 NO 
 
 
Finally, we require some more general information 
 
*10 Where do you normally live? (please write these in the spaces below) 
 
Town /City:…………………………… (specify) Country/Nation: ……………………… (specify) 
 
11 Are you:  Male   or Female  
(please tick ) 
 
 
12 Which of these categories describes your age? (please tick ) 
 
1  15 – 19 yrs 7  45 – 49 yrs 
2  20 – 24 yrs 8  50 – 54 yrs 
3  25 – 29 yrs 9  55 – 59 yrs 
4  30 – 34 yrs 10  60 – 64 yrs 
5  35 – 39 yrs 11  65 – 69 yrs 
6  40 – 44 yrs 12  70 yrs and over 
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*13 Which of the following best describes your travelling group? (please tick  one only) 
 
I am visiting the glacier: 
 Alone  With my family (or partner) and friends 
 With my partner  With an organised tour 
 With my friends With a club 
 With my family group  Other (please specify here)………………………… 
 
 
*14 Are you visiting the glacier with children under your care? 
(please tick ) 
 YES (go to Q15) 
 NO   (go to Q16) 
 
 
15 Please indicate the age of the youngest child under your care 
(please tick  one only) 
 under 2 years 
 2 – 4 years 
 5 – 9 years 
 10 or more years 
 
 
*16 My visit to the glacier today is………………. 
(please tick  one only) 
 Independent of a guide 
 Guided by a professional 
 Guided by friend or family member 
 
 
*17 Approximately how much 
time will you spend 
visiting this glacier? 
(please tick  one only) 
 ¼ hour (15 minutes) or less 
 ½ hour (30 minutes) 
 ¾ hour (45 minutes) 
 1 hour (60 minutes) 
 1½ hours (90 minutes) 
 
 2 hours (120 minutes) 
 2½ hours (150 minutes) 
 3 hours (180 minutes) 
 4 hours (240 minutes) 
 5 hours (300 minutes) or more 
 
 
18 While in the Glacier region, I will visit……… 
(please tick  one only) 
 
 Both Fox and Franz Josef Glacier 
 Only this glacier 
 
 
*19 Did you visit the Department of Conservation Information Centre (in 
the township) before arriving at this glacier?  (please tick  one only) 
 YES 
 NO 
 
 
20 In your home country (where you live), about 
how often do you visit largely unmodified 
natural areas? 
(please tick  one only)
 never 
 once every two years 
 once a year 
 twice a year 
 between 3 and 5 times a year 
 between 6 and 10 times a year 
 more than 10 times a year 
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME.  YOUR COOPERATION AND HONESTY IN 
COMPLETING THIS SURVEY ARE GREATLY APPRECIATED. 
 
ENJOY YOUR VISIT! 
 
This research is undertaken with the authority of the Department of Conservation, 
and in association with Lincoln University. 
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Gletscherbesucherumfrage 1998 
 
Uns interessieren Ihre Ansichten über Gefahren und Sicherheit in dieser Gegend. Wir 
möchten gern mehr darüber wissen, wie Sie sich hier fühlen, so daß diese natürliche Gegend 
so gut wie möglich verwaltet werden kann. Diese Umfrage ist Teil einer weiteren Studie, die 
1998 in verschiedenen neuseeländischen Orten stattfindet. Alle Antworten sind für uns 
wertvoll und werden streng vertraulich behandelt.  
 
Für die meisten Fragen werden Sie gebeten, Ihre Meinung auf einer Skala anzudeuten. Bitte 
tun Sie das indem Sie die Nummer einkreisen, die am besten Ihre Meinung beschreibt. Einige 
Aussagen können wiederholt erscheinen. Bitte tun Sie Ihr Möglichstest, um auf jede 
Aussage zu antworten.  
 
Bitte geben Sie Ihre eigenen Antworten. Geben Sie nicht die Antworten von anderen Leuten 
oder Antworten, von denen Sie denken, daß sie akzeptabler sind. Uns interessieren IHRE 
Ansichten. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. 
 
1 Ihrer Meinung nach, wie sicher ist: (bitte nur eine Nummer einkreisen) 
Neuseeland als Reiseziel.......................................................... sehr sicher 1  2   3   4   5   6   7  sehr unsicher 
Ihr eigenes Land (falls es ein anderes als Neuseeland ist) als 
Reiseziel ................................................................................. 
sehr sicher 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 sehr unsicher 
Dieser Gletscher als Reiseziel................................................. sehr sicher 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 sehr unsicher 
 
2 Bitte zeigen Sie an, sie sehr sie einverstanden oder nicht einverstanden sind mit 
den folgenden Aussagen. Die Nummer 1 auf der Skala bedeutet komplette 
Übereinstimmung mit (oder Unterstützung für) eine Aussage, während die Nummer 7 
andeutet, daß Sie anderer Meinung sind (oder diese Aussage nicht unterstützen). 
 
 AUSSAGE BITTE KREISEN SIE DIE NUMMER EIN, DIE AM BESTEN 
IHRE MEINUNG ZEIGT 
1 Diese natürliche Gegend scheint stabil und 
berechenbar zu sein 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
2 Dies scheint ein sicherer Ort zu sein Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
3 Ich fühle mich, als ob ich ein Risiko 
eingehe, während ich diesen Gletscher 
besuche 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
4 Die Gefahren am Gletscher scheint das 
Management gut zu kontrollieren 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
5 Als Besucher fühle ich mich hier 
körperlichen Gefahren ausgesetzt 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
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6 Es würde mich nicht überraschen, zu erfahren, 
daß dies eine gefährliche Gegend ist 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
7 Die physische Natur dieser Gegend macht 
mich besorgt um meine persönliche 
Sicherheit 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
8 Während ich hier war, habe ich oft über die 
Gefahren, denen ich ausgesetzt sein 
könnte, nachgedacht 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
9 Ich bin mir der natürlichen Gefahren in 
dieser Gegend bewußt 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
10 Hier am Gletscher habe ich mich 
manchmal unsicher gefühlt 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
11 Diese natürliche Gegend kommt mir 
unberechenbar und instabil vor 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
12 Ich habe über Gefahren an diesem 
Gletscher nicht nachgedacht 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
13 Während ich hier am Gletscher war, habe 
ich mir über persönliche Sicherheit oder 
über die Sicherheit anderer in meiner 
Obhut keine Gedanken gemacht 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
14 Es gibt hier an diesem Gletscher für mich 
sehr eindeutig Gefahren 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
15 Die Gefahren hier scheinen außerhalb der 
Kontrolle vom Management zu liegen 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
16 Während ich diesen Gletscher besuchte, 
habe ich mich sicher gefühlt  
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
17 Es würde mich überraschen, 
herauszufinden, daß dies eine gefährliche 
Gegend ist 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
18 Ich fühle mich körperlich verletzlich in 
dieser Gegend 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
19 Ich bin mir nicht bewußt, daß es hier 
natürliche Gefahren gibt 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
20 Als Besucher hier fühle ich mich 
verantwortlich für meine eigene Sicherheit 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
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21 Besucher sollten selber mehr 
verantwortlich sein für ihr Handeln in 
natürlichen Gegenden wie dieser 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
22 Manager sollten mehr tun, um Besucher 
vor Schaden in natürlichen Gegenden zu 
schützen 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
23 Als Besucher an diesem Gletscher habe ich 
angenommen, daß ich gut for Gefahren 
geschützt werde 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
24 Während ich an diesem Gletscher bin, ist 
meine Sicherheit die Verantwortung von 
denen, die die Gegend verwalten 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
25 Ich würde gern mehr offensichtliche 
Anzeichen von Management sehen 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
26 Das Management sollte Zutritt zu 
Gegenden, die vielleicht gefährlich sind, 
verhindern 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
27 Es sollte mir erlaubt sein, selber zu 
entscheiden, wo es sicher ist 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
28 Ich passe lieber selber auf meine Sicherheit 
auf, während ich hier bin 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
29 Ich verlasse mich auf andere für meine 
Sicherheit, während ich hier bin 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
30 Wenn Besucher keine Verantwortung für 
ihre eigene Sicherheit übernehmen wollen, 
dann sollten sie diesen Gletscher nicht 
besuchen 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
31 Ich würde hier gern weniger 
offensichtliche Anzeichen von 
Managementpräsenz sehen 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
32 Ich ziehe es vor, für meine Sicherheit in 
dieser Gegend selber verantwortlich zu 
sein 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
33 Ein bißchen Gefahr ist ein akzeptabler Teil 
eines Besuches in einer natürlichen Gegend 
wie dieser 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
34 Management hat eine Verpflichtung, mich 
über alles, was meine Sicherheit hier 
betrifft, zu informieren 
Stimme absolut zu   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bin anderer Meinung 
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3 Welcher Risiken oder Gefahren (falls überhaupt welcher) sind Sie sich bewußt 
gewesen während Sie diesen Gletscher besuchten? Bitte benutzen Sie die 
untenstehenden Zeilen, um diese aufzulisten. 
1 6 
2 7 
3 8 
4 9 
5 10 
Ich bin mir keiner Gefahren an diesem Gletscher bewußt   
(bitte nur ankreuzen  falls Sie zustimmen) 
 
 
4 Während Sie diesen Gletscher besuchten, sind Sie sich Schilder oder 
Nachrichten bewußt gewesen, die Sie vor Risiken oder Gefahren warnten? 
(bitte ankreuzen ) 
 JA 
 NEIN 
(falls NEIN, 
gehen Sie zu 
Frage 6) 
   
5 Wenn Sie JA geantwortet haben zu Frage 4, können Sie sich erinnern, wovor Sie diese Schilder 
oder Nachrichten gewarnt haben? (bitte auflisten) 
1 6 
2 7 
3 8 
4 9 
5 10 
Ich bin mir dieser Schilder und Nachrichten bewußt gewesen, kann mich aber nicht erinnern, 
wovor sie mich warnten  
 
6 Während Sie diesen Gletscher besuchten, sind Sie sich Schildern oder 
Absperrungen bewußt gewesen, die Ihnen den Zutritt zu Teilen des 
Gletschers verwehrten? (bitte ankreuzen ) 
 JA 
 NEIN 
(falls NEIN, bitte 
gehen Sie zu 
Frage 8) 
 
7 Falls Sie JA zu Frage 6 geantwortet haben, haben SieTeile des Gletschers 
besucht, wo der Zutritt eingeschränkt war? (bitte ankreuzen ) 
 JA, mit  
    Führer 
 JA, ohne  
    Führer 
 NEIN 
 
8 Wie nahe sind Sie an den Gletscher herangegangen?  
(bitte nur eine Antwort ankreuzen ) 
 Nicht bis ganz an die 
Gletscherwand  
 Nah genug, um den Gletscher 
anzufassen 
 Ich bin so nah 
herangegangen, wie es die 
Absperrung zuließ 
 
9 Wären Sie gern näher an den Gletscher herangegangen? (bitte ankreuzen )  JA 
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 NEIN 
 
Zum Schluß brauchen wir noch allgemeine Information 
 
10 Wo leben Sie normalerweise? (bitte schreiben Sie in die untenstehenden Zeilen) 
 
Wohnort: ………………………....................... 
(bitte hier angeben) 
Land/Nationalität: ………………………........... 
(bitte hier angeben) 
 
11 Sind Sie:  Männlich   oder Weiblich  
(bitte ankreuzen ) 
 
12 In welche der folgenden Kategorien fallen Sie altersmäßig? (bitte ankreuzen ) 
 
 15 – 19 Jahre  45 – 49 Jahre 
 20 – 24 Jahre  50 – 54 Jahre 
 25 – 29 Jahre  55 – 59 Jahre 
 30 – 34 Jahre  60 – 64 Jahre 
 35 – 39 Jahre  65 – 69 Jahre 
 40 – 44 Jahre  70 Jahre und älter 
 
13 Welche der folgenden  Kategorien beschreibt Ihre Reisegruppe am besten? (bitte  nur 
eine Antwort ankreuzen )  
 
Ich besuche diesen Gletscher: 
 Alleine  Mit meiner Familie (oder Partner) und Freunden 
 Mit meinem Partner  Mit einer organisierten Tourgruppe 
 Mit Freunden  Mit einem Club 
 Mit meiner Familie  Oder (bitte geben Sie hier an)……………………… 
 
14 Besuchen Sie den Gletscher mit Kindern in Ihrer 
Obhut?(bitte ankreuzen ) 
 JA (bitte gehen Sie zu Frage 15) 
 NEIN (bitte gehen Sie zu Frage  
     16) 
 
15 Wie alt ist das jüngste von den Kindern in Ihrer  
Obhut? bitte ankreuzen ) 
 Jünger als 2 Jahre 
 2-4 
 5-9 Jahre 
 10 Jahre oder älter 
 
16 Mein Besuch am Gletscher heute ist.. 
 (bitte nur eine Möglichkeit ankreuzen ) 
 Professionell geführt 
 Ohne Führer 
 Von Freunden oder Familie  
    geführt 
 
17 Wie lange ungefähr planen Sie heute an diesem Gletscher zu bleiben? (bitte nur eine 
 Möglichkeit ankreuzen ) 
 
 1/4   Stunde  (15 Minuten) oder weniger  2    Stunden (120 Minuten) 
 1/2   Stunde  (30 Minuten)  21/2 Stunden  (150 Minuten) 
 3/4   Stunde  (45 Minuten)  3    Stunden  (180 Minuten) 
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 1     Stunde   (60 Minuten)  4    Stunden  (240 Minuten) 
 11/2  Stunden  (90 Minuten)  5    Stunden  (300 Minuten) oder mehr 
 
18 Während Sie in der Gletscherregion sind, werden 
Sie……… 
(bitte nur eine Möglichkeit ankreuzen ) 
 
 Fox und Franz Josef Gletscher  
    besuchen 
 Nur diesen Gletscher besuchen 
 
 
19 Haben Sie das Department of Conservation Auskunftsbüro (im Ort) 
besucht bevor Sie hier am Gletscher ankamen?  (bitte ankreuzen ) 
 JA 
 NEIN 
 
 
20 In Ihrem Heimatland (wo Sie leben), wie oft 
besuchen Sie weitgehend im Naturzustand 
belassene Gegenden? 
(bitte nur eine Möglichkeit ankreuzen )
 Nie 
 Einmal alle zwei Jahre 
 Einmal pro Jahr 
 Zweimal pro Jahr 
 Drei bis fünfmal pro Jahr 
 Sechs bis zehnmal pro Jahr 
 Mehr als zehnmal pro Jahr 
 
 
DANKE FÜR IHRE ZEIT. WIR WISSEN IHRE KOOPERATION UND 
AUFRICHTIGKEIT ZU SCHÄTZEN. 
 
VIEL SPASS BEI IHREM BESUCH! 
 
 
 
Diese Untersuchung wird mit der Erlaubnis des Department of Conservation und 
in Assoziation mit der Lincoln Universität ausgeführt. 
 289
                                     
 
 
Department of Human and Leisure Sciences 
PO Box 84, Lincoln University 
Canterbury, NEW ZEALAND 
 
Phone: (64) (03) 325 2811 x 8770 
Fax: (64) (03) 325 3857 
Email:  espines@lincoln.ac.nz 
 
 
INFORMATION FÜR TEILNEHMER 
 
Sie haben an der Gletscherbesucherumfrage 1998 teilgenommen. Diese ist Teil einer weiteren 
Studie, die sich mit Besucheransichten über Risiken und Gefahren in natürlichen Gegenden 
befasst. Eines der Ziele dieser Studie ist es, herauszufinden, wie bewußt Besucher sich der 
Gefahren in natürlichen Gegenden in Neuseeland sind und welche Warnschilder (falls 
überhaupt welche) am wirkungsvollsten über diese Gefahren informieren. Um dies zu 
erreichen, hat der Forscher verschiedene Gefahrenwarnschilder auf dem 
Gletscherzugangsweg plaziert. Einige der Gefahren, auf die diese Schilder hindeuten, sind 
echte Gefahren der Gegend während andere es nicht sind. Es ist wichtig, daß beide, also 
berechtigte und unberechtigte Gefahrenwarnungen benutzt werden, so daß wir die Wirkung 
der Schilder bemessen können. 
 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie werden für die Doktorarbeit des Forschers an der Lincoln 
Universtät verwendet werden. Die Ergebnisse werden ebenfalls für einen Bericht für das 
Department of Conservation über Besucherbewußtsein von - und Ansichten über - Gefahren 
benutzt werden. Teile der Ergebnisse könnten veröffentlicht werden, aber Sie können 
absoluter Vertraulichkeit versichert sein. Der Fragebogen ist anonym. Die Identität von 
Teilnehmern kann nicht bestimmt werden durch die Information, die Sie uns gegeben haben. 
 
Dieses Projekt wird durch Stephen Espiner ausgeführt, unter der Aufsicht von Dr. Kevin 
Moore. Beide Forscher können Sie an der Lincoln Universität erreichen (obige Adresse) und 
beide besprechen gerne jegliche Besorgnis, die Sie über die Teilnahme an diesem Projekt 
haben, mit Ihnen. Sollten Sie sich, zu beliebigem Zeitpunkt innerhalb der nächsten zwei 
Wochen, entscheiden, daß Sie lieber doch nicht teilgenommen hätten, können Sie sich 
jederzeit mit dem Forscher in Verbindung setzen und Ihre Information zurückziehen. Um dies 
zu tun, brauchen Sie lediglich die dreistellige Kennzahl oben auf dieser Seite. Nach Ablauf 
dieser zwei Wochen nehmen wir an, daß Sie Ihre Zustimmung zur Teilnahme an dieser Studie 
und zur Veröffentlichung der Ergebnisse (unter strikter Anonymität) gegeben haben. 
 
Dieses Projekt ist vom Ethik-Auschuß der Lincoln Universität und von dem Department of 
Conservation überprüft und genehmigt worden. 
Code: 
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Appendix B: Survey implementation schedule 
 
Day Glacier Session Times Hazard Signs 
1. Tuesday FOX A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 no sign 
27-01-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 rock, ice 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 no sign 
2. Wednesday FOX A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 rock, wind, insects 
28-01-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 no sign 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 
14.00 – 15.30 
river, rock 
no sign 
3. Thursday FOX A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 insects, river, rock 
29-01-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 insects, wind, rock, ice, river 
  C (observation) 14.00 – 15.30 rock, ice, river 
4. Friday FOX A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 wind, ice, river 
30-01-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 no sign 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 ice, river 
5. Saturday FOX A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 rock, wind, ice 
31-01-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 insects, river, wind 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 rock, ice 
6. Sunday FOX A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 river, ice, insects 
01-02-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 no sign 
  C (observation) 14.00 – 15.30 no sign 
7. Saturday FRANZ A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 no sign 
21-03-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 rock, ice 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 no sign 
8. Sunday FRANZ A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 rock, wind, insects 
22-03-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 no sign 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 
14.00 – 15.30 
river, rock 
no sign 
9. Monday FRANZ A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 insects, river, rock 
23-03-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 insects, wind, rock, ice, river 
  C (observation) 14.00 – 15.30 rock, ice, river 
10. Tuesday FRANZ A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 wind, ice, river 
24-03-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 no sign 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 ice, river 
11. Wednesday FRANZ A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 rock, wind, ice 
25-03-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 insects, river, wind 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 rock, ice 
12. Thursday FRANZ A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 river, ice, insects 
26-03-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 no sign 
  C (observation) 14.00 – 15.30 no sign 
13. Friday FRANZ A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 insects, wind, rock, ice, river 
27-03-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 no sign 
  C (observation) 14.00 – 15.30 no sign 
14. Saturday FRANZ A (survey) 10.00 - 13.30 no sign 
28-03-98  B (survey) 14.00 – 17.30 insects, wind, rock, ice, river 
  C (observation) 10.00 – 11.30 no sign 
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 Appendix C: Survey and observation guidelines 
 
For research assistants working on the Glacier Visitor Survey 
You will be supplied with the following items. Please ensure that you have them with you at 
the glacier each day. 
 A clipboard for conducting the questionnaire interview 
 A second clipboard for self-complete respondents (German & Japanese visitors) 
 Identification badge 
 Copies of the Glacier Visitor Questionnaire (note: copies are white, blue, and yellow 
for the three languages used) 
 Response cards 
 Pens 
 Golf umbrella 
 
Selecting respondents 
All adult visitors to the glaciers are part of the study’s target group.  Adults (for the purposes 
of this study) will be taken as those people over the approximate age of 15 years. 
 
Visitors should only be approached and asked to participate on their return from the glacier 
walk.  This will give them an opportunity to form opinions on hazards and safety, as well as 
be exposed to the introduced and regular hazard signs. 
 
Participants should be selected on a random basis.  That is, approach people according to a 
random system which gives each visitor an equal chance of selection.  I recommend that you 
use a wristwatch to decide when to approach a potential respondent or group.  For instance, 
decide that when the second hand on your watch reads 30 seconds, you will approach the next 
person to cross a previously identified imaginary line, or point (perhaps a landscape feature).  
If (as will often be the case) a group of people are walking together, choose the person in the 
group who has the next birthday (and is 15 years or over). 
 
When you approach a group of visitors, you should identify yourself immediately, and say 
something like: 
Hi!  My name is Stephen, and I’m conducting some research on visitors to this 
Glacier.  This is a joint study between Lincoln University and the Department of 
Conservation, and we’re interested in your opinions and awareness of hazards 
and safety in this area32.  Could you spare 5 or 10 minutes to take part in the 
survey? 
 
If the person you have approached is from Germany or Japan, please ask them to complete the 
survey in their language (note: German language questionnaire are copied in blue.  The 
Japanese questionnaires are yellow). 
 
If the person you have approached declines to be interviewed, please record this refusal on the 
non-response form (attached to your clipboard).  Following a refusal, leave about two minutes 
                                                 
32 If you’re talking to a group, you might then say: ‘Could I please speak to the person aged 15 years or older 
who next has a birthday.  The interview will take between 5 and 10 minutes’. 
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before approaching another visitor.  This may help avoid having a string of visitors refuse 
(simply because they observed someone else refuse a questionnaire). 
 
Interviewing the respondent 
Once you have secured the interview, you need to briefly explain the requirements to the 
respondent.  This information is located on the top of each questionnaire (you can read this 
out if wish), and partially reiterated on the cover of the response cards booklet.  Those 
completing Japanese or German versions of the questionnaire will not be given a response 
booklet, but rather, will complete the form themselves.  It is important that the questionnaire 
is completed on site, so provide the respondent with a clipboard and pen to make this easier. 
 
Give the respondent the response booklet and explain that his or her answers should be 
chosen from here.  Read out each question to the respondent and record his or her answers on 
the questionnaire form.  Emphasise that there are no right or wrong answers, and that we are 
interested in their honest impressions and opinions. 
 
Guide the respondent through the response booklet where necessary.  At times, he or she will 
need to skip a page because a certain question is not applicable. 
 
Thank the participant for his or her time, and offer the information sheet (the final page of the 
questionnaire).  Explain that this page contains information about the study and contact details 
should there be any concerns or questions.  Those completing Japanese or  
German versions of the questionnaire should also be offered the final page from the 
questionnaire they complete. 
 
Some general guidelines 
 Wear your identification badge at all times in the field 
 Always be polite and courteous 
 Withdraw from situations where the respondent becomes angry or aggressive; the 
respondent is ingenuine; the respondent looks upset or disturbed by the contents of the 
questionnaire; or any other circumstance where your safety may be compromised. 
 Ensure each respondent is offered a copy of the study information sheet 
 
Recording Observations 
One of your tasks is to spend a small amount of time each day making observations of how 
visitors behave with respect to hazards while at the glaciers.  In particular, we are interested in 
how visitors react or respond to different hazard safety signs. 
 
At the time specified in the survey schedule (or at other times as directed) set up the 
appropriate sign at the location previously identified by the project leader (note: on some days 
no signs will be set up).  Situate yourself in such a way that you can easily observe visitors 
approaching the sign, and their movements beyond the sign. 
 
It is important to count carefully (tally) the people who act against the suggestion or advice on 
the signs.  Use the observation log to make notes about any behaviour such as people 
climbing on the glacier (without guides), standing immediately beneath the overhanging ice, 
or people who break the barrier once they’ve seen others go across.  Please be careful to count 
people only once, and note down the precise time period during which your observations were 
made. 
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Appendix D: Record of non-response 
 
 Date Location Sex Age Nationality Reason 
1.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
2.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
3.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
4.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
5.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
6.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
7.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
8.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
9.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
10.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
11.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
12.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
13.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
14.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
15.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
16.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
17.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
18.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
19.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
20.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
21.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
22.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
23.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
24.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
25.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
26.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
27.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
28.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
29.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
30.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
31.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
32.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
33.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
34.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
35.   M……….F 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5 
 
KEY 
 Age 1= 15-24   Reason 1= No time 
 2= 25-44    2= Not interested 
 3= 45-54    3= Language difficulty 
   4= 55-64    4= Too cold/wet/windy 
   5= 65 +    5= Other 
 301
Appendix E: Introduced pictorial warning signs by category 
 
Sign Hazard Category 
 
Rockfall Hazard is present and identified by DOC in 
current signs 
   
 
Icefall Hazard is present and identified by DOC in 
current signs 
   
 
River Hazard is present but not identified by DOC in 
current signs 
   
 
Tripping / 
falling33 
Hazard is present but not identified by DOC in 
current signs 
                                                 
33 The tripping / falling pictorial sign was damaged in transit to the Fox Glacier and could not be usefully 
repaired.  Hence, this sign is not included in the discussion or analysis. 
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Strong winds Hazard is neither present nor identified in DOC 
signs 
   
 
Stinging insects Hazard is neither present nor identified in DOC 
signs 
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Appendix F: Observation log 
 
Date Time Location Weather Sign(s) Tally  
 Start    Total arriving:  
 finish      
Comments 
 
and Observations   Non-compliance:  
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Appendix G: List of key informants 
 
 Pseudonym Position / Speciality 
1 Don Natural hazard specialist 
2 Tom DOC - Head Office management (External Relations) 
3 Mick Geomorphologist and hazard specialist 
4 Todd Geomorphologist and hazard specialist 
5 Gina Policy Analyst and risk assessment specialist 
6 Peter DOC - Regional Office manager  
7 Jane Regulatory Specialist at Parks Canada 
8 Mike DOC – Senior level manager (West Coast) 
9 Jock DOC – Senior level manager (West Coast) 
10 Keith DOC – Field-level manager (West Coast) 
11 Stan Tourism operator (West Coast) 
12 Jim Outdoor recreation organisation director 
13 Bob DOC - Head Office (Policy) 
14 Tim DOC - Regional-level manager (Wellington) 
15 Wayne DOC - Field-level manager (Wellington) 
16 Ray DOC – Head Office (Policy / Signs) 
17 John DOC – Head Office manager (QCM) 
18 Kyle DOC – Head Office manager (QCM) 
19 Dave DOC – Head Office manager (Health & Safety) 
20 Sam Department of Labour (Health & Safety advisor) 
21 Kirk DOC – Head Office manager (Business / Finance Unit) 
22 Neil DOC – Field-level manager (West Coast) 
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Appendix H: Information sheet for survey respondents 
 
   
 
Department of Human and Leisure 
Sciences 
PO Box 84, Lincoln University 
Canterbury, NEW ZEALAND 
 
Phone: (64) (03) 325 2811 x 8770 
Fax: (64) (03) 325 3857 
Email:  espines@lincoln.ac.nz 
 
INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS 
You have been a participant in a project called the Glacier Visitor Survey 1998.  This is part 
of a larger study looking at the attitudes of visitors to hazards and safety in natural areas.  One 
of the aims of the study is to find out about visitor awareness of hazards at natural attractions 
in New Zealand, and which warning signs (if any) are the most successful at conveying safety 
messages.  To this end, the researcher has placed several hazard warning signs along the 
Glacier access walk.  Some of the hazards shown in these signs are genuine hazards of the 
area, while others are not.  It is important that both valid and invalid hazard messages are used 
so that we can determine the effect of the signs. 
 
The results of this study will be used in the preparation of the researcher’s doctoral 
dissertation at Lincoln University.  The findings will also be used in a report to the 
Department of Conservation on visitor awareness of, and attitudes towards hazards.  Parts of 
the results may be published, but you can be assured of the complete confidentiality of the 
information gathered here.  The questionnaire is anonymous.  The identity of participants 
cannot be determined from the information you have provided. 
 
This project is being carried out by Stephen Espiner, under the supervision of Dr Kevin 
Moore and Dr Pat Devlin.  The researchers can be contacted at Lincoln University (see 
address details above), and will be pleased to discuss any concerns you might have about 
participation in this project.  Should you, at some point in the next two weeks, decide to 
withdraw your participation from this project, it is possible to contact the researchers, and 
have the information you have given deleted from the data set.  To do this, all you need is the 
three-digit code number from the top of this page.  After this time, it will be understood that 
you have consented to participate in the project, and consent to publication of the results with 
the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the Lincoln University Human Subjects 
Ethics Committee, and the Department of Conservation. 
 
Code: 
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Appendix I: Interview consent form 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW INFORMANTS 
 
Risk Perception Study 
 
I have been briefed and understand the general nature of the Risk Perception Study.  On this 
basis, I agree to participate in the project as an informant, and consent to publication of the 
project’s results with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved.  I understand also 
that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including withdrawal of any information I 
have provided. 
 
 
Signed:__________________________________  Date:_____________________ 
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Appendix J: Classification of scale scores 
 
Likert Scale 
number 
Standardised 
scores 
Score range Classification  
1 14.3 14.3 – 28.5 Low  
2 28.6 28.6 – 42.8   
3 42.9 42.9 – 57.0 Moderate  
4 57.1 57.1 – 71.3   
5 71.4 71.4 – 85.6 High  
6 85.7 85.7 -100   
7 100    
 
The process of standardisation assumes that Likert scale responses are linear.  This acknowledgment 
is important in the use of such scales for analysis of the sort undertaken in Chapter 6. 
Scale numbers  1, 2 = low 
   3, 4 = moderate 
   5, 6, 7 = high 
 
Each classification has a range of approximately 28.5.  The classification is made for convenience of 
reporting and to ensure that the use of summary phrases to describe scale outcomes is consistent and 
their calculation transparent. 
 
 
 
